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Abstract 
This research combines elements in pragmatics, sociolinguistics, and cogml1ve 
linguistics, using empirical data to contribute to our understanding of th e processing of 
polite discourse. One hundred and five hours of spontaneous conversational data 
produced by native Cypriot Greek speakers of both sexes and of various ages and 
socio-economic backgrounds were recorded in various setti ngs. The serni-phonological 
transcription of realisations of offers and requests yielded a corpus of 2,189 
observations. Extra-linguistic variables considered during the analysis of these data 
included the interl ocutors ' sex, age, and social class, the rel ationship between them, 
the setting of the exchange, and the order of occurrence of the speech act in the fl ow of 
the conversation. Linguistic variables included the presence/absence of a main-clause 
verb, its type (lexico-semantically defined), the subj ective modality, and number+ 
person for which thi s was marked, as well as additional markers of politeness (address 
terms, diminutives, etc.). To test the validity of Brown and Levinson ' s (1 987) 
prediction that the degree of indirectness of an utterance reali sing an FTAr is 
commensurate with the sum of the Di stance between interlocutors, the Power of the 
hearer over the speaker, and the Ranking of the imposition which FTAx entail s in the 
culture in question, frequencies of co-occurrence between these variables were 
investigated. Thi s investigation revealed an arbitrary association of particular 
combinations of li nguistic features with particular combinations of extra-lingui sti c 
features. It is proposed that, to the extent that particular expressions are 
conventionalised for some use, and to the extent that such expressions constitute our 
mai n resource for achieving politeness, politeness is presumed given a minimal 
context. Such context is modelled as a frame combi ning information about extra-
linguisti c features of the situati on and the (socio-culturally defined) appropriate use of 
language therein. The presumptive nature of the impli catures arising when a frame of 
thi s kind is instantiated guarantees that politeness, defined as a perlocutionary effect 
consisting of the addressee holding the belief that the speaker is polite, is achieved all 
else being equal. A natural explanation is thus provided for the oft-repeated 
observation that politeness commonly passes unnoticed. Thi s account departs from 
previous approaches, which view politeness as tied to speakers ' intentions and 
communicated by means of particularised implicatures. In the proposed schema, 
speakers' intentions corne into play only when the expression used is not 
conventionali sed for some use relative to the (minimal) context of utterance. They then 
give ri se to particularised implicatures which necessitate a reference to the nonce 
context of utterance. 
O Marina Terkollrafi 
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with non-rising intonation 
Request perfolmed using a Speech Act Verb in the imperative 
with ri sing intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verh in the indicative 
with ri sing intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verb in the indicative 
with non-rising intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verb in the subjunctive 
with ri sing intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verb in the future tense 
with non-rising intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verb in the past tense 
with non-rising intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verb in the imperative 
with ri sing intonation 
Request performed using a Speech Act Verb in the conditional 
with non-rising intonation 
Lisl of Abbrel'ia/iolls IIsel/ ill Figures 
R-THELO-fND Request performed using the verb Tel o, ' I want ' in the 
indicative with non-ri sing intonation 
R-TH ELO-COND Request performed using the verb Telo, ' I want' in the 
conditional with non-ri sing intonation 
R-THELO-INDRI Request performed using the verb Telo, ' I want ' in the 
indicative with ri sing intonation 
R-THELO-PAST Request performed using the verb Telo, ' I want ' in the past 
tense with non-ri sing intonation 
R-THELO-PASTRI Request performed using the verb Telo, ' J want ' in the past 
tense with ri sing intonation 
XIX 
R-EXO-INDRl Request performed using the verb e x o, '} have' in the indicative 
with ri sing intonation 
R-EXO-PAST Request performed using the verb e x o, ' I have' in the past tense 
with non-ri sing intonation 
R-BORO-INDRI Request performed using the verb b ora, ' I can ' in the indicat ive 
with ri sing intonation 
R-BORO-IND Request perfolmed using the verb boro, ' I can ' in the indicative 
with non-ri sing intonation 
R-BORO-CO ND Request perfOlmed using the verb boro, ' I can ' in the 
conditional with non-ri sing intonation 
R-PREPI-IND Request performed using the verb p rep i , ' it must' in the 
indicative with non-ri sing intonation 
R-PR£ PI-FUT Request perfotmed using the verb p repi , ' it must' in the future 
tense with non-ri sing intonation 
R-INDIRST-I N Request performed using an indirect statement 
R-EPTTREPO-IMP Request perfotmed using the verb epi trep o, ' I allow' in the 
imperative with non-ri sing intonati on 
R-EPITRE PO-SUBJ Request performed using the verb e p i trep o, ' 1 allow' in the 
subjunctive with non-ri sing intonation 
R-EPITREPO-LN DRl Request performed using the verb e p i trepo, ' I allow' in the 
indicative with ri sing intonation 
R-EPITRE PO-FUT Request performed using the verb epi trepo, ' 1 allow' in the 
future tense with non-ri sing intonation 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Lisl of Abbrel'ia/iolls IIsel/ ill Figures 
R-fNDIRREQ-fN Indirect request performed wi thout making reference to the 
speaker or the addressee 
R- INDIRREQ-SUBJ Indirect request containing a reference to the speaker or the 
addressee perfonned using the subj uncti ve with non-rising 
intonation 
R-INDIRREQ-INDRl Indirect request containing a reference to the speaker or the 
addressee perfonned using the indicat ive wi th rising intonat ion 
R- INDIRREQ-IND Indirect request containing a reference to the speaker or the 
addressee perfonned using the indicative with non-ri sing 
intonation 
R-INDIRREQ-FUT Indirect request containing a reference to the speaker or the 
addressee performed using the future tense with non-rising 
intonation 
R- INDIRREQ-COND lndirect request containing a reference to the speaker or the 
addressee perfOlmed using the conditional with non-rising 
intonation 
R-INDIRREQ-PAST Indirect request containing a reference to the speaker or the 
addressee performed using the past tense with non-ri sing 
intonation 
R-IME-INDRI Request performed using the verb ime, ' I am' with rising 
intonation 
xx 
Reason Embedded clause or prepositional phrase expressing reason used 
as an additional marker of poli teness 
salesperson-cllst new The speaker is a salesperson addressing a new customer 
salesperson-ellst old The speaker is a salesperson addressing a long-standing customer 
SIGNOMI 
speaker-audience 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
The lexical item sijnomi, 'I'm sorry' used as an additional 
marker of politeness 
The speaker is althe keynote speaker at a formal discussion 
addressing a member of the audience 
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"[T]here are no giant leaps from any pal1icular perspective to 
universal truth. Instead, there is only patient, incremental growth 
in understanding, as one concrete, particular language/ 
worldview after another is encountered, acknowledged, and 
grappled with." 
Schultz (1990:45) 
Preface 
The motivation to study the expression of politeness in Cypriot Greek (henceforth CG) 
came from native Cypriot Greek speakers' remarking on the extensive use of 
derivational diminutives (e.g. neraci , 'small water', k afeDaci , 'small coffee') in 
Standard Modern Greek (henceforth SMG), and Mainland Greek speakers' remarking 
on the extens ive use of the 2nd person singular in CO, in situations where SMG would 
have stipulated the use of the polite plural. Both derivational diminution and the polite 
plural are conventionally used in SMG to express politeness (S ifianou 1992b; Bakakou-
Orfanou 1989); and both achieve this effect by somehow making the speaker' s 
utterance more indirect. Could it be, then, that conversational exchanges in CG are 
generally re lative ly direct? Is it possible to be direct and still be poli te? If politeness is 
an impol1ant reason for deviating from rational effi ciency in conversation captured in 
Grice's (1989a[ 1975]) Cooperative Principle, as often assumed (e.g., R. Lakoff 1973; 
Leech 1983; Brown & Levinson 1987), then how might politeness as directness be 
accounted for theoretically? 
Clearly , these questions could not be settl ed without undel1aking an empirical 
investigation of what speakers actuall y say during face-to-face interaction in Cyprus. 
Both deri vational diminutives and the polite plural are also used in CG to express 
politeness. T he remarks motivating thi s study, then, were prompted more by the 
differences in the extent to which politeness is achieved by means of these devices in 
the two communities, than by differences in the possibility itself of being polite by 
using these devices. Consequently, the investigation should not focus on how politeness 
can be expressed in CG (i .e . describe the fu ll range of linguisti c means available in CG 
for convey ing politeness), but should concentrate on how politeness is clistomarily 
expressed therein (i .e . identify those lingui stic means which CG speakers regularl y have 
recourse to when being polite). To study when and to what extent linguisti c means 
which previous research on SMG has identified as markers of po liteness in Modem 
Greek (e .g., S ifianou 1992a) are drawn upon by native speakers of CG, recordings of 
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spontaneous urban CG speech were conducted, and an extensive corpus of utterance-
sequences reali sing offers and requests was compiled. 
The point of departure for the ensuing discussion has been succinctly formulated 
by Peter Matthews (p.c.): "one has no difficulty, in ordinalY English , in saying that, on a 
particular occas ion, a particu lar person is "being impolite" or, perhaps, that they are 
falling over backwards to "be polite" . In either case, one is talking of depal1ures from a 
nOlID, on which, since it is the norm, one usually does not comment." The ana lysis of 
the data collected provides the platfOlID from which to el ucidate the nature of this nOlm 
for CG, and its role in speakers' onl ine production and interpretation of utterances. In 
pal1icular, the aim is to establi sh (a) the relationship between extra-linguistic features of 
the situation (such as the interlocutors' sex, age, and social class, the relationship 
between them, the setting of the exchange, and the order of occurrence of the speech 
act) and the linguistic means deployed each time to perfonTI offers and requests 
respectively, (b) how this relationship may be fOlmalised for theoretical purposes, and 
(c) to what extent and based on what evidence this fOlm alisation might be claimed to 
model part of what native CG speakers know about their language. 
The review of selected previous research on lingu isti c poli teness in chapter I yields 
theoreti call y moti vated hypotheses regarding the relationship between lingui stic 
politeness and the central notions of face, rationa lity, presumptive inference, fram es, 
and universality. Chapter 2 outlines the processes of data collection and corpus 
compilation, and sets out the objectives of the data analysis. Chapter 3 introduces the 
reader to the stlUcture and use of CG. The attempt to analyse the collected data using 
the framework of Brown and Levinson ( 1987[1978]) in chapter 4 highlights several 
diffi culti es with applying their framework to empi rical data. These fai lings prompt the 
formu lation of a frame-based approach to politeness in the foll owing two chapters. 
Chapter 5 explores the re lationship of politeness to speaker-meaning, and argues that 
politeness constitutes a perlocutionary effect achieved (to the extent that it passes 
unnoticed) automatically by vit1ue of presumptive inferences arising g iven a minimal 
context. Chapter 6 explores the usefulness of the notion of frames, developed within the 
fields of Artificial Intelligence, psychology, linguistics and sociology, in accounting for 
lingui stic po li teness, give n their role as 'structures of expectations' in default 
(presumptive) reasoning. This investigation is completed by chapter 7 which applies the 
proposed fram e-based approach to the collected data and discusses its psycholinguistic 
implications and li mitations. The proposed approach has far-reaching theoreti cal 
impl ications for the nature of co-operativeness and its relationship to the notion of face, 
the role of context in presumptive inference, and the interaction of linguistic and real-
world knowledge, all of which constitute central concerns of prag matics broadly 
construed. 
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Chapter 1 
"One has to es<;apc from the realism of the stmcture, 
to which objectivism, a necessary stage in brcaking 
with primary cxperience and constructing thc 
objective relationships, necessarily leads when it 
hypostatises these relations by trcating thcm as 
realities already constituted outside the history of the 
group - without falling back into subjectivism, 
which is quite incapable of giving an account of the 
neccssity of the social world. To do this, onc has to 
return to practice." 
(Bourdicu 1990:52) 
Theoretical preliminaries: placing politeness in context 
1.1 Two meanings of politeness 
Traditional grammars of many languages are interspersed with remarks about politeness. 
Probably the earliest phenomena targeted by such remarks concern the use of address 
tenTIS: address systems are said to have included indirect variants used to indicate 
politeness as far back as Proto-Indo-European times (Seebold 1983:33; Ehlich 1992:82ff). 
Syntactico-semantic phenomena, such as neg-raising, 1 morpho-syntacti c phenomena 
regarding tense and aspect,2 and derivational phenomena3 are also associated with 
politeness in this context. In such descriptive accounts of languages, politeness is indicated 
by a deviation from rational effic iency (as captured by Grice's (1989a[1 975]:26-7) 
Cooperative Principle (hencefol1h CP) and the subsumed maximst either at the leve l of the 
1 This is the phenomenon where a narrow-scope negation operator (internal) takes wider scope over the 
sentence (external). In an early account, use o f the 'illogical' neg-raised form is attributed to " Ie dessein 
d'ancnucr la rigucur dc la defense" (Maninon 1927:536). 
2 Thus, Jcspersen (1933:285) notcs that "IT v.'Ould seem or one would Think is a morc politc or guardcd way of 
saying 'it sccms'." 
) For example, Triantafyllidis (1963[ 19271: 147) notes the use of diminutives in Modem Greek "to phrase 
something more politely". This use of diminutives is not a recent occurrence in the language: writing in the 
s(."Cond century AD, Herodianus infonns us that diminutives may be used "dia\; to'1< pret-".pon", ' for 
d(."Cency' (ibid.: 148). 
4 The CP reads: "'Makc your conversat ional contribution such as is rcquircd, at thc stagc at which it occurs, by 
the aceepted purpose or dir(."Ction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged". Four maxims spell out its 
content: 
The maxim of Quantity 
(i) Make your contribution as informative as is requircd (for the currcnt purposes of the cxchange). 
(ii ) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
"111e maxim of Quality 
(i) Do not say what you believe to be false. 
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lexicon or at that of syntax or of morphology: politeness is inherent to certain terms or 
constructions in virtue of this deviation.s It can thus be described as a phenomenon internal 
to the Saussurean langue. although of course its origins may lie within parole (the kinds of 
situations in which the 'polite' variants are used; cf. Braun 1988:52; Held 1992: 136-9). 
This notion of politeness as an inventory of tel111s1constructions, which we may refe r 
to as 'politeness-outs ide-context', is reminiscent of the everyday use of the term ' polite'. 
The OED defines this as: "1. having good manners, courteous 2. cultivated, cultured 3. 
refined, elegant". Clearly, these are properties that individuals may also exhibit outside a 
dyad, once a standard has been set. Politeness then becomes a given, a stati c notion within 
the synchrony of any language. Eelen (1999:47ff.) outlines the following characteristi cs of 
this everyday understanding of 'politeness': evaluativity (evaluating others' behaviour as 
polite or impolite), argumentativity (using such evaluations to achieve a social effect), 
focussing on 'polite' forms and attitudes (on a macro-socially - rather than micro-socially 
- defined scale ranging from 'polite' through 'neutral' to 'i mpolite'), normati vity (a 
matter of social norms), modality (the optionality of 'polite' interactional strategies), and 
reflexivity (the society's investing of particular forms with politeness, what was referred to 
above as the setting of ' polite ' standards). 
Such commonsensical understanding of 'politeness' is inappropriate as a starting point 
for a theory of linguistic politeness. Not only is an equivalent tenn not found in some 
languages (Ehlich 1992:94; Nwoye 1992:315), but corresponding tenns in different 
languages do not necessarily cover the same semantic fields (Hill et al. 1986; Watts 
1992:49; Luksaneeyanawin 1999). Everyday perceptions of politeness are equally 
changeable over time (Ehlich I 992:94ff.), and speakers' perceptions of what is polite might 
be particularly uncertain or diverging during periods of flux CR. Lakoff 1979:74). But 
perhaps the most compelling argument against taking the everyday notion as the basis for a 
theory of linguistic politeness is that the use of grammarians' 'polite' variants of neutral 
tenTIS or constructions may well lead to a contrary effect in contex t. Garfinkel 's 
experiments, in which he asked students to behave "in a ci rcumspect and polite fashion" 
(1972a:9) towards the members of their families, provide an eloquent example of this (for 
(ii ) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
'Ille maxim of Relation 
Be relevant. 
'[be maxim of Manner 
(i) A void obscurity of expression. 
(ii) Avoid ambiguity. 
(iii) De brief (avoid unnecessary prolixi ty). 
(iv)De orderly. 
5 This is clearly a one-way correspondence only: not all deviations from rati onal efficiency are explicable in 
terms of politeness. The relevant intuition would seem to be 'no deviation from rational effic iency, no 
politeness ' . 
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an example from the CO data, see 4.2.6 below). Being part of widely valy ing social 
practices, the everyday notion of politeness turns out to be ambiguous and imprecise, and 
cannot serve as the bas is for a theoreti cal definition with reference to which politeness 
phenomena may be identified and described. 
The search for a more sound basis for theorising has led all of the approaches 
di scussed in 1.2 below to incorporate in one fo rm or another a reference to the contex t of 
utterance, thus moving toward a more dynamic notion of politeness-in-context. Compared 
to the everyday notion, politeness within current lingui st ic research emerges as a non-
evaluative, non-argumentative notion, (aiming at) encompassing all fonns which may be 
appropriate in a cultural (macro-social) and situational (micro-social) context.6 However, it 
remains a normative (and by extension a reflexive) notion (Eelen I 999:59ff. ), as well as a 
modal one. 
Challenging thi s line of research, Eelen (1999:57-8) suggests that a technical construal 
of politeness must be non-normative. He justifies this claim with reference to the 
theoretical and empirical di ffi culti es of delimiting cultural or societal ' norms' 
(1 999: 170IT.): the empirical variabil ity which such norms exhibit both cross-culturall y and 
intra-culturally simply argues against the theoreti cal usefu lness of this notion. Whi le 
subscribing to the ex istence of these diffi culti es, I would argue that any theOlY of linguist ic 
politeness must incorporate a reference to norms, drawing on the possibili ty of 
inappropriate usage giving rise to impoliteness (whether accidental or intended; chapters 5, 
6 below), a point not refuted by Eelen himself (1999: 179). How is such inappro priateness 
to be captured theoretically, if not with reference to nOlmS which may we ll be contested 
even at the micro-level? Admittedly, thi s rai ses the question whether contested norms may 
be thought of as norms at all. Observation of real usage (addressees' reception of, and 
responses to, actual utterances) provides an answer here (Gum perz & Tannen 1979:306-7; 
Oumperz 1982:5-6): intra-cultural interaction on a day-to-day basis is, for the most part, 
unproblematic; its non-memorableness , if [ may coin a term, would seem to poin t in this 
direction. Contested norms show up as the exception rather than the rule in this picture. 
There is therefore room for a more flex ible construal of politeness nOims as norms 
underlying behaviour which is adequate in context (Braun 1988:49; Escandell-Vidal 
1998 :46), to the extent that this adequacy remains uncontested. Ee len's objection to a 
normative not.ion of politeness can thus be usefull y recast as a methodological one: rather 
than rejecting norms altogether, elaborating our definit ion of contex t can he lp pin down this 
otherwise elus ive notion. The present study seeks to achieve this by analysing actually 
observed behaviour (including participants' reactions to this behaviour): starting from the 
6 Ide ( 1989:225) puts Ihis nicely: "[ploliteness is a neutral term. Just as 'height' does not refer 10 the slate of 
bring 'high', 'politcncss' is nOI Ihe stale ofbcing 'polite' ." 
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view that the uncontested use of an expression in context is evidence of its adequacy with 
respect to this COli text, it seeks to identi fy those features in the context of utterance which 
regularly co-occur with the expression in question, and with which use of th is expression 
must, in virtue of this regularity, be associated.' 
The distinction drawn above between the two meanings of politeness is not new. 
Braun (1988:49-53) and Held ( 1992: I 36ff.) distinguish politeness as a marked inve ntOlY of 
forms from politeness as social adequacy, whi le Watts et al. (1992: II ) distinguish first-
order politeness as an everyday notion from second-order politeness as a technical term 
within linguisti c theory, a distinction taken up by Eelen (1999: 143ff.). The point of 
repeating this here is to emphasise the commonsensical bias of approaches which seek 
politeness in deviations from the CP (R. Lakoff 1973 , Leech 1983, Brown & Levinson 
1987) in a move consonant with the intuition "no deviation from rational efficiency, no 
politeness" which implicitly guides traditional accounts. While this intuiti on may have been 
useful at an initial stage to draw attention to the phenomena of linguistic politeness, it 
nonetheless has the effect of confining politeness to instances of deviation from the CP, 
when, on closer investigation, such deviations only achieve politeness in associati on with 
the context of utterance. Reference to the context of utterance is therefore unavo idable. At 
the same time, once a theory incorporates such a reference, it must account for attested 
instances of achieving politeness without deviating from the CP (Arundale & Ashton 1992; 
chapter 5 below). Appealing to the above intuition, then, proves inadequate to account fo r 
the full range of po liteness-in-context. This inadequacy of (at least some) approaches 
proposed to date may be traced back to their equivocal placement in view of the di stinction 
between politeness as an everyday notion and as a technical term. 
1.2 Setting the scene: an overview of the main themes in politeness research to date 
An increasing number of studies pertaining to linguistic pol iteness have appeared in the last 
three decades, witness the recent fifty-one-pages-Iong ' Bibliography on linguistic 
po liteness' (DuFon et al. 1994). While it is impossible to devote separate atte ntion to all the 
theoreti cal proposals put forward ,S one may identify some recurring themes which provide 
the theoreti cal background for any discussion of poli teness. This section focuses on those 
approaches which, incorporating empirical considerations, have given pro minence to these 
themes. The order of presentation is roughly chronological, and is intended to bring in 
re lief the gradual shift of emphasis from pol iteness as deviat ion from rational efficiency in 
earlier accounts to a more comprehensive notion of politeness-in-context in later ones (1.1 
above). 
7 On how context may be conceptualised for our purposes, see chapters 6, 7 below. 
S For a fairly comprehensive review, sec Ee1en 1999, chapter 2. 
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1.2.1 Politeness as a matter of rules or maxims 
The idea that politeness can be accounted for by appealing to rul es originates in the work of 
Robyn Lakoff (1973). Lakoff introduces the notion of pragmatic rules, that is, rules which 
decide whether an utterance is pragmatically well-fanned or not. Pragmatic we ll-
formedness in this context is identified with the acceptabil ity of an utterance, which is the 
result of the interaction between syntax and semanti cs wi th pragmatics. Pragmatic rules 
also come into play in cases of pragmatic ambiguity, i.e. when the force of an utterance 
cannot be decided without reference to context, understood here as "the speaker's 
assumptions about his relations with the addressee , his real-world situati on as he speaks, 
and the extent to which he wishes to change either or both" (1973:296). Pragmatic 
competence subsumes two general rules: clarity, or speaking in accordance with Grice's 
maxims of conversation, and politeness. Different conversations accord a variable weight to 
these two rules, depending on their purposes, resulting in a continuous trade-off between 
clarity and politeness. Three fUliher rules spell out the content of politeness in Lakoff's 
(ibid.:298) scheme: 
(1) Don't impose 
(2) Give options 
(3) Make the addressee feel good - be friendl y 
Rule ( I) in fact di ctates clarity, which is thus subsumed under politeness (1973:303). These 
rules are app l icable to different situations, and in the same situation to different ex tents. 
Being polite is thus defined - but only implicitly so - as operating according to those 
rules which are in effect each time, and doing so in "speech and actions alike" ( ibid.:303). 
A different ordering of the three rules is responsible for cross-cultural differences in 
po liteness assessments, while the rules in themselves remain universal (ibid.:304). 
Another proponent of a maxim-based view of politeness is Geoffrey Leech. Leech 
(1980, 1983) introduces three pragmatic scales, inter-related in a causal/deterministic way 
in guiding politeness9 assessments: the scale of cost-benefit for the hearer, the optionality 
scale, and the politeness or indirectness scale. Leech also incorporates Brown and Gi lman's 
(1972 [1960]) notions of power and sol idarity , which he sees 3., interacting with the first of 
these scales in determining the need for the speaker to give the hearer options, or, in other 
words, to be indirect. These scales motivate a Politeness Princi ple (PP), subsuming s ix 
\I Leech (1980:109) dirrerentiates 'tact' as "strategic conflict avoidancc" rrom 'ncgative politcncss' as "the 
degree to which the individual behaviour or a particular person [ ... ] exceeds the nonnal degree or tact 
required in a given situation". His 'tact' is, thcn, closcr to thc traditional understanding or 'politcness', while 
his 'politeness' panly overlaps with what is traditionally termcd 'stratcgic politeness' (and is distinct rrom 
politeness achieved by means orslrategics, simply rererred to as 'politeness'; cf. Escandell-Vidal 1998:46-7, 
55n.6). This justifies currently adopting the tenn 'politeness' as part or retaining a homogeneous meta-
language across theories, and avoiding conrusion with the more special ised application or 'tact' to Leech's 
Tact Maxim (1980: 109; 1983: (07). 
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maxims - Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy - which 
jointly spe ll out polite behaviour in general. The importance of these maxims varies cross-
culturally and according to the situation, allowing for clashes between them to be reso lved 
variably, depending on which maxim calTies greater weight in the situation at hand. These 
six maxims re late to the content of the conversation. A seventh , Phatic, maxim, dea ling 
with the way the conversation is managed by participants, is intended to account for 
obviously uninformative utterances, which serve to extend the common ground between 
participants. Leech's primary concern in proposing the PP is to show that the CP should not 
be abandoned just because it is so commonly breached. The maxi ms of the PP explain why 
participants breach the CP: they give rise to implicatures in the same way as the maxims of 
the CP. Behaviour which cannot be accounted for with reference to the PP necessitates the 
introduction of two fUl1her principles, the Irony Principle, and the Banter Princip le. These 
are second-order principles, which fulfill their purpose by breaching the PP, which is a 
first-order principle alongside the CPo Further aspects of conversational behaviour, which 
are not directly linked to the relationship between interlocutors, require the postulation of 
the Interest Principle, and the Pollyanna Principle. The resulting complex or first- and 
second-order principles and maxims combine in an Interpersonal Rhetoric, where rhetoric 
is defined as " the effective use of language in its most general sense, applying primari ly to 
everyday conversation" (Leech 1983: 15). Regarding their applicability, Leech notes that 
" [ .. ] such princip les being the general functional ' imperatives' of human communication, 
are more or less uni versal , but [ ... ] their relative weights will vary from one cultural , social, 
or linguistic milieu to another" (1983:150). Unfortunately, as in R. Lakoff's scheme, no 
indication is provided of how to come to grips with this variation. 
The practice of appealing to politeness rules/maxims to account for conversational 
phenomena is adopted by Ide (1982) and Gu (1990), who suggest further rules in order to 
account for the facts of Japanese and Chinese conversation respectively. The need to 
proliferate the rules/maxims as soon as one moves into a new culture points to perhaps the 
greatest weakness of this practice: the lack ofa principled explanation as to what moti vates 
such rules (Watts 1992:46). The theories outlined in the following section address this 
weakness. 
1.2.2 The (re)discovery of face 
Brown and Levinson's (1987[1978]; henceforth B&L) theory has overall been great ly 
influential in the field of politeness studies (2 .6 below), but perhaps their most important 
contribution is their (re)discovery of Goffman's notion of 'face'.tO Providing a social-
10 This is furthcr discussed in 1.3.1 below. 
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psychological moti vation for politeness , they write: "politeness [ ... ] presupposes [a] 
potential for aggress ion as it seeks to di sann it, and makes possible communication 
between potentially aggress ive parties" (B&L: I). This fi cti on of the ' virtual offence' 
ori entates participants to their mutual face-wants, conceptualised as: "the public se lf-image 
that every member wants to claim for himself, consisting in two related aspects: (a) 
negati ve face: the bas ic claim to [ .. . ] freedom of acti on and freedom from imposition (b) 
positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ' personality ' claimed by interactants, 
crucially including the des ire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of' 
(B&L:61). Maintaining a Gri cean framework, Brown and Levinson propose considerations 
of face as the reason for interlocutors' deviations from the cr. They make 1\'10 important 
assumptions from the sta11: that interlocutors are rational, and that they are endowed with 
face, which they wish to maintain . In their theory, every speech act is potentially face-
threatening to an aspect of either the hearer's or the speaker' s face. Although face-threat is 
imminently present, it is so in varying degrees, represented as the seriousness or 
weightiness of an FTAx. Interlocutors calculate thi s using the fonnula W.y = D (S,H) + P 
(H,S) + R,-, where D(S,H) is the social di stance between the speaker and the hearer, P(H,S) 
is the power of the hearer over the speaker, and Ry is the ranking of the impos ition that 
FTA,- entails in the culture in question.l ! As the we ightiness of an FTA increases, 
interlocutors move upwards along a scale of increasing indirectness represented as a 
hierarchy of strategies (fi g. I). These fi ve strategies, as we ll as their relative ordering, are 
claimed to be uni versal. However, the weightiness of a particular FTA, as computed based 
on the values of D, P and R" pertaining to thi s act, will be culture-specific, thereby 
theoretically justifying the theory ' s claim to universality: in different cultures, different acts 
will be FTAs, and to a di fferent degree. This claim is al so empirically grounded, since 
Brown and Levinson based their investigation on data from three languages: Tze ltal , a 
Mayan language, Tamil , of the Dravidian language-group, and English (from both sides of 
the Atlantic). 
I . witho ut .... d ...... iv .. ac tion , baJdly 
/' 
on rec ord 2 . po.iti .... polit .. n ess < Do ' ho FTA < 4 . 0" •• 00":' w Uh .. . .. u i ..... io n < 3 . no"" .. po'U~." 
:5 . D o n 't d o t he FT " 
G r .. a t .. r 
Figure 1: Strategies for performing FT As (from B&L:60) 
t t For Fuller de finition o f these vari ables and di scussion, see 4. 2 below. 
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Brown and Levinson's theory has been dubbed "the face-saving view" (Fraser 1990:228-
232). Recently, however, an alternati ve " face-constituting" view has also been put forward 
(Arundale 1999). This is grounded in a co-constituti ve model of communication, which 
departs from the Gricean model in two impOl1ant ways: meaning is now seen as emerging 
within a dyad rather than as an individual psychological attainment; moreover, it is 
continuously in the process o f being constituted in the light of both past and future actions. 
Arundale proposes two principles which spell out how communication as emergence is 
achieved: the Sequential Interpreting Principle, and the Recipient Des ign Principle 
(1999: 13 1, 135; ori ginal emphasis) . In appealing to the first one , 
" Recipients interpret the utterance currently being produced by another individual 
using expectations in voked in producing/interpreting their own prior utterance; they 
inteorate this current interpreting with their own evolving interpreting of the inter-
action; and they invoke expectations fo r another subsequent interpreting of the 
recipient 's own next utterance (to be used in producing that next utterance)" 
while in appealing to the second one, 12 
"Speakers frame an utterance to be produced using both expectations invoked in their 
interpreting of another's prior utterance, and recipient interpretings yet to be 
formulated; they attribute to the future recipient knowledge of certain resources and 
procedures; they project the interpreting, integrating, and invoking processes the 
recipient will employ in fonnulating an interpreting of the utterance to be articulated; 
they uroduce the utterance by selecting and articulating utterance constituents; and 
they presume that their recipients will hold them accountable for their contribution to 
the conversation." 
By integrating both speakers' and recipients' expectations in this way, the co-constituting 
model of communication can account fo r a broad range of phenomena left unaccounted for 
in the Gricean model, from the handling of conversational turns, topics, and adjacency 
structures, to the emergence and maintenance of language as a social construction. Of 
greater interest to us here, it can account fo r the co-constituting of face in interaction, 
through two further principles operating within the framework of the Sequential 
Interpreting Princip le. The default interpreting principle captures how nonnal ways of 
designing utterances give rise to expectations regarding on-going interpretings, while the 
nonce interpreting principle comes into play when such expectations have not been 
in voked, or have been explic itly cancelled. As Arundale notes, "[flor Brown and Levinson 
[ ... ] politeness in language use is always accomplished by means of particularised 
conversational implicature" (1999: 144). Consequently, in their scheme facework is 
conceptualised as "an extrinsic or exogenous factor that simply moti vates language use" 
12 This principle recognises the imporlance of the notion of recipient- o r audience-design, which is central to 
CA accounts of conversation and Accommodation Theory (Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Giles & Powesland 1998 
[1975[; BcIl1984). 
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(1999:147). However, once it is recognised that in conversation face may not only be 
threatened but it may also be maintained by not creating any imbalance, the 
conceptualisation of politeness as balancing threat with redress is no longer viable. 13 In 
Arundale's words, "[c]onversants can and do attend to their own and other's face even 
when redress ing a threat is not an issue. This stasis mode of maintaining face involves 
routine means of attending to face following the default interpreting principle, hence it is 
not explained within Brown and Levinson's theory." (1999: 145; original emphas is). Face 
Constituting theory puts back into prominence a conceptualisation of facework as fully 
intrinsic to conversation, which is more in line with the ori ginal Goffmanian notion of face 
as " located in the fl ow of events" (1967:7) and "on loan from society" ( 1967: 10), and of 
face maintenance as "a condition of interaction, not its objective" (1967:12). As such, it 
provides a theoretical response to criticisms of Brown and Levinson 's notion of face as 
being "the sole 'prerogative' of the individual" (Mao 1994:469). 
1.2.3 Discernment and volition: two ends of a continuum? 
Another facet of Brown and Levinson's theory which has come under attack, mainly in the 
work of Japanese scholars such as Ide and Matsumoto, is its focus on politeness as an act of 
individual volition: implicatures of politeness arise through purposeful breaches of the CP. 
This "strategic conflict avoidance" view of politeness leaves out a range of phenomena in 
which politeness functions as "social indexing" (Kasper 1990: 194-7). Acknowledging 
one's understanding of the si tuation and of the relation between conversational participants, 
and indica ting thi s understanding by means of an appropriate linguistic choice are essenti al 
to this latter function of politeness, for which Hill et al. (1986:348) have introduced the 
term 'discernment'. Politeness as discernment is pervasive in obligatory markings of 
nominal and predicate forms, the choice amongst which appears to be more a matter of 
social convention than of the speaker's FTA-specific intention (Ide 1989:244; 1990). In 
Ide's (1989:23 1) words "[w]hereas Brown and Levinson dealt with face wants, the 
di scernment aspect of linguistic politeness is distinguished by its orientation toward the 
wants of roles and settings". Ide (1989:227) summarises as fo llows the differences between 
the choice of formal forms and the use of strategies to achieve politeness: "[f]ormal forms 
are I) limi ted in choice, 2) socio-pragmatically obligatory, 3) grammaticall y obligatory, 
and 4) made in accordance with a person who is not necessarily the addressee, the referent 
or the speaker him/herself." 
The motivation for including these under the rubric of ' politeness' is threefold. First, 
they give rise to implicatures in much the same way as breaches of the Gricean maxims do: 
13 This point is takcn up in 1.3.2 be low. 
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only this time, the resulting implicatures are "interactional" (Matsumoto 1989:210), in that 
they are generated by an unexpected choice between utterances which are other'wise equally 
informative, truthful, relevant, or perspicuous. Second, an inappropriate choice is "almost 
cel1ain to result in loss of face" (Matsumoto 1989:218; cf. Hill et al. 1986:351). And third , 
they do not occur in isolation from volitional strategies in actual usage (Ide 1989:232), 
neither are they restricted to ' honorific ' languages such as Japanese (Ide 1989:226; 
R.Lakoff 1972:926). Volition and discernment are thus said to constitute two ends of a 
continuum, captured within Weber's typology of social actions, which ranges from 
instrumental rational action (cf. volition) through value-rational action and affectual action 
to traditional/conventional action (cf. discernment) (Ide 1989:244). Different cultures pay 
variable attention to these different aspects of politeness (Hill et al. 1986) , witness the fact 
that discelllment (i.e. recognition of relative position) is linguistically encoded in Japanese 
in the form of honorifics (Matsumoto 1988 :419). However, they must both be accounted 
for within a truly universalising theory of politeness. 
Or must they? According to Watts (1992:69; original emphasis), politeness consists in 
"a conscious choice of linguistic forms which, in accordance wi th the dictates of the time 
and the fashion, are conventionally understood to be an attempt on the part of ego to 
enhance his/her standing with respect to alter [ ... ] its functions may eas ily be non-altruistic 
and clearly egocentric." Watts proceeds to doubt "that linguistic politeness is a uni versal of 
language usage, unless it can be shown typologically that every culture makes use of 
vo litional strategies of marked ego-centric behaviour" (ibid.). Such volitional strategies 
include "highly ritualised, formulaic behaviour [ ... J, indirect speech strategies [ ... J, and 
conventionali sed linguistic strategies for saving and maintaining face" (Watts 1989: 136; 
references omitted). On Watts 's account, face underlies only such a narrow 
conceptualisation of politeness as (individual) rational behaviour, since it onl y emerges 
with reference to a se lf-identity developed within a ' closed' group, in the Bemsteinian 
sense of a group in which the interests of the group - of the 'we' - supersede those of the 
individual - the 'I' (Bemstein 1971 ). Face considerations not being prior to the 
development of thi s se lf-identity, they only come into play in the transi ti on from closed 
group- to open group-interaction, where the T supersedes the 'we'. 
A rather different motivation is proposed as guiding interaction in closed groups, 
namely "maintaining group cohesion" (Watts 1989: 16 1). This is achieved by means of 
relational work , which takes into account 
" I . the nature of the social activity in which the interactants are invo lved 2. the type 
of speech event they are engaged in within that activity 3. the degree to which [they] 
share a common set of cultural assumptions relating to the social activity and the 
speech event (i.e. the degree to which the group is closed or open) 4 . the stock of 
commonly shared assumptions in relation to the informational state of the discourse 
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[ ... ] 5. the social distance between and the status of interactants with respect to the 
social activity" (ibid.: 137) . 
13 
The result is socially appropriate behaviour - now tenned 'politic' - and may be seen as: 
universal, in that it presup poses a process of sociali sation; omnipresent in verbal 
interaction, to which it gives cohesion and continui ty; and oriented towards ensuring 
relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995(1 986]). Upholding "the perceived f abric of 
inte1personal relationships within the social group" (Watts 1989: 133) is the essence of 
politic behaviour, which subsumes polite behaviour as a marked subset. However, while 
prov iding an explanation for nati ve English speakers' often negati ve evaluations of the 
tenn "politeness" (Watts 1992:43), Watts's schema has yet to provide a moti vation for 
interactants' upholding "the perceived fabric of infelpersonal relatiol/ships withil/ the 
social group" . Inasmuch as the search for Relevance itself may be subject to considerat ions 
of face,14 restricting the application of face to volitional strategies may not be a viable 
option after all (see also l.3. 1 below). 
1.2.4 Contracts and conventions 
Fraser (1990, 1999, forthcoming; Fraser & Nolen 1981) proposes a conceptualisation of 
politeness according to which "{bJeing polite does not involve making the hearer ' feel 
good' , a la Lakoff or Leech, nor does it invo lve making the hearer not 'fee l bad', a la 
Brown/Levinson. It simply invo lves getting on with the task at hand in light of the tenns 
and conditions of the C[onversational] C{ontract]" ( 1990:233). On this view, a 
Conversationa l Contract (hence CC), consisting in each participant's understanding of 
hi s/her rights and obligations, is continuously operati ve in every conve rsation. The terms of 
the CC draw on three resources: conventi on (such as general terms relating to mutual 
intelligibi li ty and the turn-taking system), the social institutions within the framework of 
which the conversation is taking place, and previous encounters or the particul ars of the 
situation. Tenns emanating from the fi rst two are seldom renegotiable. Tenns emanating 
from the third resource are however continuously updated depending on participants' 
perceptions of factors such as the status, power, and role of each speaker, and the nature of 
the circumstances. The kind of messages which may be expected, both in tenns of force 
and content, depends to a large extent on these latter factors . Impoliteness results when the 
terms of the CC are violated. It follows that "[p]oliteness [ ... ] is not a sometime thing. 
Rational participants are aware that they are to act within the negotiated constraints and 
generally do so. [ . . ] Politeness is a state that one expects to ex ist in eve ry conversat ion" 
(Fraser 1990:233). Viewing politeness as the expected state in conversation has some 
14 See 5.2 below, on Sperber and Wilson 's ( 1995) rej ection of the CP. 
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important theoretical implications. First, "[the] Speaker selects the form of the utterance to 
meet [the] rights and obligations [constituting the CC) and in terms of: the Nature of the 
message (content and force) [and the] Anticipated perlocutionary effect" (Fraser 1999:15). 
Ultimately, however, politeness is "totally in the hands (or ears) of the hearer" (Fraser & 
Nolen 198 1 :96). Being a concomitant of rational efficiency, it is not signalled by deviations 
from the CP, in other words, it is not implicated. t S Second, politeness is defined as "'a 
property associated with a voluntary action" (Frase r & Nolen 198 1:96). This may initially 
seem to be at odds with its being said to be the expected state in conversation. However this 
is not so , if 'voluntary' in the case of politeness is interpreted, in light of the feature of 
' modality ' ( in the sense of optionality; 1.1 above), as consti tuting the preferred option or 
alternative, i.e . the expected one. Finall y, the notion of intended deference as "that 
component of activity which functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is 
regularly conveyed" (Goffman 1967:56) is now brought in to account for utterances which 
"in virtue of their meaning, encode speaker intention to convey deference" (Frase r 
forthcoming: 19). 
A contractual view of politeness brings into prominence the noti on of participants' 
expectations in conversation. These expectations emanate to a large extent from 
participants' knowledge of conversational conventions, and of constraints imposed by 
social institutions, pal1icipant roles and the nature of the circumstances, a ll of which rely 
heavily (i f implic itly) on convention. The importance of thi s notion is brought to the fore in 
the work of Blum-Kulka (1987a, 1987b, 1990). Based on analyses of Israe li and American 
English requests and parents' control acts, Blum-Kulka concludes that conventional ity, 
rather than unquali fied indirectness, is the essence of pol iteness. She interprets this finding 
by appealing to a principle of pragmatic clarity, according to which lengthening the 
in fe rential path beyond 'reasonable limits' , set by norms which are subject to situational 
and cultural constraints, constitutes an imposition in itself, which subtracts from the 
politeness of an utterance (1987a: 141 ). Balance between two aspects of minimisation (of 
the impos ition, and of the length of the inferential path) is achieved by means of 
conventional indirectness , which is now placed at the high end of the politeness scale 
(1990:271-3; cf. Holtgraves & Yang 1990:722-724). One important contribution of B1um-
Kulka's research is the findin g that pragmatic clarity correlates not onl y with the length of 
the in ferentia l path, but also with the type of speech event (Hymes 1974) which 
encompasses the scene, the participants, the message content, the message form, the rules 
of interaction and the norms of interpretation in which an act occurs (Blum-Kulka 
1990:263). In this respect, "conventionali ty of situation can act similarl y to other types of 
conventionality in ensuring that [a particular] interpretation becomes the default one" 
15 This point is taken up in 5.4 below. 
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(1987a: 142fn.9). This type of conventionality needs to be taken into account in discussing 
politeness phenomena, s ince "the definition of the speech event, as constructed by the 
participants, creates event-specific frames which affect both the repertoire and the 
interpretation of po liteness values" ( 1990:261 ). For Blum-Kulka, then, politeness can on ly 
be studied from an ernie, cu lturally relativistic perspective ( I 987b:260ff.; I 990:260, 262). 
However, I would argue that , if the products of conventional is at ion are culturally specific, 
the mechanisms need not be , as Lewis 's (1969) study of the rational basis for conve ntions 
has shown (cf. Garrod & Doherty 1994). A study of politeness phenomena may still be 
uni versal is ing in this underlying sense. 
1.2.5 Is po liteness communicated? 
The view that politeness is the expected state in conversation, rather than communicated by 
means of impiicatures, is introduced by Fraser (1990:233), and further explored within the 
framework of Sperber and Wilson's (1995[1986]) Relevance Theory (Escandell-Vid.a l 
1996, 1998; Jary 1998). Jary ( 1998: 11 ) summarises the problem as follows : 
" many examples of what an observer could term instances of polite behaviour might 
go unnoticed by the interactants. In such a case, one ei ther has to give up the claim 
that they are communicating politeness or extend one's definition of communication 
to include some SOl1 of subliminal communication, unattended by the interactants." 
Instead, Jary suggests, (im)politeness constitutes an additional message only when it makes 
mutually manifest a divergence in the speaker's and the hearer's assumptions concerning 
their relative standing for the purposes of an act. To determine such standing, Jary retains 
Brown and Levinson's formula for computing the weightiness of an act, but refrains from 
making any claims regarding the relationship between linguisti c form and values of D, P 
and Rx (ibid.:2). The use of polite forms, then , makes manifest assumptions regarding the 
participants' relative standing. These assumptions are not necessarily relevant, and the use 
of polite forms may therefore pass unnoticed. Neverthe less, evidence of the absence of, or a 
mismatch between, these assumptions is relevant enough: the hearer will then infer that the 
speaker holds him in a lower (or higher) standing than what he had previously assumed and 
a change in his cognitive environment will occur. However, this does not mean that 
po liteness has been communicated as yet. For this to happen, the hearer must take it that it 
was the speaker 's intention to make manifest such an assumption. This would produce a 
change in the participants' mutual cognitive environment, thereby fulfilling the 
preconditions for communication as defined within RT to occur. It is in thi s sense that the 
strategic use of politeness to achieve certain effects is parasitic on its unselfconsciousl 
social index ing use. As a motivation for the latter, Jary suggests "a longer term aim of most 
people to either maintain or increase their standing in the eyes of group co-members" 
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(1 998: 12). One engages in the pursuit of shorter-term aims while trying to simultaneously 
fu lfill/not j eopardise thi s longer-term aim . While the notion of face is not expl icitly 
discussed in this light, one senses it is never far away. 
Simi lar to Jary 's remark that the use of polite forms most often passes unnoticed, 
Escandell-Vidal 's ( 1996,1998) discussion of politeness within RT stems from the remark 
that 
"[c]onversational strategies, or conversational efforts, can onl y have their raison d' 
etre as exploitations of a default , 'unmarked' behaviour. [ ... J being able to prevent 
undes irable results or to enhance positi ve effects en tai l having first a precise 
knowledge of expected courses of events (including, obviously, linguisti c events and 
behaviour), and their socia l consequences. If so, politeness must primari ly be a matter 
of social adequacy, establi shed in terms of expectations." (1998 :46; footnote omitted) 
Exploring the nature of such expectations, EscandeIl-Vidal draws on Schank and Abelson' s 
( 1977) distinction between general knowledge, shared by all human beings in virtue of their 
sharing standard needs, and specific knowledge, pertaining to frequently experi enced 
events. Because specific knowledge presupposes exposure to a situation, it is acquired, and 
can therefore be assumed to be culture-specific ( 1996:643). Knowledge pertaining to 
politeness, which is acquired through socia li sation, is of th is latter type, which elegant ly 
accounts for the differences encountered cross-culturally (1996:645). Escandell-Vidal 
further suggests that expectations are a parti cul ar kind of mental (meta-)representations. 
Their distribution across a group can thus be accounted for within Sperber' s ( 1996) theory 
of culture as epidemiology of representations (Escandell-Vidal 1998:47-8). Ex pectations 
having to do with the use of cel1ain linguistic express ions "will contain a characterisation 
both of the express ion and of the conditions under which it will be appropriate" (ibid.). To 
capture such expectations, Escandell-Vidal (1996:635) suggests the AI notion of a frame. 16 
Frames are triggered not only by the use of linguistic expressions, but also by ex tra-
li nguistic situations. On this account , once a frame is acti vated, it makes a prese lection of a 
structured set of assumptions from which the specific contex t, that which ensures optimal 
relevance, can be chosen (1996:64 1). For Escandell-Vidal, the fact that both social 
relationships (based on created categori es such as status, power, distance, social role, or 
face) as well as language use are defined by social conventions, and are therefore cul ture-
spec ific ( 1998:48-9), does not preclude the poss ibility of a uni versali sing account, as is 
argued by Blum-Kulka (1.2.4 above). However, uni ve rsali ty is not sought at the level of a 
rational choice between strategies either, as attempted by Brown and Levinson (1.2.2 
above). Rather, it is now placed at an underl ying level, remin iscent of the practice adopted 
in generative grammar: 
16 This notion is defined and further di scussed in U.3 and in chapter 6 below. 
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"univer~ah; have the form of abstract principles [ ... ] subject to parametric variation. It 
seems reasonable to depart from the same hypothesis also for pragmatic universals 
[ ... ] The conception of interpersonal relations (i. e. of distance and powe/,), and the 
notion of f ace (with its positive and negative sides) are constitutive parts of any 
politeness system; again, the di ffe rences between cultures depend on different 
se lections for their values" ( 1996:64 7). 
17 
Given problems pertain ing to Brown and Levinson's definitions of D, P and Rx, and 
the proposed formula (Turner 1996:5; 4.2 below), Escandell-Vidal 's allowing greater 
fl exibility in thi s domain constitutes an improvement over Jary's (1998) account. The 
approach proposed in thi s thesis retains ITom her proposal the notion of frames, exploring 
their status and content and proposing specific frames for politeness in CG (chapter 6, 7.3 
below). It also elaborates on her suggestion to view pragmatic universals as subject to 
parametric va riation, by probing the socio-histori cal factors involved in producing such 
variation (1.3 .4, 7.3 below). However, it parts with Escandell-Vidal's claims in arguing 
against the theoretical adequacy and the psychological plausibili ty of the three sociological 
variables as currently defined (4.2 below). It also di stances itse lf fro m the theoretical 
framework of RT, arguing instead that politeness is a perlocutionary effect (5.3, 5.4 below). 
1.3 Delimiting the scope of a theory of politeness 
The overview provided in the previous section shows politeness theorising to date to be 
defined by two parameters. The fi rst is the notion of face: one can follow how, once this is 
identified as the underl ying principle at work , theori es of politeness start moving away 
from the narrow commonsensical notion of politeness as marked by some deviation from 
rational efficiency to broader conceptualisations calling for "a general theory of politeness 
as a pal1icular subsystem in a cogniti ve pragmatic theory" (Escandell-Vidal 1996:647). The 
second i~ the equivocal placement of accounts of politeness to date in view of the parallel 
di stinctions between intention vs. convention, or agency vs. structure. The 
conventional/structural component of politeness is emphasised by those theorists who 
introduce rules, max ims, or conventions to account for politeness phenomena, either intra-
or cross-culturally (R. Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983; Ide 1989, 1990; Blum-Kulka 1987a, 
1987b, 1990). At the opposite end lie approaches which stress the importance of rationally 
deri ved strategies and ind ividual vo lition (B&L; Watts 1989, 1992; Arndt & Janney 1985, 
1992), while most recently, a number of theorists (Fraser 1990, 1999; Escandell-Vid.al 
1996, 1998; Jary 1998; Arundale 1999) have given prominence to the notion of 
interlocutors' expectations, by means of which socio-cultural factors wo uld seem to find 
their way into individual agents' rationali sing. 
These two parameters, face and the intention vs. convention antinomy, are in fact not 
unrelated. Taking as a start ing point Goffman's definition of face as "an image of [a 
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person] that is internally cons istent, that is supported by judgements and evidence conveyed 
by other participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal 
agencies in the situation" (1967:6-7; emphasis added), an agent's face may be viewed as 
the society's mark of approval , the positive sanctioning of particular behaviours, emerging 
in interaction with another agent; clearly, the latter's partaking of evaluative practices 
which are close ly related to those of the former is crucial, both for the recognition, and for 
the positive sanction ing of these behaviours (fig.2). 
Society :1: ................................  . ....................... :1: 
Figure 2: A schematic representation of face as socially constituted 
The antinomy between intentions and conventions thus turns out to be only apparent: it 
only emerges if evaluations are attached directly to particular behaviours (figJ). 
Figure 3: A schematic representation of face as constituted through rational 
individual action alone 
The evaluative practices through which face emerges in interaction may be seen as the 
product of the habitus, a system of dispositions that can be traced back to the objective 
conditions of existence (Bourdieu 1990:52ff). Bourdieu (1990:53; emphasis added) 
describes the relation between these dispositions and the practices they give rise to as 
fo llows: 
"The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of ex istence 
produce habitus, systems of durable , transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures , that is , as principles which generate 
and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastelY of 
the operations necessQly ill order to attain them." 
In this way, the habiflls functions as a principle of "conductorless orchestration" (ibid.:59), 
which is produced neither by conscious co-ordination (i.e. the recognition of intentions), 
nor by mechanistic repetition (i.e . the application of conventions), but which can - so long 
a::; the imp0l1ance of this notion is not properly acknowledged - create the appearance of 
being the product of either of these. 
Significantly, for our current purposes, the 'objective adaptation of practices to their 
outcomes' mentioned in the above excerpt is not temporally restricted to some point in time 
prior to the OCCutTence of these outcomes - if such a point can be identified at all 
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(Bourdieu 1990:60ff,; Good 1995: 144ff). Theories which attempt to account fo r the 
structuring and interactional sign ificance of discourse by appealing solely to interlocutors' 
expectations - i.e . the way in which they project into the future, and attempt to anticipate 
others' re-actions to their action - fail inasmuch as they are oblivious to the fact that 
interlocutors do not possess perfect knowledge of the preferences and competences of other 
participants. Recogn ising, on the other hand, that past experiences not only shape new ones, 
but may also be re-interpreted in their light (Arundale 1999), allows us to account for the 
efficiency wit.h which interlocutors handle everyday exchanges - as th is is brought out 
post [acto by, for instance, the analysis of conversational transcripts - an efficiency which 
nevertheless cannot be put down to 'all-knowledgeable' action which is the hallmark of 
rationality (Bourdieu 1990:6 1). Through its (temporal) omni-relevance, the habitus 
provides the un ify ing principle which consh'ains expectations pertaining to future outcomes 
and re- interpretations of these outcomes alike (ibid.:60). 
Bourd ieu 's insights, developed within a social-theoretical framework, provide a useful 
reminder of a point which is central to the theoreti cal argument outlined below, and 
empi rically grounded and further developed in the fo ll owing chap ters; that individual 
intentions are not elementary, but are sociall y constituted and (re-)negotiated. Individual 
rationality is constrained by - or, functions with in the boundaries of - a societal 
rationali ty,l1 which sets the limits for variation within it (in which resides the potential for 
change over time). The politeness practices of a communi ty - the sancti oning of a 
linguistic behaviour as appropriate in context - may thus be seen as the outward 
manifestation of this over-arching rationality, which, though mot ivated (7.3 below), and 
therefore not reducible to convention (in the Saussurean sense of the tenn , rather than that 
of Lewis 1969), does not reduce to individual rationality either, because it is historically 
constituted. Consequently, rather than being grounded in individual agents' rationalising 
about ends and means (cf. , e .g., B&L), universality will now be sought at the interface of 
societal and individual rationality. Estab li shing the evidence for this interface, as well as 
teasing apal1 its intricacies, wi ll remain central concerns throughout this thesis. 
1.3 .1 The umbilical li nk to Face 
Linking the Goffmanian notion of face to conversati onal phenomena in different cultures 
- Goffman ( 1956, 1967, 1971) mainly explored its application to verbal and nonverbal 
behav iour in an Engli sh-speaking environment - is an important advancement afforded by 
Brown and Levinson (1987). However, their conceptualisation of the two aspects of face 
\7 This tenn, suggested in a li nguistic context (1.3.3 below), may be seen as parallel to Bourdieu's habitus. 
However, the two remain distinct: defining the latter as bodily hexis (1991:81fT.), Bourdieu assigns to it a 
distinctly embodied character, which is not claimed of the former. 
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(1.2 .2 above) has been criticised as inadequate to account for both intra- and cross-
culturally observed facts. For these authors, considerations of face enter the picture only 
when the speaker is about to perfolm a Face Threatening Act (B&L:65-8). Some acts are 
said to be intrinsically face threatening, the threat concerning either the speaker's or the 
addressee's positive or negative face. These claims are not tenable in light of evidence 
showing that face is commonly negotiated over conversational turns (Good 1995: 146), a 
finding which has been used to link conversation-analyti c tenns such as preference 
organisation to face (Bayraktaroglu 1992a, 1992b:318-9; Lerner 1996). Face considerations 
cannot therefore be attached to particular FT As, 18 unless, departing from the Brown and 
Levinson view, one is prepared to dub all acts FTAs, thereby advocating "an overly 
pessimistic, rather paranoid view of human interaction" (Schmidt 1980: 1 04). But even this 
avenue is closed, given Matsumoto's (1988) and Bayraktarog1u's (1992a) discussion of 
examples from Japanese and Turkish, in which they show that acts may not onl y threaten 
face, but also enhance it (Mao 1994:456); Arndt and Janney's (1985) discussion of 
interpersonal supportiveness focuses on both verbal and nonverbal mechanisms by which 
this is achieved. Acts cannot be intrinsically race-threatening ror the added reason that 
participants ' face can only be mutually maintained: in Matsumoto's (1988:410) Japanese 
examples, enhancing one's interlocutor's face enhances one's own face at the same time. 
Participants' mutual orientation to each other's as well as their own face is establ ished in a 
number of studies, investigating the balancing effect of different types of conversational 
moves (Bayraktaroglu 1992a, I 992b) and strategies (Held 1989: 169). Based on the analysis 
of arguing exchanges in English, Muntigl and Turnbull (1998:243) conclude: "face-work 
may be directed to own (sic] and/or to other 's [sic) face, and the effects on face of a face-
work attempt include not only maintenance and restoration, but also enhancement and 
damage." It would appear, then , that face is "endogenous" to conversation (Arundale 
1999); put succinctly, "there is no faceless communication" (Scallon & Scallon 1995:38). 
Attempts to limit the application of this notion to a marked subset of strategic behaviour 
(Watts 1989, 1992; Janney & Al11dt 1992) are lacking precise ly because they fai l to 
acknowledge this. 
Cross-culturally. it is Brown and Levinson 's construal of face as individual wants 
which has prompted criticisms ofa bias toward western notions of individuality.1 9 Attempts 
to account for conversational exchanges in a non-western context have opposed 'group 
face ', "the individual's desire to behave in confonnity wi th culturally expected fonns of 
behaviour", to 'se lf-face' , "the individual 's desire to attend to hi s/her personal needs and to 
18 Thc act-by-act approach adopled by Brown and Lcvinson can be traced back to the influcnce of Speech Act 
theory on their account (B& L: I 0- \). 
19 This bias extends to the Gricean basis of their approach, which consequently focuses on the individual as a 
rational agent (Wcrkhofcr 1992: (56). 1.3.3 below attempts to redress thc balance. 
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place his/her public-self image above those of others,,2o (Nwoye 1992:313), or proposed the 
notion of ' relative face orientation ', "an underlying direction of face that emulates [ ... J one 
of two interactional ideals [ ... }: the ideal social identity, or the ideal individual autonomy", 
and which may further be 'centripetal' or 'centrifugal' (Mao 1994:471-3) . The prioritising 
of negative face over positive face (B&L:64, 73-4) can similarly be traced back to this 
individuali sti c bias, and appears to be misguided in light of evidence from such diverse 
languages as Japanese, Chinese, Ojibwa, Igbo, Polish and Greek (Matsumoto 1988:405; Gu 
1990:24 1-2; Rhodes 1989:254-257; Nwoye 1992:324; Wierzbicka 1991; Sifianou 1992b). 
It seems that, in these languages, cons iderations of in-group membership and/or social 
hi erarchy replace the emphasis on individualism characteristi c of western societi es - with 
variable importance attributed to negative face even in the latter, as attested by differences 
between West-coast and East-coast Americans (B&L:245; Tannen 198 1:229fnA ). Both 
Goffman and Durkheim - on whose discussion of positive and negative religious rites 
Goffman bases hi s distinction between supportive and remedial interchanges - are careful 
about such generalisations: 
" If we examine what it is one paJ1icipant is ready to see that other participants might 
read into a situation and what it is that will cause him to provide ritual remedies of 
various sOI15 [ ... }, then we find ourselves directed back again to the core moral 
traditions of Western cultu re. And since remedial ritual is a constant feature of public 
life, occurring among all the citizenry in all socia l situations, we must see that the 
historical centre and the contemporary periphery are linked more closely than anyone 
these days seems to want to credit" (Goffman 197 1: 184-5). 
"Whatever the importance of the negative cult may be, [ ... }, it does not contain its 
reason for existence in itself; it introduces one to the relig ious life, but it supposes this 
more than it constitutes it" (Durkheim 1976(1915]:326). 
The variab le claims made by politeness theorists as to interpersonal supportiveness (Arndt 
& Janney 1985:282) or non-imposition (Ide 1982:382) being the essence of polite 
behaviour suggest that decisions as to the priority of one aspect of face over the other are 
arbitrary. Consequently, no such decision will be made here. However, I take it that the 
need for both aspects, as well as their paradoxical inter-relation (See llon & Scollon 
1995:36), are well establi shed theoretically in Goffman's and Durkheim's writings, and as 
such must be retained. Positive and negative face will be seen as wants (rather than 
properties) of the self co-constituted in conversation (Arundale 1999). And since notions of 
'self cannot arise without reference to 'other' , such wants necessarily arise and find 
fulfilment in a dyad, which accounts for their omni-relevance to communication. 
At the same time, one must bear in mind that definitions of the self are subject to 
variation, as can be seen in Scollon and Scollon's visual representation of the Chinese and 
20 In virtue of encompassing this second clause, the definition of self-face departs from B&L's definition of 
face. 
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western concepts of the person, which draws on Hsu's (1983) analysis of the self (fi g,4). 
This representation brings into relief the different ways in which cultures delimit 
conceptualisations of the se lf: in a Chinese contex t, one's se lf includes one's intimate 
society and culture; consequently, one's face-wants cannot be captured with respect to the 
narrower westem - and one must also allow for variation within ' westem' -
conceptualisation of the se lf. 
,,, 
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Figu re 4: The C hinese and the Western concepts of the l>erson 
(from Scollon & Scollon 1995:132-3) 
Exotic as the Chinese concept of the person may sound to western ears, it is grounded in 
the cultural and biological non- viabili ty of the biologically isolated individual (Scollon & 
Scollon 1995: 133), al so acknowledged by Aristotl e in his defin iti on of man in Book One of 
the Politics as fu %osei zw'/on politiko%on (Politics, 1253a3). As mental 
representations, conceptualisations of the self are distributed across a group like other 
cultural representations (Sperber 1996). Zegarac's (2000) analysis of face in Serbo-
Croatian suggests that it can indeed he accounted for a~ such a culturally and hi stori call y 
constituted representation. Incorporating variation at the leve l of conceptualisations of the 
self enables us to give an economical account of cross-cultural conceptualisations of face 
without having to give up claims as to the universal importance of this notion. 
1.3.2 Politeness as the unmarked way of speaking in a community 
It is common in the recent literature on linguisti c po liteness to view speaking politely as the 
unmarked way of speaking within a community, a view stemming from the observation that 
politeness most often passes unnoticed, while what is commented on is impoliteness 
(Kasper 1990: 193; Jary 1998: 1-2; Escandell-Vidal 1998:46) . Another way of putting this is 
to claim that in conversation, politeness is the expected state (Fraser 1990:233). Fraser 
moreover claims that "being polite is a hallmark of abiding by the CP" (ibid.). Give n that 
politeness is more often than not identifi ed with deviations from the CP, how can we make 
sense of Fraser's claim? 
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I should like to argue that to be polite is indeed to be rational; and that interlocutors' 
harbouring expectations of politeness about each other follows from their mutually 
assuming each other's face-wants and rationality. The relevant reasoning is as follows: if to 
be polite is to be rational , and if efficient cost-and-effect accounting is at least part of this 
rationality, then being polite must be less costly than some marked, more cost ly alternative. 
Interaction under conditions of hostility and distrust is costly, because it requires 
continuous alertness and second-guessing on the part of both interlocutors. On this view, it 
is less cost ly to achieve one's immediate goal in interaction - be it to direct another'S 
actions, or simply to induce a belief in one's interlocutor - in situations where there is no 
need for hostil ity or di strust. It follows that interlocutors will view situations that require 
them to interact under conditions of hostility and distrust as marked, while situations which 
do not requi re them to take up the extra effort will be viewed as unmarked. Rational 
interlocutors are then likely to assume that a situation does not call for hostility and distrust, 
and wi ll need to be provided with a reason before they are prepared to give up thi s initial 
assumption. 
Two types of ev idence support this line of reasoning. First, experimental evidence 
suggests that being " less polite" involves some effort, much as being "more polite" does, 
and therefore cannot be the unmarked alternative. Werkhofer (1992: 173-4) presented 
subjects with scenarios asking them to assume the role of speaker and produce utterances 
which would be "more polite" or "less polite" in the situation. He found that "[i]n 
generating [" less polite" utterances}, subjects did not just eliminate "polite" elements, using 
less of the same, but they now added elements of another, markedly "rude" sort, so that the 
less polite utterances were again longer." The second type of evidence comes from folk 
literature. Being both a record of collective experience, and part of the culture one is 
socialised into , folk literature can provide an insight into worldviews shared by a group, 
and as such may be appealed to in the search for similarities and divergences among 
different groups' perspectives. Tales of mildness producing the expected results when 
aggression did not are common in European languages (Spanish, Greek, Lithuanian, 
Estonian, Rus.sian) and also found in other parts of the world (Indonesia, Afri ca, India) 
(Thompson 1957:20-1). Particularly widespread is the tale of the contest between the wind 
and the sun: the sun with its warmth causes the traveller to remove hi s coat, while the wind, 
blowing violently, causes him to pull it c loser around him. Politeness or kindness are 
similarly rewarded in Irish, Missouri French, Greek, Buddhist, Chinese, African (Bankon, 
Bulu, Duala), Icelandic, Breton, Spanish, and Italian tales (ibid.: 187-8). What one may 
extract from these tales is a common perception that one fares further with politeness than 
with aggress ion. As this perception is shared across many unrelated cultures, there is a 
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good case for claiming a rational basis for it. Appealing to rational cost-and-effect 
accounting prov ides such a basis: being polite is rational be<:ause it yields greater effects. 
Politeness is then expected because it is rational; as such, it constitutes the unmarked 
way of speaking in a community, which accounts for use of polite forms passing unnoticed. 
This marks a departure from Brown and Levinson's theory ( 1.2.2 above), which rests o n 
the premise of the 'virtual offence'. In their scheme of things, it is recognition of the 
speaker's polite intention that provides the addressee with evidence that face-threat is not 
intended: politeness must be recognised as intended, i.e. it must be communicated by 
means of an implicature in order to be achieved. Contrary to their view, what is now 
claimed is that , rather than needing to be continuously provided with evidence that a face-
threat is not intended, people routinely enter in conversational exchanges assliming that a 
face-threat is not intended: no face-threatening intention is attributed a priori, needing to be 
dispelled by means of politeness. By the same token, a polite (i.e. face-anointing) intention 
is not attributed a priori either. Politeness is now construed as a broader notion, which 
encompasses all instances in which face is constituted as a 'by-product' of - if you prefer, 
falls out from - interlocutors' adhering to the interactional norms of the community within 
which they are operating, as outlined in the following section. 
1.3.3 A frame-based approach 
I claimed earlier that it is less costly to achieve one's goals in situations where hostility and 
distrust are uncalled for. It may, however, be objected that hosti lity and distrust arise 
naturall y when 'se lf' meets 'other' ; hostility and distrust are , in other words, natural 
concomitants of all communicative situations. I do not disagree. Indeed, it is because 'self 
is defined as such only in relation to 'other', that the possibility exists for interactants to 
appeal to a common collective 'st::lf , to which they both belong, and which is defined a!S 
such in contrast to some 'other'. Such a common collective ' se lf' is invoked in 
conversation when one demonstrates one 's familiarity with the interactional norms of the 
community within which one is operating. As Lerner ( 1996:303) puts it, "[t]o maintain face 
is to fit in ." A different, 'soc ietal' aspect of rationality can be seen to be in operat ion here, 
and to constrain individual agents' choices: 
"context is already pre-figured, pre-cast, so to speak, in the mould of society. It is 
actually society itself that 'speaks' through the interactants when they try to influence 
each other [ ... ]. The classical approach which bases itself upon the rati onal action 
performed by the single individual fails inasmuch as it does not take into account the 
degree to which this rationality itself is societal, hence supra-individual." (Mey 
1993 :263) 
The lasting neglect of this aspect of rationality by theories of politeness (Ide 1989:243) 
leaves them unable to account for the fact that "[t]he act or behaviour of being polite is 
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performed by an individual agent and yet it is, at the same time, an intrinsically social one, 
social, that is, in the dual sense of being socially constituted and of feeding back into the 
process of structuring social interaction" (Werkhofer 1992: 156). 
In Brown and Levinson's theory, rationality is defined in a vacuum. It is identifi ed 
with the ab ility to select those means that will realise one's ends most effi cientl y and at 
least cost (B& L:64-5). The appropriateness of these means to realise the desired end is 
construed as a pure ly quantitati ve notion: speakers are claimed to compute the weightiness 
of an FTA( based on their assumptions regarding the context-dependent values of D, P, & 
R(, and then use that as a guide to select the appropriate strategy from the proposed 
hierarchy of strategies . However, the same lingui stic means may well show different 
situational distributions in different communities (Terkourafi 1997, 1999). This means that, 
in selecting the most efficient means to realise one's goal, one must take into account the 
interactional norms of the community within which one is operating. The appropriateness 
of a cel1ain lingui stic means to achieve a desired end, then, is more usefully construed as a 
qualitative notion, which may be explicated as appropriateness relevant to what is usual or 
expected in a certain situation within a community (4.1.4 below). 
Once the appropriateness of a linguistic means to ach ieve a desired end is construed in 
qualitati ve terms, assessing it invo lves knowing what is usua l or expected in a certain 
situation within a community. One way of formal ising this is by appealing to the notion of 
a frame. Informally, we may, following Minsky (1975:212), think ofa frame as a "data-
structure for representing a stereotyped situation." Evidence that cross-cultural preferences 
for different politeness modes arise early in life (Ide 1978:289-91 ) suggests that the 
community one is socialised in crucially defines one's knowledge pertaining to politeness. 
Frames are acquired in the course of sociali sati on by abstracti ng away from , or general ising 
over, actual s ituations. They combine, as separate components, in formation about a 
situation (who are the participants, what is the setting of the exchange, etc.; chapters 6, 7 
below) with information about the appropriate use of language therein (Escande ll-Vidal 
1998:48) and are stored in long-term memory with default values fillin g in particular 
component-slots. Given that social categorisation is largely dependent on culture 
(Escandell-Vidal 1998:47), such default values may be use fully conceptualised in terms of 
radial categories (G. Lakoff 1987). Percepmally encountering a novel simation, then, 
provides data to be matched with data stored in memory. The greater the number of features 
of the perce ived situation matching default values fi lling in component-slo ts of a particula r 
frame, the more strongly thi s particular frame will be recalled from memory. In this way, 
expectations are set up . Note that, because frames combine information about both the 
extra-linguisti c features of a situation, as well as the appropriate use of language therei n, 
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whichever of these is available first will give rise to expectations about the other. 21 In this 
way, we can account for politeness assessments regarding utterances which are produced 
and interpreted in the course of an actual situation (where expectations are set up with 
recourse to the extra-linguistic features of the situation); but also, for politeness default 
values which cultures attribute to specific linguistic behaviours seemingly independently of 
context (where expectations are set up with recourse to linguistic information).22 
Furthermore, once the similarity driving the matching of perceived information and 
information stored in memory is construed as a matter of degree, along the lines of G. 
Lakoff (1987), the proposed approach turns out to be constrai ning enough to account for 
different politeness assessments of the same linguistic means within different cultures, 
while at the same time being general enough to allow for the observed creativity of 
linguistic politeness. 
Frames contribute to the understanding process by making available background 
knowledge which is relevant to the eventual ity at hand. However, since such knowledge is 
acquired through socialisation within a community, as opposed to following from logical 
necess ity, infe rences based on it are defeasible. That is, interlocutors go ahead and draw 
such inferences in normal circumstances, unless there occurs to them an alternative or 
reason to the contrary. Frames act as a pointer as to what such ' nonnal circumstances' are 
in different situations for different communities. Thus, they naturally complement an 
account of understanding along the lines of Levinson 's (1995, 2000:73ff.) default 
heuri stics. Infe rences drawn with reference to these heuristics do not constitute additional 
propositions, the recovery of which follows from, and relies on, the recovelY of the 
propositional content of the utterance. 
Consider the classic example of someone at the dinner table asking for the salt by 
saying "Can you pass me the salt?" In an English-speaking context, the speaker's utterance 
meets the addressee's general expectations about how language is used given the setting 
(the dinner table) and the activity interlocutors are engaged in (havi ng dinner). There is 
therefore no need for the speaker's polite intention to be recovered on the basis of his/her 
utterance, since, were this to be so, one would need to subscribe to the counter-intuiti ve 
claim that the addressee computes the speaker's request first as a literal quest ion (Searle 
1996a[1975]). 23 Rather than the proposition expressed, what is recovered in this case is 
simply the fact that the speaker has made a request. Politeness is achieved as a 
perlocutionary effect, just in case tbe addressee also bolds tbe be lief that asking for the salt 
21 On holistic storing and recall ofstcrcotypical cvents as less efTonful, see S~rbcr & Wilson (1995: 186). 
22 Our ability to make such judgements provides evidence for the claim that frames are stored in memory with 
default values filling in particular component-slots. 
23 For problems with this view, see Grocfsema 1992. 
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by saying "Can you pass the salt?" is polite given the circumstances. 24 On the other hand, if 
the speaker's utterance did not meet the addressee ' s general expectations about how 
language is used, the latter would draw specific inferences pertaining to the former's 
intentions. Contrary to politeness, then, impoliteness or excessive politeness are part of 
what is recovered based on the speaker's utterance, which accounts for their being marked 
(also in the sense of being noti ced) in relation to politeness. 
In the ex ample above, while the in fe rential mechani sm (Levinson's heuri sti cs) may 
well be uni versal, it is the frames appealed to by participants (who is speaking to whom, in 
what setting) that determine the output of the inferential process?5 In this sense, Levinson's 
default heuristics help account for the unmarked way of speaking within a community . In 
speaking politely, interlocutors set themselves and each other up as competent members of 
the community, in other words, they constitute each other's and their own face. But this is 
not achieved by means of some additional layer of meaning, or speaking politely would 
have to be construed as marked relative to some unmarked way of speaking which would 
not be carrying thi s additiona l layer of meaning. Rather than being mediated by recognising 
Lhe speaker 's inLenLion (whi ch Lhus becomes - for the mosL pan - irrelevant), face-
constituting, i.e. the setting up of oneself and of one 's interlocutor as competent members 
of the community within which one is operating, fall s out directly from one' s uttering an 
expression which one 's interlocutor believes to be appropriate relati ve to the situation. The 
account outlined above also acco rds with the intuition that speaking polite ly constitutes the 
unmarked (less costly) way of speaking within a community in that it ascribes to 
interlocutors less cogniti ve process ing compared to Brown and Levinson's theOlY. Rather 
than moti vating an intermediate level of assumptions about the context-specific values of 
sociological variables such as D, P and R,,", immediately perceivable features about the 
situation now enter directly interl ocutors' assessments about po liteness. 
1.3 .4 The question of univers ality 
Considerations of language structure, hi story and use, all enter in politeness assessments. 
An eloquent example of thi s is provided by Braun 's (1988:58-9) di scussion of varieti es of 
American Spanish where - contrary to what is observed in many other languages, 
including Standard Spanish - the 2pJ. pronoun vos is considered to be less polite than the 
2sg. til. Investigating address systems in different languages , Braun is led to the conclusion 
that "the unde rlying forces of address behaviour [ .. . ) cannot always be summarised into the 
dimensions of status and di stance" (1988:42). Explaining the homogeneity of Brown and 
Gilman 's (1972(1 960]) findings in thi s domain , she points both to the "long and successful 
2~ This point is taken up in 5.3·4 below. 
25 5.4.S below elaborates on this point. 
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process of standardisation" (ibid.:24) which the languages they draw on have undergone, 
and to thei r restricted se lection of informants (upper-middle-class males from urban areas). 
A recent example of the interplay between structural , historical and usage factors in 
detelmining politeness assessments comes from French (Allen-Mi ll s 2000). French 
companies' attempts to encourage use of the familiar pronoun tu amongst company staff 
reportedly failed in the face of comments that France is not ready for "this kind of Anglo-
Saxon cheek." What the proponents of this move seem to have underestimated is both the 
hi story of English 'you' , which was initially the 2pl. pronoun contrasting with 'thou' , and 
the subsequent disp lacing of 'thou ' by 'you' , which has now become the universal form of 
address appropriate in all situations. French fll contrasts wi th the 2p l. pronoun VOllS, and as 
such is only appropriate in a limited number of situations. The two forms are therefore not 
equi valent in politeness connotations, a fact which can be traced back to their hi story, their 
current placement in the structural system of English and French respectively, and their use 
in terms of both the types and the number of communicative situations that they are 
appropriate to. 
There is, in other words , plenty of evidence to suggest that po liteness is a matter of 
language-specific and synchronically defined conventional (if underlying ly rational) 
beliefs, while universal ity has commonly been sought, most notably in the work of Brown 
and Levinson , in the direction of a rational principle of diachronic and cross-cultural 
applicability. Is there room for a synthesis between the two views? I would argue that there 
is. I base this claim on the observation that the linguistic means/strategies discussed by 
Brown and Levinson are associated with politeness functions in many languages, including 
the CG data on which the present study is based. Arguably, therefore, there is indeed 
something inherent in the linguistic strategies which Brown and Levinson identify that 
makes them suitable vehicles of politeness connotations. One may go so far as suggesting 
that this ' intrinsic' property is to be traced back to the two aspects of face as wants of the 
,elf (1.3. 1 above). 
Perhaps what is needed is a three-way distinction analogous to that drawn in the socia l 
sciences among structures, haJJitus, and practices (Bourdieu I 990:52ff.), a distinction 
which interposes between the 'fonnal' meaning potential of an expression as part of a 
system and in virtue of its relation to other forms in that system, and the 'actual ' meaning 
of that expression on an occasion of use, a level of socio-hi storically constrained preferred 
interpretations . As Bourdieu (1990: 139) notes: 
"While, on the one hand, it has to be shown, contrary to mechanistic obj ecti vism, that 
symbolic fonns have a logic and an efficacy of their own which make them relative ly 
autonomous with respect to the objective conditions apprehended in distributions, on 
the other hand it also has to be pointed out, contrary to margi nalist subjectivism, that 
the social order is not formed , like an election result or a market price, by simple 
mechanical addition of individual orders." 
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My proposal is therefore to consider the linguistic means/strategies di scussed by Brown 
and Levinson as "symbolic forms" whose potential a historically constituted "social order" 
transfO IlTIS into concrete possibilities - what appear to be conventional beliefs operati ve 
locall y and in real time. What this proposal amounts to empiricall y - and therefore one 
way of testing it - is that politeness realisations in different cultures should be best 
accounted for by appealing, rather than to a rational principle of diachronic and cross-
cultural applicability, to culture-specific frames , as introduced in 1.3.3 above, which bring 
extra-linguistic features of the situation in direct co- relation with part icular linguistic forms, 
thus capturing the (socio-historicall y establi shed) evaluati ve link between the two (5.4.3.3, 
6.5 below). The universal validity of this scheme depends on the ex tent to which a common 
core of extra-linguistic features of the situation can be shown to directly affect polite usage, 
while at the same time not reducing to an intennediate level of assumptions about 
sociological variables such as Brown and Levinson's D, P and Rx (B&L:76ff.) . This would 
provide grounds for arguing that these features are organised into "data-structures 
representing stereotyped situations", i.e. into frames, which are involved in the process ing 
of polite discourse. In other words, what would now be claimed to be universal wo uld be 
the mechanism, i.e. frames, and its component parts, wh ile the content of frames, the 
specific values filling in component slots, and therefore the politeness import of any 
particular linguistic means, can be expected to vary across cultures. The viabil ity of this 
proposal is ultimately a matter of the empirical investigation of politeness realisati ons in 
different cultures. The present study takes a step in this direction, fo llowing Glick's 
(1996: 167) injunction that "we need to tum to a more explicit investigat ion of the actual 
empirical facts associated with politeness in order to di scover the empirical bases for 
universal ising schemes of and for regularities of usage." 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
“Participant observation is only a fiction 
inasmuch as we treat it as an activity 
significantly different from that of the people 
under observation: we are participant observers 
only as far as we are also prepared to accept our 
informants’ right to the same title.”  
(Herzfeld 1987:90-1; original emphasis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Data collection and the choice of variables 
 
2.1 Brief description of the project 
In this chapter I outline the processes of data collection and analysis which led to the 
compilation of a corpus of conversational data from Cypriot Greek. This corpus 
provides the basis for testing the empirical validity of approaches to politeness proposed 
to date, and for proposing an alternative account in later chapters. Relevant data were 
extracted and analysed from a total of eighty one-hour-long audio tapes recorded using 
a Philips D6350 portable cassette recorder with a Sony ECM-150T condenser 
microphone, and seven two-hour-long video tapes used to record some of the television 
broadcasts analysed. This material was collected between October and December 1998 
in the four major towns of the Republic of Cyprus (Lefkosia, Lemesos, Larnaka and 
Pafos). Native speakers of CG of both sexes and from various socio-economic 
backgrounds were recorded in a variety of settings, classified under three general 
headings as: at home/informal social gatherings, at work (mainly offices and shops), 
and in formal discussions/on radio/TV (only unscripted broadcasts were used). To 
ensure the comparability of the data across settings, only adult speakers’ speech was 
taken into account. A total of six hundred and seventy-two informants took part in 
ninety-one sessions. Utterance-sequences realising offers or requests were subsequently 
identified and transcribed, yielding a database of 2,189 observations. Transcripts of data 
sessions are available in a bound hard copy (236pp.). 
 
 
2.2 Sampling 
Following in the steps of the Milroys’ Belfast studies (Milroy 1980:43ff.), informants 
were approached informally and in person by myself. As the initial sample consisting of 
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family and friends grew to include informants from a variety of socio-economic 
backgrounds and in different geographical areas, personal introduction following a 
friend’s recommendation (where possible) provided the opportunity for explicit 
reference to my Cypriot family background, which could not have otherwise been 
detected (this was only very marginally detectable on the basis of accent). In line with 
previous observations about the definition of in-group in contemporary Cypriot society 
(Terkourafi 1999:114), such reference helped establish a climate of trust as well as 
overcoming initial embarrassment by providing an opening topic for the conversation 
other than the research project itself. Occasionally, a purpose-obtained document from 
the Cypriot Ministry of Education granting official permission for the research was 
presented, as written evidence confirming the scientific interest of the project. This 
practice was adopted in the case of public institutions and large corporate companies 
(schools, branches of the Cyprus Electricity Authority, insurance companies, banks, 
radio and television stations). Permission to conduct a recording was always requested 
in advance, and the cassette recorder was kept visible at all times. When the recording 
session was taking place in a shop, permission was sought by the owner or 
salesperson(s) prior to the beginning of the session. Exceptionally, no permission was 
asked to record public group discussions or exchanges in the open-air market, because 
of the already established public character of these activities.  
The ‘friend of a friend’ sampling procedure, as described above, was preferred 
because it balances the demands of objectivity — which would call for a random 
selection of informants along the lines of Trudgill’s Norwich studies (Trudgill 
1974:20ff.) — against the need to ensure informant cooperation for a linguistic study in 
a community where, on the one hand, language has commonly been the focus of heated 
controversy (3.4.2-3 below), and, on the other hand, a personal appeal to help a friend 
has more chances of success than an appeal to contribute to an impersonal project.1 
Nevertheless, the informants recorded do not constitute a self-selecting sample for two 
reasons. First, efforts were explicitly directed at including as wide a range of ages and 
socio-economic backgrounds as possible. Second, given the importance Cypriots attach 
to interpersonal relationships, the linguistic interest of the study played little, if any, part 
in securing informants’ cooperation. 
 
 
2.3 Fieldwork strategy 
The fieldwork strategy adopted was participant observation (Milroy 1987:60ff.). As 
Milroy (ibid.:61) notes, “[f]or linguists, the main advantage of the method lies in its 
capacity to offset [...] the worst effects of the observer’s paradox.” In particular, two of 
                                                 
1 Elsewhere (Terkourafi 1999:113) I refer to this attitude as indicative of a Gemeinschaft type of social 
organisation (Scollon & Scollon 1995:135-7; George 1990). 
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the basic tenets of this technique were followed in the present study.2 First, speakers 
were recorded in groups rather than individually. Compared to evoking a situation 
during an interview or through a questionnaire, this process ensured the authenticity of 
the data since 
“the members of the group themselves exercise social constraint on one another’s 
language. It would be quite unacceptable for someone in the group to put on an act 
during the recording and use a form of language which was not normally used in 
that speech community or among the individual speakers.” (Nordberg 1980:7; 
quoted in Milroy 1987:63) 
This point is of particular importance for the present study, since the extra-linguistic 
variables whose impact on polite expression is being investigated crucially include 
features of the addressee and of the relationship between interlocutors. Second, 
considerable effort was devoted to breaking down the asymmetrical relationship 
between researcher and informant, by means of my participation in ongoing group 
activities and willingness to answer questions. My claim to a common cultural 
background and ability to partly take on the local accent facilitated this task. 
The use of the method of participant observation meant that a number of further 
considerations, beyond the authenticity of the data collected, could be satisfactorily 
dealt with. First, the resulting corpus of conversational data is homogeneous, in that it 
originates in face-to-face interaction (as opposed to telephone conversations or written 
replies to a questionnaire). My presence throughout all but eight hours of the recorded 
conversations readily satisfied further requirements, such as the observation of visual 
cues for the assessment of informants’ age and social class, and for the subsequent 
identification of speaker and addressee and of non-verbal uptakes during the 
transcription of the data. Finally, the availability of the data in recorded form enables us 
to follow the sequential unfolding of the discourse, crucially registering the occurrence 
of an uptake and intonational variety, and to detect accent changes which in general are 
indicative of standardisation tendencies (3.4.3 below). 
Recording sessions seldom lasted longer than an hour and each session took place 
in a different setting. While increasing the burden of promptly securing informants’ 
trust — the sampling procedure outlined earlier aimed at minimising this difficulty — 
this practice was dictated by the large number of extra-linguistic variables under 
investigation (2.7.1 below). Sessions generally proceeded as follows: once permission 
was granted, informants were instructed to carry on with their usual routine, a task more 
easily guaranteed in working environments. No fewer than two informants were present 
at any one time, numbers rising up to a dozen in work settings. Informants came and 
went freely during sessions. When not dictated by professional considerations, the topic 
of the conversation usually pertained to news items and various aspects of life in 
Cyprus; I made no effort to manipulate this in any way. References to personal issues 
                                                 
2Focussing on adolescent speech and using several fieldworkers were a priori excluded for the present 
study. 
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were avoided, as were indeed times and places where confidential matters would be 
discussed, e.g. private consultations in a bank or in the doctor’s surgery.3  
Information about the project was provided as requested. In the first instance, 
informants were told that data were being collected as part of a personal postgraduate 
project, and that the object of study was the use of language in urban settings. If further 
information was sought, they were told that this did not refer to dialectal features of the 
discourse, such as accent or lexical items, but rather to the negotiation of interpersonal 
relationships through language. Finally, they were told that the data would be analysed 
and quantified anonymously to be presented to a university in the UK. The provision of 
accurate and detailed information to informants was judged desirable on the following 
grounds. First, the naturalness and spontaneity of exchanges was enhanced by ensuring 
informants that their speech was being studied as a linguistic code in its own right and 
not in contrast with SMG, in other words that it was the regularities of their speech as 
such, and not the ways in which it deviated from the Athenian norm, that were of 
interest to this study. Promoting awareness of my own Cypriot roots and of the fact that 
the study would be submitted to a non-Greek institution further abated informants’ 
reservations in this respect. Moreover, since the method adopted did not involve 
conducting interviews or making use of a questionnaire, it was important to encourage 
informants to interact while minimally interfering with their usual routines, something 
which could only be achieved by making clear that it was such interaction that was of 
interest. Considering the importance of internal group dynamics for the control of 
stylistic level (cf. Nordberg’s remark quoted above), providing detailed information 
about the project was not felt to undermine the naturalness of the data. Given the 
informants’ lack of familiarity with linguistics as a discipline and with studies of 
spontaneous speech,4 rather than having biased the data obtained, the accuracy of the 
information provided contributed significantly toward overcoming the reservations and 
embarrassment generated by the novelty of the situation. 
 
 
2.4 Compiling the corpus 
The analysis of utterance-sequences from the data collected focuses on task-oriented 
verbal exchanges which present one with the possibility of immediate action and can be 
readily complied with in the course of the same session. Typically, this includes offers 
and requests for action (including verbal action), but excludes questions (i.e. 
information-seeking utterances which are not introduced by an illocutionary verb 
specifying the act performed by the speaker or to be performed by the addressee). For 
example, in (1) below, the interviewer’s utterance constitutes a request for verbal action 
                                                 
3 As a result of this and of informants’ awareness that they were being recorded, FTAs of high R 
(B&L:77-8) are virtually absent from the data collected. 
4 Spontaneous urban CG speech has not been previously recorded. Newton (1972b) recorded narratives 
in rural areas in 1963. 
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(“I would like you to tell us, Mr Nikolaidis, ... ?”), and, as such, it is included in the 
analysis.5 
(1) [88.03; On TV; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
prin mbume ston tropo me ton opion eksetazete, opos poli 
sosta ipete, i kaθe periptosi eCi tin IDieterotitan tis, 
Ta iTela na mas pite cirie nikolaiDi, ipete oti, molis 
xTes, proxTes, enimeroTicete? 
before enter-dep.-1pl. at-the-ACC. way-ACC. with the-ACC. which-ACC. examine-
ind.-2pl., as very correctly say-past-perf.-2pl., the-NOM. each case-NOM. have-ind.-
3sg. the-ACC. peculiarity-ACC. its, FP want-past-imperf.-1sg. SP us-GEN. tell-
dep.-2pl. Mr-VOC. nikolaidis-VOC., say-past-perf.-2pl. that, just yesterday, the-day-
before-yesterday, brief-pass.-past-perf.-2pl.? 
‘Before coming to the way in which you examine, as you said very correctly, each 
case is unique, I would like you to tell us, mister Nikolaidis, you said that, you were 
briefed only yesterday, or the day before?’ 
Had the interviewer sought to obtain the same information by means of a question (e.g. 
“You were briefed only yesterday?” or “When were you briefed?”), his utterance would 
not have counted as an observation under the present analysis. 
In classifying requests for verbal action alongside requests for non-verbal action 
and subsequently distinguishing these from questions, the current analysis departs from 
the traditional view which classifies questions under the class of directive speech acts 
(Searle 1996b[1979]:147-8; Bach & Harnish 1979:47-8; Allan 1986:199).6 This move is 
warranted by the following considerations. From a theoretical perspective, requests for 
verbal action are more like speech acts of the directive class in that they have 
compliance conditions, whereas questions have answerhood conditions (Harnish 
1994:415; Vanparys 1996:35).7 Therefore, speakers’ choice between a question and a 
request for verbal action is significant and the two cannot be conflated without some 
loss in descriptive accuracy. Utterance-sequences selected for analysis thus exhibit a 
certain homogeneity of content along the lines of a very general distinction between 
action-focussing and information-focussing utterances, the latter characteristically not 
encoding features of the discourse situation in any interesting way. From a practical 
point of view, this move ensures that selected utterances are addressed to one specific 
addressee (rather than anyone capable of providing the information sought), so that s/he 
may be identified for the purposes of the analysis. Utterances addressed to more than 
                                                 
5 Arabic numerals in brackets number examples. “88.03” means session 88, observation 03. Examples are 
followed by a word-per-word translation and a gloss (in single inverted commas). Expressions discussed 
in the text are italicised in the original, as well as in the translation and the gloss. See the Table of 
Symbols and Abbreviations and 2.5 below for transcription conventions. 
6 Labov and Fanshel (1977:64) point out the ambiguous use of the term ‘question’ to refer equally to 
interrogative utterances, requests for information and expressions of doubt. 
7 The analysis of questions as a class of speech acts in their own right, distinct from statements and 
directives, is also proposed by John Lyons (p.c.), who draws attention to the felicitous performance of 
unanswerable and Socratic questions for which a definition as “requests for information” would be 
misleading (Lyons 1995:254; Récanati 1987:158; Sperber & Wilson 1995[1986]:249-54; Vanparys 
1996:73). 
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one participant were discarded, as the plural number used in such cases is literal (on the 
variable of number & person of verb forms, see 2.7.2.4 below). 
The distinction between utterances which have different ‘satisfaction’ conditions 
(answerhood vs. compliance) emanates from the notion of ‘direction of fit’ (Searle 
1996b:142; Harnish 1994:415). Prioritising this notion in his analysis, Récanati 
(1987:157ff.) contrasts performative acts to constative acts. Utterance-sequences 
constituting the present corpus fall under the category of performatives, which exhibit 
the world-to-words direction of fit, and may be broadly distinguished into directives and 
commissives. These are defined as “performative acts involving an agent, to be 
distinguished according to the specific agent (speaker or hearer) responsible for 
bringing about the state of affairs referred to” (Récanati 1987:160). 
In Récanati’s (1987:163) analysis, the distinction between directives and 
commissives is achieved with reference to the intention that the speaker expresses by 
means of his/her utterance, and not on the basis of the utterance’s propositional content 
(but see 2.7.1.2 below). The notion of an uptake, which registers the addressee’s 
recognition of the speaker’s intention, is thus central to the present analysis. Austin 
(1962:115-6; original emphasis) introduces this as follows: 
“An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried 
out. [...] Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the 
meaning and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary 
act involves the securing of uptake.” 
Subsequent analyses of speech acts downplayed the importance of this notion, to the 
point that the unit of linguistic communication has been identified with “the production 
or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act” 
(Searle 1969:16) without any reference to the addressee’s uptake whatsoever. At the 
opposite end, Mey (1993:251) writes  
“What is important is not what a speaker (more or less arbitrarily) decides to 
question, order, request, etc., but the effects the ‘speech acts’ in question (however 
widely interpreted) have on the development of the conversational interaction.” 
Evidence that, rather than any inherent meaning, linguistic strategies possess a 
potentiality of meaning, which may be exploited according to the context, the 
conversational styles of participants and the interaction of their styles and strategies 
(Tannen 1994:23-4), has led to remarks that “[s]peaker’s meaning is a type of intention 
that can be discharged only through joint actions” (Clark 1996:139). The addressee’s 
uptake constitutes the second part of an act jointly performed by the speaker and the 
addressee (Clark 1996:198). Introducing the addressee once more into the picture 
allows us to study the interactional norms that s/he shares with the speaker (1.1, 1.3.3 
above). Furthermore, by constituting evidence of the addressee’s understanding of the 
speaker’s utterance (Clark 1996:200), the addressee’s uptake (verbal or non verbal) can 
help us identify the type of speech act that has taken place, a process commonly 
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referred to as “validation through ‘next turn’” (Peräkylä 1997:209). As Goffman 
(1976:279) notes, 
“what is available to the student (as also to the actual participant) is not the 
possibility of predicting forward from a statement to a reply — as we might a 
cause to its effects — but rather quite a different prospect, that of locating in what 
is said now the sense of what it is a response to.” 
Goffman goes on to note the importance of the addressee’s perception of the phrasal 
stress, facial gestures, and body orientation of the speaker in determining the former’s 
understanding of the latter’s utterance. This information, as well as the addressee’s 
background knowledge of the events at hand, is made accessible to us through his/her 
uptake. 
The present study takes the addressee’s uptake into account in three ways. First, 
this helps to determine the type of speech act performed. The occurrence of an uptake 
thus guards against potential bias on the part of the researcher to associate specific 
constructions with particular speech acts. Second, it helps identify the addressee, when 
this is not possible with reference to the speech-act-designating utterance. Third, 
speech-act-designating utterances which constitute (part of) the uptake are analysed 
separately (i.e. under ‘uptake’, see plate 1). This is because, coming in response to the 
original speaker’s utterance, the addressee’s choice of expression in the uptake is often 
conditioned by that of the original speaker, and must be assessed in relation to, rather 
than independently of it. For example, in (2), the interviewee’s compliance with the 
interviewer’s requests replicates not only her choice of the subjunctive mood and of the 
first person plural, but also her choice of verb (‘to start’). 
(2) [1.3,4; On the radio; Speaker1: female, 31-50, middle-class; Speaker2: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer (S1) to interviewee (S2)] 
S1: na ksecinisume ap' afto nomizo etsi? [na mas to eksiji- 
S2:         [e (.) na ksecinisume ap' afto 
S1: SP start-dep.-1pl. from this-ACC. think-ind.-1sg., so? [SP us-GEN. it-ACC. expl- 
S2:           [e (.) SP start-dep.-1pl. from this-ACC. 
S1: ‘Let’s start from this, shall we? [Would you explain it to us’ 
S2:     ‘[er (.) Let’s start from this’ 
In sum, the current analysis combines the theoretical apparatus of speech act theory 
(in distinguishing questions from directives, and defining directives and commissives; 
2.7.2.1 below) with insights from conversation analysis (the notion of ‘uptake’), in an 
effort to draw generalisable conclusions based on actual conversational data.8 
 
 
2.5 A note on transcription 
Transcription conventions are based on Sacks et al. (1974:731-4; see Table of Symbols 
and Abbreviations). A period in parenthesis “(.)” indicates brief silences. Longer 
silences are marked “((pause))”. Rising intonation, non-standard accentuation of lexical 
                                                 
8 Van Rees (1992) discusses the advantages of this approach over a singularly conversation-analytic one. 
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items, and emphatic rises in pitch are indicated, but intonational patterns are otherwise 
not transcribed. The segments of CG speech are rendered by IPA symbols, yielding a 
semi-phonological transcription, which does not represent post-lexical processes. This 
ensures that the phonological image of lexical items is preserved, while 
sociolinguistically significant information, such as accent shifts indicative of 
standardisation tendencies, is obtainable. 
 
 
2.6 Objectives of the data analysis 
The analysis of the data collected aims to reveal which theoretical framework accounts 
for them accurately and economically. The starting point for this investigation will be 
Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness (1987; 1.2.2 above), in particular their 
predictions regarding the combined effect of interlocutors’ assumptions about Distance, 
Power and Ranking of the imposition on the choice of specific strategies ranked along a 
scale of increasing indirectness. There are at least two reasons for focussing on Brown 
and Levinson’s theory when analysing empirical data.9 First, Brown and Levinson 
present us with a thoroughly worked out theoretical proposal about how sociological 
variables relate to linguistic ones, a proposal which stems from their analysis of 
empirical evidence from three genetically unrelated languages, and as such should be 
readily applicable to the analysis of further cross-linguistic evidence. Second, their 
theory has been perhaps the most influential within the field of politeness studies since 
it was first put forward in 1978. A large body of studies pertaining to the expression of 
politeness in various languages have been conducted within their framework, or have at 
least taken it as their point of departure.10 As Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1997:11) put it, “it is 
impossible to talk about [politeness] without referring to Brown and Levinson’s 
theory”. If reasonable doubt can be established as to whether politeness assessments in 
CG are guided by interlocutors’ assumptions regarding Distance, Power and Ranking of 
the imposition — Brown and Levinson’s three sociological variables — the details of 
an alternative proposal will turn out to be well worth exploring. 
At this point, one may want to object that Brown and Levinson’s theory was never 
intended as a psychologically plausible account of politeness assessments made in the 
course of actual conversations by speakers of a language, but merely as a theoretical 
post facto explanation of the observed facts. However, on closer scrutiny this objection 
turns out to be untenable: Brown and Levinson explicitly discuss the formula yielding 
                                                 
9 Other approaches to politeness proposed to date are briefly outlined in 1.2 above. 
10 A non-exhaustive list includes: Arundale 1999; de Ayala 2001; Bayraktaroglu 1992a, 1992b; Blum-
Kulka 1987a, 1990; Boutoulousi 1994; Calvo & Geluykens 1994; Carrell & Konneker 1981; Chen 2001; 
Culpeper 1996; Georgiadou 1997; Glick 1996; Gu 1990; Hayashi 1996; Held 1989; Hernandez-Flores 
1999; Hill et al. 1986; Holmes 1988; Ide 1989; Jary 1998; Kong 1998; Mao 1994; Matsumoto 1988, 
1989; Mehrotra 1995; Meier 1995; Nwoye 1992; Pavlidou 1991, 1994; Rhodes 1989; Scollon & Scollon 
1983; Sifianou 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Snow et al. 1990; Subbaraq et al. 1991; 
Turner 1996, 1999; Tzanne 1995; Werkhofer 1992. 
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Wx as “at least a partially accurate representation of cognitive process” (B&L:81). 
Moreover, they attribute specific assumptions to the speaker regarding the social 
distance between himself and the hearer, the power of the hearer over him, and the 
culture-dependent ranking of the FTA in question (B&L:74-5); while the speaker’s 
choice of expression is modelled as a decision-making process along the lines of a 
specific mode of reasoning about means and ends (B&L:64-5). As Eelen (1999:64; 
original emphasis) notes, “[Brown and Levinson’s] theory is in fact about real human 
beings, and the wants and rationality characteristics of the Model Person are attributed 
psychological reality”. 
The objectives of the current analysis may therefore be spelt out as follows: first, to 
test whether the definitions of Distance, Power and Ranking of the imposition 
(B&L:76-8) are ‘operationalisable’; by this, I mean whether a consistent way of 
assessing the values of these variables across situations can be established for CG, such 
that interlocutors may plausibly be said to appeal to these dimensions rather than any 
others in making decisions about politeness. This first test essentially amounts to 
checking the falsifiability of Brown and Levinson’s theory. A second objective is to test 
the psychological plausibility of their theory. More specifically, one may question 
whether interlocutors indeed undertake the amount of cognitive processing which 
Brown and Levinson’s framework implies in postulating that interlocutors appeal to an 
intermediate level of assumptions about D, P and Rx, which follows the perception of 
extra-linguistic reality and precedes politeness assessments. If an alternative approach 
can be found which accounts for the CG data, while assigning less cognitive processing 
to interlocutors by allowing for the perception of the situation to be directly linked to 
politeness assessments, then, on this latter count, it should be preferred. 
 
 
2.7 Choice of variables 
A number of linguistic devices are available in Modern Greek for the performance of 
offers and requests (Sifianou 1992a:125ff.). The present analysis takes into account: the 
presence or not of a verb predicating an act A of the speaker or of the addressee, the 
type of main-clause verb, the subjective modality expressed by it, and the combination 
of number+person for which it is marked, as well as the contribution of address terms, 
diminutives, and of the lexical items liγo, ‘a little’, and parakalo, ‘please’, to the 
politeness import of the speech-act-realising utterance. Although in principle it may be 
possible to relate each of these to one or more of Brown and Levinson’s politeness 
strategies (B&L:91ff.), the complex interplay between their politeness potentials as a 
result of their co-occurrence in the same utterance makes this a dubious, if not self-
defeating, task.11 Such a classification of the politeness import of an utterance would 
                                                 
11 Terkourafi (1999:110-2) discusses this point with reference to diminutives. On the difficulties of 
assessing indirectness see 4.1.3, 4.1.4, 7.3.1-4 below. 
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level the subtlety of expression afforded by each of the possible combinations of these 
devices, thereby a priori assuming that such combinations are in some way equivalent, 
and can therefore be used interchangeably according to the requirements of Brown and 
Levinson’s proposed formula for computing the weightiness of an FTAx (B&L:76-8). 
Aiming precisely to test the validity of this assumption, the present study refrains from 
taking this step. Rather, the CG conversational data are used to put Brown and 
Levinson’s predictions to the test.  
Brown and Levinson claim that the degree of indirectness opted for by a speaker in 
realising an FTA is commensurate with the sum of the values that the speaker assigns to 
the variables of Distance, Power, and Ranking of the imposition for that FTA, i.e. D, P 
and Rx are subjectively assessed by each participant. To test this claim, it is desirable to 
propose a way of assessing the values of these variables which remains consistent 
across a group, i.e. which is not (wholly) idiosyncratic. For if this requirement for 
consistency is given up, not only does Brown and Levinson’s theory become 
unfalsifiable, it also becomes hard to explain how two interlocutors may agree on their 
assessment of the FTA-specific values of D, P and Rx, and therefore perceive each other 
to be polite, if not wholly by coincidence. It will therefore be a fundamental assumption 
held throughout this thesis that extra-linguistic features of the communicative situation, 
such as the sex, age, and social class of the speaker and of the addressee, the 
relationship between them, the setting of the exchange, and whether the speech act 
performed occurs for the first time or is repeated, may be drawn upon to assess the 
situation-specific values of D, P and Rx, in accordance with Brown and Levinson’s 
definitions of these variables (B&L:76-8). In what follows, extra-linguistic features of 
the situation are referred to as independent variables and the linguistic devices opted for 
as dependent ones. A more general aim of the analysis is to spell out the existing 
relationships between these components of the speech situation for CG (Hymes 
1972:66). 
 
 
2.7.1 Independent variables 
2.7.1.1.The kind of speech act 12 
The present analysis is concerned with two classes of performative speech acts: a 
generic class of requests, referring to states of affairs desirable from the speaker’s point 
of view, and a generic class of offers, referring to states of affairs desirable from the 
addressee’s point of view. Usually, but not always, the responsibility for bringing about 
the state of affairs referred to lies with the addressee for requests, and with the speaker 
for offers. 
                                                 
12 For present purposes, the kind of speech act performed constitutes an independent variable, insofar as 
it determines the values of the dependent variables (2.7.2 below), and is not determined by them. This 
should not be taken to mean that its own value is determined independently of other factors, such as the 
addressee’s uptake (2.4 above). 
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Compared to definitions of offers and requests within existing classificatory 
accounts, the above definitions combine theoretical motivation with empirical 
implementability. Classifications of speech acts generally follow one of two directions: 
some specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for different types 
of speech acts (Searle 1969, Labov & Fanshel 1977, Bach & Harnish 1979, Hancher 
1979, Allan 1986, Récanati 1987), whereas others propose a classification of speech act 
verbs13 according to their propositional content and/or the syntactic complements which 
they may take (Austin 1962, Verschueren 1980, Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1981, 
Pavlidou 1987, Vanparys 1996). Neither of these proposals is unproblematic. In fact, 
the possibility of reaching a universally valid classification of speech acts remains itself 
an open question (Lyons 1995:251) which cannot be settled independently of challenges 
to the Wittgensteinian dictum that there is an indefinite number of things people can do 
with words (Searle 1996b:155). 
Classifications of speech acts following the first direction have variously 
prioritised one of the following criteria: illocutionary point, psychological state, 
perlocutionary intention, direction of fit, content restrictions, or preparatory conditions. 
Critics of this view start by suggesting a number of properties, emanating from set-
theoretical laws, that any classification must meet (Ballmer & Brennestuhl 1981:58-9; 
Vanparys 1996:26). Classifications of speech acts along the aforementioned lines, they 
argue, fail to exhibit some or all of these properties, and should be rejected as 
inadequate.14  On the other hand, a classification of speech act verbs based on speakers’ 
intuitions about their meaning (Ballmer & Brennestuhl 1981:19), or on actual usage 
(Vanparys 1996:127ff.) can help reach “the ultimate goal, a classification of illocutions” 
(Vanparys 1996:133). Such an analysis is first and foremost an analysis of an area of a 
language’s lexicon, and as such it must be attempted anew for every language studied. 
Theoretical preoccupations aside, this option is not currently open to an analysis of CG 
illocutions, the only work currently available for (standard) Greek (Pavlidou 1987) 
being limited in scope as to both the material studied (performative verbs and 
expressions), and the classification criteria used (valency relations). 
However, in the days following the abandonment of the performativity hypothesis, 
the practical value of a classification of speech act verbs in guiding us toward a 
classification of spontaneous illocutions seems itself open to question. For explicit 
performatives are seldom used in conversation. Rather, their primary conversational 
function is to clarify one’s intentions, as in exchanges of the type “Are you asking me?” 
“No, I guess I’m telling you”. As many theorists have since noticed, speech acts are 
essentially pragmatic events and can be studied only as such (Leech 1980:84-5; Allan 
1986:280). In other words, an adequate specification of their force is possible only after 
                                                 
13 Not all speech act verbs can be used performatively (consider *I boast that ... , *I threaten that ... ). 
Performative verbs constitute a proper subset of the class of speech act verbs (Verschueren 1980:3-18). 
14 See Vanparys (1996:27ff.) for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature. 
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they have actually occurred (sometimes not even then, as requests for clarification 
demonstrate). Consequently, an appeal to a speech act verb when none is present, in 
order to describe the illocutionary force of a speech act, would constitute an undesirable 
interference with the facts on the part of the analyst (Leech 1980:99).15  
As a result, we seem compelled to appeal to a generic notion of speakers’ 
intentions, which, variously construed, have motivated classifications of the first type. 
Drawing on previous definitions of directive and commissive acts (Searle 1996b:147-8; 
Bach & Harnish 1979:47-51; Allan 1986:195-7, 199-200), we may formulate the 
traditional distinction between them as follows: directives express the attitude of the 
speaker towards some future act of the addressee, along with his/her intention that 
his/her utterance be taken as reason for the addressee to act, while commissives express 
the speaker’s commitment to a future course of action, specified in the propositional 
content of his/her utterance, along with the intention that his/her utterance be taken as 
reason for the addressee to believe that s/he commits him/herself to this course of 
action. These definitions include a reference to the propositional content of the 
utterance, echoing Searle’s suggestion of a propositional content condition (Searle 
1969:63; Bach & Harnish 1979:55-7). However, a common way to perform a request is 
to state one’s desire: 
(3) [74.2; Informal social gathering; Speaker: female, over 51, middle-class; Addressee: 
male, over 51, middle-class; Relationship: friends] 
θelo liƒon neron, arjire 
want-ind.-1sg. a-little water-ACC., Arjiros-VOC. 
‘Arjire, I’d like some water.’ 
Similarly, an offer may be performed by predicating a future act of the addressee: 
(4) [76.33; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: colleagues] 
xristo pinis kafe? 
Christos-VOC. drink-ind.-2sg. coffee-ACC.? 
‘Christo, will you have some coffee?’ 
Judgements about their indirectness notwithstanding, (3) is intuitively classified as a 
request and (4) as an offer, even though the act (of providing the water) requested of the 
addressee in (3) remains implicit, and so does the act (of providing the coffee) to which 
the speaker commits himself in (4). The present analysis, then, will follow Récanati’s 
(1987:163) suggestion that “[any] proposition whatever can be the content of a directive 
                                                 
15 This is not the type of analysis proponents of classifications of the second type have in mind anyway. 
Rather, their intention is to study in detail the semantic dimensions involved in the expression of 
illocutionary force cross-linguistically, so as to explore the possibility of establishing a universal set 
(more likely, a universal core) of speech acts. Nevertheless, any study of speech act verbs takes as its 
starting point the fact that the meaning of the verb can be asserted in an unqualified manner on an 
occasion by the speaker. Lyons’s caution regarding the non-existence of the indicative mood in some of 
the world’s languages (1995:178-9, 332) may prove to be an insuperable obstacle in this respect. 
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or a commissive; it suffices that the speaker’s utterance express his intention that the 
addressee (or the speaker), by virtue of this utterance expressing this intention, behave 
in such a way as to make the proposition true.” The act requested of the addressee or 
committed to by the speaker can subsequently be inferred on the basis of background 
knowledge about the structure of events (Bach & Harnish 1979:76ff.). 
If an offer or a request may be performed by focussing on either participant, 
including the opposing one of the actual ‘locus of action’ (meaning the participant 
responsible for bringing about the state of affairs referred to), identifying such locus of 
action is not always a straightforward affair. Consider (5): 
(5) Take a vacation. 
Addressed by one spouse to the other during a conversation about the importance of 
spending quality time together, (5) could be interpreted as a request, and the 
responsibility for bringing about the state of affairs referred to would lie with the 
addressee. Addressed, however, by an employer to an employee, the responsibility for 
bringing about the state of affairs referred to would lie with the speaker. Moreover, 
were the employer content with the employee’s performance, (5) could be interpreted as 
an offer, which the addressee could, in turn, accept or decline; but were the employer 
discontent with the employee’s performance, (5) could be intended as a command, and 
indeed asserted as such if challenged. Knowledge of the intonational contour of the 
utterance, and of the situation in which it was uttered is therefore required to infer its 
illocutionary force. The addressee’s uptake can also be of help in this respect, by 
demonstrating his/her intuitive understanding of the speaker’s utterance, and thus 
providing grounds for further clarification should the illocutionary force perceived 
diverge from the one intended. That this interpretation is along the correct lines is 
shown by the fact that (6) and (7) below can be used by the aforementioned employee to 
report this exchange to a friend. 
(6) The boss was pleased with my work and offered me a vacation. 
(7) The boss was worried about my work and ordered me to take a vacation. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from this discussion. First, the illocutionary force 
of an utterance can be determined by the analyst only post facto, that is, when 
information about its intonational contour, context of utterance, and the addressee’s 
uptake is available. This is merely another way of stating the widely accepted fact that 
speech acts are pragmatic events (Allan 1994:4132). Second, the distinction between 
commissive and directive acts may sometimes depend not so much on which of the two 
participants is responsible for bringing about the state of affairs referred to (pace 
Récanati 1987:163) as on to whom (the speaker or the addressee) this state of affairs is 
desirable. The present analysis thus departs from Récanati (1987; 2.4 above) in taking 
the propositional content of the utterance into account, since this is necessary to 
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determine the ‘locus of desirability’ of the speech act. As the two different 
interpretations of (5) rendered by (6) and (7) above demonstrate, the illocutionary force 
inferred based on the ‘locus of desirability’ of the speech act may on occasion be 
different from the illocutionary force inferred based on which of the two participants is 
responsible for bringing about the state of affairs referred to. In such cases, the 
illocutionary force inferred based on which of the two participants constitutes the locus 
of desirability appears to yield the intuitively correct result, and should therefore take 
precedence. 
If the preceding discussion settles the issue of distinguishing commissive from 
directive acts in the data, the question of distinguishing between subtypes of directive 
acts remains. The relevant speech acts in the data are requests and commands. 
Traditionally, these are distinguished by appealing to the power relationship between 
interlocutors (Searle 1969:70). A command is issued when the speaker’s utterance is to 
be taken as sufficient reason for the addressee to act, while a request is performed when 
the speaker’s attitude, as expressed in his/her utterance, is to be taken as reason for the 
addressee to act (Bach & Harnish 1979:47-9). On an alternative definition, a request, as 
opposed to a command, explicitly concedes to the addressee the right of non-
compliance (Lyons 1995:255). Theoretically motivated as this distinction may be, in 
practice it becomes hard to apply, especially in work settings. We are here in danger of 
classifying all directives by speakers of higher power as commands, while on occasion 
the addressee may have the option of non-compliance — an option which, unless s/he 
chooses to take as manifested by his/her uptake, we as analysts will have never known 
to have been available. The difference between requests and commands being one of 
strength (Searle 1996b:143, Hancher 1979:2), different tokens of each act may occupy 
different positions on the strength continuum, making a categorical distinction between 
them difficult, if not impossible, to draw. It then seems preferable to follow Labov & 
Fanshel (1977:78, original emphasis; cf. ibid.:63-4), who use the term ‘request’ 
generically as follows: 
“RULE FOR REQUESTS 
If A addresses to B an imperative specifying an action X at time T1, and B believes 
that A believes that  
1a. X should be done (for a purpose Y) [need for the action ] 
  b. B would not do X in the absence of the request [need for the request ] 
2.   B has the ability to do X (with an instrument Z) 
3.   B has the obligation to do X or is willing to do it. 
4.   A has the right to tell B to do X, 
then A is heard as making a valid request for action. 
Subtypes of requests in the data can subsequently be distinguished on the basis of the 
interaction between the dependent variables (2.7.2 below), the variable of the order of 
occurrence of the speech act (2.7.1.2 below) and the addressee’s uptake (2.4 above), 
which subsume the additional distinctions drawn by these authors on the basis of 
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mitigation or aggravation of expression (direct versus indirect requests) and of the 
conversational handling of requests (putting off, relaying, embedding or reinstating 
requests). To replicate this information under the variable of the type of speech act 
performed would be not only redundant, but also misleading, since it would create the 
false impression that subtypes of requests can be distinguished independently of a 
number of other factors. 
The methodological decision to currently distinguish between offers and requests 
along a general dimension of desirability (to the speaker or to the addressee) of an act 
predicated of the speaker or of the addressee in an utterance of a sentence (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995[1986]:250-1) is supported by empirical evidence which suggests that 
speech-act theoretical descriptions play no actual role in comprehension (Good MS, 
reported in Geis 1995:31).16 As (5)-(7) above, and (8)-(9) below from the CG data 
show, even direct formulations are not uniquely associated with particular illocutionary 
forces. Both (8) and (9) use the imperative vale, ‘put-imp.-perf.-2sg.’; yet (8) is 
interpreted as an offer, while (9) as a request, based on the propositional content 
expressed each time jointly with other features of the situational context. The 
desirability of an act predicated of the speaker or of the addressee can be inferred based 
on the propositional content of the utterance and features of the situational context, even 
if the illocutionary force of the utterance cannot be further clarified.17 
(8) [80.3; At home; Speaker: female, 18-30, middle-class; Addressee: female, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationship: friends] 
marina, vale fai 
marina-VOC., put-imp.-perf.-2sg. food-ACC. 
‘Marina, help yourself’ 
(9) [89.6; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, working-class. Addressee: female, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationship: salesperson to new customer] 
ela vale mila ftina 
come-imp.-perf.-2sg. put-imp.-perf.-2sg. apples-ACC. cheap-ACC. 
‘Come and buy cheap apples’ 
 
2.7.1.2. The order of occurrence of the speech act 
Labov and Fanshel (1977:93) remark that, “[a]n appropriate use of requests involves 
more than the form: the timing of the request is also important”. In fact, the form of a 
request is not independent of its timing: 
“Because repeated requests are an aggravated form of criticism, challenging the 
other’s competence quite sharply, it is common practice for speakers to mitigate 
their repetitions by varying their form. [...] This principle applies to requests 
                                                 
16 Sperber and Wilson (1995:244-5) base their critique of speech-act theory on a similar argument. 
17 Capturing this intuition, Thomas (2000) proposes to distinguish utterances which are ‘ambivalent’ (i.e. 
which make clear the perlocutionary effect sought by the speaker, but not the illocutionary force of 
his/her utterance) from those which are ‘indirect’ (i.e. which do not make clear what is the perlocutionary 
effect sought by the speaker). 
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repeated after B has responded to the first request by refusing or putting it off, as 
well as to the case where B has not responded at all.”(Labov & Fanshel 1977:95) 
Repetitions of the first type have been termed ‘emphatic’ or ‘emotive’, and are 
attributed to internal factors (the emotive urge in the speaker), while repetitions caused 
by failure to elicit a response are classified as ‘purposive’ (Persson 1974:89, 160ff). The 
present study distinguishes between the following possibilities: a) the first occurrence 
of the speech act is immediately followed by an uptake (verbal or non verbal), or b) it is 
not, which sometimes causes c) repetition of the speech act, until uptake (preferably 
compliance) is secured. The repetitions we are presently concerned with arise under 
possibility c): they are pragmatic repetitions, defined as such on the basis of identity of 
illocutionary force (Merlini Barbaresi 1996:105), and realised as self-repetitions, where 
any number of turns may elapse between the original speech act and its repetition. 
2.7.1.3 The participants’ sex, age, and social class 
The participants’ sex, age, and social class were noted during the collection of the data. 
Visually assessing interlocutors’ sex is relatively straightforward in the large majority 
of cases. A speaker or an addressee will be male or female. Assessments of age, in the 
absence of prior information about it, are approximate. In the present study adult 
informants are classified in three age groups: 18 to 30, 31 to 50, and over 50. These 
correspond to major turning points in an individual’s personal social and professional 
development. As it happens, the above distinction also registers the occurrence of major 
historical events in the history of Cyprus. The over 50s group would have been at least 
entering adolescence by the time the island became an independent state in 1960, 
whereas the group of those between 31 and 50 would have had little, if any, direct 
experience of the old regime. Finally, informants aged 30 years or younger would have 
been no older than five at the time of the Turkish invasion of 1974, which once more 
changed the political situation on the island. In any case, it is the relative ages of 
speaker and addressee (whether one perceives one’s addressee to be of the same age, 
younger or older) that is most relevant to assessments of politeness, and for that purpose 
interlocutors commonly rely on approximate estimates on the basis of visual evidence. 
The variable of social class, on the other hand, is notoriously difficult to study 
(Milroy 1987:29ff.). In aiming for as accurate a distinction as the occasional absence of 
prior information about informants would allow, the present study draws a general 
distinction between two groups: working- and middle-class. However, no unitary 
criterion was found that could afford one with the correct predictions. Criteria currently 
appealed to include information about one’s profession, level of education, or financial 
capacity. On the few occasions when such information was unavailable, one’s 
appearance and non-verbal behaviour provided indications as to the value of this 
variable. Nonetheless, since interlocutors appear to handle exchanges with complete 
strangers without noticeable difficulty, an appeal to such superficial evidence may not 
be completely unwarranted methodologically, as it probably mirrors the actual 
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procedure followed by interlocutors in the above case. As such, the success of this 
move is not independent of the researcher’s native intuitions about the linguistic 
community under study. 
 
2.7.1.4 The setting of the exchange 
Hymes (1972:58ff.) uses the term ‘setting’ to refer to “the time and place of the speech 
act and, in general, to the physical circumstances.” Following Aijmer (1996), the 
conversational settings presently studied are grouped under three general headings: at 
home/informal social gatherings, at work (shops and offices), and in formal discussions 
/on radio/TV. The channel of communication (Hymes 1972:61-2) invariably consists in 
face-to-face oral interaction, realised as unscripted conversation between native Cypriot 
Greek speakers. 
The interactional importance of setting may be traced back to two reasons. First, 
the types of participants (and non-participants) one may expect to find in different 
settings will vary. Clark (1996:14-5) distinguishes between ‘participants’, including 
side participants, and all other listeners (eavesdroppers and bystanders), whom he 
defines as ‘overhearers’. Each of the settings presently studied will normally be 
associated with some of these categories. Clark (1996:15) comments that “side 
participants and overhearers help shape how speakers and addressees act toward each 
other”. The interactional significance of the presence of an audience is also noted by 
Brown and Levinson (B&L:16) who, nevertheless, do not comment further on how the 
presence of an audience influences the assessment of the three sociological variables. 
Setting is interactionally important for the further reason that it helps delimit 
participants’ social roles, and the duties and obligations that are presumed to go with 
them (Goffman 1976:294; Schiffrin 1994:104; Scollon & Scollon 1995:34). The actions 
that a participant can be legitimately expected to perform may, as a result, involve little 
verbal negotiation, often taking place with little or no verbal input from either 
participant. On the other hand, participants generally refrain from performing actions 
that fall within another’s duties, and if they do so, greater verbal negotiation is involved 
(as when one of the participants in a formal discussion asks the co-ordinator of the 
discussion for the right to speak). Such roles, being socially constructed, rather than 
factual, can subsequently assume an existence of their own, independently of the setting 
of the exchange, and be invoked with the same consequences as if the current setting 
was the one that originally motivated their ascription. Hymes (1972:60) refers to “the 
cultural definition of an occasion as a certain type of scene” as its “psychological 
setting” which is distinct from its physical counterpart. However, “[s]ince scene implies 
always an analysis of cultural definitions, setting probably is to be preferred as the 
informal, unmarked term for the two” (ibid.). An analysis of cultural definitions in 
terms of this last remark would introduce a fair amount of subjective interpretation of 
the facts on behalf of the analyst, and is not currently undertaken for this reason. Rather, 
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the present study confines itself to studying the impact of physical setting on the verbal 
enactment of politeness, while at the same time attempting to capture to an extent the 
distinction between physical and psychological setting by a reference to the relationship 
between participants. 
 
2.7.1.5 The relationship between participants 
As defined in the present study, the relationship between interlocutors combines the 
variables of the social distance between participants, and of the power of the hearer over 
the speaker (B&L:74ff.). The reason for this decision lies with the observation that 
participants’ assessments of these variables proceed in parallel, rather than 
independently of one another (Holtgraves & Yang 1990:725; Watts et al. 1992:9; 
Tannen & Kakava 1992:13).18 The interdependence of power and distance can in fact 
be traced back to Brown and Levinson’s definitions of these variables. The hearer’s 
power over the speaker is defined as “the degree to which H can impose his own plans 
and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S’s plans and self-evaluation” and 
emanates from “material control (over economic distribution and physical force) and 
metaphysical control (over the actions of others, by virtue of metaphysical forces 
subscribed to by those others)” (B&L:77). Thus defined, P is, under normal 
circumstances,19 not wholly unrelated to the frequency of interaction between 
interlocutors, which constitutes a criterion for assessing the social distance between 
them (ibid.). Note here that, trivially, assessments of power and distance cannot come 
into existence independently of each other: the possibility of control is created the 
moment one becomes aware of the possibility of interaction. 
Following these considerations, a more direct way of referring to the relationship 
between participants was sought, in order to register the possible values of this variable 
with the greatest possible detail, while ensuring that generalisation, i.e. abstraction from 
the facts, may still be possible at a later stage. The following possibilities are 
distinguished: members of the same family, friends, acquaintances, long-standing 
colleagues, new colleagues, long-standing customer and shop-attendant/waiter, new 
customer and shop-attendant/waiter, long-standing superior and subordinate, newly-
collaborating superior and subordinate, member of the audience and speaker, 
interviewer and interviewee, complete strangers. 
There are two reasons for preferring such a faithful representation of the facts. 
First, it helps avoid arbitrary decisions on behalf of the analyst. For example, whether 
the power of the customer or the shop-attendant is greater in a shop setting may remain 
                                                 
18 Pace B&L:80-1. The alleged independence of D, P, and Rx fails, in my view, to be demonstrated by the 
examples which they furnish, alternative explanations for which include, among others, a difference in 
speakers’ sociolects, currently studied as a separate variable of social class (2.7.1.3 above). 
19 Exceptionally, the hearer’s high power over the speaker is established independently of any prior 
interaction, as when the hearer is carrying a weapon, is a head of state, or carries signs of legitimate 
authority. 
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ambiguous. The former may be said to possess economic power over the latter, however 
it is the latter who has control over the goods that the former desires. This situation is 
accentuated when the shop attendant is also the owner of the shop. On the other hand, 
classifying the two as of equal power will be inaccurate on those occasions where they 
obviously are not. Idiosyncratic factors may also play a part here. A comparable 
indeterminacy characterises the relationship between interviewer and interviewee, when 
the interviewee is an important and famous figure. Examples of this kind suggest that 
the power differential is subject to constant negotiation through discourse, thus making 
it inappropriate for consideration as an independent variable in the analysis of empirical 
data. Second, the above categories, while representing possible combinations of power 
and distance, do not reduce without residue to such combinations. They contain 
additional information about participants’ rights and obligations which interlocutors 
draw on when handling conversational exchanges. That this information is also 
prototypically attached to the setting of the exchange does not argue against its 
reduplication here, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between the values of 
the variable of ‘setting’ and those of the variable of ‘relationship’. Separate reference to 
the setting of the exchange and the relationship between participants thus affords us 
with all the information also available to participants in an exchange. Based on this, we 
may subsequently generalise over situations, drawing on observed similarities in 
linguistic expression. For example, it may turn out that the relationships of (long-
standing/new) customer and shop-attendant, and (long-standing/newly collaborating) 
superior and subordinate are indeed comparable in virtue of similarities in linguistic 
expression. The motivation for these similarities may then be sought in the direction of 
underlying common features between these relationships. To start at the opposing end, 
i.e. by assuming that these relationships share some underlying feature, and to group 
these relationships together as a result, would, in my view, be assuming more than is 
warranted by the facts. 
 
2.7.2 Dependent variables 
2.7.2.1 Presence/absence of main-clause verb 
Offers and requests may be realised without using a verb, as in (10): 
(10) [04.4; On the radio; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
o loƒos ston cirio mavrom˘ati 
the-NOM. speech-NOM. to-the-ACC. Mr-ACC. mavromatis-ACC. 
‘Mr Mavromatis, the floor is yours’ 
(10) contrasts with (11), where a similar offer is performed using a full VP:  
(11) [03.4; On the radio; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
.hhh (na Dosumen ce˘) to loƒo ston andrean, 
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(SP give-dep.-1pl. and) the-ACC. speech-ACC. to-the-ACC. andreas-ACC. 
‘(Let me) bring in Andreas.’ 
Sifianou (1992a:152ff.) discusses requests performed without using a verb as 
elliptical constructions, and relates their occurrence with service encounters where the 
repetitive, familiar nature of the tasks involved allows information that can be easily 
inferred from the context, linguistic or otherwise, to be omitted (ibid.). This explanation 
is along the lines of Brown and Levinson who associate such instances of ellipsis with 
positive politeness (B&L:111).20 An alternative explanation for verb-less utterances in 
Modern Greek draws on structural properties of the language, namely the fact that verbs 
must be inflectionally marked for the categories of number and person among others. 
Speakers may avoid using a verb when they prefer to leave these unspecified, as in (10). 
Compared with (11), which is addressed to a younger addressee who is subsequently 
addressed by FN and in the 2sg., the omission of the verb in (10) — no doubt in 
conjunction with the title+LN used — produces a more, rather than less, formal effect. 
 
2.7.2.2 The type of main-clause verb 
In realising performative acts, the utterances selected for analysis point to a state of 
affairs to be brought about by the speaker or by the addressee. This may be done by 
means of a reference to an act A predicated of the speaker or the addressee, or it may be 
left implicit. 
(12) [26.3; Speaker1: female, over 51, working-class; Speaker2: female, 31-50, middle-
class; Relationship: family] 
S1: zina to moron pai po tSi 
S2: ne 
S1: zina-VOC. the-NOM. baby-NOM. go-ind.-3sg. from there 
S2: yes 
S1: ‘Zina, the baby is going to the other room.’ 
S2: ‘Yes.’ 
To explore how indirectness is expressed in such utterances, the following distinctions 
are drawn based on the notion of preparatory conditions (Searle 1969:57ff.): (a) an 
utterance is referred to as an ‘indirect statement’ if it does not contain a reference to a 
preparatory condition for the act requested/offered, as in (12); (b) if an utterance 
contains such a reference, then (i) if this condition pertains to the existence of goods 
(e.g. prior to purchase; (3) in 4.1.2, (4)-(5) in 7.3.3 below), specific note is made of the 
main-clause verb used (usually exo, ‘I-have’, but also ime, ‘I-am’, or iparxo, ‘I-
exist’), since this lexical choice is significant (contrary to ime and iparxo, exo 
allows reference to the addressee); (ii) if a preparatory condition other than the 
existence of goods is referred to, utterances are referred as ‘indirect requests/offers’. 
                                                 
20 Instances of ellipsis which involve incompleteness and fall under the off-record strategy (B&L:227; 
Sifianou 1992a:155-6) were not encountered in the CG data. 
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When the state of affairs to be brought about by the speaker or by the addressee is 
specified by means of a reference to an act A predicated of the speaker or the addressee 
and A is designated by way of a verb, this may be in the main clause or in a subordinate 
one. In the latter case, the main-clause verb may be impersonal (e.g. prepi, ‘it-must’, 
epitrepete, ‘it-is-allowed’) or personal. Personal main-clause verbs may further 
express volition (e.g. θelo, ‘I-want’, epitrepo, ‘I-permit’) or ability (e.g. boro, ‘I-
can’). In this way, we may include in our analysis lexicalised, as opposed to 
grammaticalised, realisations of modalities which are not expressed in the inflectionally 
marked mood system of Modern Greek.  
Impersonal prepi and epitrepete signal speaker or addressee commitment. 
prepi shows a high degree of commitment toward the act to be performed. Of 
interest here are occurrences of prepi which express obligation (as opposed to strong 
probability in inference). In such cases, prepi occurs in the present indicative, the 
future, or the conditional, and is followed by the act-designating verb in the 1sg./pl. or 
2sg./pl. introduced by the subjunctive particle na (Holton et al. 1997:201). Whereas 
initially prepi may appear to be incompatible with requests (Sifianou 1992a:145), 
(13) and (14) below show that this is in fact equally used to indicate that an obligation 
is undertaken by the speaker or placed upon the addressee:21 
(13) [21.29; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationship: old colleagues] 
epiDi en˘' apoxoriso en˘a prepi na su ta˘ sumaro 
because FP depart-dep.-1sg. FP must SP you-2sg.-GEN. them-ACC. sum-up-dep.-1sg., 
‘I’ll have to sum them up for you because I’m going to leave.’ 
(14) [12.3; At work; Speaker: female, over 51, middle-class; Addressee: male, over 51, 
middle-class; Relationship: old colleagues] 
ce (.) prepi na mas pis ti ores ise DiateTimenos na 
pijenis ... 
and, (.) must SP us-GEN. tell-dep.-2sg. what hours be-ind.-2sg. prepare-pass.-past-
part.-NOM. SP go-non past-imperf.-2sg. … 
‘You must also let us know what times you are prepared to be there’… 
Impersonal epitrepete, on the other hand, signals a lesser degree of commitment 
and is typically used to perform requests: 
(15) [20.19; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: old colleagues] 
epitrepete? ((to look at the newspaper lying on the table)) 
allow-pass.-ind.-3sg.? 
‘May I?’ 
Offers or requests performed using one of the personal verbs epitrepo, boro, 
and θelo (Sifianou 1992a:142,144,150) focus attention on the attitude of the main-
clause subject toward the act specified in the subordinate clause, as opposed to offers 
                                                 
21 This accords with the definition of offers and requests as, among other things, desirable from the 
addressee’s or from the speaker’s point of view (2.7.1.1 above). 
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and requests performed by means of the act-designating verb alone (i.e. when this is in 
the main clause), which focus attention on the act to be performed. epitrepo is used 
to perform requests and typically occurs in the 2sg./pl. of the imperative, indicative, 
future or subjunctive, followed by the act-designating verb in a clause introduced by the 
subjunctive particle na: 
(16) [04.3; On the radio; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
epitrepste mu epitrepste mu na sineCiso omos akomi akoma 
liƒo 
allow-imp.-perf.-2pl. me-GEN. allow-imp.-perf.-2pl. me-GEN. SP continue-dep.-1sg. 
but yet yet a-little 
‘Allow me to say something more.’ 
boro and θelo may be used to perform both offers and requests.22 They then occur in 
the 1sg./pl. or 2sg./pl. of the present indicative or the conditional, and are followed by 
the act-specifying-verb in a subordinate clause introduced by na: 
(17) [62.5; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: salesperson to old customer] 
mborumen na zitisumen amesa prosfores 
can-ind.-1pl. SP ask-dep.-1pl. directly offers-ACC. 
‘We can ask for offers immediately.’ 
 
2.7.2.3 Subjective modality 
Lyons (1995:328ff.) draws a distinction between objective and subjective modality, 
associating the latter with speakers’ “expressing their own beliefs and attitudes or their 
own will and authority, rather than reporting, as neutral observers, the existence of this 
or that state of affairs” (ibid.:330). This potential for expressing subjectivity makes 
devices which realise modality in natural languages apt for the expression of politeness. 
Modality may be grammaticalised in two ways: via verbal mood (ibid.:255), and (some 
uses of) tense (ibid.:319). The two are in fact interdependent (ibid.:196, 327, 332-3). 
Prosodic structure may also realise modality, with the occurrence of rising intonation 
marking interrogativity in languages such as Modern Greek, where this is not signalled 
structurally (ibid.:185-6; Sifianou 1992a:137-9). Finally, modality may be realised by 
means of negation (Lyons 1995:175-6; Sifianou 1992a:146ff.). In the relevant instances, 
negation is interpreted as having wide scope over the proposition expressed as a result 
of a process of neg-raising, which has been attributed to politeness (Horn 1989:333ff.).  
Alongside the three moods traditionally recognised in Modern Greek (Tzartzanos 
1946[1928]; Triantafyllidis 1941; Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987; Holton et al. 
1997:203ff.), i.e. the indicative (for current purposes, what is referred to as ‘indicative’ 
in the transcribed examples is restricted to the imperfective non-past; (17) above), the 
                                                 
22 Impersonal bori, ‘can-ind.-3sg.’, which expresses weak possibility, is of no interest here (Holton et al. 
1997:202). 
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subjunctive (referred to as ‘SP (na) + dependent’;23 (24) below),24 and the imperative 
(referred to as ‘imperative perfective/imperfective’; (16) above), I will also note: the 
future (referred to as ‘FP (θa (SMG)/ en˘a (CG)) + dependent; (20) below, (13) 
above),25 the past (referred to as ‘past perfective/imperfective’; (26) below), and the 
conditional (referred to as ‘FP (θa) + imperfective past’; (18) below). The present 
indicative, subjunctive, imperative, future, past, and conditional forms in Modern Greek 
are distinguished morphologically (Holton et al. 1997:119ff.), and with respect to the 
negative particles with which they may co-occur (Den for the present indicative, future, 
past and conditional; min for the subjunctive; cf. Mackridge 1985:243, 279; Joseph & 
Philippaki-Warburton 1987:179), and the position of clitics (clitics follow imperatives 
but precede indicatives and subjunctives; cf. Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987:183; 
Holton et al. 1997:206). Yes/no questions are distinguished from statements on the 
basis of intonational contour ((4) above) and may be accompanied by the particles 
mipos/min (Mackridge 1985:39-40, 126-7; Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987:4, 
19; Holton et al. 1997:412-3). 
 
2.7.2.4 Number & person  
Modern Greek has a T/V distinction, making it possible to express politeness by means 
of verbal number and person (Brown & Gilman 1972[1960]; B&L:198ff.; Bakakou-
Orfanou 1989; Sifianou 1992a:60ff.). These are studied together, since they are 
morphologically compounded in the same inflectional endings (Holton et al. 
1997:119ff.). In general, use of the 2nd person focuses on the addressee as the locus of 
the action to be performed, while use of the 1st person focuses on the speaker. These 
two devices interact variably with the locus of desirability of the act in achieving the 
polite effect (2.7.1.1 above). 
Bakakou-Orfanou (1989:140) defines the ‘social’ plural as expressing “the kind of 
social relationships [between participants] and secondarily other features of their social 
identity” and distinguishes between the social plural proper (2nd person reference), and 
the secondary social plural (1st person reference). The former may also be termed 
‘relative’, in that it implies that the social standing of the addressee or the social 
distance between interlocutors is assessed from the speaker’s point of view (ibid.:159). 
Its use in SMG is associated with two features of the situation: the type of the 
relationship between speaker and addressee, and the formality of the setting (Mackridge 
1985:77-8; Holton et al. 1997:197-8). V usage prompted by the formality of the setting 
                                                 
23 The term ‘dependent’ is introduced by Holton et al. (1997:110, 220ff.) to indicate the verb form 
combining perfective aspect (in the stem) with non-past inflectional endings, what is traditionally referred 
to as ‘aorist subjunctive’. 
24 Pavlidou (1991:13fn.2) and Sifianou (1992a:141fn.3) discuss the non self-evident status of the 
subjunctive in Modern Greek.  
25This is variably classified with the indicative (Holton et al. 1997:204, Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 
1987:180), or with the subjunctive (Mackridge 1985:274ff.). 
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is symmetric, while V usage relating to the relationship between interlocutors may be 
symmetric, if interlocutors are of equal social standing, thereby signalling increased 
social distance; or asymmetric, with the person of higher standing giving T and 
receiving V (Bakakou-Orfanou 1989:183). However, V may also be adopted by the 
person of higher standing prompted by middle-class values (Makri-Tsilipakou 
1983:226), or in an attempt to give respect (Sifianou 1992a:62). In general, V usage 
depends on the aspect of the relationship between interlocutors that the speaker is 
foregrounding, and may be symmetric or asymmetric as a result (Petrits 1990:141). The 
relative plural falls under ‘honorary’ plural (where only the Verb agrees with its logical 
subject, while the Noun and Adjective agree with the real subject), which contrasts to 
the ‘semantic’ plural (where the predicate agrees with its logical subject; cf. Bakakou-
Orfanou 1989:185ff.). It therefore constitutes a conventional implicature in SMG, 
whereby what is communicated is the grammatical meaning of the 2sg. accompanied by 
the honorary element (Levinson 1983:128-9). 
However, evidence suggests that V usage is not similarly conventionalised in CG 
(Terkourafi 2001:463ff.). When using the 2pl. toward a single addressee in the data 
collected, speakers often fluctuate between the singular and the plural, often switching 
between the two a number of times.26 
(18) [85; Setting: On TV; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class. Addressee: female, over 
51, middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
ciria vasiliu kliste mas aftin ti sizitisi. ti Ta leƒate 
((one turn)) 
na se Diakopso? ixa Djavasi akrivos afto pu lete ... 
parakalo olokliroste 
Mrs-VOC. vasiliou close-imp.-perf.-2pl. us-GEN. this-ACC. the-ACC. discussion-
ACC. . what FP say-past.-imperf.-2pl. 
((one turn)) 
SP you-2sg.-ACC.  interrupt-dep.-1sg? have-past.-1sg. read-non-fin. exactly this-
ACC. which say-ind.-2pl. … please conclude-imp.-perf.-2pl. 
‘Mrs Vasiliou, close this discussion for us. What do you think?’ 
((one turn)) 
‘May I interrupt? I had read exactly what you are saying’ …‘Please do conclude.’ 
(19)[42; At work; Speaker1: female, over 51, middle-class; Speaker2: female, 18-30, 
middle-class; A=MG; Relationship (all): acquaintances] 
S1: katsete 
((some turns later)) 
S2: Telete na parete ena˘n, paksimaDi? (.) e˘˘ kolokoti 
((a few turns later)) 
S2: ise apo el˘aDa?jati ( ) 
((one turn)) 
S2:  eci jeniTices?  
((one turn)) 
S2: ne? i ƒonis su ciprei? 
((some turns later)) 
S1: mbori na eCete Dicon ... 
((a few turns later)) 
                                                 
26 Occurrences of pronouns and verbs in the 2sg./pl. are italicised in this section for the purposes of 
illustration. 
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S1: ((laughing)) ise tis lemesu esi i tis lefkosias 
S1: sit-imp.-perf.-2pl. 
((some turns later)) 
S2: want-ind.-2pl. SP take-dep.-2pl. one, biscuit-ACC.? er, a kolokoti-ACC.27 
((a few turns later)) 
S2: be-ind.-2sg. from Greece? because ( ) 
((one turn)) 
S2: there be-born-past-perf.-2sg.? 
((one turn)) 
S2: yes? the-NOM. parents-NOM. your-2sg. Cypriot? 
((some turns later)) 
S1: can-ind.-3sg. SP have-dep.-2pl. right 
((a few turns later)) 
S1: ((laughing)) be-ind.-2sg. the-GEN. lemesos-GEN. you-NOM.-2sg. or the-GEN. 
lefkosia-GEN. 
S1: ‘Have a seat’ 
((some turns later)) 
S2: ‘Would you like a biscuit? er, a kolokoti 
((a few turns later)) 
S2: ‘Are you from Greece? Because’… 
((one turn)) 
S2: ‘Were you born there?’ 
((one turn)) 
S2: ‘Yes? Are your parents Cypriot?’ 
((some turns later)) 
S1: ‘Maybe you are right’… 
((a few turns later)) 
S1: ((laughing)) ‘Are you from Lemesos or from Lefkosia yourself?’ 
Based on the speakers’ fluctuation between the plural and the singular in these 
examples one may hypothesise that non-literal use of the 2pl. is felt by Cypriot Greeks 
to belong to the SMG code, and therefore occurs when this code is called for, i.e. in 
formal settings, and when the addressee is classified as a Mainland Greek. It may thus 
be interpreted as an instance of code-switching (McCormick 1994:581). This hypothesis 
is supported in three ways. First, when used non-literally, the 2pl. can only combine 
with the SMG future particle θa, and not with its CG equivalent en˘a (5 in table 2, 
3.3 below; (20)). Furthermore, combinations of the 2sg./pl. with address terms diverge 
from SMG usage (Sifianou 1992a:64; Bakakou-Orfanou 1989:175; (21), (22)), and so 
do replies in the 1pl. ((23)). Attributing the non-literal use of the 2pl. in the examples 
below to code-switching accounts for the observed divergences from SMG usage: 
speakers may perform less than optimally when using a code for which they do not have 
native-speaker intuitions (3.4.4 below). 
(20) [59.10; At work; Speaker: female, 18-30; middle-class; A=MG; Relationship: 
acquaintances] 
Ta pjite kati? na sas cerasume? 
FP drink-dep.-2pl. something? SP you-2pl.-ACC. treat-dep.-1pl.? 
‘Will you have something to drink? May I offer you {something}?’ 
(21) [6; On TV; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, middle-
class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
                                                 
27 Local sweet pie. 
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s'efxaristo cirie fetHa 
you-2sg.-ACC. thank-ind.-1sg. Mr-VOC. fetas-VOC. 
‘Thank you Mr Fetas.’ 
(22) [82; Formal discussion; Speaker: female, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 
31-50, middle-class; Relationship: speaker to member of the audience] 
cirie panajo÷ ciriako Ta mu epitrepsete, aplos Telo na 
mas to anaptiksete afto … 
Mr-VOC. panayo- kyriako-VOC. FP me-GEN. allow-dep.-2pl., simply want-ind.-
1sg. SP us-GEN. it-ACC. develop-dep.-2pl. this-ACC. … 
‘Mr Panayo- Kyriakos, allow me, I would just like you to expand on this for us’… 
(23) [42.8; At work; Speaker1: female, over 51, middle-class; Speaker2: male, over 51, 
middle-class; Relationship: new colleagues] 
S1: sas cerasumen kati? 
S2: imasten endaksi 
S1: you-2pl.-ACC. offer-dep.-1pl. something? 
S2: be-ind.-1pl. alright 
S1: ‘May we offer you something?’ 
S2: ‘I’m fine.’ 
In these examples, non-literal use of the 2pl. is assessed as polite in the context of 
the formality of the setting, or of the Mainland Greek identity of the addressee. Indeed, 
when occurring in a different context, informants commented on this usage as ‘stand-
offish’, or ‘inappropriate’ (Terkourafi 1997:38-9). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that 
at least some speakers consider this usage to be polite independently of such a context. 
(24) is an instance of non-literal use of the 2pl. by a female service-provider to a 
Cypriot Greek addressee with whom she is not familiar: 
(24) [59.2; At work; Speaker: female, 18-30, middle-class; Addressee: male, over 51, 
working-class; Relationship: salesperson to new customer] 
na mu pite ton ariTmon tis asfalias sas? ton ariTmon pu 
eCete (mazi) sas? 
SP me-GEN. tell-dep.-2pl. the-ACC. number-ACC. the-GEN. insurance-GEN. your-
2pl.? the-ACC. number-ACC. that have-ind.-2pl. with you-2pl.-ACC.? 
‘Can you tell me the number of your insurance? The number you have with you?’ 
Similar occurrences have been recorded in a secretarial office, an insurance company, a 
legal firm, and a number of shops fewer than half of which may be considered 
‘upmarket’, and were independent of the recipient’s sex, age, or social class. Speakers 
were always female and younger than 50 years of age; in fact, 71.43% were 30 years 
old or younger. Young working women’s usage of V forms is consistent throughout 
their utterances ((24) above) and across turns. That is, they do not hesitate or switch 
between the 2sg. and the 2pl., as happens in instances of code-switching, such as (25), 
where the verb is marked for 2pl., but the pronoun for 2sg. 
(25) [71.32; Informal social gathering; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; A=MG; 
Relationship: acquaintances] 
e Doste mas to˘ Doste to tu andrea ksipna olus osi ksipna 
o andreas 'a se ksipnisi 
give-imp.-perf.-2pl. us-GEN. the-ACC., give-imp.-perf.-2pl. it-ACC. the-GEN. 
andreas-GEN. wake-up-ind.-3sg. all-ACC. who-NOM. wake-up-ind.-3sg. andreas-
NOM. FP you-2sg.-ACC. wake-up-dep.-3sg. 
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‘Give us the, give it to Andreas, he wakes everyone up, Andreas will wake you up.’ 
It is therefore possible that, in line with findings regarding phonological change in the 
United States, where 
“[i]n the course of change from below, the most advanced vowel systems are 
found among younger speakers […] these innovators are found among […] the 
upper working class and lower middle class […] In most of the vowel shifts […], 
women are considerably more advanced than men.” (Labov 1994:156) 
young working (not necessarily working-class) women are leading a change pertaining 
to the non-literal use of the 2pl. in CG. In generalising its use to settings which are not 
formal, and addressees who are not Mainland Greeks, young working women are 
dissociating this from the SMG code ((18) to (23) above), and introducing it into the 
CG code as a conventional marker of politeness. 
Compared to non-literal use of the 2pl., non-literal use of the 1pl. “focuses […] on 
the speaker, whom it presents as a member of a real or fictional group” (Bakakou-
Orfanou 1989:176). Bakakou-Orfanou (1989:81ff.) divides this into ‘psychological’, 
‘minimising/maximising’, and ‘social’. The first serves to demonstrate the speaker’s 
emotional participation in, or attitude toward, the meaning of the verb, or to give 
directions and instructions (Mackridge 1985:81; Bakakou-Orfanou 1989:94; Sifianou 
1992a:103-4; Holton et al. 1997:198-9). When it expresses the speaker’s emotional 
participation in the meaning of the verb, it can be ‘inclusive’ (Tzartzanos’s (1946:54) 
“first person plural of community”), expressing friendliness toward the addressee whom 
it includes in the action alongside the speaker, an option open to speakers whose 
standing is higher than, or equal to, that of their addressees; or ‘exclusive’, including in 
the action a third person toward whom friendliness is now expressed (Bakakou-Orfanou 
1989:88-9). Appealed to in criticisms and control acts by speakers of higher or equal 
standing, the 1pl. may function as a minimiser. It can then be inclusive, replacing the 
2sg., or exclusive, replacing the 1sg. Or it may function as a maximiser. It is then 
always exclusive, replacing the 1sg. (Bakakou-Orfanou 1989:115ff.). Finally, the 
secondary social plural (1st person reference) is always exclusive. This functions either 
to enhance ego’s standing based on the association of plurality with power and is used 
by speakers of high standing28 or to lower ego’s standing, when the speaker is of lower 
standing than the addressee (Bakakou-Orfanou 1989:176ff); Sifianou 1992a:105). 
The 3sg. may also be used to achieve a polite effect (Makri-Tsilipakou 1983:229; 
Mackridge 1985:81; Petrits 1990:134-5; Sifianou 1992a:62). 
(26) [32.3; Formal discussion; Speaker1: male, 31-50, middle-class; Speaker2: female, 
31-50, middle-class; Relationship: speaker (S1) to member of the audience (S2)] 
S1: kati iTele i maria 
S2: ne. kati iTela 'a simbliroso ... 
S1: something want-past.-imperf.-3sg. the-NOM. maria-NOM. 
                                                 
28 Sifianou’s (1992a:104) “royal” plural, which she associates with lower groups’ speech also falls under 
this. 
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S2: yes. something want-past-imperf.-1sg. SP add-dep.-1sg. … 
S1: ‘Maria would like to say something.’ 
S2: ‘Yes, I would like to add something’… 
 
2.7.2.5 Additional markers of politeness 
In practice, the four dependent variables described above often achieve the polite effect 
in conjunction with further politeness markers occurring in the same utterance. Most 
common in Modern Greek are address terms (Makri-Tsilipakou 1983:220ff.; Bakakou-
Orfanou 1989:169ff.; Petrits 1990:131ff.; Sifianou 1992a:63ff.), diminutives 
(Triantafyllidis 1963[1921]:146-49; Babiniotis 1969:21-3; Mackridge 1985:158; Daltas 
1985:63; Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987:217; Sifianou 1992a:165ff.; Sifianou 
1992b), and the lexical items liγo, ‘a little’, and parakalo, ‘please’ (Sifianou 
1992a:169-71, 191ff.; Sifianou 1992b:168ff.). 
From a conversation analytic point of view, one possible function of address terms 
is as “an attention-getting device” or “a summons” (Schegloff 1972:357-9). In the data, 
address terms are generally used to select the participant next in line to speak, and can 
thus help identify the intended recipient of an utterance. However, by involving the 
speaker in the selection of an appropriate expression from the inventory of terms 
available in a language, they also constitute an important — Levinson (1978) claims 
universal — marker of politeness. The relevant inventory of terms in Modern Greek 
ranges from formal address by title+LN (cirie/ciria, ‘Mr/Mrs’+LN) or 
professional/ honorary title (jatre, ‘doctor’, sevazmiotate, ‘respected’), through 
title+FN, to informal FN, and kinship terms which may co-occur with expressions 
demonstrating familiarity or endearment, such as (v)re (an uninflected semantically 
void lexical item) and the possessive pronoun mu, ‘my’ (cf. the non-literal use in CG of 
re kumbare, ‘hey best man’, to male addressees, je mu, ‘my son’, kori mu, ‘my 
daughter’, to younger male and female addressees respectively, and mana mu, ‘my 
mother’, used indiscriminately of sex or age; Terkourafi 1999:114). 
Diminutives constitute a well established device for expressing politeness in a 
number of languages (Jurafsky 1996:557-8). Babiniotis (1969:19) distinguishes three 
types of morphological/functional diminution in SMG (derivational via suffixation, 
derivational via compounding, and periphrastic) which may also appear in combination. 
Diminution is used in conversation to convey a variety of senses, only some of which 
are relevant to CG. Derivational diminution via suffixation by means of the dialectal 
suffixes  -u(D)a/-u(D)i(n), -i(n), and -ikuri(n) predominates in CG. Their 
conversational occurrences are invested with strong connotations of affection, and are 
consequently restricted to exchanges with in-group members (Terkourafi 1997:19ff). 
The lexical item liγo, ‘a little’, is usually treated as a marker of periphrastic 
diminution (or diminution via syntactic modification; cf. Sifianou 1992a:169-71). 
Instances of similar periphrastic or analytic diminutives are attested in a number of 
languages (Jurafsky 1996:569), and can function as politeness markers (B&L:139, 157). 
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liγo can occur in collocations with both nouns and verbs. “Theoretically”, Sifianou 
(1992b:168) observes, “in collocations with nouns, liγo can be ambiguous: it can be a 
simple quantifier, or a semantically void but pragmatically meaningful lexical item.” In 
collocations with verbs, on the other hand, “liγo has lost its literal force and serves 
strictly politeness purposes. [...] Thus viewed, it is a kind of informal variant of 
parakalo, please” (ibid.). The present analysis considers occurrences of liγo both as 
an adjective and as an adverb during the performance of a speech act. These are studied 
separately from occurrences of morphological diminutives in an effort to further explore 
the hypothesis that such occurrences of periphrastic diminution relate to the influence of 
SMG on the speech of Cypriot Greeks. This hypothesis is based on the observation that 
this type of diminution is only marginally used in CG and then mainly in the presence 
of Mainland Greeks (Terkourafi 1997:24).  
Finally, the present analysis considers occurrences of the lexical item parakalo, 
‘please’. Situational factors determining its use in SMG “seem to be a relative social 
distance between interactants and a requested task falling, to a certain extent, beyond 
the normal everyday tasks people perform for each other easily” (Sifianou 1992a:195). 
Morphologically, parakalo is a verb, and can be used performatively as well as to 
report the occurrence of a requestive act. When parakalo constitutes the main-clause 
verb it is entered under ‘type of main-clause verb’ ((27); 2.7.2.2 above).  
(27) [12.20; At work; Speaker: female, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: old customer to salesperson] 
ta exo proplirosi prin Djo mines? (.) parakalo na mu ta 
Dosete. 
them-ACC. have-ind.-1sg. pre-pay-non-fin. before two months-ACC.? ask-ind.-1sg. 
SP me-GEN. them-ACC. give-dep.-2pl. 
‘I paid for them two months ago. I ask that you give them to me.’ 
When parakalo marks the occurrence of a requestive speech act, it is classified as an 
additional marker of politeness. 
(28) [56.29; Speaker: female, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, middle-
class; Relationship: family] 
mu Dinis liƒon to psomi, parakalo? 
me-GEN. give-ind.-2sg. a-little the-ACC. bread-ACC., please? 
‘Can you pass the bread, please?’ 
 
 
2.8 Summary 
In this chapter I discussed the methodological considerations which informed the 
compilation of a corpus of conversational data for the investigation of politeness in CG. 
Plate 1 provides an example of a recording session, as transcribed and analysed for the 
independent and dependent variables discussed above. The analysis of these data aims 
to examine whether combinations of the independent (extra-linguistic) variables relate 
to combinations of the dependent (linguistic) ones via a principle reducing the values of 
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the former into a single index which then guides the choice of linguistic expression (4.2 
below), or via a more direct correlation, which can be formulated in the form of frames 
(chapters 6, 7 below). Before proceeding to explore which theoretical framework best 
accounts for these data, an overview of the structural and usage properties of CG will 
help set the linguistic ‘scene’ in which informants’ choices occurred, and against which 
they must consequently be assessed. 
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Chapter 3 
"Sometimes -
I can't explain it - memory 
grows harsher in thi s light, dough 
dried by the sun . " 
(scrcris, III rlie KelYliia district) 
Cypriot Greek: a survey of its structure and use 
3.1 Introduction 
For the purposes of this dissertation, Cypriot Greek is broadly defined as the variety of 
Greek spoken today in the major urban centres of the Republic of Cypms - Lefkosia, 
Lemesos, Larnaka, and Pafos (Cypms Tourism Organisation 1997:7; map 1). While no 
attempt will be made at present to tackle the theoretica l questions posed by the 
characterisation of linguistic varieties as (standard) languages as opposed to dialects, 
arguments commonly appealed to, such as mutual intelligibility, codification, the variety 
lIsed in education and by the mcdia, spcakers' attitudes to diffcrent linguistic varieties, as 
well as structural differences between varieties, constitute some of the criteria with 
reference to which CG will be described in what follows. This exercise aims to provide an 
overview of the linguistic situation in Cypms today, so that speakers' choices regarding the 
expression of politeness in the recorded data may be incorporated into, and assessed 
against, the wider spcctmm of linguistic choices open to them at anyone time. 
3.2 A glance at the history of the Cypriot dialect 
As with the other dialects of Greek, the beginnings of the Cypriot dialect li e in the period of 
the hellen istic koine (Bealldollin 1884: 19; Hadjiioannou 1990[ 196 1 ]:243; Christodoulou 
1972: 114). However, partial insulation "from the influence of the capital in the middle 
Byzantine period when, from the middle of the seventh century till the campaigns of 
Nikeph6ros Phokas in 965, [Cypms] was under Arab or joint Arab-Byzantine mle" 
(Horrocks 1997:284), led to the early weakening of the Byzantine tradition. Byzantine 
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administration on the island was eventually disnlpted by the Frankish! conquest of 11 9 1, 
fo llowing which Cypriot emerged as "the first modern dialect to appear in its distinctive 
modern guise" (ibid.). After the Lusignans came the Venetians, then the Turks, and finally 
the British, leading up to the fonnation of the independent state in 1960. 
Written sources date back to the thirteenth century with the Cypriot trans lation of the 
law of the Lusignan kingdom, the Assises of the kingdom of Je11lsalem and of Cyprus. A 
more fluent literary language survives in the fifteenth ccnUlry Chronicle of Leontios 
Machairas , and its sequel, the Chronicle of Georgios Boustronios, and in the Love Poems of 
the sixteenth century, placing the active fonnation of Mediaeval Cypriot, the predecessor of 
the modern dia lect, within the intervening centuries (Beaudouin 1884: 13; Horrocks 
1997:286, 306-7; pace Menardos 1969a[ 1909]:21 0).2 Throughout the three centuries of 
Ottoman rule, literary production in the dialect thrived in the mouths of the 
'poihtai>orhde " ', professional verse-makers for weddings and feasts. The advent of the 
twentieth eentury saw the appearance of dialectal poetry in print.3 Significantly, during this 
period, the language spoken on the island remained largely unaffected by the linguistic 
debale unfolding on lhe Mainland (Horrocks 1997:344fr.) and by lhe purisl lendem:ics 
which rid Modern Greek of many words of foreign provcnanee.4 Today, di alecta l prose 
appears occas ionally in the press, especially when recounting funny or unusual incidents 
often involving direct speech, while the theatrical genre termed 'Cypriot sketch' has been a 
stable feaulre of radio and television productions over the last few decades. A recent 
development concems the use of the dialect in the media for advertisements appealing to 
traditiona l aspects of Cypriot life (pavlou 1996). 
3.3 An overview of the main structural features of the modern dialect 
Cypriot, along with the dialects of Chios and the Dodecanese, form the group of South-
Eastern Greek dialects (Newton 1972a: 15ff.). 5 Their morpho-phonologica l characte r-
istics arc shown in table I. Further defining features of the Cypriot dialect arc li sted in 
table 2.6 
1 Following the three-century-long rule of the Lusignan dynasty, Cypriot is the only dialect of Greek to have 
received the influence of French (Contossopoulos 1969:93fn.3) 
2 For texts sec: Sathas (1873,1877), Dawkins (1932), Siapkaras-Pitsillidcs (1952). 
lSee Lipcrtis 1923, 1930, 1934; Liasidis 1933; Michael idis 1960. Yangoulli s (1 986) provides a brief 
overview of dialectal poetry to the present day. 
4 Beaudouin (1884: 16) relates this to infrequent contact with the Mainland due to distance, the isolation of the 
people who in most cases did not travel outside the island, and the scarc ity of Greek newspapers on the island 
around that time. 
s Christodoulou (1969:119-23) discusses alternative classifi cations based on (a) historical , (b) geographical, 
or (c) phonological criteria. 
6 The variety described in table 2 is that of the Mesaoria plain (3.4.2 below). The reader is referred to the 
works cited for a more comprehensive account of the Cypriot dialect. 
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SEC phenomena Additional CG phenomena Examples 
I 'softening ' of one or more SMG cc, 'and ' 
of the velar eonsonants /kJ 
Ix! Iyl before a fron t vowel 
> CG Ifc 
or glide to [tn [n [3 1 
respective ly 
2 Iyl epenthesis in verbs 111 SMG pistevo 
- &6yoo 'believe-ind.- I sg.' 
> SEG pis!cv],o 
3 retention of These involve tenser articul- SMG /akos, 'well'-NOM. 
long consonants alion, rcsponsiblc fo r Cyprip l > CG lak~os 
aSJlirat~d voiceless stops lp], 
It J, [k ] (Newton 1972a:89-93; 
Arvaniti 1999: 173-4). On their 
phonological status in CG see 
Newton 1972b:32-5; Chara-
lambopoulos 1982. 
4 deletion of the voiced SMG 6cn, 09i 
fricatives (lvi , 16/, Iy!) (negati ve particles) 
in intervocalic position > CG en, oi 
5 retention of final In! Re-interpretation of fina l nw; SMG ya/a, ' milk-NOM.' 
a marker of neuler gender; > CG ya/an 
addition of final - n to verb SMG ioe, 
forms mainly in the 3sg.; 'see-perf.-past.-3sg. ' 
re-distribution of word bound- > CG ioen 
aries followi ng rapid co-articul- SMG ton oron, 
ation ofarticlc + common noun. ' the-ACe. whey-ACe.' 
(Menardos 1969b11894J: 17-8; > CG onoros, 
Had·iioannou 1990:249-50). ' the-NOM. whey-NOM.' 
6 manner dissimilation of Following manner dissimi lation, S EG pistevyo, 
obstmcnt I obstmcnt into devoicing of stops (unless thoy ' believe-ind.- I sg. · 
fricative+stop. are placed between a nasal and a > CG pistefko 
vowel or sonant) occurs in some 
SE dialects, including Cypriot 
I (Newton I 972a: 110). 
7 Retention of the ancient SMG yrafun, 
3rd person plural verb 'write-ind .-3pl. ' 
endings -usl{n}, -asl{n} > CG ymfusin 
(Contossopoulos 1969:93) 
Table 1: Morpho-phonological characteristics ofCG as a SEC dialect 
CC phenomena Remarks Examples 
Phonology and suprasegmentals 
I Ij/ fo llowing l vi , 1M, 16/, Ip/ , or If! SMG (!iavazo, 
yields [cJ ' read-ind.- ! sg.' 
(Menardos t969b[1894P4-5; Newton > CG 8cavazo 
1972b:30, 53 ; Arvaniti 1999:176) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
2 devoieing of fbi, /dI, /g/ occurs word- In other SEG SMG adc, 
initia lly and intervocalically dialects devoicing exhortative partic le 
(Menardos 1969b:9-11; Newton I 972b:28; oceurs only word- > CG ate 
Panayotou 1996a: 124) initially (Newton 
1972" 12i). 
3 /il prothes is affecting certain verbs Relates to InJ SMG mi sta8is, 
when immediately preceded ttl the retention (5 m ' not stand-imp.-perf.-2sg.' 
same intonation group by the table I above). > CG men istaBis 
pronouns ton, tin, tis, tes, the negative 
lei prosthesis i . 
reported for other 
particles en, men, or th e conjunction SEG dialects 
an, ' if (Menardos 1969c 
(Menardos 1969b: 19-20; Newton 1972b:83)' l1925J: 142ff.). 
4 possibility of dynamic stress on the SMG to po'oild to nw, 
fourth syllable from the cnd of an 'the-NOM. bicyclc-NOM. 
intonation group my ' 
(Mcnardos 1969b:22-3; Newton 1972b:43-4; > CO to po'oilato mu 
Arvan iti 1999:177) 
5 non-standard accentuation of SMG I tara, ' now' 
individual items > CG tdm 
Morphology 
6 obsolescence ofthc genitive plural of SMG to fai ton selion, 
male adjectives and nouns, w hich is 'the-NOM. food-NOM. 
now rendered by the accusative the-GEN . dogs-GEN.' 
(8eaudoui.n 1884:66, 98; Mcnardos 1969d > CG to fain tus fil"lIs, 
11896J:32-4,196gelI912j;53) 'the-NOM . food-NOM. 
the-ACe dogs-ACC.' 
7 accusative plura l of the female article SMG tis polis, 
and of the unstressed third person 'the-ACe. cities-ACC.· 
p lural of the female pronoun tes > CG tes polis 
(Newton 1972b:62-4; Panayotou 1996a:124) 
8 d ialectal diminutive suffixes SMG feraei > CG Jeruin 
-1I(O) in, -1I(O)a, -in 'hand-dim.-NOM.' 
(M"""'"", 1969h6, 1969",47, 1969fl I929l l26) 
9 interrogative pronoun inda SMG ti> CG inda, 'what' 
(Menardos 196ge:65; f-Iadjiioannou 1990:25 1) 
10 verbs in - isko Imperfective SMG mcno >CG ml nisko 
(Beadouin 1884:94-5; Menardos 196ge: 103) aspect of the 'stay-ind.-I sg.' 
imperative mood SMG mene > CG 'minisee 
in - iscc and -n:e 'stay- imp.- i mperf. -2sg. ' 
(Kolitsis 1986:22J; SMG vuta > CG 'Vllf'in:e 
Menardos 1969b: ' divclsoak -imp. -imperf. -2sg. ' 
22fn.I,196ge:87) SMG vutJkse > CG Vlltlla 
'dive/soak-imp. -perf. -2sg.' 
7 Anaksagorou (1987: 145) restricts occurrences of this phenomenon to instances of negation with iJen. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
II dia lectal 3rd person singular present SMG inc > CG cni 
ind icative of the verb 'to be' 'be-ind.-3sg. ' 
(Menardos 196ge:67-8) 
12 dia lectal 2sg. perfective imperative SMG 6es > CG 6e 
of the verbs ' to look', 'to tell' '100k-imp.-perf.-2sg. ' 
(Menardos 196ge:75; Newton 1972b:80- 1) SMG pes > CG pc 
' tel l-imp.-oerf.-2s2. ' 
13 sigmatic aorist In free fluenmtion SMG afiso, 
with one in IkI of verbs dfin:o, 'leave 'leave-perf.-past- I sg.' 
alone', a nd (Jlo, 'give' > CG cfikHI CfiSll, SMG coosa, (Newton I 972b:86; Panayotou 1996a: 125) 
' g ive-perf.-past- l sg.' 
> CG e60kal e60sa 
SMG n'afiso, 
'SP leave-dep. - l sg.' 
> CG na'fiko l na'fisa, 
SMG no 0050, 
'SP give-de p.- lsg.' 
> CO na ooko / na ooso 
14 retenti on of the syllabic augment as a SMG kalalava, 
ma rker o f the past tense ' understand-perf.-past- I sg.' 
(Menardos 196ge:70; Newton 1972b:73; > CG ekala/ava 
Kolitsis 1986:217) 
15 d ia lectal future particle cn:a, SMG ea, 'will ' 
irreal is particles iBen:aI eBen.·a > CG cn:o 
(Menardos 196ge:75-6; Newton 1972b:67; SMG Oe Bal no min, 
Aerts 1983) 'will not ' 
> CG cndj'cn:a/cn:a mcn 
SMO 8a, 'would ' 
> CG iBen:al cBcn.·a 
16 dialectal negative palticics mell, clld3C SMG JeBelo, 
(Menard;)s 1969g[1931]: 150; Hadj iioannou 'not want- ind.-! sg.' 
1990:249 > CG cnd3c Bela 
17 dia lectal adverbs of quantity and of SMG poli, 'very' 
p lace > CG pol:a, 
(Beaudouin 1884:96; Menardos 196ge:60; SMG Ie'lios, 'complete ly' 
Hadj iioannou 1990:251 ; Panayolou > CG I feA:o, 
1996a: 124-5) SMG coo, 'here' 
> CO oome 
SMG cei, ' th ere' 
> CG tra~l1e 
18 widespread apocope of syll ables and The deietie pronOWl SMG pano Slo, 'on the' 
ensuing sandhi phenomena in CG is lulos,J;on > CG pa slo 
(Newton 1972b:121-3; Hadjiioannou 1990:251 ) rather ,1",,, SMG SMG apo kalo apo to, 
aflos,l;o. ' underneath ' 
Mcnardos > CG plI ka slo, 
comments on using SMG afton Ion, ' this' 
alios 
'" "" 
> CG Illn don, 
imitation of SMG oen ine/oen inc? 
standard speech 'i t iSH' t / isn ' t it?' 
("dJ.'lVlKOUpa"; > CG em!'! cm!'? 
196'k63). 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Syntax 
19 clitic pronoun postposition Tern (1999a,b) SMG su 10 ipa, 
(Mcnardos \969c:71-2 ; Ter.d 1999a, 1999b; relates this to tbe 'you-GEN-2sg. it-ACC. 
Petinou & TerLi in press) licensing require- tell-perf.-past- l sg.' 
mcnts ofCG clitics. > CG ipa su to 
20 extensive (inherited and novel) use SMG rota Ion iosif, 
of gen itive complements 'ask-imp. -pcrf.-2sg. thc-
(Menardos 1969d:34fT.) ACC. Joscph ' 
> CG arota III iosif 
, ask-imp.-pcrf.-2sg. thc-
GEN. Joseph ' 
Semantics 
21 divergences In the meaning of SMG pjano - 'touch' vs. 
individual items CG pcan:o = 'buy, take, pass', 
SMG opoioipotc = 
·ccrtainly 'vs. 
CG 'opozoipotc ~ 
'anyway' 
22 cxtensive usc of the aorist (simplc 1n addition to SMG cfts fill? 
past tens c) denoting definite ' havc-ind.-2sg. cat-non-
(Menardos 196ge:76-7; Karyolemou 1995) past time (Quirk fin .?' vs. 
" 
a1. 197U6), CG cfilcS! 
this has subsumed 
tho senses <X- ·cat-perf.-past-2sg. ?' 
pressed 
'" 
SMG 
by tho perfect 
(completely) and 
by the pluperfect 
I (to a larie exteni) 
Lexicon 
23 Lcxemcs deriving from: a) cjom; csum: 
a) ancicnt Cypriot, which forms a ' Ine' , 'you ' 
single dialect group with Arcadian, (SMG eyo, CSl) 
b) poetic words, rare in Alti(.; prose, b) VI/ro, ' I nm' 
e) archaic words, scarce In other (SMG (rexo) 
modern dialects, c) ka'ni, 'it 's cnough ' 
d) rare words of the hellenistic kohle, (SMG ' flam) 
e) Byzantine words, scarce in other d) ilandron, 'o ld tree' 
modcrn dialects, (no SMG cquivalent) 
f) loanwords from Provcn9al, Italian, e) kapira, ' toast' (SMG /iiyania) 
Arabic and Turkish f) xalwl1in, 
g) recent compounds which are Cypriot cheese 
typically Cypriot (no SMG equivalent) 
(Hadjiioannou 1 99U:246-9; Panayotou g) sovaromllo, 
1996a: 125; Horrocks 1997:7) ' I spcak seriollsly' 
(SMG milo sovara) 
24 Lexica l relationship of Cypriot to "[rJn spite of such SMG 111110 'talk', l/co 'say' 
standard Greek: the translation of a striking differences vs. 
glottochronological list in Athenian in superficial CG sindl xan:o, Jd 10 fonns, it is possible 
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and Cypriot Greek showed non- that the partitioning 
cognate correspondcnces in 16% of of semantic space 
varies b"1 little 
cases, the exact proportion varying from village 
according to semantic field (e.g., nil Cypriot 10 
for numera ls, high for animal terms) Athenian" (ibid.). 
(Nl"Wton 1972b:l 10-1) 
Table 2: Defining features of the Cypl""iot dialect 
3.4 The composition of contempora.-y urban Cypl""iot Greek speech 
The pientre which emerges from the data is not that of a single homogeneous 
(geographically and/or socially defincd) varicty. Rather, one may identify in contemporary 
urban CG speech elements of (i) localised Cypriot varieties, (ii) an urban Cypriot Greek 
kOine, (iii) Standard Modem Greek, and (iv) English. Different speakers are familiar with, 
and have recourse to, these varieties to different extents, in line with Le Page and Tabourct-
Keller's (1985: 182) fo llowing remark: 
"We can onl y behave according to the behavioural patterns of groups we find it 
desirable to identify with to the extent that: 
i) we can identify the groups 
ii) we have both adeq uate access to the groups and ability to analyse their 
behavioural patterns 
iii) the motivation to join the groups is sufficiently powerfu l, and is either reinforced 
or reversed by feedback from the groups 
iv) we have the abi lity to modify our behaviour." 
Cypriot Grceks can, and do indeed, identi fy different 'groups' as is evidenced by the 
existence of distinct names for the concomitant linguistic varieties . Localised "patois"g 
speech is referred to as xorkaf1ka, a variant infonnants elearly felt to be different from what 
they speak, which may be referred to as cipriaka (( I) below) to distinguish it from 
kalamarisflka9 (=SMG) and eNglezika (=English) (Karyolemou 1998: 1 0) . 
3.4. 1 Localised patois speech 
I use this tenn to refer to the varieties of the Cypriot dialect spoken in different parts of the 
island. As Newton (I 972b: 19) notes , '''Village Greek' itself is not in fact a unitary dialect. 
It is a continuum of closely related types of speech linked by a series of independent 
8 This term denotes regional varieties which are not written (Haugen 1972[1966]:99). 
9 From the verb kalama'rizo, ' to speak like a Mainland Greek'. This derives from kalama'ras (fern. 
kalamdru) , 'Main land Greek ' (on the process of naming linguistic systems after the groups who use them, 
see Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985:235) . Following a period of derogatory use, today kalama'ras is used 
more or less neutrally, although seldom in the presence of newly arrived Mainland Greeks. For its etymology, 
see Babiniotis (1998) s.v. kalamara " \-"Jkalama~r i . 
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phonological, morphological and Icxical isoglosses."lo The Big Cypriot Encyclopaedia 
(1986: 126-7; Contossopoulos 1969:97ff.) lists the characteristics of 18 local oral varieties 
(map 2). However, " local linguistic idiosyncracies" are described as being "in retreat" as 
early as the end of the 1960s (Contossopoulos 1969:93). The relocation of refugees from 
northem to southem areas following the Turkish invasion of 1974 advanced this trend 
furthcr, with varieti es previously spoken in northem areas affl icted the most (Anaxagorou 
1987: 129; Panayotou 1996a: 122). Today, regional variation can be mainly observed at the 
phonological and suprasegmental levels of analysis, and native speakers often comment 
on how inhabitants of other areas sirnun ti 10m; 'drawl their voiees', ll or pronounce some 
words di fferently. 12 Localised patois speech will not occupy us further, seeing as (i) it is 
first and foremost a characteristic of rural speech, while the present study focuses on urban 
speech, and (ii) local dialectal features have not been attested in infonnants' speech, 
possib ly as a rcsult ofthc recording situation. 
3.4.2 The koille 
The existence of a Cypriot koille is reported by many authors. Some associate this with the 
operation of social factors such as urbanisation, the impact of technological progress, 
education, and the media, (Contossopoulos 1969:92-3; Koli tsis 1986:2 15), to which others 
add the relocation of refugees to the south after 1974, and the estab lishment of the first 
University on the island in 1989 13 (Anaxagorou 1987: 129; Panayotou 1996a: 122). For 
these authors, the emergence of the Cypriot koine constitutes a re latively recent 
phenomenon. 
However, the language analysed by Newton (I 972b/ 4 is already said to fonn thc basis 
of a "local kaine, heard commonly, especially on the lips of younger speakers, in villages 
whose indigenous dialect may differ in various respects from it" (1972b:2 1; emphasis 
added). Newton (ibid.) considers the language used by Cypriot communities in Britain and 
South Africa - migration to the latter having largely occurred in the first decades of the 
twentieth century (Saint John-Jones 1983:99-100) - to have been based on this kOine. 15 
Geograp hically, this variety is associated with the inhabitants of the Mesaoria plain 
10 Contossopoulos (\969:90) cites the size of the island (925\ km2), the high proportion of mountainous areas, 
and historical events (colonisations, various linguistic and ethnic substrata since anci ent times, fore ign 
conquests) as formative factors or these local varieties. 
l J Said by inhabitants or Paros orthose of Leflcosia, and by the latter or those of Lemesos. 
11 Over a century ago, Menardos ( I 969b[ 1894]:26) reports a much similar situation. 
1] The first students were admitted.in 1992. 
14 His study is based on matcrial CQllcctcd almost a decadc carlicr, in 1963 (Newton 1972b:8). 
15 Attesti ng to the ex istence of a koil/e before the rccent social changes with which its emergence is often 
associated, Christodoulou (1973:310) laments the receding or the "Lelkosia koine" in favour of local 
varieties in the schoolyards of the capital over the preceding twenty five years. 
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(Newton 1972b: 19; map 2). Hadjiioannou (1990[ 1961 ):246) also notes the prevalence of 
the variety of Me saori a: 
"by modem Cypriot dialect, we mean the dialect spoken by the inhabitants of the 
towns and of the villages in the plain area of Cyprus as the inhabitants of 
mountainous areas.. have preserved a more archaic linguistic variety closer to the 
mediaeval dialect". 
According to these remarks , the Cypriot koine represents an instance of "elevation of a 
dialect to a pos ition of primus infer pares" (Jones 1998:289), as opposed to cases of 
koincisation (Trudgi ll 19S6: 107; Kerswill & Williams 2000:66) when "the proliterated 
variety is [ ... ] a non-geographically locatable amalgam in which the regiona l dialects have 
been reduced to a common core" (Jones 1998:290). 16 The selection of the variety of 
Mesaoria accords with the prediction that such selection "is frequently influenced by 
factors such as political centralisation, with the language of the power-base often gaining in 
importance" (Jones 1998:261). Spoken in Lefkosia, which has been the administrative 
centre of the is land at least since the time of the Lusignans (1191- 1489),17 this regional 
variety was already enjoying increased prestige at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
Menardos (1969b[ 1894]: 13) commented, referring to some phonetic features of the Pafos 
dialect: 18 "ra 1tA£icrta tOUtCOV { ... ] &iv' lOlCOllatlK6., 1tOlliKl~ OlCtc:rupolleva v1t '6.llcov 
Kv1tpirov " (,most of these ( ... ] are idiomatic, frequently ridiculed by other Cypriots '). If 
certain regiona l features provoked laughter, this was not due to their inherent 
ridiculousness, hut rather because of their departure from some accredited variety 
(Chambers 1995 :232). 
Trudgill ( 1983a: 186ff.) attributes the variabi lity in degree of linguistic distance 
between regional varieties and the accredited one, with some varieties being closer to it 
than others , to the relationship between social and regiona l varieties of a language, which 
he represents by means of the 'pyramid mode\' (fig.I). According to this, regional 
differentiation is greatest among lower-working-class speakers, and smallest at the top of 
the pyramid, i.e. amongst speakers from the upper-middle-class. To the extent that social 
stratification characterises human societies in general, it seems reasonable to aSSllme that 
16 Pace Karyolcrnou (\ 998: 10). The distinction may be considered a matter of degree, and the two processes need not be 
mutually exc lusive, as evidenced by the loss in the !wille of one of the distinctive phonological fcatu res of the 
d ialect of Mesaoria, IttJ in items such as pCllcra, (Menardos 196ge:99fn .3; Newton 1972b:20, 98-9), which was 
replaced by the l eSI of west em and southern areas. This development may be explained w ith reference to Principle 2 
of Kerswill & Williams (2000:85-9), which slales thaI "lmJarkcd rcgional forms arc disfavoured": pellera is 
markedly regional compared to SMG pc8cra; /peeeera/ is also the CG underlying phonological form (Newton 
1983:62). 
17 " I.nslead of 14 or 15 bishoprics, as during the Byzanline period, four Latin bishoprics were now fou nded, and the 
Latin archbishop was based in Lefkosia" (Spyridakis 1964:83). The Lcfk osia d istrict has dominated the urban 
system of the island throughout the years, already accounting for approximately 30% of the total Cypriot 
population at the first census of 188 1 (Conslantinoll 1994:222). 
18 This belongs 10 Hadj iioannou 's (1990: 246) group of "archaic" varieties. 
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there will at all times exist a linguistic variety enjoying more prestige than others. Based on 
these remarks , one may want to challenge the assumed recent emergence of the Cypriot 
koine, and in particular the pivotal role of contact with SMG (claimed by Contossopoulos 
and Kolitsis, see above) in this process. On the othcr hand, the rapid pace of social change 
in Cyprus in the years following the Second World War is undeniable (Saint John-Jones 
1983:39). Internal migration and the concentration of people in the towns, at least during 
the day, with the concomitant retreat of rural ways of li fe (Constantinoll 1994:227), the 
transfonnation of Cyprus into a service-oriented economy (Chri stodoulou 1994:614), and 
financia l prosperity, 19 along with the factors suggested at the beginning of this section, arc 
likely to have accelerated the process of adoption of a Cypri ot koine, especially by the 
continuously increas ing numbers of speakers populating the ranks of the middle class (cf. 
fig. I ). 
social variation 
• • rcgional variation 
Figure 1: Dialect variation in the UK (after Trudgill 1983a: 188) 
This koine is the dominant variety spoken at home and at work in towns today. It is 
used by Cypriots of all socia-economic backgrounds in their daily transactions with each 
other. Its usc by the media is generally restricted, though not negligible: this is the language 
of the 'Cypriot sketch ' and of a limited range of advertisements (3.2 above), as we ll as of a 
small number of local TV productions depicting contemporary urban life. It is occasionally 
heard on the radio from callers to popular talk shows, and it features in short pieces of nOI1-
serious prose in the daily press. However, this variety has not been codified.2o Authors with 
a particular interest in the spoken language, as we ll as laymen who occasionally write in it 
for in formal purposes21 have recourse to a variety of orthographic conventions, none of 
which adequately render the phonological feanlres of Cypriot speech (Contossopoulos 
1972:94-5; Panayotou I 996b). The intellegibility of this variety to speakers of SMG is 
considerah ly higher than that of localised patois speech. Nevertheless, a numher of features 
19 1.n 1988 Cyprus passed the thresho ld ofperCllpita gross national income reckoned as the boundary between 
middle-income and high-income economics (Christodoulou 1992:xvi i). 
20 Codificat ion constituting a defining feature ofa standard language (Joncs 1998:262), ttlc term 'standard ' is 
currently reserved for SMG (3.4.3 below) . 
21 One middle-class middle-aged male informant from Lamaka stated that tle uses this variety in leiters to his 
daughter. 
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at all lcvcls of analysis affecting high frequency words and constnlctions, not least of which 
a range of sounds exotic to the Mainland Greek ear,22 are area lly restricted to CYPnis. As a 
result, CG speech retains a distinctive flavour , which renders intelligibility of all egro 
enunciated speech by speakers of SMG partly a matter of personal motivation and 
famili arisati on with the speech of individual speakers (Hudson 1996[1 980]:35-6).23 The 
fo llowing excerpt reveals Cypriots' linguistic self-awareness, as expressed by two middlc-
class in fonn ants, S I (male, aged 18-30) and S2 (female, aged 3 1-50). 
(I) [58; At work, Pafos] 
S I : opos tf eyo stin argin cksecinisa na su milo pjo- pjo bSara el:inika to'ra itan kaSara 
usiastika en' kalamaristika Oioti, ala ka6ara inc nomizo 
S2: 'en: en' 0- ((laughs)) u1:a ka6ara, 
MT: 'en: en' ul:a ka6ara e? 
S I : e' Oici mu apops i. iparxun para pol:es leksis res opies kovume, (.) 'en les 
MT: 'en tes lalumen (.) ul:es ((laughs)) 
S2: imasten praktici a'6ropi 
((several turns)) 
S I: ena Oiastima eOocimasa to, jati e'lea mu tf emena, tfekama to tf ekatala'venan pliros. 
tf ekamna to:: 'mil un ka-, opos milumen kanonika as pumen eipriaka ... tfareseen tus. 
usiastika en (.) c' laSos mas pu milumen pu al:as:umcn ti:: tin omilia mas. 6ilaOi 
areseen tus pu se akuan na milas ti:n ta cipriaka as pumc 
S2 : ne afu katalavenun ets i tf aA:os. jati i ro6ites exun pob 6iaforan [pu tus cipreus? 
S I : [o,i 
S2 : al:a 'e mbori na tus milisis teAa ka6ara cipriaka mes tin cl:aoa. kseris kapu 6a tus sigisis 
((laughs)) 
S I : ama milas arya katalavenun ta endaksi 
S2: ma, tJe , ena lepta tJe fla prospii6umen pale apu mbume, ap' tin eipro iste- ali to ioion 
etsi. 
S I: 'Same as me at the beginning 1 started talking to you more? more clearly in Greek 
now whether it was clearly in essence it's 'kalamaristika' because, they're all clear 1 
think.' 
S2: 'There're not a- « laughs)) all clear,' 
MT: 'They're not all clear eh?' 
S I: 'That's my opinion. There are many words that we cut (.) we don 't' 
MT: 'We don't say them (.) whole.' «laughs)) 
S I: 'We arc practical people. ' 
((several turns)) 
S I : ' I tried it for a while, because they said that to me too, and 1 did it and they 
understood fully. And 1 did it 1 spoke nor- , as we speak normally in Cypriot so to 
speak and they li ked it. In fac t it's (.) it's wrong that we speak that we change 
our, our speech. That is, they liked listening to you speak the, Cypriot say' 
22 These are the sounds resulting from ' sofiening ', as well as the geminates (ineluding aspirates) of Cypriot 
speech (table I, 1 and 3), previously encountered also in other SE dialects . "lU]niversal education, access to 
the mass media, the night of the young to the cities, and the advent of easy mobility" (Horrocks 1997:301) 
have resu lted in the retreat of regional varieties in the mainland, and the emergence of Cypriot as "the only 
living Modem Greek dialect" (Contossopoulos 1969:92). Th is development is not unrelatcd to the particular 
historical events of the last 50 years and their impact on the ideological orientation of Cypriot Greeks 
(Stamatakis 1991, Persian is 1994). 
23 Newton (\983:56) notes that "careful enunciation results in phonetic realisat ions which may well occur 
normally in other typically more prestigious dialectal levels". 
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S2: ' Yes since they understand anyway. Why, are Rhodians much different [from 
Cypriots?' 
SI : [ 'No' 
S2: 'But you can't speak to them in proper Cypriot in Greece. You know that you 
will confuse them.' ((laughs)) 
S I: 'When you speak slowly they understand alright.' 
S2 : 'But, wait a moment, even if we pretend, wherever we enter, are you from Cyprus? 
It 's always the same.' 
The excerpts below, from the recorded data, exemplify the main feanlres of the kOine. 24 
(2) [35; At work, Lefkosia] 
end3' ipa tus tetjon prama 
(end3e: 1. 1 (softening), 2.16 (negative particle); ipa tus: 2. 19 (clitic postposition); tetjon: 
1.5 (final In/retention)] 
" didn' t tell them sllch a thing.' 
(3) [53; At work, Pafos] 
ja na poja'tisumente kamjan: eksindarka metra: tetrayonika. posin posotita? 
(poja'tisumente: 2.4 (dynamic stress on the fourth syllable); eksindarka: 1.6 (manner 
dissimilation); pos in: 1.5 (final In! retention] 
'To pai nt about sixty square metres. How much?' 
(4) [39; At home, Lemesos] 
, : inda psatin eferes? 
2: yophan. 
3: e na pa na tin tianis is. 
(inda: 2.9 (interrogative particle); psarin, yophan: 1.5 (final In! retention); yophan: 1.3 
(long consonants); tianisis: 1.4 (voiced fricative dcle tion)] 
, : 'What fish have you brought?' 
2: 'Whitebait.' 
3: 'Well , go and prepare it.' 
(5) [5 1; At work, Pafos] 
ena zefkarin pandofies. ektos pu kotSincs 
(zcfkarin: 1.6 (manner dissimilation), 1.5 (final InJ retention), pu: 2. 17 (apocope); 
kotSines: 1.1 (softening)] 
'A pair of slippers. Except for red. ' 
(6) [1 8; Fonnal discussion, Lefkosia] 
jati i peris:oteri andres 6en klesi ... 
(peris;oteri: 1.3 (long consonants), klesi: 1.7 (3p \. in - IISI)] 
' Why most men don't cry' ... 
(7) L44; At work, Lemesos] 
, : ... ta: tuta tus ctsi zavonusi ta yCIUSea tus ta poSea tus indalos en' pu kamnun, inda 
'n' pu ta lalusi? . . 
2: ( ) tSinon pu to tsil:as pu kate c' ine stravon:i ta'? 
24 These are noted in square brackets; "1.1" means table I, phenomenon I (3.3 above). 
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(tuta: 2. 18/note (deictic pronoun tufOS) ; zavonusi: 1.7 (3pl. in -USI) , 2.23 (dialectal 
word); r;eru8ca: 2.8 (diminutives in -ulll); r;cru8ca, p08ca: 2. 1 (l6/+/j/~[e]); en': 2. 11 
(3sg. 'to be'); inda 'n' pu: 2.9 (dialectal interrogativc pronoun), 2. 18 
(apocope+sandhi), lalusi: 1.7 (3pl. in -IIS1) , 2.21 (di fferences in lex ical meaning); 
tsil :as: 1.3 (long consonants) , 2.23 (dialectal word); stravon:i ta: 2. 19 (clitic 
postpositi on)] 
I : ... 'their, these so they twist their little anns their legs how is it that they do, what 
are they called?' ... 
2: '( ) the one that you pull from undemeath and it twists them? ' 
(8) [37; At work, Letkosia] 
eSis po l:es tSe: eSis tes potSi- var' tes mes to folter su, jati en tes va l:i s 
[eSis, tSe, potSi: 1.1 (softening) , pol:es: 1.3 (long consonants), tes: 2.7 (female 
pronoun); var' tes mes to: 1.6 (manner dissimilation), 2. 18 (apocope+sandhi); folter: 
2.1 (ldJ devoic ing) , en: 1.4 (voiced fricative deletion)] 
'You have many and, you have them there- put them in your fo lder, why don't you 
put the m' 
(9) [44; At work, Lemesos] 
arr;isen i meyali na men izilefci tf i mitSa ... 
(men: 2.16 (negative particle); izilcfci: 2.3 (Iii prosthesis), 1.2 (lyl epenthesis), 2 . 1 
(/v/+/j/~[e]); tf: 1. 1 (softening); mitSa: 2.23 (dialectal word)] 
'The older one started not to be jealous and the young one' ... 
(10) [30; At work , Letkosia] 
ksirin:c to pu pano? 
(ksirin:c : 2. 10 (verbs in -isko); pu: 2.18 (apocope)] 
'Cut a bit off at the top? ' 
(II) [37; At work, Letkosia] 
maria po n:a't1' i kOIU, 130 m:u t'al:a ekama tis ta painding ( 
ctsi. 
) seliC\es en:a ti s ta fiko 
(po n:a'rt'i: 2.15 (future particle) , 2.18 (apocope+sandhi); koru: 2.8 (diminutive in 
-u) ; 60 m:u, en:a fiko: 2.13 (dialectal aorist); painding: 2.2 (fbi dcvoicing); lekama ti s 
la: 2. 19 (cl iti c postposition), 2.4 (dynamic stress on the fourth syllabic)] 
' Maria when the lass comes, give me the others I bound them fo r her ( ) pages 
I ' ll leave them like this ' 
(12) [47; At work, Pafos] 
10lra ckopsamcn tCAa mc asxolumaste me 80rume me:, sa na tJ' cnd3' exume ma8ca 
[tolra : 2.5 (non-standard accentuation); ekopsamen: 2. 14 (syllabic augment), 2.24 
(d ifferences in lexical meaning), 2.22 (extensive usc of aorist); teAa: 2. 17 (dialectal 
adverb), me ... me ... me:: 2.16 (dialectal multiple negati on), 8orume: 2.23 (dialectal 
word); end3e: 1.1 (softening); 2.16 (negative particle) maeca: 2.1 (/e/+/j/-.>[c])] 
'Now we've completely stopped we neither wony nor sec nor, as if we don 't have eyes' 
(13) [54; At work, Pafos] 
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(pc: 2. 12 (dia lectal imperative); ct'~oka: 2.13 (dialectal aorist); ct>okalarota tu iosif: 
2.20 (genitive complements); ixriasti , ixriastitc: 2.3 (/if prosthesis); mazin: 1.5 (final 
fn! retention); sasctc: 2.23 (dialectal word); turpin an: 2.2 (fbi devoicing)] 
'Tell me, er, I gave {them} to Joseph and he 's bringing {them}, so whenever it's 
necessary if you need {any} he'll have with him and you can settl e that if you do n't 
have another one ... I didn't agree anything with him (.) if he wants to and you' ll fix 
it you'll need the turb ine ( ) ask Joseph and,' 
(14) [22; At work, Lamaka] 
I: en' el:ipsi? 
2: e [(name of retailer)] pu ti ferni tJ'en pol:oercetc 
[en': 2.11 (3sg. 'to be'), 2.20 (difference in lex ical meaning); el:ipsi: 1.3 (long 
consonants); pol:oercete: 2.17 (adverb pol:a) , 2.23 (djalecta l compound word)] 
I: ' Is it out of stock? 
2: 'Er «name of retailer)) that brings it and he doesn 't come very often.' 
(15) [65; At work, Pafos] 
o ari6mos tis solines ( ) pun:a valume sto 5romon, na valo oxto? 
[tis solines: 2.6 (accusative plural instead of genitive) ;25 pun:a: 2.15 (future particle), 
2.18 (apocope+sandhi)] 
'The number of tubes ( ) that we'll use in the street, shall I put down eight?' 
Examples (2) to (15) show that the defining features of the Cypriot dialect as spoken "in 
the Mesaoria plain have been preserved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the modern kaine. 
What is more, while these are not numerous, they are prominent in everyday speech, as 
they affect high-frequency items (conjunctions, prepositions, adverbs, commonly lIsed 
verbs such as 'see', 'say' , 'ask', 'give', ' take'). 
3.4.3 Standard Modem Greek 
The term Standard Modem Greek refers to the variety of Greek used in Main land Greece, 
particularly in Athens, and which has, since 1976, also been the official language of the 
Greek statc?6 In Cypms, this is used in written di scourse, as we ll as in education and by the 
media (but see 3.4.2 above).27 Not surprisingly, Cypriot Greeks do not possess native 
intuitions fo r this variety, but only for Greek as spoken in Cyprus (Christodoulou 
25 Contrary to the noted obsolescence of the genitive plural of male nouns and adjectives. the noun concern ed 
here is female (i solina, ·tube'), potentially indicating a contemporary tendency for the generalisation of mle 
2.6. 
26 The education act of 1976 detennined that the language of instruction in all classes shou ld be 'Modern 
Greek', ""defined as ' the Demotic language shaped by the Greek people and classic national wri ters as a 
Panhellenic instrument of expression, cod ified, without local peculiari ties and extremes"'(Horrocks 
1997:361}. For a general overview ofSMG, see ibid. :362fT. 
27 Following the constitutional arrangements of 1960, an official organisation, simultaneously legislative and 
executive, the Greek Communal Chamber, was founded for the promulgation of Greek national education 
(Persian is 1994: 104). Use of the Cypriot koine in schools is nonetheless widely tolerated (Contossopoulos 
1969:93), whi le particular political groups have called for its active promotion in literature and in education 
(Persianis 1994:97). 
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1973:309). Most Cypriot Greeks , however, have a good passive knowledge of the standard 
variety - although instances of hypercorrection are not lacking (Newton 1983; Terkourafi 
1997:32) - and will accommodate to the speech of Mainland Greeks in conversation or 
merely in their presence «(16)-(26) below). The degree to which individua l speakers will 
standardi se on these occasions varies , depending on their personal attributes - previous 
contact with SMG being the most important (eL condition (ii) of Le Page & Tabouret-
Keller's remark quoted in 3.4 above) - and idiosyncratic feanlTes, as well as the 
situational context. Some excerpts from the recorded data indicati ve of Cypriots' use of 
SMG follow. 
(16) [35; At work, Letkosia] 
I: e vasika pistevo oti oti e¥i na kani me to:: piotitan paro¥is = 
2: =ndaksi= 
3: =en' kala na ta Oumen mazi 
4: na ta Oumen to t' iSela na po amos, . 
[pistevo: # 1.2 (suspension of Iyl epenthesis); e¥i: # 1 I (suspension of softening); t': 
#=-2.9 (interrogative inda)] 
I: 'Er basically I believe that whatever is related to quality of provision= 
2: =' alright'= 
3: =' it' s good to look at all together ' 
4: 'We' ll do that. But what I wanted to say' ... 
(17) [48; At work, Pafos] 
katalaves pas inc i miro6ja tus? poli apali 
[kata laves: ;£,2. 14 (no sy ll abic augment); inc; #=-2. 11 (3sg. ' to be'); miro5ja; #=-2. 1 
(suspension ofIM+lj! --> [ell; po'li: *2.17 (adverb pol:a)] 
'Can you tell how they smell? Very lightly.' 
(18) [40; At work, Lemesos , A=MG] 
ja pes mu, etsi e¥i afton to misticizmon tu peru opos akujete? opos Ojavazume? 
(pes: ;t2.12 (dialecta l imperative); e~i: * 1. 1 (suspension of softening); afton; :/:. 
2.18/note (deictie pronoun tufas); akujete: #=- 1.3 (suspension of fricative deletion); 
ojavazume: * 2.1 (suspension of lo/+/jl ---t[c])] 
'Tell me, docs it have this mysticism of Pen'\ that we hear about? that we read about?' 
(19) [56; At home, Pafos , A=MG] 
rotise me oti Selis ja poOosfero. (leo), an oen, an ksed s. (.) jati exo tin endiposi pos oe, 
ksero oti andipaSas to poOosfero 
(rotise me: :/:.2. 19 (genitive complements); an kseris: *2.3 (suspension of Ii! 
prosthesis); oen: #=-2.16 (negative particle); endiposi; #=- 1.5 (final /n! deletion)] 
'Ask me what you will about football (l say), if you don 't, if you know. Because I 
have the impression that you don't, {I don't} know you di slike football. ' 
(20) [12; At work , Letkosia] 
ta exo proplirosi prin Ojo mines? 
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(ta exo propliros i: #:2.22 (perfect), #:2.19 (suspension of c1iric postposition);28 6jo: #:2. 1 
(suspension of /31 +/j1--+[c])] 
' 1 paid for them two months ago?' 
(2 1) [46; At work , Lemesos] 
vazis e60 ti fraulitsa su? (.) na min ta valo ce t' al:a 
(e60: * 2. 17 (adverb oawe); frauli tsa: #2.8 (diminutive suffi x -itsa), min: #2. 16 
(negati ve particle men); cc: * 1.1 (suspension of softening)29] 
'Can you put your strawberry-dim. here? (.) so that I don 't put the other ones too ' 
(22) [65; At work, Pafos] 
9a protimusa na tus i50piumen tilefonikos i proforikos 
(9a: *2.15 (funtre particle en:a); tilefonikos, proforikos: learned adverbs in - 05J 
' I' d rather we notified them by phone or in person' 
The preceding examples already reveal a degree of mixing of the two varieties (Cypri ot 
kOine and SMG). This is more striking in the following examples, in which pauses, repairs 
or fa lse starts attest to Cypriot Greeks' uncertainty about the use of parti cular lexical items 
or constructions. 
(23) [68; At home, Pafos, A~MG] 
a' 6a 6is kamja 6ialcxton etsi ksexoristin as pume pu aksizi ton kopon eprepe na se 
parome ston dinon tSi kato 
(9a 6is: *2.15 (future particle en:a); 5ialexton: SMG word with manner 
assimilation (1.6) and final /nI (1.5); tSi: t.1 (softening)] 
' If you are to see a dialect that's special so to speak that's worthwhile we should take 
you down to Dinos.' 
(24) [54; At work, Pafos] 
fern is mu ti:::n e (.) (.) sfraj i5ula tis etetias? 
[fernis mu: 2. 19 (clitic postposition); sfraji5ula: #2.8 (diminutive suffi x -ula)] 
'Can you bring me the, er, company stamp-dim.?' 
(25) [41 ; At work, Lemesos] 
mitSi::, mi kri, pjo siya «explaining)) mitSi , e amesos esini5itopiisa oti: mas (.) 
« laughing)) pernun to pos milumen c' ekama to mitSi mikri 
(mitSi::, mikti : #2.23 (replacement of dialectal lexical item which involved soften ing 
( 1.1 )); es ini5 itopiisa: 2. 14 (syll abic augment); mi lumen: 1.5 (final /nJ)] 
' Lads, guys, keep it down «explaining)) lads, er I immediate ly realised that we (.) 
« laughing)) are being recorded how we speak and I utrned ' lads ' into 'guys '.' 
(26) [34; At work, Lefkosia] 
I: pji ea lavete meros sti:n Ii: Ii: pji Sa lavele meros is Ii sine6ria simera 
2: cxun sune5rion 0 xristos, 0 steAos 
28 Judging by its occurrence with the pluperfect 
ixa m:as pi oti ... , 'They had told us that ' ... (57; Fonnal discussion; Paros) 
chtic postposition is probably structurally (though not stylistically) independent rrom use of the present 
perfect. 
29 On the stigmatisation of the sounds t!idzand tjld3 in SMG, see Joseph 1992. 
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«several turns later)) 
3: pjos 6a pjos Sa pjos Sa proe5rcvsi ti sinandisi? 
4: e:yo ime 
[Sa lavete: *2. 15 (future particle en:a); usc of SMG sineorion, 'conference', instead of 
sineiJria, 'meeting'; Sa proe5revsi ti sinandisi: complementation in accusative instead 
ofSMG construction with genitive; c:yo ime: reply 'I am' instead of ' I will '] 
I :'Who will take part in the, the , who will take part in today 's meeting' 
2: 'Christos, Stelios have a conference' 
«several turns later)) 
3: 'Who will who wi ll who will ehair the meeting?' 
4: ' I am.' 
This brief account of the usc of SMG in Cyprus raises the question whether what 
actually occurs is an instance of diglossia (Ferguson 1959:325). Examination of all nine 
proposed criteria (ibid.:328-336) reveals that this is indeed so. (1 n what follows, SMG IS 
referred to as the H(igh) variety, while the Cypriot koine as the L(ow) one.) 
I) Specialisation of function for H and L with minimum overl ap between the two sets 
occurs, with H used for religious senTIons, personal letters (but see fn. 21 above) political 
speeches, university lectures, news broadcasts, newspaper editorials and poetry,30 while L 
is used for instructions to waiters and clerks, conversation with family, friends and 
co lleagues, the 'Cypriot sketch', captions on political cartoons and folk literature. 
2) Speakers regard H as superior to L in a number of respects, and this bel ief is also 
held by speakers whose command of H is quite limited. Investigating language attitudes on 
the island by means of a matched-guise test, Papapavlou (1998) found that the use of SMG 
is associated with the qualities of being more: attractive, ambitious, inte ll igent, interesting, 
modern, dependable , pleasant, and educated, but not more: sincere, friendly, kind, or 
humorous. These findings echo Trudgill 's ( I 983a: 198) remarks pertaining to the more 
favourab le evaluation of English RP speakers as opposed to regionally accented speakers, 
and support the higher prestige of SMG over Cypriot speech (Sciriha 1995, 1996; PavlOll 
1997)." 
3) There is a sizeable body of written literature in H, which is held in high esteem by 
the speech community. This body of literaulre is in continuous production in another 
speech community (Mainland Greece) in which H serves as the standard variety. 
30 E.g. the poetry of Kostas Montis. 
31 Implicit evaluations of Cypriot speech arc also found in the writings of linguists. Contossopoulos (1972:95-6) 
echoing l-Iadzidakis and Pantc\idis (quoted ibid.), finds Cypriot articulation to be "generalemcnt rel5chec", a 
characterisation reminiscent of the argument from "case of articulation", based on which non-standard speech is o(l:cn 
criticised as being "lazy" or "sloppy" (Chambers 1995:233). However, as Newton (1983:61) points out, by preserving 
underlying forms of earlier periods, as well as applying Cypriot-spccHic rules on underlying SMG fonus, Cypriot 
speech is both phonologically conservative and innovative compared to SMG. This observation counters the claim that 
"the standard dialect inhibits many of the low-level, variable processes of phonetic conditioning that characterise 
s(Xlken language", which underlies the "case of articulation" argument (Chambers 1995:232). 
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4) Children invariably learn L in what may be regarded as the "'normal" way of 
learning one's mother tongue, while learning H is chiefly accomplished by means offonnal 
education. As a result, Cypr iot Greeks never quite 'feel at home' using H (ef. above on 
native speakers' intuitions and instances of hypercorrection). 
5) There is a strong tradition of grammatical study of H, as opposed to L, including an 
established orthography which allows little variation. Significantly, 
"[i]n the case ofrelativcly small speech communities with a single important centre of 
communication, [ ... ] a kind of standard L may arise which speakers of other dialects 
imitate and which tends to spread like any standard variety except that it remains 
limited to the functions for which L is appropriate" (Ferguson 1959:332). 
In Cyprus, thi s role is fulfilled by the Cypriot kaine. 
6) Digloss ia may be a relatively stable situation, typically persisting at least several 
centuries. Two remarks by Menardos (196ge[ 1912]:63fn.l , 87fn.2), to the effect that some 
learned fonns attributed to Cypriot Greek by Sakellarios must have been obtained by 
educated Cypriots, testi fy that diglossia in Cyprus is not a modern phenomenon. 
7) H has indeed grammatical categories not present in L, such as the participle, 
reported by Menardos ( 196ge:93ff.) to be obsolete in the modem dia lect. Furthennore, the 
obsolescence of the genitive plural from the inflectional paradigm of male adjectives and 
nouns (2.8, 3.3 above), and that of the present perfect from the inflectional paradigm of 
verbs (2.22, 3.3 above) attest to the reduction in L of the inflectional system of nouns and 
verbs found in H. 
8) Technical tcnns and learned expressions are borrowed from H (examples (16),(22)), 
while popular expressions and the names for fami liar objects come from L (examples 
(5),(7)). At the same time, one finds "many paired items, one H and one L, refer/ing to 
fairly common concepts ... , where the range of meaning of the two items is roughly the 
same" (Ferguson 1959:334; (25), and the examples in Newton I 972b: 111 ). 
9) As regards the underlying phonological fonns of lexical items, speakers appear to 
have a single inventory of oppositions for the whole H-L complex, while extensive 
interference in both directions occurs in tenns of the distribution of phonemes in specific 
lexical items. As Newton (1983) shows, stylistic variation between localised patois speech, 
the Cypriot koine and SMG generally involves suspension of rules already internalised by 
speakers. On the other hand, the persistence of long consonants, final In!, and aspirates in 
the speech of Cypriot Greeks (even after many years of living in Athens) must be attributed 
to the fact that production of their standard counterparts would involve acquiring new 
rules. Thus, the H voiced stops fbi , /d/, /g/ arc rendered in CG with some degree of 
prenasalisation even word-initially (cf. CG [mboro] vs. SMG [boro], ' I-can'), in the 
absence of a contrast of voice for stops in L (Newton 1983 :63). Newton therefore assumes 
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that L forms. rather than their H counterparts, constitute the point of departure, and 
illustrates thi s claim by discussing likcly and acnml instances of hypercorrection. 
A further feature of dig lossic situations, namely when this situation begins to be 
problematic, is also exemplified in Cyprus. Determining factors for such change of attitude 
are "(a) morc widespread literacy [ ... J, (b) broader communication among different 
regional and social segments of the community [ ... ], (c) a desire for a full-fledged standard 
"national" language as an attribute of autonomy or sovereignty" (Ferguson 1959:338). 
Indications that Cyprus meets the first two conditions have already been provided (3.4.2 
above). Karyolemou ( 1996a) discusses several indications that it probably meets the third 
condition as well. lnterestingly, both the adoption of H or of one form of L (the Cypriot 
koine) as the standard have been supported, Echoing Ferguson' s (1959:338-9) predictions, 
arguments given in support of H include its natural ability to act as a uni fy ing factor (with 
Mainland Greece) , and its higher expressiveness and accuracy compared to L (Karyolemou 
1997), while arguments given in support of L refer to the reso lution of educational 
problems and the need for modernisation (Persianis 1994). 
These observations leave little reason Lo doubt that the linguistic situation in Cyprus 
constitutes an instance of diglossia. The two varieties remain di stinct in their functions and 
in speakers' perceptions, while instances of standardisation in phonology and syntax 
provide indications that these arc realised as suspension of Cypriot-specific rules, rather 
than acquis ition of new ones (Newton 1983; Terzi (p.c.) notes that clitic preposition in 
finite contex ts as a result ofV-to-T movement involves the suspension ofa Cypriot-specific 
rule of T-to-M verb movement). No process of koincisation (Ketwsill & Williams 2000) 
may therefore be in sight. That said, the importance of li nguistic accommodation during 
face-to-face interaction (e.g. Cypriots' standardising in the presence of Mainland Greeks) in 
di sseminating change under the right social conditions (ibid.:66; Trudgi ll 1986:4ff.) can 
hardl y be underestimated. 
3.4.4 Engl ish 
The final component of contemporary urban Cypriot Greek speech is Engli sh. Contrary to 
the varieti es discussed so far, its appearance on the scene is relatively recent. The British 
assumed administration of the island in 1878. Cyprus was declared independent in 1960. 
Since then, British influence has remained pervasive in a number of occupational milieus. 
In the administrative sector, statistical reports and agricu lnlral instructions arc compiled in 
English (loannou 1991 :36; Panayotou 1996b), while the policies of semi-governmental 
organisations often reflect the corresponding British ones (including the usc of imperial 
measures; data sess ions 35, 57). In the legal profession, Greek law was recently introduced 
alongside Commonwealth law, translation of which is under way. In the medical 
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profession, reports arc commonly written in English (panayotou I 996b). Last, but not least, 
in the educational sector, English-speaking education is widely availab le at all levels, 
Ioannou 199 1 :25-7; Karoulla-Vrikkis 1991 :51-4). 
Usc of the English language in Cypms has not uncommonly been the focus of heated 
debate (Karyolemou 1993).32 Nevertheless, the data show that, though extensive at the 
lexica l level, this remains stmcturally marginal to Cypriot speech, as expected in a 
community whose first language is thc vchicle of an important body of literanlre, despite its 
recent colon ial past.)} The aforementioncd debate may then have largely resulted from a 
general preference for vocabulary and pronunciation, rather than syntax, as markers of 
soc ial differences (Hudson 1996:45). Some examples of Cypriot Greeks ' use of English 
from the recorded data follow (English words in the original arc italicised in the 
trans lation). 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31 ) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(21; At work , Lefkosia] 
tren mboro fla pien:o tSe na'rkume sto tho ilet en:a pao na pjaso wethis alo pos 
'And I can't go to the toilet all the time. I think I'll go buy some wetties.' 
[34; At work , Lctkosia, A=MG] 
egi ap'afta ta mats 
'There are some mats.' ((for placing drinks on)) 
[35; At work, Lefkosia] 
cyrapsa sinandisi me to prod3ckt manad3er 
' I wrote down meeting with the project manager.' 
[35; At work, Lefkosia] 
inda 'n' pu kamno to sekretari eyo re peSca? 
'What am I going to be the SeCr elQ1Y guys?' 
(35; At work , Lefkosia] 
xoris' ta se Sco set tSc na ta valumen to'ra e ... kame ta khomplit 
' Divide them into two sets and let's put them now er ... make them cumplete.' 
[30; At work, Lefkosia] 
rna cinos rna cinos pu pies pu kaname preSar thest? 
'That one that one you went to that we did a pressure test on?' 
(37; At work , Lefkosia] 
a e tot' en epia n' al:akso to khaS akhaunt akoma. po 'vale pu evalen to tSek buk 0 
andonis, 
'Ah er, in that case I haven't been to change the cash account yet. Where did he put 
where did Andonis put the cheque boo":?' 
(40; At work , Lemesos] 
l2 Aksclos (1994) summarises the controversy following a citizen's request to have he r passport issued in 
Greek rather than English. Karyolemou (1995, 1 996b) summarises the debate prompted by the question of the 
language of the newly-founded University. 
33 On the linguistic issues commonly facing post-colonial societies, see Le Page & Tabouret-Kellcr 1985. 
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panajia mu i kopcl:cs tu <'iikastiriu <'iila<'ii. cpira tus ta d3ad3mcnt pu to <'ickato, to 
<'ickato, ... a: sori 3ila5i. xa. enevriase me 
'God w ith the girls at court. [ brought them the judgements from October, from 
October, ... ha , wclll ' m sony. Shc made me angry. ' 
(35) [60; At work, Pafos] 
6elo ena khopi tin imera pu kanun to ithereiJon ( ) stin praksi tis imeras apo 
pano to ithere iJon na yrafti. ... ce? na pane meta stan andrea na ipoyrafun ta eTJgrafa. 
ekames to ofer lether? 
' I want a copy on the day they make the iteration ( ) on the act of that day at the 
top ( I want) the iteration written . .. and? then the documents must go to Andreas to 
be s igned. Have you prepared the offer letter?' 
The borrowing of individual lexical items, as exemplified in the above excerpts, shows 
that (a) English words are rendered using sounds already existing in the phonological 
inventory of CG, while phonological rules sueh as devoicing are also app lied ((8), ( II ) in 
3.4.2 above), (b) they are typically rendered in Greek as neuter gender ((30) above), (c) 
plura l number is sometimes indicated using the suffix - s ((28), but see a lso (3 1) above), 
and (d) they arc typ ically used instead of the SMG equivalents to render technica l or 
otherwise non-traditional tenns. This last feature would appear to account for their 
preponderance in work settings (as opposed to at home). With regard to style, English 
words mainly co-occur with features of the Cypriot kOille - although thi s is by no means 
restrictive, as shown by the predominance ofSMG feanlres in (28) and (35). They therefore 
appear to belong to a more informal register, sinee not only are they not used by all social 
classes alike, but the ir use is also largely avoided in the presence of Main land Greeks and 
on radio/TV (but see (37) below where the speaker is expressing personal fee lings, and (40) 
where the speaker and addressee are familiar with one another). 
In addition to individual lexical items, whole expressions are borrowed, and 
incorporated into Cypriot speech either (partly) trans lated , or untranslated. In contrast to 
individual loanwords, these expressions are not subject to the application of Cypriot 
phonologica l rules (e.g. manner dissimilation is sllspended in (38) be low), and they appear 
to eonstiUlte the exclusive domain of middle-class speakers, since a good command of 
English is required for their eorreet use. 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
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[35; At work , Lefkosia] 
vasika kseris sto telos tis imcras inda'n'pu 'ni? 
<Basically do you know at the end of the day what it is?' 
[90; On TV] 
chie pavlu, e, ofilo na 30so cc tular;iston to k"redit episis sto- ston alID03ion ipuryo, 
para oti ime pikramenos 
'Mr Pavlou, er, despite be ing deeply hurt, I ought to at least give some credit also to 
the- the minister in charge,' 
(57; Formal discussion, Pafos] 
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e ena Bco pramata ets i of t"Ii rckord tora tfa flume. mjan d3'U1amc? 
'Er one or two things like ojJthe record now and we' ll go. Since we've come?' 
(39) [46; At work, Lemesos] 
e tor' an igete to xrono tSe parakolu8usate afto etsi thu start yui8, t"Iioti en' poli kalos 0 
isij itis tf en:a, mbori na sas katefBini ... 
'Er, if you had the time and you attended that just to start with, because the 
presenter is very good and he will, he can direct you' .. 
(40) [40; At work, Lemesos, A~MG] 
to daiari as satS ine se lida tu fa ilofaks. ean to dis ((pause)) 
'The diwy as slIch is a page oftheJiloJax. If you look at it ((pause)) 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter provides a brief description of contemporary urban Cypriot Greek speech, and 
an overview of the main issues surrounding language use in Cypms. Apart from loca lised 
patois speech, which is not represented in the data, three varieti es were identified: the 
Cypriot koine, which has inherited almost all of the features of the variety of Mesaoria, 
Standard Modern Greek, and English. The prevai ling sinmtion of diglossia means that 
Greek - spoken as a fi rst language by just over 620,000 Greek Cypriots li ving on the 
island, and , alongside Turkish, one of the two official languages of the Republic of Cypms 
- is used by speakers in its standard or in its local form distinctively, as predicted by Le 
Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985: 182, quoted in 3.4 above). Fo llowing Papapav lou's (1 998) 
findings, situations in which one wants to emphasise one's social or professional 
competence will ca ll for eonfornlity with the grammatical and lex ical choices of SMG -
within the limits of the speaker's previous experience wi th this variety - while situations 
in which one wishes to foreground one's sincerity and friendliness will ca ll for the usc of 
the Cypriot koine. Typical examples of the fanner type of situation are in the presence of 
Main land Greeks and on radiolTV, while typical examples of the latter are with fami ly and 
co lleagues. Nevertheless, this emde distinction does not do justiee to the multiple 
intenned iate shades of speakers' intentions, which may be expressed by various 
combinations of standard and local fonns. 
It is therefore possible to gain an insight into the stance that the speaker is adopting at 
anyone time by analysing hislher choice of standard and/or local fOnTIs , as these are 
evidenced in the grammatical and lexical detai ls of hi s/her utterance. Examining how these 
choices co-vary with the formal means used for expressing politeness (2.7.2 above) can 
shed some light on those considerations which motivate the choice of particular linguistic 
devices for express ing politeness in CG. In what way and to what extent are these 
considerations related to the notion of face, as outlined in 1.3.1 ? How do such 
considerations relate to the situation at hand? Can they he derived from it via a principle 
such as Brown and Levinson's Wx=D(S,H)+P(H,S)+Rx? Or do they relate to the extra-
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linguistic feanlres of the sitttation in a more direct way, i. e. without having recourse to a 
principle? These are some of the questions to which the following chapters attempt to 
provide answers. 
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Chapter 4 
Quantitative and qualitative aspects of politeness in Cypriot 
Greek 
4.1 Methodology of the data analysis 
Chapter 2 outlined the data co ll ection process which led to the comp ilation of a corpus of 
spontaneous conversational data from CG. To test the validi ty of Brown and Levinson's 
predictions as regards thi s corpus (2.6 above), two lines of enquiry are possible. First, one 
may construct hypotheses regarding the values of D, P and Rx for observed situations and 
examine whether interl ocutors' utterances tend indeed to become more indirect as the 
values of the three sociological variables increase. Second, one may work one's way back 
from the actual utterances observed to the purported values of D, P and R, wh ich motivated 
them, and examine whether these values can consistentl y be obtained using Brown and 
Levinson 's de finitions of the Distance, Power and Ranking of the impos ition. The present 
chapter explores these poss ibilities by undertaking a descripti ve stati stical anal ysis of these 
data, complemented by the discuss ion of individual examples . 
4.1.1 The stati sti cal analys is of the data 
The analysis undertaken consisted of counting frequencies of (a) occurrence of the possible 
values of the variables considered (2 .7 above), and (b) co-occurrence of the most frequently 
encountered values of these variables . These frequencies were in itially exp lored through 
tables, and subsequentl y charted in diagrams (approximately two-hundred and fifty 
diagrams were produced in total). The software package used was SPSS, version 9. It was 
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thus possible to establi sh frequencies of co-occurrence of values of the extra-lingui stic 
variables considered (certain types of speaker and addressee standing in a ce l1ain type of 
re lationship to each other performing a pal1icular speech act for the first - or for the 
second - time in a cel1ain type of setting) with values of the lingui stic variables (presence 
of a particular type of verb occulTing in a certain modality, nurnber and person). Such 
analys is allows us to establish whether, when particular values of D, P and R.t are operati ve, 
speakers opt fo r a general level of indirectness realised as various combinations of 
linguistic features all falling under the same strategy from Brown and Levinson 's proposed 
hi erarchy (fig . I , 1.2.2 above) , or a more direct co-relation holds between pal1icular 
combinations of values of the extra-linguistic and linguisti c variables considered. 
The descripti ve statistical analysis outlined above was dictated by the type of data 
co llected, and by our current objectives. The spontaneity and accuracy of the data guided 
the process of data collection (2.2, 2.3 above). Given the non-standard nature of CG speech 
(3 .4 above), record ings were preferred over questionnaires, and the sampling procedure 
targeted friends and friends of fr iends. In additi on , gaining access to the workplace often 
proved easier than to people 's homes, since no specia l arrangements (e.g. finding a 
convenient time when more than two informants may be present) had to be made in the 
former case. Consequently, different age-groups and social classes, as we ll as different 
settings, are unequally represented in the collected data (4. 1.2 below). 
The nature of the data posed fUl1her restricti ons to the types of analysis potentially 
applicable. The variables considered assume values which are norninal (categorical) rather 
than numeri cal or ordinal (Hinton 1995:2 1; Woods et al. 1986:8- 13), so that only non-
parametri c tests are suitable for their analysis (S iegel & Castell an 1988:35). However, the 
chi-square tes t - widely used for the analys is of categorical data (Hinton 1995:240) -
was rejected, s ince an independent- or a related-samples test (S iege l & Castell an 1988: 169) 
could not be calTied out without manipulating the data. Thi s is because, in the co llected 
data, utterances are not uniformly distributed between pairs of speakers and addressees. An 
utterance may be one of many add ressed by a speaker to the sarne addressee , or the only 
utterance addressed by the particular speaker to a di fferen t addressee, or uttered by an 
altogether different speaker, while summaris ing utterances by speaker was found to be not 
onl y extremely complicated practically - since it would involve deciding whether to count 
speakers or pai rs of speakers and addressees (or perhaps trip lets of speakers, addressees 
and settings) - but also theoreticall y dubious. Criticisrns of the chi- square test as no t 
sufficiently powerful (Owen & Jones 1982:331: but contrast Siegel & Castellan 1988:50), 
and the small number of utterances attained per combination of variables (Woods et al. 
1986: 144-5; Siegel & Castel Ian 1988:199) constituted further reasons for not applying the 
chi-square test to these data. 
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The first step taken to overcome these restrictions was to obtain a large enough corpus 
by recording a correspondingly large sample of speakers. Six hundred and seventy-two 
informants were recorded, yielding a corpus of 2,189 realisations of offers and requests. 
This move was judged appropriate on both theoretical and practi cal grounds. Not onl y do 
"large samples impose fewer restrictions on testing" (Owen & Jones 1982:323), but also 
the larger the corpus of data co ll ected, the greater the number of utterances which may 
ultimately fall under each combination of variables (although there was no guarantee that 
this number would always be higher than the minimum of five cases per cell required for a 
chi-square test; Siegel & Castell an 1988:49-50). 
Secondly, a descri pti ve statistical analysis of these data was opted for. Rather than 
providing a basis on which to draw inferences about the population (whether of speakers, 
or of realisations of offers and requests) at large, the data collected were described and 
summarised as an object in its own right (Woods et al. 1986:48), as outlined above. Whi le 
this move limits the number of conclusions one may draw from these data - since each 
time a variable is added to the list of co-occurring features, the number of utterances 
concerned decreases - it nevertheless does not compromise the objecti ves or the current 
analys is. This is because the analysis does not aim to provide an exhausti ve description of 
the possibilities open to speakers for express ing politeness in CG, but rather to test the 
validity of Brown and Levinson's theo!)' of poli teness, in particular their tenet that the 
degree of indirectness of an utterance correlates positively wi th the sum of D, P and Rx, 
with respect to the collected data. 
4.1.2 An overview of the variable values encountered in the data 
Variable values encountered in the data were initially entered into a purpose-built 
Microsoft Excel 98 Workbook. Generalisations carried out at this stage were kept to a 
minimum, so as to compile a detai led record of all the values exhibited by the variables 
under consideration, wh ile avoiding assumptions about their impact on D, P and Rx (for 
extra-linguisti c vari ables) or their indirectness (for linguistic variabl es). The values 
registered for different variables are given below in order of frequency of occurrence. 
Extra-linguistic variables (cf. 2.7.1 above) 
Type of speech act 
Value Frequency 
request 1,486 
Order of occurrence of the speech act 
Value Freq uency 
first time 1,72 1 
offer 703 
Total 2,189 
subsequent times 468 
Total 2, 189 
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Sex of the speaker Sex of the addressee 
Value Frequency Value Freguency 
male 1,279 female 1,15 1 
female 910 male 1,038 
Total 2189 Total 2,189 
Age of the speaker Age of the addressee 
Value Frequency Value Freg uency 
3 1-50 1,430 3 1-50 1,127 
51 and over 433 18-30 692 
18-30 326 51 and over 370 
Total 2189 Total 2189 
Social class of the speaker Social class of the addressee 
Value Frequency Value Freg uency 
Middle 1,772 Middle 1,744 
Working 41 0 Worki ng 430 
Middle? 4 Middle? 12 
Working? 2 Worki ng? 3 ? I Total 2,189 Total 2,189 
'?' indicates that a participant's social class could not be inferred wi th certai nty. 
Relationship between in terlocutors 
Value 
Old co lleagues 
Acquaintances 
Old customer to salesperson 
Employer-employee* 
Interviewer to interviewee 
Family 
Friends 
Salesperson to old customer 
Salesperson to new customer 
New customer to salesperson 
Interviewee to interviewer 
Employer to long-time employee 
Employee to employer* 
Speaker to audience member 
Employee to long-time employer 
Colleagues * 
Audience member to speaker 
New co lleagues 
Strangers 
Interviewee to interviewee 
Customer to salesperson* 
Salesperson to customer* 
(relationship unknown) 
Employer to new employee 
Total 
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Frequency 
365 
227 
201 
19 1 
186 
164 
160 
158 
11 9 
89 
72 
65 
6 1 
30 
27 
22 
14 
10 
10 
7 
5 
4 
I 
2,189 
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,*, indicates unknown length of the relationsh ip. The characteri sations ' new' and 
'o ld'/, iong-time' are used when the length of the relationshi p was known, or could be 
in ferred from observation (e.g. knowledge of first names, reference to habitual or past 
events). The re lationship between interlocutors does not necessarily remain unchanged 
throughout the discourse . In such cases, the topic of the conversation provides an index of 
the relationshi p wh ich is applicable every time. 
( I) [47. 10, 47.11 ; Setting: At work; Speaker l : female, 31-50, middle-class; Speaker2: 
female, 18-30, working-class; Relationshi p: 47.10: fri ends, 47.11 : old customer (S2) to 
salesperson (S 1)] 
(47.10) S I: katse na pjumen kafen kori 
S2: oi en:a pao 
((some turns later)) 
S2: pavlina? 
SI: ne 
(47.11 ) S2: cnd3'eJis tipote: kolan al:a oi ctsi kala 
S I : pc mu. ti? 
S2: c' ja ti jortin tora pu ta ii}a tuta tJc sccftika. in' akriva tuta 
(47.10) S I: sit-imp.-perf-2sg. SP drink-dep.-I pI. coffee-ACC. girl-VOe. 
S2: no FP go-dep.- I sg. 
((some turns later)) 
S2: pavlina? 
S I: yes 
(47.11 ) S2: not have-ind.-2sg. any tights but no so good 
S 1: tell-imp.-perf-2sg. me-ACe. . what? 
S2: be-ind.-3sg. for the-ACe. event-ACC. now that them-ACe. see-past.-perf.-l sg. 
these and think-past-perf.-l sg .. be-ind.-3pL expensive these 
(47.10) S I: 'Stay fo r coffee lass.' 
S2: ' No I' ll go.' 
((some turns later)) 
S2: ' Pavlina?' 
S I: ' Yes' 
(47. 11 ) S2: ' You don't happen to have any tights, not fancy ones.' 
SI: 'Tell me. What?' 
S2: ' It' s for the event. 1 just saw these and thought. These are expensive.' 
Setting of the exchange Town 
Value Freguency Value 
At work 1,520 Lefkosia 
At home 192 Pafos 
On TV 171 Lemesos 
At in forma l social gatherings 152 Larnaka 
On the radio 96 Total 
Formal discussion 58 
Total 2,189 
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Freguencx 
960 
841 
29 1 
97 
2,189 
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Linguistic variables (cf. 2.7.2 above; values occurring less than five times In the 
corpus are omitted) 
Type of verb 
Value Frequency 
Action Verb 1,243 
Speech Act Verb 285 
Bela, ' to want' 277 
exo, ' to have' 89 
(Missing) 58 
bOrD, ' to be ab le to' 37 
prepi, ' it-must' 37 
Indirect statement 34 
epitrepo, ' to allow' 26 
Indirect request 16 
ime, ' to be' 14 
kserv, ' to know' II 
Speech Act Formula II 
Belo-folmll ia 11 
Addressee focussed 8 
parakalo, ' to ask' 8 
iparxo, ' to exist ' 6 
Omitted 18 
Totol 2,189 
The above classification refl ects both grammatical and lexical considerations 
influencing indirectness (2.7.2. 1-2 above). Missing values in this and subsequent tables, 
correspond to speech acts perfo rmed without using a verb form. 'Action verb' refers to 
ma in-clause verbs whose propos itional content expresses the act to be perfonned, when 
this act is not verbal. Common examples are Jino, ' I-give', pjano, ' I-pass, I-take, I-buy ', 
pino, ' I-drink '. 'Speech act verb' refers to verbs whose propositional content expresses 
the act to be petformed when this act is verbal. These include milo, ' I-speak', sxo/iazo, 
' I-comment ', apando, ' I-answer'. When an established pe ri phrasis is chosen instead of a 
speech act verb, the re levant expressions are termed ' speech act formulae' . These 
include ime 010 afij a, ' I-am all ears', Jino ena paraJiYl11a, 'I-give an example', Jino 10 
loyo, ' I-grant the fl oor', kano ny"a erotisi, ' I-ask a question'. In a similar vein, Belo-
formulae include express ions used as altematives to the ve rb 8e/0, ' .I -want' , such as 
qp80 lin ana!Jji, 'I-fee l the need to', and prolimo, ' I-prefer'. Sometimes the act to be 
performed must be inferred from a verb whose propositional content expresses lack of 
action on behalf of the speaker or the addressee ((2) below). Such ve rbs are termed 
'addressee focussed'. akuo, ' I-l isten', cito, ' I-look' are commonl y used in this way. 
(2) [2.7; On the radio; Speaker: male, 3 1-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationshi p: interviewer to interviewee] 
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n' akusumc. ti simeni kult"ura tu cipriaku faj itu. 
SP hear-dep.-Ipl. what mean-ind.-3sg. culture-NOM . the-G EN. Cypriot-GEN. food-
GEN. 
'Let us hear what 'Cypriot food culture' means.' 
Modality 
Values 
Imperati ve~ 
Subjuncti ve~ 
Indicative 71 
Indicative ~ 
Subjunctive 71 
Future~ 
(M issing) 
Future 71 
Imperati ve 71 
Past~ 
Indirect 
Condition al~ 
Past?! 
Indicative 7I-negative 
Past ~ -negati ve 
Omitted 
Total 
Frequency 
702 
392 
325 
2 17 
136 
94 
58 
43 
39 
39 
37 
36 
36 
15 
6 
14 
2, 189 
Upward and downward arrows indicate ris ing and falling intonation respective ly. The 
term ' indirect ' in th is and the fo llowing tab le corresponds to indirect statements and 
indirect requests/offe rs performed without maki ng reference to the speaker or the 
addressee (2.7.2.2 above). 
Number and person of the verb-form 
Values 
2nd singular 
I st singular 
1st plural 
2nd plural 
3rd singul ar 
(Missing) 
Indirect 
3rd plural 
Omitted 
Total 
Frequency 
1107 
476 
21 2 
150 
136 
58 
37 
12 
I 
2, 189 
'3 rd singular' encompasses (a) occurrences of impersonal verbs in the main clause 
(reference to the ' type of verb' used helps di fferentiate among these; (13), (14) in 
2.7.2.2 abovc:::), (b) references to the exish::nce of goods as a preparatory condition for 
the act requested/offered ((5) in 7.3.3 be low), and (c) utterances in which the recipient 
of the speech act is referred to in the 3sg. (various poss ibilities are fUl1her marked as 
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'clause subject: 3sg.' under 'additional markers' below; (26) in 2.7.2.4 above). '3 rd 
plural' typ ica ll y covers reference to the ex istence of goods as a preparatOlY condition 
fo r the act requested/offered. 
(3) [29.36; At work ; Speaker: male, 3 1-50, working-class; Addressee: fema le, over 5 1, 
working-class; Relationship: new customer to salesperson] 
mipos iparxun lipole potiraca mikra (.) ja ton kafe (.) plastika 
whether eXist-ind.-3pl. any glasses-di m.-ACC. small -ACC. (.) for the-ACC. coffee-
ACC. (.) plastic-ACC. 
'Are there any little glasses by any chance (.) for coffee (.) plastic ones' 
Additional markers of politeness 
Values 
(No additional marker) 
FN 
Embedded clause/prepositional phrase expressing purpose 
Embedded clause/prepositional phrase expressing reason 
cilie,'Mr'+LN 
FN+mu,'my' 
Conditional clause ( Belo-indicative-2sg.) 
liro, 'a little ' 
re,'hey'+FN 
ella lepto, 'one minute ' 
Clause subject: 3sg.(FNINOM.) 
Diminutive 
parakalo, 'p lease ' 
re, ' hey' 
cilia, 'Mrs'+LN 
Honorary Title 
cnie,'Mr' +FN 
cil'ia,'Mrs'+ FN 
kori, ' daughter' 
Kinship term (l iteral) 
Tag question 
Conditional clause ( Belo-indicative-2pl .) 
FN+embedded clause/prepositional phrase expressing purpose 
Professional Title 
Clause subject: 3sg. 
Add:offe r (A V -subjunctive-I sg.) 
Conditional clause (AV-indicative-2sg. ) 
mana mu, ' my mother' 
Frequencv 
1,284 
11 7 
93 
62 
53 
29 
25 
19 
17 
15 
15 
12 
12 
II 
10 
9 
9 
9 
9 
8 
8 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
oj na, ' not to ' 5 
ella lepto, 'one minute'+embedded clause/prep. phrase expressing purpose 5 
ate, exh0l1ative particle 5 
Clause subject: 3sg.(passive) 5 
Conditional clause (AV-indicative-3sg.) 5 
Omitted 296 
Total 2, 189 
In add ition to the expected address terms (ciricicina+LN, professionallhonoralY title , 
cirieJciriatFN, FN, FN+mu, re(+FN), kon~ mana mu, kinshi p terms), diminutives, and 
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the items liya and plirakalo (2.7.2.5 above), the fo llowing markers are significant fo r our 
discussion: giving reasons for the speaker's utterance, by means of an embedded clause 
or prepositional phrase expressing purpose or reason (B&L: 128, 170; Sifianou 
1992a: 185-7); hedging the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance, by means of a 
conditional clause questioning the addressee's desire for, or willingness or ability to do, 
the act (Behl A V- indicative-2sg./pl.; B&L: 162-3; Sifianou I 992a: 188; Boutoulousi 
1995); hedges oriented to the relevance of the speaker's utterance (AV-indicati ve-
2sg./3sg.; B&L 169); offm accompanying requests ((4) below). 
(4) [10.4; At work; Speaker: female, 3 1-50, working-class; Addressee: female, over 51, 
working-class; Relationship: salesperson to new customer] 
60cimase na kamoti lefono 
try-imp.-perf.-2sg. SP mGke-dep.-lsg. ca ll 
'Try it on while I make a telephone call ' ((to check availability of customer's shoe 
size at other shop)) 
'Clause subject: 3sg.(FN/NOM.)' and ' clause subject: 3sg.(passive)' differentiate 
instances where the 3sg. (with or without FN) refers to the addressee ((26) in 2.7.2.4 
above) from instances where the main-clause verb is in the passive ((5) below). 
(5) [60.19; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: female, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationshi p: employer to employee] 
sUn praksi tis imeras apo pano to itereiSon na yrafh: 
on-the-ACe. act-ACe. the-GEN. day-G EN. from above the-NOM. iteration-NOM. 
SP wl'ite-pass.-dep.-3sg. 
'The iteration should be written at the top of the day's Act. ' 
4.1.3 The notion of indirectness in Brown and Levinson (I 987) 
One possible definiti on of indirectness is "any communicati ve behaviour, verbal or non-
verbal, that conveys something more than or different from what it literall y means" 
(B&L: 134). The difficulties in applying this definiti on empi ri cally are twofold . First, it 
is a matter of considerable debate whether utterances express any literal meaning, and if 
so, how that may be delimited. 1 Bach (1994) advocates a notion of literal meaning 
which encompasses the semanti c representation of sentences together wi th referent 
assignment to deictic and referring expressions, but stops short of identifying this with 
the minimal truth-evaluable proposition which may be the result of further saturation or 
completion. However, theorists who defend common pre-theoret ica l intuitions as a 
guide to fleshing out 'what is said' by an utterance (Recanati 199 1[1 989]) would not be 
prepared to take thi s step, since it renders most of everyday speech non literal thereby 
go ing against such intuitions. The second problem posed by the above definition of 
indirectness is that it does not yield any predictions as to the relative indirectness of 
different expressions. Consequently, even granting that it may be used for c\ass ificatOlY 
purposes (di stinguishing direct express ions from indirect ones), it cannot be used 
1 Lcczenberg (200] :300ff.) discusses some of the related problems. 
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comparatively. But it is this latter type of definition that is called for if we are to be 
able to rank observed utterances along a scale of indirectness. 
Elsewhere, Brown and Levinson suggest drawing on the notion of a generalised 
conversational implicature (hencefol1h Gel) to explain the intuitively different 
politeness import of the following offers (B&L:6-7): 
(6) (a) Will you have anything to eat? 
(b) Will you have something to eat? 
(c) Won't you have anything to eat? 
(d) Won' t you have something to eat? 
Leech (1983: I 57ff.) proposes a Gricean analysis of these sentences, according to wh ich 
their scmantic structurc (positivc vs . ncgativc polarity of something vs. anything, non-
informativeness of negati ve questions) is key to deri ving the cOITesponding 'default ' 
implicatures? Their indirectness resides in the increasing complexity of deri ving these 
implicatures, which is thus responsible for thei r increas ing politeness import (cf. Leech 
1980:109ff.). Ultimately, the interpretation of (a) to (d) as increasingly polite is a matter 
of semantics. and as such ought to be universal: all cultures will derive the same Ge l 
from an utterance of, say, (d) - although, as Blum-Kulka's (1987a) investigation of 
Israeli requestive hints and Sifianou's (1992a) investigation of Greek requests have 
shown, different cultures may assess this different ly as to its politeness import. 
However, the ranking of (a) to (d) as increasingly polite a long these lines tums out to be 
culturally biased: the derivation of the cOITesponding Gels is not independent from 
background knowledge which is pattly culturally specific (5.4.3 below). Indeed, it can 
be argued that (at least some) Gels depend on the existing consensus between 
interlocutors, and as such cannot be universal in the absolute sense postu lated 
previously (5.4. 5 below) . Consequently, no universally valid scale of indirectness along 
which to rank observed utterances is forthcoming. 
In spelling out the details of their proposal, Brown and Levinson out li ne four 
verbal super-strategies - silence is a fifth 3_ under each of which are listed a number 
of distinct sub-strategies (B&L:94ff.; fig.!, 1.2.2 above). When attempt ing to 
characterise observed utterances as more or less indirect, one may appeal to these 
concrete rea lisations of different super-strategies. Unfortunately, this task is not 
unproblematic either, as the same linguisti c forms may well fall under different super-
strategies. Diminutives are a case in point. These are listed now as an instance of 
positive poli teness (in their guise as in-group identity markers; B&L: l 09), now as an 
instance of negative politeness (in their function as hedgeslminimisers, B&L: 157, 177). 
Inclusive 'we' is another. When this indicates a swi tch in personal centre, or serves to 
2 Although Leech does not use the term GCls, his reference to implicatures derived "by default" from the 
conversational maxims, and which are "provisional, and liable to subsequent cancellation" (1983:164-5) 
warrants use of the term in this case. The content of such GCls roughly amounts to a gradual 
superimposition of polite beliefs as these are understood in Leech's scheme (ibid.: 169-71 ). 
3 Sifianou ( [995, 1997a, 1997b) argues against the inclusion of silence in this hierarchy on a par with 
other super-strategies suggesting instead that it is best viewed as a sub-strategy falling sometimes under 
positive politeness, and sometimes under negat ive politeness. 
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include both the speaker and the addressee in the activity, it constitutes an instance of 
positive politeness (B&L: 119-20, 127-8), but it can also be negat ively polite if 
prompted by the desire to impersonalise the speaker or the addressee (B&L:202-3). The 
same is tlUe of the subjunctive, which can serve to avoid di sagreement, and is then 
positively polite (B&L: 11 7), or to deny the truth of th e speaker's utterance or show 
pessimism, when it falls under negative politeness (B&L:157-S, 173-5). Similarly, 
giv ing reasons can be positi vely polite by assuming that the addressee can see the 
speaker's point (B&L: 12S), or negatively polite by making an impl icit claim to being 
relevant (B&L: 170). Such indeterminacies, which follow from the potential 
multi functionality of all uttcranccs (Turncr 1996:4), arc prcsumably resolved in Brown 
and Levinson's approach by recourse to the assumed val ues of 0 , P and R~. However, 
this renders their approach unfalsifiable: if the degree of indirectness of an utterance is a 
concomitant of the assumed values of 0, P and Rh then it wi ll always correspond to the 
weightiness of the FTA~ (the sum of the values of 0, P and R~), since these values can 
be manipulated by the speaker according to the effect s1he is trying to achieve 
(B&L:22Sff). Differently put, if the values of the components on both sides of the equal 
sign in the formu la Wx§(S,H)+P(H,S)+R x cannot be determined unambiguously or 
independent ly of each other, the formula becomes an ana lytic truth . Consequently, 
while being true to the facts, Brown and Levinson 's classi fi cat ion of linguisti c 
realisations renders less than straight-forward the application of their hierarchy of 
strategies to the analysis of empirical data. Their ranking of super-sh'ategies along a 
uni-directional scale of indirectness which is hard to implement - not to mention the 
fact that no indication is given as to how to choose between sub-strategies of the same 
super-strategy (Terkourafi L999; 7.3 below) - must therefore be counted as a weakness 
of their approach. 
4.1.4 Toward a quali tative notion of indirectness 
Taking the principle of iconicity as a stalting point, an altemative proposal suggests that 
the more morpho-phonologically complex the expression used, the more indirect it is 
(cJman 1989; Irene Philippaki-Warburton p.c.) For example, use of the conditional , 
which is fOlmed in SMG by adding the future palticle 8a to the inflectional paradigm of 
the imperfective past, would be more indirect than use of the futu re. Allowing for 
intonation to enter the picture, use of the indicative with ri sing intonation would be 
more indirect than use of the indicative with intonation which fa ll s sentence-finally 
(Cruttenden 1997[1986]: 163-4; Ladd 1996: 113ff.). 
However, appealing to this principle will not always do: both the subjunctive and 
the future are formed in Modern Greek periphrastically, by adding the particles fl.7 and 
8a respectively to the inflectional paradigm of the present. In this case, the iconicity 
argument fa i Is to indicate one of the two fOlms as more indirect than the other. The 
matter is fulther complicated by the fact that, in some analyses, the future is subsumed 
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under the subjunctive on semantic grounds (Mackridge 1985:274ff.). Yet, wh ile not 
yield ing a scale of indirectness on which the values encountered in the data may be 
ranked without overlap, an appeal to iconicity does allow p3l1ial orderings of these 
values. Thus, the imperative tums out to be less indirect than the subjunctive, which is 
in tum less indirect than the conditional; using the 2pl. will be more indirect than using 
the 2sg.; and an utterance where the act requested/offered is expressed in the main 
clause by an Action Verb will be more direct than an utterance in which the act 
requested/offered is expressed in a subordinate clause introduced, say, by the verb 8c/a, 
' I-want ', all e lse being equal. 
Thc addition of thc last proviso points to thc same difficulty which Brown and 
Levinson attempt to reso lve by appealing to Leech 's semantic analysis (4. 1.3 above): 
indirectness is ultimately a matter of the whole utterance, and as such any attempt to 
define it restricted to individual categories provides only a partial solution to the 
problem (8&L:22). In this study, I attempt to pin down the degree of indirectness of 
observed utterances with reference to the morpho-phonological realisation of the main-
clause verb - in which the values of the first four linguistic variables considered 
(2.7.2.1-4 above) are combined - in conjunction with additional elements which do not 
contribute to truth-conditional content, but are interactionally significant and are 
interpreted as markers of politeness. The resulting picture is one of indirectness as a 
qualitative notion rather than a quantitative one: utterances may coincide as to their 
degree of indirectness (whether semantically or morpho-phonologically construed) but 
be distinguished as to the situations in which their use is deemed appropri ate. While this 
approach may not seem very far removed from Brown and Levinson 's original proposal 
- for what are they trying to capture by means of their fonnu la WxB(S ,I f) I P(II ,S) I R x 
if not the situational appropriateness of di fferent expressions? - it remains distinct, in 
that it assumes neither that expressions may be consistently ranked on a un i-directional 
sca le of indirectness, nor that speakers' choices will always move upwards along thi s 
sca le - which is thus awarded psychological reality - when the values of D, P and R, 
increase. It is to this last assumption that we now tum. 
4.2 D, P and R,.. under the microscope4 
With reference to an utterance realising an FTAn Brown and Levinson define the social 
distance (D) between the speaker and the hearer as "a symmetric social dimension of 
similarity/difference within which Sand H stand for the purposes of thi s act" (B&L:76). 
Frequency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material goods (including 
face) exchanged between interlocutors, as well as stable socia l attributes, all playa pal1 
in detelmining the value of D on a palticular occasion. The power (P) of the hearer over 
4 This seclion deals with D, P and R" as defi ned wilhin Brown and Levinson's framework. Theoretical 
discussions of some problems pertaining to the operation of these variables are found in Turner (1996, 
1999). For a discussion of alternative Ierms and construals oflhese nOlions, see Spencer-Oaley 1996. 
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the speaker, on the other hand, is an asymmetric social dimension based on "the degree 
to which H can impose his own plans and his own self-eva luation (face) at the expense 
of S's plans and self-evaluation" (B&L:77).5 Material and metaphysical control are 
sources of power thus defined. The last variable, RT, " is a culturally and situationally 
defined ranking of impositions by the degree to which they are considered to interfere 
with an agent 's wants of se lf-determination or of approval" (B&L:77). Assessments of 
these variabl es are context-dependent; D, P and Rx are assessed anew for each FTA. 
Moreover, once combined into the weightiness value of the FTAx according to the 
fo rmula W,€l(S,H)+P(H,S)+R "' the particular values of D, P and R, become 
untraceable, thereby "mak[ing] the sources of the final assessment [of W] ambiguous" 
(B&L:81). 
In thi s section , I shall argue that the above definiti ons of the three sociological 
variables, as well as the formula which combines their values in one numeri cal estimate 
of the weightiness of an FTAx, fail to account for the data collected on the following 
grounds: 
I. There is no change in the degree of (in)directness of realisations of offers and 
requests when observable features of the situation which, according to these 
definiti ons, have a bearing on the values of D and P, are directly manipulated to 
yield low D+P values and high D+P values respecti ve ly. 
2. According to the above definitions, instances of asymmetrical usage point to the 
unequal status of interlocutors and must be associated with P. However, certain 
instances of asymmetrical usage in the data cannot be accounted for under the 
current definition of thi s variable. To account for these, the definition of power 
must be extended to allow for symbolic/metaphorical control of the addressee 
over the speaker, a move which renders the notion so elusive as to be practi ca lly 
unfalsifiable. 
3. When calculating D, P and RT, a speaker may not be starting from a clean slate: a 
high W may result from an interactional imbalance caused by a prior FTA. 
4. Problems with Rx: an increase in R may be accompanied by a shift to more 
intimate address fDlm s. 
5. Even for those sets of expressions which can be ordered along a scale of 
increasing indirectness based on morpho-phonological criteria (4.1.4 above), 
speakers' choices in different contexts reveal discontinuities in the appl ication of 
the scale which cannot be captured with reference to the values of D, P and Rx. 
~ The authors view both simations where the hearer has increased power over the speaker and those in 
which the speaker has increased power over the addressee as involving high P, thereby explaining choice 
of the off-record strategy (B&L:77, 83). This move conflates under the same mbric (high P) two types of 
situations which are intuitively different. However, they do not explore the obvious alternative of 
conceptualising high P of the speaker over the hearer as negalive. i.c. represented by numerical values 
below zero. 
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6. There appears to be a division of labour between two general means of achieving 
indirectness: varying the morpho-phonology of the main-clause verb, and the use 
of add itional modifiers. Rather than combining these to achieve a gradual increase 
in indirectness in keeping with increasing values of D, P and RH speakers opt for 
one or the other in predictable ways. The choice between the resulting two 
'modes' of indirectness is therefore significant for speakers and is obscured if the 
corresponding fonnal means are placed along a uni-directional scale of 
indirectness. 
7. Speakers' choices of linguistic means can sometimes be traced back to specific 
features of the si tuation, thus reducing ambiguities as to the source of the final 
assessment of W. 
4.2.1 The combined effect of the three sociological variables on degree of indirectness 
If we estimate the values of D, P and Rx on pal1icular occasions of use, we find that the 
degree of indirectness of the utterances involved does not increase analogously to the 
increasing values of the three sociological variables. The most straightforward 
hypothes is in this respect is that requests and offers exchanged between speakers of the 
same sex, age and social class (low D) who occupy simil ar positions in the professional 
hierarchy (low P) should be more direct than offers and requests exchanged between 
speakers of different ages and sexes (high D, withholding assumptions about the power 
relations between different age-groups and sexes) occupyi ng different positions in the 
profess ional hierarchy (high P). Figure 4.1 shows the frequencies of different 
combinations of type of verb and modal ity (as di stinct bars) and number+person (as 
colours within bars) lIsed in requests performed for the first time by middle-class men, 
aged 3 1-50, addressing middle-class men, aged 31-50, who are old colleagues at work.6 
The situation being one of low D and low P, directness, in the guise of A V- imperative-
2sg., is prefelTed (24/56, or 42.85% of utterances; (7) below). 
(7) [43.0 1; At work; Speaker: male, 3 1-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: old colleagues] 
anikse tin porta re rikho anikse tin porta re jati re 
open-imp. -pelf- 2sg. the-ACe. door-ACe. hey rikos-VOe. open-imp. -pelf-2sg. the-
ACe. door-ACe. hey because hey 
' Hey Riko open the door open the door because ' ((addressee opens door)) 
This preference persists in requests perfonned for the first time by middle-class7 
women, aged 18-30, addressing middle-class men, aged 3 1-50, who are their employers 
at work, a situation of high D and high P (3/8, or 37 .5% of utterances; figA.2, (8) 
below). 
6 Abbreviations are explained in the List of Abbreviations used in Figures. 
7 There were not enough instances of working-class women addressing middle-class men under the same 
circumstances to allow a comparison. High P is ensured by the speakers' position in the professional 
hierarchy, which is lower than that of their addressees. 
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(8) [37.15; At work; Speaker: female, 18-30, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationsh ip: employee to employer] 
eIis pol:es tIe: eIis tes potIi- val tes mes to folter su, jali 'en tes val:is 
«several turns later)) 
val tin tIe tutin mes' to folter su na men ti xasume 
Yo 
have-ind.-2sg. many and, have-ind. -2sg. them there- pW-imp. -pelj-2sg. them-ACe. 
in the-ACe. folder-ACC. your-2sg., why not them-ACe. put-imp.-perf.-2sg. 
«several turns later)) 
put-imp.-pelf2sg. the-ACe. and this-ACe. in the-ACe. folder-ACC. your-2sg. SP 
not her-ACC. lose-dep.- I pI. 
'You have many {sheets of paper} and you have them over there, put them in your 
folder why don't you?' 
((several turns later)) 
'Put thi s one too in your folder so we won't lose it.' 
A similar picture emerges with regard to offers. figure 4.3 shows offe rs performed 
for the first time by middle-class men, aged 3 1-50, addressing middle-class men, aged 
3 1-50, who are old colleagues at work. The preferred realisat ions are: 8elo,'I-want'-
ind icative with ri sing intonation-2sg. (4/20, or 20% of utterances; (9) below), and AV-
subjuncti ve with rising intonation- l sg. (3120, or 15% of utterances; (10) below). 
(9) [83.02; At work; Speaker: male, 3 1-50, middle-c lass; Addressee: ma le, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: old colleagues] 
«address term)) ela na su po re, e niko, 8es na su kanoniso n' al:aksis imerominian? 
((address term)) come-imp.-perf.-2sg. SP you-2sg.-GEN. say-dep.- Isg., hey nikos-
VOe., want-ind.-2sg. SP you-2sg. -GEN. alTange-dep.- Isg. SP change-dep.-2sg. 
date-ACC.? 
«address telm )) 'Hey Niko, listen, do you 'vI/ant me to an'ange a change of date for 
you?' 
(10) [76. 18; At work; Speaker: male, 3 1-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: old colleagues] 
aku re (oimitri tin pempli) stis kosi ox to tu oktovri (.) en:a kami eIJjenia tJi kato (.) ... na 
'1'10 na se pcao na pame? 
listen-imp .-perf.-2sg. hey (d imitris-VOe. the-ACe. thursday-ACC.) on-the-ACC. 
twenty-eighth the-G EN. october-GEN. (.) FP do-dep.-3sg. opening-ACe. down there 
(.) ... SP come-dep.- Isg. SP you-2sg.-ACe. pick-up-dep.-lsg. SP go-dep.- Ipl.? 
' Hey Dimitri , li sten on Thursday October twenty-eight (.) he' ll do the opening down 
there (.) ... Shall ! come to pick you up and go together?' 
Bela- ind icative with rising intonation-2sg . similarly accounts for 3/5 (60%) of offers 
performed for the first time by middle-class women, aged 18-30, addressing middle-
class men, aged 3 1-50, who are their employers at work (figAA; ( II ), (12) below). 
( I I) [40.24; At work; Speaker: female, 18-30, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
midd le-class; Relationship: employee to employer] 
na para!1Jilo tin ii)ian posotitan i 8es na paraIJjilo pjo pol:es 
SP order-dep.- l sg. the-ACe. same-ACe. quantity-ACe. or wont-ind.-2sg. SP 
order-dep.-l sg. more many-ACe. 
'Shall I order the same quantity or do you .van! me to order more?' 
(12) [60.61; At work; Speaker: fema le, 18-30, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
midd le-class; Relationship: employee to employer] 
ena si 9ru Belis na su fka lo khopi? 
one see-through want-ind.-2sg. SP you-2sg.-GEN. take-out-dep.-I sg. copy? 
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' Do yOIl want me to make you a transparency? 
In both offers and requests, then , different combinations of the values of the extra-
linguisti c variables under consideration (sex, age, relationship between the 
interlocutors) which, according to Brown and Levinson's definitions of D and P, should 
produce an increase in the context-specific values of these variables, have no effect on 
speakers' preferences regarding the degree of indirectness of the main-clause verb of 
their utterances. 
Interestingly , the similarity in degree of indirectness between situations of low D+ P 
and those of high D+P also concel11S additional markers of poli teness used (figA.5). The 
relevant mitigation mechanisms include: (a) diminution: this may be deri vational via 
suffixation, or peri phrastic including time-hedges (ena lepto, 'one minute', mja stiymi, 
'one moment ') and the adverb liro, 'a little' (2.7.2.5, 4.1.2 above); (b) embedded 
conditional clauses using an Action Verb or the ve rb 8elo,' I-want' (4.1.2 above); (c) 
embedded clauses or prepositional phrases expressing purpose or reason (4.1.2; (7), (8) 
above). Twenty out of seventy-six utterances (26.3 1 %) exchanged between middle-
class men, aged 31-50, who are old co lleagues at work (low D+P), and three out of 
fom1een utterances (2 1.42%) by middle-class women, aged 18-30, to middle-class men, 
aged 3 1-50, who are their employers at work (high D+P), make use of one of these 
mitigation mechanisms. These ratios are sufficiently close to suggest that an increase in 
the values of D+P produces no increase in the overa ll degree of indirectness of the 
observed utterances. What is more, there is no qua litative difference in the mitigating 
mechanisms preferred: giving reasons for one 's utterance (poss ibility (c)) prevails in 
situations of both low and high D+P. 
Two objections may be raised to this interpretation of the data. First, could the 
variable of Ranking of the imposi tion be responsible for the relatively direct realisations 
observed? This is cUl1'ently taken into account in di stinguishing requests from offers,8 
and in distinguishing between the first time and subsequent times an offe r or a request is 
perfo rmed (2.7.1.1.-2 above) . Is it possible that Rx was high when D and P were low, 
and vice versa, thus offsetti ng the combined effect of D+P? This is unlikely for two 
reasons. Fi rst, reali sations of greater directness than any observed should be available 
for use in s ituations where all three variables are low. However, the preferences 
described above concern the most direct realisations from the range of formal 
possibilities available in eG. Second, as the examples cited show, conversational topics 
largely concerned mundane issues. As a result, Rx is generally stable at a low level 
throughout the data (B&l:25 1; fn.3, 2.3 above). It therefore does not balance the 
variations in D+P in the data. Brown and Levinson's predictions regarding the 
Sin Brown and Levinson's account, both constitute intrinsic FTAs threatening the hearer's negative face 
(B&L:65-6). Moreover, oITers are amongst few F I"As which may be performed baldly-on-record 
(B&L:99). These predictions fail to explain why preferred realisations of oITers in the data are relatively 
more 'indirect' (by pushing the act offered in complement position. or using rising intonation) than 
preferred realisations of requests. 
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combined effect of the three sociological variables on the degree of indi rectness of 
observed utterances are simply not confilmed. 
The second objection may still contain an element of truth, though it invalidates 
Brown and Levinson's predictions in a different respect. In the above instances, more 
requests and offers are exchanged between interlocutors when D and P are low (76 
between 21 pairs. average 3.62 per pair) compared to those exchanged when D and P 
are high ( 14 between 6 pairs; average 2.34 per pair). To account fo r this finding within 
Brown and Levinson's theory, one would have to appeal to their fifth super-strategy, 
'Don't do the FTA,.9 Whi le increased D and P values may we ll result in non-reali sation 
of the FTA, this is something which cannot be empirically verified. ]n addition, one 
would then have to explain why an increase in the val ues of D and P causes a 
po larisation of speakers ' choices around the two extremes of Brown and Levinson's 
hierarchy of strategies (fig. 1 , 1.2.2 above), rather than a shift toward highe r-numbered 
strategies. Alternatively, drawing on the notion of a Conversational Contract (Fraser & 
Nolen 198 1, Fraser 1990), I would propose that it is part of the terms of the CC (the 
negotiated rights and obligations of interlocutors) that employees confOlm to the wishes 
of their employers rather than express their own, whereas no such restriction app lies 
between equals on the professional hierarchy. This view has the advantage of 
accounting for both the lesser number of offers and requests addressed by employees to 
employers, as well as their direct performance: offers and requests falling within the 
tetnls of the CC have been pre-negotiated, so to speak, thereby requiring no fUl1her 
explicit negotiation each time. 
4.2.2 Metaphorical Power? 
The most common address terms in the data are FN+I11lJ (the possessive pronoun ' my'), 
FN, titl e+FN, and title+LN (4.1.2 above). The distribution of two of these in the data, 
FN+ mu and titl e+FN, is mostly asymmetrical, and as such calls for explanation unde r 
the variable of Power. Instances of FN+ mu are surprisingly homogeneous: out of thirty 
pairs of speakers and addressees, twenty-four use this asymmetrically. In the majori ty of 
cases, a speaker who rece ives FN+ mu replies with FN or a kinship term, such as '1118111:a, 
' mum '. In onl y two out of thil1y pairs is the speaker male; moreover, in only three pai rs 
is sfhe younger than the addressee . The emerging pattern is one whe re FN+ mu is used 
asymmetrically by older women when addressing younger addressees. Being a typical 
address term llsed by mothers to children, FN+ m/J could then be associated with the 
addressee's low P over the speaker. This interpretation explains why a male employer 
can use it to address a female employee: 
(13) [76. 14; At work; Speaker: male, over 51, middle-class; Addressee: female, over 51, 
middle-class; Re lationship: employer to employee] 
lipon kitakse , kane tilefonima esi m8l11!a mu 
9 For problems with this strategy, see fn.3 in 4.1.3 above. 
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so look-imp.-perf.-2sg., make-imp.-perf.-2sg. phone-call you-2sg.-NOM. Marula-
VOc. my 
'OK look, you make the call, Mantia dear.' 
However, onl y fi ve out of twenty-four pairs using FN+ mu asymmetrically are 
employers addressing employees. Five more instances are exchanged between famil y 
members, while the remaining eleven instances are exchanged between friends, 
acquaintances or old colleagues. To account for these last eleven instances in terms of 
the speaker's Power over the addressee, thi s must now be construed metaphori cally. 
Power based on the speaker's older age relative to the addressee no longer emanates 
from control over the addressee, whether this is understood as materi al control (over 
economic di stribution and physical force) or metaphysical control (over the actions of 
the speaker by vil1ue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by the speaker). It therefore 
cannot be captured within the CUlTent definiti on of this variable (B&L:77). Instances in 
the data where the addressee's 'rea l' (as opposed to metaphori cal ) power over the 
speaker is not low, yet FN+mu is used, make this point ra ther dramatically. 
(14) [48. 17; At work; Speaker: female, 3 1-50, middle-class; Addressee: female, 3 1-50, 
working-class; Relationship: salesperson to new customer] 
ean e((is opjooipote enoiazmo Selo, e jan:a Illu? 
if have- ind.-2sg. any hesitation want-ind.-l sg., eh yana my? 
' If you have any questions, Yana dear?' 
In (14) the addressee is a customer entering the shop for the first time. The 
salesperson's repeated offers (of services and adv ice) indicate her desire to see the 
client return . In this sense, the addressee can be said to have at least some power over 
the speaker. Use of FN+ mu in this example is obviously an instance of pos itive 
politeness. Out by using this asymmetrically, the speaker is assel1ing her power over the 
addressee. This power, however, does not emanate from her relationship to the 
addressee; in fact, it runs contr31Y to it. She can therefore claim power over the 
addressee only metaphori ca ll y: by behaving the way a mother would toward a child, she 
conveys her desire to treat the addressee well. 
A closer look at instances of titl e+FN reveals that this is used asymmetrically in 
twelve out of twenty-four speaker-addressee pairs. This usage consists of one party 
giv ing title+FN and receiving, variably, FN, LN (without titl e, a usage nowadays 
confined to the army and the classroom), or mana mu, literally 'my mother', an 
endearing form of address (2.7.2.5 above). The problem with accounting for these 
twelve pairs is that the person who receives title+FN does not always have control over 
the speaker. Consequently, according to Brown and Levinson's definiti on, s/he should 
not have Power over the speaker. Only one out of the twelve is a pai r of employer and 
employee. Six fU11her pairs are old colleagues: in four of these the rec ipient of title+FN 
is older, while in two more slhe is of the same age-group as the speaker. The remaining 
fi ve pai rs are salespersons and old customers, and the recipient of titl e+FN (whether 
salesperson or customer) is always older. Older age in a work se tting thus turns out to 
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be the guiding princip le in asymmetrical title+FN usage. 1O However, age can only in a 
metaphorical/symbo lic way be construed as a source of Power of the addressee over the 
speaker. Power based (solely) on age is, so to speak, 'nominal '; it cannot be enforced in 
the direct way that Brown and Levinson 's definition implies. 
By extension, then , title+FN comes to encode appreciation/respect: enhancing 
hislher own positive face by showing himlhersel f to be a competent member of society 
is the speaker's primary concem in expressing these feelings, rather than attending to 
the addressee's real power over himlher. As such, the expression of appreciation/respect 
can override considerations of social class or re lationsh ip, even when these would 
normally tip thc balance of powcr in favour of thc spcaker.11 This is espccially obvious 
in examples such as ( 15) below, where a yo unger working-class female salesperson 
receives title+FN by an older, middle class old customer. 
( IS ) [66.11 ; At work; Speaker I : male , over 51 , middle-ciass; Speaker2: female, 3 1-50, 
working-class; Re lationship: old customer (S I) to sa lesperson (S2)] 
S I : ela ciria (.) ela ciria deni. oistixos ena 
S2: [0 na kraUso?] 
S I : [ena s: imon mono.] ena 'r imon mono. kratis' to tre in' endaksi 
S I: come-imp.-perf.-2sg. Mrs-VOC. C.) come-imp.-perf.-2sg. Mrs-VOC. eleni-
VOc. . unf0l1unate ly one-ACe. 
S2: [what SP charge-dep.-I sg.?] 
S 1: [one-ACC. juice-ACC. onl y. ] one juice on ly. charge- imp.-pe rf.-2sg. it-ACC. 
and be-ind.-3sg. OK 
S 1: 'Come Mrs (.) come Mrs Eleni. Unfortunately one' 
S2' '[What shall I charge for?], 
S 1: ' [Just one juice.] Just one juice. Take that and keep the change.' 
In sum , asymmetrical instances of FN+mu and title+ FN may be explained only if 
we extend the CUlTent definiti on to include a notion of power which may be impossible 
to implement in any real sense. Such metaphorical construal leaves us with an elusive 
notion which is hardly constrained: it can be in confli ct with concrete sources of power, 
and may even override them as shown above. How is a speaker to decide which to 
attend to, real or metaphorical Power, if we extend its definition in this way? Moreover, 
asymmetri cal uses of FN+mu and title+ FN cannot be attributed to re-ranking P 
(B&L:228ff.) . In re-ranking variable values, speakers aim to achieve particular effects, 
i.e. engage in strategic use of language, whereas FN+mu and titl e+FN are established as 
a form of address used by older women to younger addressees , and by younger speakers 
to older addressees in a work setting respectively. 
However, calculations of Power need not come into the picture. Use of FN+mu and 
title+FN can be directly ti ed to extra-linguistic features of the situation, the speaker's 
female sex and/or older age relative to the addressee, and the addressee's older age in 
)0 Recipients oftitle+FN were older than 50 years of age in sixteen om of twenty-four pairs, and between 
the ages of 31 and 50 in a further seven pairs. This suggests an absolute 'age-threshold' of around 45 
years of age fo r addressing someone by title+FN. While testing this hypothesis necessit ates information 
about the exact age of infonnants, which was not available, the existence of an absolute age-threshold 
~oints even more strongly to age rather than power as the determining factor in title+FN usage. 
I Schwenter (1 993:38) reaches a similar conclusion based on evidence from Spanish. 
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work settings, respecti vely.12 Strategic exploitations of these are then possible, as in 
(13), (14), ( 15) above, and ( 16) below. Indeed, il is because these last examples deviate 
from establi shed usage that they can achieve the pa l1icular effects the respecti ve 
speakers are seeking to achieve each time. 
4.2.3 Isolated FT As? 
The following marked usage oftitl e+FN occurred at home: 
(16) [56.7; At home; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class ; Addressee: male, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationshi p: fami ly] 
o nikos? niko ela na sistiSis me ti marina. 0 nikos ine fititis sti iefkosia, 
« two turns» 
katse cirie niko. Selis na mas kanis ta neskafe esi pu kseris i na mas ta kan'i fanitsa? 
nikos-NO M.? nikos-VOC. come-imp.-perf.-2sg. SP introduce-pass.-dep.-2sg. with 
the-ACe. marina-ACC. the-NOM. nikos-NOM. be-ind.-3sg. student-NOM . in-
the-ACe. lefkosia-ACe. 
((two turns)) 
sit-imp.-perf. -2sg. Mr-VOC. nikos-VOC. . want-ind.-2sg. SP us-G EN. make-dep.-
2sg. the-ACC. coffees-ACe. you-2sg.-NOM. that know-ind.-2sg. or SP us-GEN. 
them-ACe. make-dep. -3sg. the-NOM. fani-dim.-ACe.? 
Nikos? Niko come say hi to Marina. Nikos is studying in Le tkosia. 
((two turns)) 
Have a seat M,. Nikos. Do you want to make us some coffee since it is your 
speciality or shall Fani make them? 
cirie niko in (16) is marked both because the addressee is a younger member of one's 
family and the setting is at home. What is more, it cannot be explained as a moment3lY 
shift to a more ' formal ' address term, as proposed by Brown and Levinson in cases of 
an increase in R (4.2.4 below). It occurs as pal1 of an offer to the addressee to sit down, 
something he was about to do anyway. Even the ensuing request to prepare coffee, to 
which the offer may be said to function as a prelude, cannot in any way be considered to 
be an imposition of high R: it is an everyday occurrence at home. What, then, prompted 
this marked use oftitl e+FN, which is unique in the data and was perceived as marked in 
context? 
Goffman 's (1967: 19) notion of interactional imbalance is relevant here: 
"When the pat1icipants in an undertaking or encounter fail to prevent the 
occulTence of an event that is express ive ly incompati ble with the judgements of 
social worth that are being maintained, and when the event is of the kind that is 
difficult to overlook ( .. . ] one or more pal1icipants find themselves in an 
established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace, and an attempt must be 
made to re-establi sh a sati sfactory ritual state for them." 
Based on thi s notion, Bayraktaroglu (1992a: 15) proposes the notion of Face Boosting 
Acts, acts which satisfy (rather than threaten) the face-wants of the addressee and/or the 
speaker. The postulation of FBAs is necessary to account fo r what happens when the 
interactional balance has been disturbed, and face loss has OCCUlTed for one of the 
12 Revising their original stance, Brown and Levinson allow address forms to be directly tied to the social 
relationship between interlocutors (B&L:! 8). 
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participants. The father addressing his son with title+FN in ( 16) may be construed as 
such an FBA. Face loss has occulTed for the son in close ly preceding discourse th rough 
another paIticipant 's notic ing of his physical disabili ty. Arguably, the father's marked 
use of tit le+FN attempts to correct this prior loss of face by boosting his son's face: 
addressing him as an older person wOlthy of respect. 
In exemplifying how a "negative" politeness strategy can be used to redress 
positive face needs, thi s example highlights the fact that attempts to assoc iate particular 
politeness sub-strategies with specific face-wants (as in B&L) are poorl y motivated. 
Moreover, if the motivation for choosing a more 'fDlmal' address term in this case does 
indccd reside with an increase in Rx, this R x docs not narrowly cOlTcspond to the FT A x 
in which the address term occurs; rather, it is the result of an interactional imbalance 
caused by another speaker in prior discourse. That is, the seriousness of the FT A.T is not 
in this case compounded of the risk which x engenders for the addressee's positive face 
(B&L:78), but of the threat to the addressee's positive face left unmitigated by another 
partic ipant in x- f. This possibility is not captured under the authors' notion of context-
dependence of the three sociological variables (B&L:78ff. ), since, judging from their 
examples, what they seem to have in mind is dependence on extra-lingui stic context, 
rather than on the li nguistic context immediately preceding an FTA. Examples such as 
(16), then, are in li ne with previous findings regarding the negotiation of face over 
conversational turns ( 1.3.1 above) and call into question Brown and Levinson's claim 
that in calculating D, P and RT , the speaker always stal1s with a clean slate (B&L:76). 
4.2.4 Problems with Ranking 
Although FT As of high R are generally absent from the data (4.2. 1 above), one such 
instance, which directly refers to the ongoing recording, is notable. In (17), the husband 
reminds his wife that the conversation is being recorded, afte r she has been referring to 
business matters with names and facts. 
(17) [1 3. 15; At home; Speaker: male, over 51, middle-class; Addressee: fe male, over 
51, middle-class; Re lationship: family J 
katayrafi ta tuto re: aynuf:a 
register-ind .-3sg. them-ACe. this-NOM. hey agni-dim.-VOC. 
' Hey Agni-dim. this is recording it. ' 
D and P on this occasion are low: the conversation is taking place at home amongst 
family members and the researcher who is a family friend. This leaves RT to account for 
the speaker' s choice of the off-record strategy. Discussing business is a delicate matter, 
much more so with a tape-recorder turned on; his wife should have known bette r, and 
his reminding her requires a lot of tact to avoid emphasising her faux pas. But if Rx is 
high, then how is the use of the endearing address term (agni-dim .• VOC.) to be 
explained? This is not the established form of the addressee's name. Rathe r, it 
constitutes a momentary shift to a more intimate address form than usual. With respect 
to such shifts, Brown and Levinson note: "[w]hat we did not expect, and have not 
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found, is that there might be a shift to more 'intimate' address fo rms with an increase in 
R" (B&L: 1 8~ original emphasis) . (17) exemplifies the possibili ty of such a shift. 
One possible explanation for the husband 's choice of address term in ( 17) is to 
enhance the chances of his wife's compliance with his remark. CO derivational 
diminutives have strong connotations of affection, and are therefore appropriate for use 
with only a restricted range of addressees (Terkourafi 1997:24). By asserting his 
intimacy with his wife, the speaker attempts to present his remark as a piece of advice 
rather than a reprimand. In this sense, his choice of add ress term could have hardl y been 
more appropriate: indeed, it is because Rr is high that a reassertion of thi s intimacy is in 
order. However, thi s exp lanation diverges from Brown and Levinson's account, 
according to which, " if shifts [in address term usage] are permissible at all, we should 
merely expect a shift towards a more 'fonnal' address form than nonnally used [ ... ] 
when R-values increase between the same interlocutors" (B&L: 18). 
Arguably, what we have in (17) is a case of mixture of strategies. This can result in 
either a hybrid strategy (something between positive and negative politeness), or a 
continuous approaching and distancing of interlocutors (B&L:230-1 ). However, (17) 
exempli fies a third poss ibility: a combination of the off-record strategy with positive 
politeness as a way of concurrently attending to both aspects of the addressee's face. 
The fact that the speaker prefers this strategy over using the off-record strategy alone is 
ev idence that expressing respect for the addressee's freedom of action as well as 
asserting familiarity with the addressee can be more efficient in achieving redress in 
situations of high W than any of these strategies in isolation. In other words, the two 
aspects of face can be equally imp0l1ant, so that none can be ignored without a loss in 
efficiency. Such evidence argues against according priority to the negative aspect of 
face over its positi ve counterpal1 (B&L:73-4), and supports the stance that, if such a 
decision is poss ible at all , it cannot be taken independently of cultural and situationa l 
factors (1.3. 1 above). 
4.2.5 Problems with scalability 
As mentioned in 4.2.2, the most commonly encountered address terms in the data are 
FN+mu, FN, titi e+FN, and title+LN. Intuitively, thi s order of presentation corresponds 
to a scale of increasing formality/decreasing familiarity. However, using morphological 
crite ria, FN+mu is ranked as more indirect than FN. That is, the expression of 
fami liarity may prompt increased indirectness in much the same way as the ex pression 
of fOlmality . This is nicely captured in Brown and Levinson's positive politeness 
strategy, which is more indirect than bald-on-record usage. The problem is that direct 
usage (FN) is applicab le to situations of higher D+P than positive politeness (FN+mu) , 
e.g. by employees addressing employers ((18) be low). The association of increasing W 
with increasing indirectness can no longer be defended in such cases. 
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(18) [91.15 ; At work; Speaker: female, 18-30, middle-class; Addressee: male , 31 -50, 
middle-class; Re lationship: employee to employer] 
mixall? na 'rtis na (jis kati? 
michael- VOC.? SP come-dep.-2sg. SP see-dep.-2sg. something? 
'Michaen Come and see something? ' 
IU4 
Attempts to rank the above set of address tenns a long one continuous scale of 
increasing indirectness are faced with the additional problem that discontinuities occur 
in the application of the scale in different settings. 13 Address telms used at work range 
from FN+mu through FN to title+FN, and occasionally title+LN (fig.4.6). However, 
title+FN does not feature amongst address tetms used on radiolTV and in formal 
discussions (figA.7).14 The possibilities now range from FN+mu through FN to 
title+LN. Older addressees are consistent ly addressed with titl e+LN (and 2p l. ), whi le 
younger addressees receive FN (and 2sg.): 
(19) [03.1 1; On the radio; Speaker: male, 31 -50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
e:h ciJ"ie mamxo na sas OOSO esas to I:o\,on (.) 
er Mr-VOC. maruxos-VOc. SP YOll-2pl.-GEN. give-dep.-I sg. YOll-2pl.-GEN. the-
ACC. speech-ACC. (.) 
'Er, Mr Maruxos , can I bring you in now? ' 
(20) [03.05; On the radio; Speaker: male, 31 -50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 18-30, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
ce: andrea vevea:: na rotisume: ( .) e-i zoi su meta ta (jekates:era (.) e-etri al:aksi? 
and andrea-VOc. certainly SP ask-dep.-Ipl. (.) er the-NOM. life-NOM. YOllr-2sg. 
after the f0U11een (.) have-ind.-3sg. change-non-fin.? 
'And Ani/rea of course let us ask. Has your life changed after the age of fourteen?' 
(2 1) below provides fU11her evidence of the restriction against use of *titl e+ FN in 
fo rmal settings: thi s never seems to constitute an option, even when doubt ex ists as to 
the appropriate address term: 
(2 1) [88.01 ; On TV; Speaker: male, 3 1-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
working-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
0: nikos 0 cirios [l'cr/as geli na pi kati 
the-NOM. nikas-NOM. the-NOM. M.r-NOM. terlas-NOM. want-ind.-3sg. SP say-
dep.-3sg. something 
'Nikos, Mr Terias would like to say something.' 
This qualitative difference cannot be captured with reference to D, P and Rr: if the 
type of setting produced an increase in the values of these variables, we would expect a 
wholesale shift toward more formal address in fonnal settings. However, this is not 
what we find , since intimate address by FN+mu is still appropriate in some cases, and 
so is FN, while titl e+FN is excluded. If, on the other hand, tit le+FN and tit le+LN are 
viewed as different realisations of the same strategy, it is important to recognise that 
13 Braun ( 1988 :38-42) discusses difficulties in ranking address terms along a single scale drawing on 
evidence from English, Arabic and Spanish. 
l ~ Title+FN is a common address term in SMG also (Bakakou-Orfanou 1989: 170-1 ). Therefore, its 
absence from more formal settings in CG cannot be attributed to standardising tendencies. 
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these realisations are not interchangeable. But if the strategy used is determined by W x 
(the sum of D, P and R.,), Brown and Levinson's theory contains no indi cation as to how 
to choose between different reali sations of the same strategy. The exclusion of title+FN 
from formal settings suggests that its use is constrained directl y by the type of setting, 
rather than - or in add ition to - Wx. Consequently, its use in the CO data can be more 
adequately described with reference to extra-linguisti c features of the situation: the type 
of setting (at work) and the addressee's older age relative to the speaker. In thi s case, 
allowing extra-lingui sti c features of the situation to enter directly into decisions 
regarding the applicable set of expressions yields the correct predictions, as it enab les 
us to refl ect qualitati ve differences between express ions which cannot be captured 
so lely with re ference to D, P and R~. 
4.2.6 Two ' modes' of indirectness 
In 4.1.4 above, a 'qualitati ve' construa l of indirectness was proposed, and was 
contrasted to the quantitati ve one current in most accounts to date (e.g. Fraser & Nolen 
198 1; Leech 1980, 1983; Blum-Kulka 1987a; B& L). Evidence of problems with 
sca labi li ty (4 .2.5 above) and of two diffe rent 'modes' of expressing indirectness in CG 
in the data collected sUPPOl1S the case fo r this alternati ve notion. 
A comparison of the overall range of combinations of type of ve rb, modality and 
number+person used at home to perform requests (figA.8) and offe rs (figA.9) to the 
overall range of additional markers of politeness used at home (fig A. IO) reveals a 
concentration on a few combinations so far as verb forms are concerned, accompanied 
by a wide range of additional markers of politeness. Utte rances recorded at work repeat 
this pattern ( fi gs. 4. 11 , 4.12, 4.13): a small number of combinations of type of verb-
modality-nurnber+person prevail in the fi rst two diagrams (4.2. 1 above), while the 
range of additional markers of politeness accompanyi ng them is inve rsely analogous to 
this. This di vision of labour between (l imited) modifi cati on in the main-clause verb and 
(extensive) modifi cation via additional elements is invelted on radiolTV and in formal 
discussions ( figs . 4.14, 4.15, 4.1 6). In the latter settings speakers draw on a wide range 
of combinations of type of verb-modality-numbel+ person. While speech act verbs' 
newly noted prevalence over action ve rbs (R-SAV-IMP , R-SA V-SUBJ in figA. 14; 0 -
SAV-SUBJ in fi gA.15) may be readily exp licable given the shift of focus to verba l 
activity in these settings, the high occun-ence of other combinations (8e/o/ I-want '-
indicati ve-l sg., 8elo-cond itional-1 sg. , and epitrepo, ' I-permit ' -imperative-2pl . for 
requests (R-THELO-rND, R-THELO-COND, R- EPfT REPO-rMP in figA.14); fJelo-
indicati ve-3sg., boro,' r-can' -indicati ve- Ipl. fo r offers (O-THELO-fNO , O-BORO-rND 
in fig.4.l 5)) is not similarly directed to the verbal nature of the acti vity. The ir 
occurrence thus suggests the speakers' increased tendency to modify the main verb 
forms of the ir utterances in these settings. Inverse ly, speakers now use additional 
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markers of politeness a lot more sparsely (figA. 16): LN is the prevalent address tenn, 
with FN used a lot less . 
Looking at figures 4.8 through 4.1 6, we may draw a number of conclusions. First, 
exchanges at home and exchanges at work show extensive similarities. The set of 
expressions which interlocutors draw on at home is a proper subset of the set of 
expressions on which they draw at work. As one informant put it, when asked how he 
would address hi s superior at work (in the fire brigade), "Jcn cxumcn cmis {ctja", 'we 
don't have such things', referring to the power differential between superiors and 
inferiors in the professional hierarchy. While his remark is probably inaccurate as it 
stands (witness the small number of requests/offers addressed by employees to 
employers; 4 .2. 1 above), it is revealing of native speakers' perception of verbal 
interaction at work: explic it verbal negotiation at work is highly reminiscent of the 
informal style found at home. 
Second, considerations of standardisation must be brought into the picture. A 
number of additional markers of politeness observed in thi s study are either variants of 
SMO ones (e.g. CO re for SMG vre, ' hey'; CO alc for SMO ade, an exhortative pm1icle; 
CO korifor SMO kopel..a, 'girl , lass'; CO diminutive suffixes -u(O) in, -u(i!)a for SMO-
aei, -ulal-itsa) or occur onl y marginally in SMG (e.g. mana mu, ' my mother'). They are 
therefore excluded from use on radio/TV and during forma l discuss ions, which favour 
standardising tendencies much as do discussions with Mainland Oreeks. 15 To an extent, 
then, figures 4.8-4.1 6 revea l the anatomy of two different registers: a non-standardising 
one (at home and at work) and a standardising one (on radiorrV/during formal 
discuss ions). The sharp divide between modification of main verb forms and 
modification by means of additional markers of politeness must be pal11y attributed to 
the ex istence of these two registers. Nevertheless, if politeness is defined as adeq uacy or 
appropriateness of verbal expression in re lation to extra-linguisti c context (1.1 , 1.3.2, 
1.3.3 above), it follows that, in selecting an appropriate register for the conversation , 
interlocutors are guided by their concern for politeness. An inappropri ate se lection of 
register can indeed be interpreted as impolite. A telling example of thi s occurred when 
the researcher (of SMO upbringing) was reprimanded by a family member for 
l ~ Evidence which supports the comparability of the two situations includes switches between 2pL and 
2sg. (2.7.2.4 above), and between SMG and CG diminutive suffixes in successive turns of the same 
speaker, as bclow:[69.19, 69.20; At work; Speakcr: male, 31 -50, working-class; Al MG; Relationship: 
acquaintances; AddresS(."C2: female, 31-50, working-class; Relationship: familyl 
S to A I: 60s mu ella: ella tsiyafllCl? 
A2 «commenting)): tSiyaraci? 
«some turns)) 
S to A2: tota? val' mu mjall ipoyrafu6lloamc. 
S to A I: givc-imp.·pcrr.-2sg. me·GEN. one, onc cigarettc-dim.lSMG·ACC.? 
A2: cigarettc-dim.lSMG-ACC.? 
((some IIIrns)) 
S to A2: tota-VOC.? put-imp.-perr.-2sg. me-GEN. one signature-dim.lCG-ACC. here and have-ind.-2sg. 
S to A I: 'Give me a, a cigarette-dim/SMG?' 
A2: 'A cigarette-dim.lSMG?' 
S to A2: 'Tota? rut a signatu re-dim/CG here for me' . 
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addressing another famil y member older than herself in the 2pL abid ing by an 
establi shed usage in Mainland Greece. While the recipient of the 2pJ. defended her 
usage as polite (taking into account her SMG upbringing), her choice of register was 
obviously inappropriate given the extra-linguisti c features of the exchange, thereby 
exposing her to criti cism. In other words, choice of register (standardising vs. non-
standardising) has an impact on politeness assessments in CG, and therefore falls within 
the scope of any study of po liteness in CG. 
To account for the existence of these two registers within Brown and Levinson's 
theOlY would require some way of comparing the overall indirectness of an utterance 
using relatively dircct vcrb forms and onc or more additional markers of politeness 
(most commonly, expressions of reason/purpose, hedges, and conditionals, often 
accompanied by an appropriate address term) to the overall indirectness of an utterance 
using more elaborate main-clause verb forms (with the act offered/requested often being 
relegated to an embedded clause) but no additional markers of politeness. The task 
seems impossible. Clearly , however, speakers do not draw on the two resources 
(modifying the main-clause verb vs. using additional markers of politeness) in parallel 
as they V3IY the indirectness of the ir utterances. Rather, they draw on one instead of the 
other. Significantly, it is not up to the speaker to choose which resource to draw on each 
time, as the researcher's experience with use of the 2pl. to famil y members shows. 
Extra-linguistic features of the situation guide a choice between what we may call two 
different 'modes' of being indirect in the data collected. Conflating these two modes on 
a un i-dimensional scale of indirectness blurs a qualitative di stinction which is essential 
to politeness considerations in CG. 
4.2.7 Transparent sources ofW assessment 
Brown and Levinson claim that " in compounding the va ri ables into a single index, 
[Wx€>(S,H)+P(H,S)+R x] makes the sources of the final assessment ambiguous" 
(B&L:8 1) . t6 That is, the proposed fOlmula operates on a summative basis which implies 
that, so long as the ' right' amount of indirectness is invested, the polite import of an 
utterance is ensured. The fact that "[a) number cannot reflect the considerations that 
formed it" (M insky 1975 :2 75; original emphasis) becomes problematic in the light of 
examples suggesting that, even in the same socio-cultural context, ce rtain polite forms 
may be more attached to the implications of one va riable rather than another. 
Discussing asymmetri ca l uses of FN+m/J (4.2.2 above), I concluded that an appeal to 
the speaker's sex (femal e) and/or age (o lder than the addressee) yields more accurate 
predictions than an appeal to the variable of Power as defin ed by Brown and Levinson. 
Similarl y, asymmetrical uses of title+FN are more adequately accounted for in terms of 
16 Brown and Levinson suggest that these values may be measured arithmetically on a scale of I to n (n 
possibly corresponding to 7; B&L:76, 287n.18)). Previous findings challenging the appropriateness of 
addition in this case arc summarised in Turner (1996:5). 
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the addressee's age (older than the speaker) and the setting of the exchange (at work ). 
This is not to say that all asymmetrical uses of FN+mu and title+FN wi ll actually 
exhi bit these extra- li nguistic features. However, they all aim at invoking the emotive 
connotations of relationships which are characterised by these extra-linguistic features. 
In this sense, rather than being ambiguous as to the sources which prompted the 
speaker's cho ice of address, asymmetric OCCUlTences of these address terms make such 
sources transparent: the speaker's asymmetric use of these address tenTIS would be 
infelicitous if there were any ambiguity as to the part icular combination of extra-
linguistic features which slhe is tlying to invoke and with which the expression of 
certain feelings is associated. 
Similarl y, if the setting of the exchange constrains the applicable set of address 
terms to a proper subset of the total set of address terms available in the culture as a 
whole, as argued in 4.2.5 above, the speaker's choice of address term wi ll have the 
effect of reveali ng something of the source of hislher final assessment. In fOlmal 
settings, titl e+LN is the standard way of addressing older addressees; in work settings , 
the same addressees are most likely to receive title+FN. Finally, the speaker's choice to 
be indirect by (primarily) modifying the main-clause verb of hislher utterance, or by 
using additional markers of politeness can also reduce ambiguities as to the source of 
hislher final assessment: to the extent that these two resources are drawn upon 
differentia lly in CO (4.2 .6 above), opting for one rather than the other reveals 
something of the reasons which prompted the speaker's choice of expression. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter attempted to account for the CG conversational data within Brown and 
Levinson's ( 1987) theory of politeness. Their main claims concern the existence of a 
continuous scale of indirectness along which speakers' choices move upwards as the 
weightiness (W,,) of the FT Ax increases, where W.~ is compounded of the assumed 
values of D, P and Rr. The descriptive statistical analysis of the data and discussion of 
individual examples challenge this view. On the one hand, current definitions of 
indirectness do not indicate a universally valid way of assessing the relative indirectness 
of utterances, rendering the quantitative notion which underlies Brown and Levinson's 
hierarchy of strategies (B&L:60; fig. I , 1.2.2 above) hard to implement empi rically 
(4.1.3 above). But, were this possible in the first place, it is doubtful whether such a 
move would be in the right direction. Evidence that speakers do not use expressions 
which are 'equally ' indirect (using the proposed hierarchy, or morpho-phonological 
criteria) interchangeably (4.2.6 above) suggests that the choice between these 
expressions is significant for politeness assessments and call s for a qualitative construal 
of indirectness (4.1.4 above). On the other hand, the variables of Distance, Power and 
Ranking of the imposition calculated for individual acts are not adequate, as cun"ently 
defined, to account for speakers ' choices of address terms, whether these concell1 
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establi shed fOlms of address, or strategic exploitations of these (4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4 
above). FU11hermore, they do not seem to have any psychological va lidity in guiding 
interlocutors ' assessments of politeness (4.2. 1 above). In the above cases, a direct 
appeal to extra-linguistic features of the situation such as the interlocutors' sex, age, and 
social class, the relationship between them, and the setting of the exchange, yields the 
cOlTect predictions. 
In conclus ion, it appears that the extra-linguistic features of a s ituation do not 
reduce without res idue to D, P and R~ values. What speakers seem to have internalised 
in this case is not a principle such as WxEl(S,H)+P(H,S)+R .n but knowledge of what 
cxprcssions to usc in what situations. Thc following two chaptcrs cxaminc how 
politeness as a societally rather than individually oriented notion is achi eved (chapter 5) 
and conceptuali sed (chapter 6), while the final chapter applies these theoretical 
proposals to the CO data. 
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Figure 4.3: Offers performed for the first time by middle-class Olen, 
aged 31-50, addressing middle-class men, aged 31-50, 
who are old colleagues at work 
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Figure 4.4: Offers performed for the first time by middle-class women, 
aged 18-30, addressing middle-class men, aged 31-50, 
who are their employers at work 
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Figure 4.1: Requests performed for the first time by middle-class men, 
aged 31-50, addressing middle-class men, aged 31-50, 
who are old colleagues at work 
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Figure 4.2 : Requests performed for the first time by middle-class women, 
aged 18-30, addressing middle-class men, aged 31-50, 
who are their employers at work 
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Figure 4.11: Requests performed at work 
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Figure 4.12: Offers performed at work 
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Figure 4.13: Additional markers of politeness IIsed in requests and offers* 
performed at work 
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Figure 4.7: Address terms used on radiorrV and in formal discussions 
by type of relationship 
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Figure 4.8: Requests performed at home and at informal social gatherings 
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Figure 4.9: Offers performed at home and at informal social gatherings 
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Figure 4.14: Requests performed on radiorrV and in formal discussions 
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Figure 4.15: Offers performed on radiorrV and in formal discussions 
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Figure 4.16: Additional markers of politeness used in requests and offers* 
performed on radiorrV and in formal discllssions 
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Chapter 5 
The rationality of politeness 
S.I Introduction 
"Automatic and impersonal, significant without a 
signifying intention, ordinary practices lend 
themselves to an understanding that is no less 
automatic and impcrsonal." (Bourdicu 1990:58) 
It is a common assumption of politeness theories that rational communication, as 
captured by Grice's Cooperative Principle and the concomitant maxims (fnA, 1.1 
above), provides the canvas against which linguistic politeness can be seen to function. 
Thus, Lakoff ( 1973:296) writes: 
"[T]wo basic rules are involved [in pragmatic behaviour], sometimes coinciding in 
their effects and reinforcing each other, more often in apparent conflict, in which 
case one or the other, depending on circumstances, will supersede. [ ... ] [These] 
Rules of Pragmatic Competence [are]: 1. Be clear. 2. Be polite. [ ... J [TJhe rules of 
clarity have been formulated [ . .. ] in Grice's (1967) work on the rules of 
conversation. " 
Similarly, Leech notes: 
" I shall want to introduce into pragmatics not only a Cooperative Principle (CP), 
but other principles, such as a Politeness Principle (PP)." (1983:7; reference 
omitted) 
"[T]he PP can be seen not just as another principle to be added to the CP, but as a 
necessary complement." (ibid. :80) 
Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the relationship between linguistic 
politeness and the CP is undel1aken by Brown and Levinson: 
"The C[ooperative] P[rinciple] defines an 'unmarked' or socially neutral (indeed 
asocial) presumptive framework for communication; the essential assumption is 
' no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason'. Politeness principles are , 
however, just such principled reasons for deviation. Linguistic politeness is 
therefore implicated in the classical way, wi th maximum theoretical parsimony, 
from the CPo [ . .. ] [P]oliteness has to be communicated, and the absence of 
communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as absence of the polite 
attitude. [ . .. ] In our model then, it is the mutual awareness of 'face' sensiti vity, and 
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the kinds of means-ends reasoning that this induces, that together with the CP 
allows the inference of implicatures of politeness." (B&L:5ff.) 
These authors assume that an inherent tension exists between linguistic po li teness 
and the CP: rough ly, either may take precedence in context, but both may not be 
satisfied simultaneously.1 This is made explicit in Brown and Levinson's account, 
where deviations from the CP, i.e. implicatures, are assumed to be the vehicle of 
po liteness. Their proposal of five politeness strategies which correspond to increas ing 
degrees of potential face-threat (fig. I, 1.2.2 above) rests on the fU11he r assumption that, 
the greater the deviation from the CP, the greater the face-risk the speaker assumes to be 
invo lved (ibid.:93), as thi s is represented in the value of W ( 1.2.2 above). This allows 
fo r the possibility of speaking in accordance with the CP, if the face-risk involved is 
small (because P or R~ are low), or the activity is task-oriented, or a matter of (real or 
metaphorical) urgency (ibid.:94-1 0 I). 
The picture painted above can be challenged. Speaking in accordance with the CP 
may well be a case of speaking politely in context 2 even in cases where considerations 
of face-risk are relevant and/or not minimal. In the CO data, bald-on- record requests 
(i.e. in the imperative-2sg.) lacking mitigation (in the form of, e.g., rising intonation, 
endearment terms, or diminutives) are perfectly acceptable also when the exchange is 
not urgent. The examples below constitute complete, one-off exchanges, or appear at 
the beginning of longer exchanges (cf. (7) in 4.2. 1 above). Nor are such requests the 
sole prerogative of speakers of higher P (cf. (8) in 4.2. 1 above, (5) below). 
Consequently , positing an inherent tension between linguistic poli teness and speaking in 
accordance with the CP seems hardly justified in thi s context: considerations of face-
risk are both pe11inent and not minimal , but these are not frustrated by speaking baldly. 
( I) [68.3 7; At home; Speaker: female, 18-30, working-class; Addressee: male , 18-30, 
working-class; Re lationship: family] 
vasili Jepase tIe ton artemi 
vassi li s-VOC. cover-imp.-pelf-2sg. and the-ACC. artemis-ACC. 
'Vassili, cover up Artemis too. ' 
(2) [47.30; At work; Speaker: female , 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: fema le, 3 1-50, 
working-class; Relationship: friends] 
fkar'ta fri9ca su. indalos efkales ta xondrinis pale? 
p/uck-imp.-pelj-2sg. the-ACC. eyebrows-ACC. your-2sg. how pluck-past-perf.-2sg . 
them fatten-dep. -2sg. again? 
'Pluck your eyebrows. You plucked them, now you're growing them back?' 
(3) [54.4; At work; Speaker: female, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: salesperson to old customer] 
( ) pien:c pano en' 0 kostas. 
1 That is, openly satisfied. As Brown and Levinson note: "Politene~s is [ .. ] a major source of deviation 
from such rational c!Ticiency, and is communicated precisely by thaI deviation. Bul even in such 
depanures from the lGriceanJ Maxims, they remain in operation at a deeper level" (B&L:95). The authors 
are here referring to the mechanism of maxim-flouting, introduced by Grice (l989a:30) as one that 
"characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature." 
2 In the scnse of interlocutors constituting their own and each other's face (I .3.3 above). 
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( ) gO-illlp.-illlpelf-2sg. up be-ind.-3sg. the-NOM. kostas-NOM. 
( ) 'Go upstairs, Kostas is there.' 
(4) [10.12; At work; Speaker: female, 3 1·50, working-class; Addressee: male, 1 8~30, 
working-class; Relationship: old customer to salesperson] 
andoni (.) ela pjas'ta misa 
andonis-VOe. (.) come-imp. -pelf-2sg. get-imp.-pelf-2sg. the-ACC. half-ACe. 
'Andoni. COllie and gel half {of them} .' 
(5) [53.62; At work; Speaker: male, 18-3 1, working-class. Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: employee to employer] 
kosta ela na ipoyrapsis e30 3ame 
kostas-VOc. cOllle-illlp. -pelf-lsg. SP sign-dep.-2sg. here here-CG 
' Kosta come to sign here, here.' 
The above constitute a small sample of similar instances in the data when speaking 
in accordance with the CP does not allow for any implicatures - commonl y viewed as 
the ve hicle of poli teness - to arise, yet politeness has been achieved. This raises some 
imp0l1ant questions. First, what is the relationship between linguistic poli teness and the 
CP? Second, is politeness always comm unicated? And third, if politeness is sometimes 
communicated, sometimes anticipated, how can we draw this di stinction in a principled 
way, and what are its implications for pragmatic theory? This chapter explores poss ible 
answers to these questions. 
5.2 The nature of cooperation 
Severa l arguments discussed in the literature support the existence of degrees of 
cooperation, cross-culturally and intra-culturally. After taking stock of claims that 
Grice's form ulation of the CP is too weak (e.g., Leech 1983; Attardo 1997) or too 
strong (e.g., Kashe r 1998[1 976]; Sperber & Wilson 1995[1 986]) to account for common 
conversational practi ces, I propose that, in accounting for what is communicated, 
cooperation should not be taken as the point of departure, but may well constitute a 
derived notion in need of explanation. The need to distinguish between degrees of 
cooperation is seen as symptomatic of the derived nature of the CP. A more economical 
account may rely on the premises of interlocutors' rationality and mutual face-wants, 
which yield different degrees of cooperation depending on the cultural and situational 
context. 
Grice (l989a[1975]:26) introduces the CP based on the observation that "[o]ur talk 
exchanges do not normally consist of a success ion of di sconnected remarks, and would 
not be rational if they did." Rather, palticipants recogn ise in conversation "to some 
extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. 
This [ ... ] may be fixed from the stat1 [ ... ], or it may evolve during the exchange" 
(ibid.). This recognition underlies the expectation that the CP will be observed. 
Explaining why people are "(ceteris paribus) expected to observe" the CP (ibid.), or 
why our talk exchanges would not be rational if they were not cooperative, Gri ce 
remarks: 
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"anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversat ion/communication 
[ ... ] must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in 
pmticipation in talk exchanges that will be profitabl e only on the assumption that 
they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperati ve Principle and the 
max ims." ( 1989a:29-30) 
Since Grice, the notion that people talk cooperat ively has become deeply 
entrenched. However, the scope of 'cooperation' has been a matter of considerable 
debate. Whereas Grice ( 1989a:28) saw cooperation as governing non-linguistic 
exchanges as we ll , Bach and Harnish (1979) (cf. Harnish 1998[1 976] :304fn.3 l ; Bach 
1987) restrict its application to linguistic communication. Closer to the spirit of Gnce's 
original fo rmulation, which saw "talking as a special case of purposive, indeed rational 
behaviour" (G rice 1989a:28), Cohen and Levesque (1990:229-30) attribute to 
cooperati ve agents the propelties of being "sincere and helpful", which they also define 
formally, while Thomason (1990:332) suggests an implicature-enabling not ion of 
accommodation defined as " acting to remove obstacles to the achievement of desires or 
goals that we attri bute to others". 
Attempting to clarify matters , Attardo (1997:756) distinguishes two levels of 
cooperation. Locutionary Cooperation (LC) refers to "the amount of cooperation, based 
on the CP, that two speakers must put into the text in order to encode and to decode its 
intended meaning", while PerlocutionalY Cooperation (PC) captures "the amount of 
cooperation two speakers must put into the text/situation to achieve the goals that the 
speaker (and/or the hearer) wanted to achieve with the utterance." Illustrating this point 
with examples, Attardo argues that the speaker can be LC cooperat ive (s/he can ab ide 
by the CP) without necessarily being PC cooperati ve (taking into account the hearer's 
goals in the situation). He then proposes the fo llowing Perlocutionary Cooperative 
Princip le (PC P): 
"Cooperate in whatever goals the speaker may have in initiating a conve rsational 
exchange, including any non-linguistic, practi ca l goal. (Or in other words, be a 
good Samaritan)." (1997:766) 
The PCP is more general than the CP, and takes precedence over it. Other principles 
goveming our actions, such as self-interest, may neverthe less ovelTide the PCP in cases 
of conflict ( 1997:777). 
One difficu lty with implementing Attardo's proposal li es in formulating a precise 
definiti on of 'goal'. While it is clear, empirica lly, that people do make assumptions 
regarding other people's goals (Lindsay et al. 1993; Lindsay & Gorayska 1994), it is 
less clear how such assumptions differ from, and interact with, the noti on of the 
speaker's intention, which I ies at the heart of (post-)Gricean accounts of meaning (Grice 
1989b). More impoltantly, Attardo's fonnulation of the PCP is rather strong: examples 
where the PCP does not conflict with any overriding principles, yet it is not observed, 
are readily available - a Zipfian principle of Least Effolt is perhaps in operat ion here. 
Granting, however, that Attardo is right in pointing out that the CP may on occasion 
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prove ' too weak' to account for conversational facts, I would constrain the applicat ion 
of any complementary princ iples with reference to interl ocutors' considerations of face 
( 1.3. 1 above, see be low) : interlocutors will be PCP cooperati ve onl y if thi s move 
somehow contributes to constituting their own and each other's face (which subsumes 
constituting the ir own face by means of constituting the face of another party). On thi s 
view, even genuinely being a good Samaritan can be construed as constituting one's 
own face - though not consciously aiming at thi s.3 
Attardo's PCP goes some way toward accounting for common conversational 
practices, but provides no insights as to why this principle should hold. Taki ng a step in 
this direction, Leech remarks: 
"The CP enables one participant in a conversation to communicate on the 
assumption that the other participant is being cooperative. In thi s the CP has the 
function of regulating what we say so that it contributes to some illocutionary or 
discoursal goal(s). [ . . . } the PP has a higher regulative role than thi s: to maintain the 
social equi li brium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our 
interl ocutors are being cooperati ve in the first place. To put matters at their most 
basic: unless you are poli te to your neighbour, the channel of communication will 
break down, and you wil l no longer be able to borrow his mower." ( 1983:82) 
In other words, it is important to be polite (or PCP cooperati ve)4 because not doing so 
makes pursuing one's aims a lot harder. In this sense, Leech's remark is in line with the 
prediction that to be polite is to be rational ( 1.3.2 above). However, whereas he 
introduces the PP as a principle function ing on a par with the CP to account for thi s 
intu ition, I would argue that the same result can be obtained by appealing to 
interlocutors' rationality and claims to face alone. 
To account for the rationality of face-constituti ng, Kasher's (1998[ 1976]) 
Rationality Princip le (R) provides a useful stat1ing-point: 
"Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at 
least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus ." ( 1998: 188) 
Some of our ends may be intimately related to the actions of others, in that they can 
only be attained - or attained at a lesser cost - through coordination with another 
person. In such cases, reasoning in accordance wi th R yie lds the conclusion that 
coordination is to be prefe'Ted ( ibid.: 19 1). 
In attempting to answer the question why it is rational fo r people to talk 
cooperatively (Gri ce 1989a:29-30),5 Kasher in fact spells out how face considerations 
3 Rather than merely take precedence if in conflict, as Attardo suggests, the said principle of self- interest 
would now constrain the operation of the PCP. 
~ Thc two attitudes are equivalent inasmuch as they arc concerned with the fact that people ollen 
cooperate beyond what is necessary for understanding and being understood. 
S Kasher derives the conversational maxims directly from R, without appealing to the CP. He also 
distinguishes 'limited cooperation', which is warranted by R, from the CP, which is too strong, and 
therefore "wrong and needless" ( 1998: 192). 
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can both motivate, and deter, cooperation between pm1ies.6 It is useful here to 
distinguish two levels of rational behaviour: face-constituting is rational at a deeper 
level, on which it orientates pat1icipants to maintain social equilibrium (1.3.2 above). 
For this reason, face-constituting can, at surface level, become an end in itse lf. In thi s 
sense, it constitutes perhaps the prototypical case of an end " intimately related to the 
actions of others" (Kasher 1998: 191; cf. Goffman's (1967:6) definition of face quoted 
in 1.3 above). Understanding considerations of face as desired "ends" motivat ing 
specific "plans" (Kasher 1998 : 191 ), we may view conversation as a plan in itse lf, whose 
preferab il ity is judged relative to that aspect of face (positive or negative) which is 
givcn precedence in context. This may ini tially create the impress ion that only positive 
face is concerned: after all , conversation will constitute the ' preferred ' plan - in the 
sense current within CA - only if considerations of pos itive face are given precedence. 
Nevertheless, negati ve face is not completely out of the picture: on considerat ions of 
negati ve face alone (avoiding imposi tion), conversation constitutes a ' disprefen'ed ' 
plan, one that wi ll be purposefully avoided. Unless some gain, then, (e.g. in positive 
face) can be posited as an 'additional benefit ' of conversations which do not serve any 
practical ends, it wou ld be quite irrational to engage in such conversations - yet people 
widely do. Trudgi ll 's (1983 [1 974]: 13) example of two Engli shmen who have never met 
before, and who, upon coming face to face with each other in a train compartment, sta rt 
talking about the weather, is perhaps the paradigmatic case of such an exchange. 7 This 
example suggests that it is indeed legitimate to view considerations of face as desired 
ends that people aim to fulfil through rational cost-and-effect accounting. 
Incorporating considerations of face into interlocutors' des ired ends enables us to 
account not only for cases where cooperati on is prefelTed, but also for instances where it 
may be opted out of, or otherwise not fully provided. The Malagasy's systematic8 
reluctance to provide personal information when asked, even when they could truthfully 
do so (Keenan 1998[ 1976]), is often cited as an instance of less than full cooperation. 
However, rather than constituting downright refutation of the G ricean maxims, 
Keenan 's findings highlight the need to constrain their application with reference to the 
operative cultural norms (Hamish 1998[1 9761:304fn.29; B&L:288-9fn .27; Horn 
1988: 130-1 ; G.Green 1996[ 1989]: 100-1 ; Mey 1993:74). Similarly, analysing interaction 
in an Egyptian village, HalTis (1996) discusses apparent evidence of violations of the 
6 Scollon and Scollon's (1995:36ff.) "paradox of face" refers to the potential of face to both motivate, and 
lead to avoiding, interaction. Essentially the same intuition underlies Leech's (1983:82) allocating the PP 
a higher regulative role than the CPo 
7 But only under his first explanation, that "it can o ften be quite embarrassing to be alone in the company 
of someone you are not acquainted with and 110/ speak to them" (ibid.; cf. Leech 1983: 141). Advanced in 
an Anglo-Saxon COntcxt, this claim challengcs Brown and Levinson's assumption that negative face 
generally takes precedence over positive face (B&L:73-4). 
8 'Systematic' points to the fact that, in Malagasy society, the amount of information provided III 
conversation is regulated by situational constraints (Keenan 1998:224ff.). 
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maxim of Quality,9 only to uncover a complex system of face conside rat ions underlying 
what, at first sight , constitutes practically no cooperation at alL In conclusion, she 
proposes that: 
"[C]onversational inference along Gricean lines must include two separable 
aspects, roughly corresponding to Grice's notions of 'cooperati ve' and ' rat ional' 
behaviour respectively. Firstly the constraints on cooperative behaviour are 
provided by the app licability of social nOtms and sanctions to all interactional acts, 
both in ritual (poli teness) and other aspects of exchange. Such nOtms are not rules, 
but are open to violation and what Grice called fl outi ng or exploitation, as are the 
Maxims. [ . . . ] The second aspect is the assessment of what is communicated 
accord ing to potential goals and effects, in other words, the interpretat ion of 
utterance meaning. ( . . . ] Such interpretation would presumably be a matter of the 
Maxims of Relevance (sic] and Manner working togethe r, with the social norms as 
well as the situational context forming an input into them. On this vie'w the social 
aspect does not calise deviations from the II/ost rational and efficient mode of 
communication, hut is prior to it: communication is ahvays and foremost a social 
act within a sOcially defined situation." (1996:49; emphasis added) 
Harris makes here several impol1ant points. First, she points out the poss ibility of 
purposefully fl outing or exploiting not only Gricean maxims, but also social norms - a 
possibility also attested in the CO data. Thus, the father addressing his son with 
title+FN (( 16) in 4.2.3 above), an address term normally reserved to older addressees, 
can be interpreted as boosting hi s son 's positive face. to (6) below, on the other hand, is 
an instance of ' teasing'. This involves openly threatening the (in this case, positive) face 
of a familiar addressee, in a way reminiscent of Leech 's Banter Principle. II HalTis's 
approach is, however, more economical than Leech's, in that, by explicitly recognising 
the possibility of flouting social norms, she does not have to postulate separate 
principles to account for the same facts. 
(6) [2 1.1 3; At work; Speaker !: female, 31-50, middle-class. Speaker2: female, 18-301 
middle-class. Speaker3: male, 18-30, middle-class. Relationship (all); colleagues) 2 
S I: pu en:a pais is ti rena? 
S2: ne na jJllFO lipole? 
((two tums)) 
S 1 :'a lis st'il umen enan anapsiktikon tis renas ja [xai xui] 
S3: [ne ne 
«pause; two tums)) 
>S 1 ((handing can to S2»): ja to peoin me ioices anal]Jes pc lis 
((two turns; pause)) 
S I ((to S3)): 'a mas fa; 
9 The importance or at least thc first sub-maxim or Quality is appreciated once one recalls that "other 
maxims comc into opcration only on the assumption that this lsub-Imaxim is satisfied" (Grice 1989a:27). 
10 Significantly, this and the rollowing example extend beyond using positive and negative politeness as a 
social accelerator and brake respectively (B&L:231 ). 'Flouting' is the only appropriate term in this case, 
since some default or unmarkcd behaviour must now be a'isumed first (Escandell-Vidal 1998: 46). 
II This reads: "In order to show solidarity with h, say something which is (i) obviously ummc, and (ii) 
obviously impolite to h" (Lccch 1983: 144-5; c r. B&L:229). 
12 Strictly speaking, (6) involvcs only the planning or an act or teasing. As such, its linguistic expression 
is directly relevant to the relationship between interlocutors. The age, and social class or the woman being 
teased (Rcna) are not known, but may reasonably be expected to approx imate those or the interlocutors. 
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S I: where FP go-dep.-2sg. to the-ACe. rena-ACe.? 
S2: yes SP take-dep.-Isg. anything? 
«two turns» 
lIS 
S l: SP her-GEN. send-dep.- Ipl. one-ACe. soda-ACe. the-GEN. rena-GEN. for [a-
laugh] 
S3 ~. 
yes] 
«pause; two turns)) 
>S I « handing can to S2»: for the-ACe. child-ACe. with special-ACC. needs-ACC. 
tell-illlp. -pef-2sg. her-GEN. 
«two turns; pause» 
SI « to S3»: FP us-ACe. eat-dep.-3sg. 
S 1; 'Where are you going, to see Rena? ' 
S2: 'Yes, shall I take anything {to her}?' 
«two turns» 
S I: 'Let's send Rena a soda [for a laugh.]' 
S3: ' [Yes yes .]' 
«pause; two turns)) 
>S I « handing can to S2»: 'Tell her, this is forthe child with special needs.' 
«two tums; pause)) 
SI « to S3»: 'She's gonna hate us {forthis}.' 
Second, HaiTis proposes an approach to utterance interpretation along the following 
lines: social nOims constrain the operation of the CP, as we ll as providing, together with 
the situational context, the input to the operation of the maxims of Relation and of 
Manner. This proposal may be elaborated in three directions. First, one may ask which 
social nOlms are relevant to cooperati ve behaviour and how they may be delimited. Can 
their impact on cooperati ve behaviour be predicted - and how?13 Second, how does the 
notion of face (Han'is 1996: 47) enter the picture Harris paints in her conclusions? Third, 
the term 'situational context' covers disparate kinds of information made available 
through different channels; which of these features are relevant to determining what is 
communicated? Do these remain constant across situations/cultures? The first and 
second points are in fact not unrelated: cooperative behaviour presupposes the 
interaction of two agents; it is thus by defini ti on subject to face considerations, since 
these arise, and can find fulfilment, only in a dyad (AlUndale 1999). Social nOlms which 
are relevant to cooperative behaviour can, then, be delimited by appealing to the notion 
of face: to the extent that such norms promote the constituting of (both aspects of) 
face ,14 they will constrain cooperative behaviour as well. The third point is taken up in 
5.4.5 below. 
Instances when people cooperate less than fully are not restri cted to particular 
cultural contexts. They are also a matter of situational context - even outside 
institutional discourse. Discussing Grice's (1989a:32) example 
(7) A: Where does Cl ive? 
B: Somewhere in the South of France 
13 This should be possible if specific social norms are lIIo/iva/ed by rationality, rather than just observed 
because of it (Davis 1998:173 ). In 7.3 below, I defend the former view, arguing on the basis of the CG 
data. 
l ~ Flexibility has to be allowed here for the fact that such norms are historically constituted (1.3 above) : 
what remains constant is their relationship to the constituting of face, rather than their content. 
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Sperber and Wilson ( 1995 :273ff.) point out that, in addition to Grice's analysis, in 
which 8 's utterance flouts the first submaxim of Quantity thereby giving rise to the 
implicature that 8 does not know exactly where C lives, 8 's utterance may also be taken 
as implicating that 8 does not want to reveal exactly where C lives . For instance, A and 
B may be planning a trip to France. A wants to know where C lives so they may pay 
him a visit - only B cannot stand the sight of C, and is therefore not inelined to give 
out the requisite information that would allow A to go ahead with his plan. Now, if A 
has reason to believe that, contrary to appearances, 8 is in fact in possession of thi s 
information (say , because 8 has said so in the past), A may well interpret 8's utterance 
as indicative of B's reluctance to reveal this information. In this case, only if A reasons 
on the assumption that B is not being cooperative (in the sense of not sharing A's goal), 
wi ll A infer 8 's reluctance based on B's utterance. What is more, the implicature that B 
does not want to say exactl y where C li ves arises contralY to Gricean prediction , since 
the CP is obviously not operative at a deeper level. Based on this di scussion, Sperber 
and Wilson conclude that the CP is sometimes too strong - predicting that 
interlocutors always share some common goals and will cooperate toward the ir 
achievement - and "neither always at work, nor always presumed to be at work" 
(1995:274). 
Sperber and Wilson 's claim that the CP is not operati ve at a deeper level may be 
challenged. One possibility is to assume that B is opting out (Grice 1989a:30). 
However, thi s entail s that the cr must first be operative, for A to derive from B's reply 
the implicature 'B does not know exactly where C lives', then contrast thi s with a piece 
of background knowledge (that A knows that 8 knows exactly where C lives), and 
based on the resulting contradiction infer that 13 has in fact opted out of the cr. This is 
problematic, since the CP is first assumed to be operati ve, and subsequent ly not to be. 
Also, in th is case, 8 's opting out is inferred, while Grice (1989a:30) only predicts that 
the CP may be opted out of explicitl y (e.g., by saying ' my lips are sealed '). 
A fUt1her possibility is to assume that the CP remains operative throughout. Two 
lines of argument are now possible. First, one may argue that, in view of the blatancy of 
B's performance, B is trying to mislead A (Grice 1989a:30). Again, thi s will not work if 
A a lready knows that B has the requisite information, and B knows that A knows that. 
Alternative ly, we may allow the maxims to operate not just on what is said, but also on 
what is implicated. Quantity operates first and gets A from 8's reply to the implicature 
that 8 does not know where C lives . Then Quality enters the picture, and when the 
implicature that B does not know is contrasted with the piece of background knowledge 
that B in fact knows, the impl icature that '8 does not want to tell' is derived. This time, 
rather than 8 's utterance, it is the implicature that ' 8 does not know' which breaches 
Quality, since B has now implicated something which slhe believes to be false. 
However, what could prompt A to apply the maxims not only to what is said, but also to 
what is implicated, so as to derive this further implicature? Interl ocutors' reciprocal 
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sensitivity to face-wants suggests itself here. As Brown and Levinson note, " respect fo r 
face involves mutual ori entation, so that each palticipant attempts to foresee what the 
other paI1icipant is attempting to foresee" (B&L:99). A may deri ve the further 
implicature that B does not want to reveal where C lives only if A is sensitive to the fact 
that, by not openly express ing di sregard for A's wishes, B may be avoiding to threaten 
A's positive face. This is an opportune example of how face considerations can 
motivate (and be taken as motivating) different degrees of cooperat ion. 
It is difficult to te ll whether Grice in fact had in mind such operation of the maxims 
on two levels. Discuss ing (7) above, he only derives the ' don ' t know' implicature 
(1989a:32-3). On the other hand, the proposed operation of the maxims on two levels is 
distinct from the poss ibil ity, which he recognises, that conversational implicatures are 
indetelminate, and may on occasion take the fOlm of a "di sjunction of [ ... J speci fic 
explanations" (1989a:40). The proposed account is nevel1heless compat ible with 
Grice's scheme, which in fact it may be viewed as spelling out more fully. In addition, 
the proposed account provides us with a glimpse into interlocutors' reasons for abiding 
by the CPo This now falls out from rationality and inte rlocutors' mutual face-wants, and 
does not have to be independently stipulated. Rather than the CP, it is these two 
premises that are assumed by default. [t is important (read: rational) for interlocutors to 
co-operate not onl y in order to avoid damage to the other's face, but a lso in order to 
ensure that their own face wi ll not be damaged. Given variability as to definitions of the 
sel f, and as to which aspect of face, defined as wants of the se lf, is prioritised in context 
(1.3. 1 above), thi s move enables us to account for the cultural and situational variation 
in degrees of co-operation exemplified above. To the extent that rationality motivates 
face-constituting di rectly ( 1.3.2, and the discussion of Kasher (1998) above), and 
Gricean co-operation only derivatively, face-consti tuti ng rather than the CP must be 
placed at the basis of a general theory of communication as providing the situational 
order that interlocutors expect in interaction. Only by according priority to the socia l 
aspect (Geis 1995: 13ff.; Harri s 1996:94) can we account for examples such as ( 1)-(5) 
above (cf. Arundale & Ashton 1992), where face is constituted by speaking in 
accordance with the CP, and not by means of deviations from it. 
5.3 Politeness as a perlocutionary effect 
According to Brown and Levinson, "politeness has to be communicated, and the 
absence of communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as absence of the 
po lite attitude" (B&L:S) . Following Horn ( 1988: 121 ), 'what is communicated' by an 
utterance will be taken to encompass 'what is said ' and 'what is implicated' by that 
utterance. Information may be implicated 'conventionally' or ' conve rsationally' , where 
the latter may be implicated in a 'generalised ' (i. e. in normal circumstances), or a 
' particularised' manner (in virtue of the speaker's intentions~ cf. fig. I ). Consequent ly, 
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Brown and Levinson's claim can be understood in several ways: poli teness may be pa rt 
of 'what is said ', or of 'what is implicated' (in any number of ways). 
WHAT IS CONVEYED 
--- ---WHAT IS SAW 
(truth·condi tional 
aspects o f mcani r.gl 
WHAT IS IMPLICATED 
------- ------
CONVENTIONALLY NON·CONVENTIONALL Y 
~----~r-----------hh------' _________ ______ 
SEMAi'TICS CONVERSATIONALLY NON·CONVERSATIONALL Y 
--------- -------
g~llu~l izcd part icularized 
C<)llv~rsational c<)nv~rsational 
implicature implicalUrc l _______ ___________ .,.-. _ _____ ---' 
PRAGMATICS 
Figure I: What is communicated by an utterance (from Horn 1988:121) 
Clarifying the above claim, Brown ( 1995: 169) notes: 
" Politeness inheres not in forms, but in the attributlon of polite intentions, and 
linguistic fDlms are only part of the evidence interlocutors use to assess utterances 
and infe r polite intentions. [ ... ] [Interlocutors] must continuously work at infe rring 
each other's intentions, including whether or not politeness is intended." 
This po int is also stressed by Arundale (1999: 144): " [I]or Brown and Levinson, then, 
po liteness in language use is always accomplished by means of particul arised 
conversationa l imp licature." 
This section explores the relationship between politeness and recognisi ng the 
speaker's intention. Drawing on theoreti cal and empirical considerations, it introduces 
the notion that politeness constitutes a perlocutionary effect, which can be achieved 
independently of recognising the speaker's intention (Fraser & Nolen J 98 J :96; Fraser 
1999). 1 explore how politeness as a perlocutionary effect is conceptuali sed, and argue 
that, thus understood , politeness is someti mes antici pated, and sometimes 
communicated by means of particularised implicatures, whereupon it re li es on 
recognising the speaker's polite intention. This claim is subsequently strengthened by 
showing that politeness is not part of 'what is said', nor conventionall y implicated by an 
utterance (thi s section, 5.4.2 below). Anticipating somewhat, we may summarise the 
main points as fo llows: politeness consists of the hearer holding the belief that ' the 
speaker is polite ' . This is different from the hearer recognising that the speaker holds 
this belief or intends to be recognised as holding thi s be li e f, and that is why politeness is 
not part of 'what is said' by an utterance. FUlthermore, po liteness is not conventionally 
implicated by an utterance , because it is not a propelty of linguisti c expressions, but of 
utterances of linguistic expressions in context. Politeness may, however, be presumed in 
context. It is then implicated in a generalised manner by utte ring a pa l1i cular expression 
in a pal1icular context. Yet, fo llowing from app lying general heuri st ics, and not with 
recourse to the speaker's intention, politeness is now anticipated. Politeness may only 
be communicated as a particularised impl icature, consisting of the hearer's recognising 
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the speaker 's polite intention.15 Based on this implicature, the heare r can come to hold 
the fUt1her bel ief that the speaker is polite. Significantly, deriving thi s implicature is not 
required for the hearer to come to hold the belief that the speaker is po li te, and that is 
why politeness is more adequately viewed as a perlocutionary effect, achieving which 
may, but need not, rely on recognising the speaker's polite intention. 
The notion of intention lies at the heal1 of the Gricean account of meaning: 
"'U meant something by uttering x' is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x 
intending: 
( I) A to produce a particular response r 
(2) A to think (recognise) that U intends ( I) 
(3) A to fulfil ( I) on the basis of his fulfilment of(2)." (Grice 1989b[1969]:92) 
Communicative intentions, then, have two propel1ies: (a) they are reflex ive, i.e. they are 
intended by the speaker to be recognised by the hearer as intended by the speaker; (b) 
they are at once fulfi lled once the hearer recognises them as intended by the speaker in 
this way (Bach & Harnish 1979: 15). That is, in cases of linguistic communication, the 
response r sought by the speaker consists of hearer understanding. 
For the purposes of this section, we shall define communication: 
"not as meaning something, but, for greater generality, as expressing a 
propositional attitude [where] [f]or S to express an attitude to H is for S reflexive ly 
to intend H to take S's utterance as reason to think S has that attitude. H identifies 
S's utterance if H identifies the attitude in question [ ... ] It is another question 
whether H takes S actually to possess that attitude, much less forms a 
corresponding attitude." (Bach 1990:391 ) 
Richard (1997: 197) defines propositional attitudes as "those mental states which 
(normally) have truth conditions (or the like) in vil1ue of their involving a representation 
of SUCh.,,16 On this view, the speaker' s polite intention may be modelled as the 
speaker's expressing the propositional attitude ' belief toward the proposition ' uttering 
expression x in situation y is polite ,.17 On the above defi nition of communication, 
politeness is communicated if the hearer recognises this intention as one that the speaker 
wants himlher to recognise. 
Politeness, however, amounts to more than this recognition: even if I do hold the 
belief that 'uttering expression x in situation y is polite ', my felicitous use of express ion 
x in situation y ( i.e. my uttering expression x in situation y and thereby constituting my 
1 ~ In agreement with Bach's definition quoted below, communication will, from now on, be understood as 
involving recognising the speaker's intent ions. This move helps distinguish instances of anticipated 
politeness (where politeness is presumed in context) from instances of communicated politeness (where 
politeness is implicated in vinue o f the speaker's intention). 
16 The caveat ' normally' covers beliefs which are held though they do not, given the corresponding 
representation's failure to refer, have tmth conditions; while the parenthetical 'or the like' refers to such 
attitudes as des.ire and wishing whose objects have satisfaction, rather than truth, conditions (Richards 
1997217fn.l ). 
17 The need to refer to the situation relative to which an expression is evaluated as polite provides prima 
faCie evidence that beliefs about politeness and the concomit ant implicatures are not wholly context-
independent (5 .4.3, 5.4.5 below). On the nature of such beliefs, see 6.2 below. 
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own and your face) is wholl y contingent upon your holding (or coming to hold) a 
cOITesponding beli ef that 'uttering express ion x in situation y is po li te.' In this sense, 
politeness constitutes a perlocutionary effect, wh ich can be identified as your holding 
the belief that I (the speaker) am polite. For you to hold thi s latter belie f, it is necessary 
fo r you either already to possess a similar attitude of bel ief toward ' uttering expression 
x in situation y is polite' (in which case whether you take me to intend you to think that 
I hold this be lie f is bes ides the point), or to come to possess an attitude of beli ef toward 
something like 'when S utters expression x in situation y, S is polite ' on the bas is of 
your taking me actually to believe ' uttering expression x in situation y is po li te.,18 Put 
simply, achiev ing politeness is different from your recognising that 1 intend you to think 
that I am polite: it involves you acttlally thinking that I am poli te. 
Tri vially, achiev ing politeness is not part of 'what is said ' by an utterance. 
Consider utte rances of the foll owing sentences: 
(8) Close the door. 
(9) I am be ing polite. 
(8) counts as a request if you recognise my expressmg, by means of (8), the 
propositional attitude ' desire' toward the propos ition 'you close the door' . Similarly, my 
intention in uttering (9) will have been fulfilled once yo u recognise my express ing, by 
means of (9), the propositional attitude 'belief' toward the proposition ' I am being 
polite'. However, (9) does not count as polite on the basis of this recognition. For this to 
happen, you must come to hold a corresponding be li ef that 1 (your interl ocutor) am 
polite; you are unlikely to hold such belief based on my asserting that I am.]9 Rather, 
you will requ ire some evidence of thi s in my behaviour: onl y my behaving in a way 
which you think is polite - say, my providing evidence that I hold the belief ' uttering 
expression x in situation y is polite' when you already hold a similar belief - counts as 
my being polite. Utterances such as 
(10) I know she was fly ing to be polite, but she came across as tUde. 
18 In this case, you will come to hold 'uttering expression x in situation y is polite' based on my uuering 
expression x in situation y only ir you think that I myselr hold thjs belier, and not ir you think that I 
merely intend you to think that I hold it, i.e. you must not only recognise my intention (a condition 
sufficient ror communication on Bach's de finition quoted above), but also take it to be sincere. This 
stronger condition is required ror you to come to hold, based on this first belier, the run her belier that I 
am polite . 
19 It is perhaps because or this that (9) sounds odd: ir politeness consisted or your recognising my 
intention to make you believe that I believe that I am being polite, then (9) would be the most direct way 
ror me to achieve Ihal, and should, arguably, be common in everyday usage. However, as il slands, (9) 
has a corrective flavour to il: one can only imagine the speaker in (9) attempting to establish a previous 
piece or behavi our as polite, after it has become clear that the addressee did not think or it as such. The 
same is not true or (8): (8) can also be uttered correctively, but this is not it s most common - much less 
its only possible - usage. In terms or the discussion in 1.3 above, this dilTerence stems trom Ihe fact Ihal 
(9) el'a/limes a panicular behaviour, but it docs not constitute it. (8), on the other hand, constitutes a 
panicular behaviour (a request) in and or itself This can be rormally represented by construing politeness 
as a runction P that relates behavjours (8 ) to contexts (C): given that P (B, C), P cannot appear in its own 
domain, since it is a runction and not an argument in the first place. 
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can be felicitously uttered only if the speaker's polite intention has been recognised, yet 
politeness has not been achieved. 
However, if politeness does not consist of recognising the speaker's polite 
intention, achieving it as a perlocutionary effect may be dependent (as opposed to 
incidental) on the hearer's recognising the speaker's polite intention. Strawson ( 1964) 
draws a distinction between what we may call intention-based communication and 
convention-based communication. In the latter, but not in the former, recognition of the 
speaker's intention amounts to producing a particular perl ocutionary effect 
conventionally associated with the speaker's utterance: 
"The speaker who abides by the conventions can avowably have the intention to 
further the procedure in the way to which his current linguistic act is 
conventionally appropriated only if he takes it that the conventional conditions for 
so furthering it are satisfied and hence takes it that his utterance will not only 
reveal his intentions but give them effect. There is nothing parallel to this in the 
case of the illocutionary act of a kind not essentially conventional." (Strawson 
1964:458; original emphasis) 
The production of a particular perlocutionary effect in the case of convention-based 
communication is secured through convention. The claim, then, that the fulfi lment of 
the speaker's intention consists of its recognition applies both to intention- and to 
convention-based communication. On this view, politeness would be achieved either as 
a result of convention-based communication if the appropriate conventions are satisfied, 
or as a result of intention-based communication, contingent on the hearer's situated 20 
interpretation of the speaker's utterance. In either case, recognition of the attitude which 
the speaker is expressing by means of hislher utterance would be necessary for 
politeness to be achieved. 
This is a view T wish to challenge. T argued earlier that your believing, based on my 
uttering expression x in situation y, that I am polite is solely contingent upon your 
believing that, roughly, 'uttering express ion x in situation y is polite' ? ! How you come 
to hold thi s latter belief in the first place is in·elevant. It is whether you hold it or not 
that is important: politeness is achieved in the former case, but not in the latter. Your 
taking me to intend you to believe that I hold the belief that ' uttering expression x in 
situation y is polite' - that is, your recognising my polite intention - is required for 
your coming to hold that ' uttering expression x in situation y is polite' jllst in case you 
did not hold this prior to my uttering el:pression x in situation y. If, on the other hand, 
20 The idea that interaction is situated first appears within the framework of symbolic interactionism 
(Blumer 1969:85-9; Denzin 1998:198). Later, Garfinkel (1972b:302) used the tenn 'situated meaning' to 
refer to "meaning constmcted in specific contexts by actors who must actively interpret what they hear 
for it to make sense." More recently, this tenn has been used to highlight the factlhat the inferences we 
draw in discourse arc jointly determined by our perception al a 'micro~lcveJ' of the current situation and 
by our knowledge al a 'macro-level' of what typically happens during this kind of situation (Schiffrin 
[994:109fr.; GumperL [996:375). 
21 Specifically, you will hold one of two beliefs: 'uttering expression x in situationy is polite', or 'when S 
utters expression x in situationy, S is polite'. 
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you already held that ' utteri ng expression x in situationy is polite', it would be in virtue 
of your holding this bel ief that you would come to hold, upon my uttering expression x 
in situation y, the fut1her belief that [ am polite, and not in vil1ue of your recognising 
whatever intention I may have had in uttering expression x in situation y. This is 
different from Strawson's (1964) convention-based communication mentioned above. 
The speaker who counts on the existence of a convention for the achievement of some 
perlocutionary effect takes it "that his utterance will not only reveal his intentions but 
give them effect" (Strawson 1964:458). That is, slhe must still have the intention to 
produce this perlocutionary effect in the first place. However, this is not always required 
for politeness to be achieved. Characteristic of cross-cultural miscommunication in this 
respect, is Tannen's (1981 :22 1-2) following example: she describes how, during a stay 
in Crete, her "careless questions" as to whether her hostess ever prepared eggs by 
beating them, and why she had not seen grapes since she had alTived in Greece, had 
been interpreted by her hosts as "hints", indirectly expressing her desire for scrambled 
eggs at breakfast and grapes at dinner, which they had then sought to provide at their 
great inconvenience. In making these remarks, Tannen (l981 :222) "had not intended to 
hint at anything, but had merely been trying [ ... ] to make conversation". These remarks 
had been read as polite requests by her hosts, who had then complied with them without 
further ado.22 Cases such as this, when politeness is achieved in the absence of a 
cOlTesponding intention on behalf of the speaker, remain unaccounted for, if achieving 
politeness as a perlocutionary effect is made contingent upon recognising the speaker's 
polite intention. In sum, whether politeness is achieved or not is always a matter of the 
hearer holding cel1ain beliefs in context based on which slhe comes to hold the belief 
that the speaker is polite , but only incidentally a matter of the hearer's recognition of the 
speaker's polite intention. In this sense, politeness is more often anticipated than 
communicated. 
Two types of evidence support the claim that recognising the speaker's intention is 
not requi red for achiev ing politeness. First, cons ider instances when one is po li te to 
one's addressee not so much to constitute that addressee's face, but rather to constitute 
one's own face in the eyes of some audience. Take (11) below: 
( Il l [85.34; On TV; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class. Addressee: female, over 51, 
middle-class. Relationship: inte rv iewer to interviewee) 
na se6iakopso? ixa 6javasi akrivos afto pu Jete ". 
SP you-ACC.-2sg., interrupt-subj .-perf.-I sg.? have-past-l sg. read-inf. exactly that 
which say-pres.-illd.-2pl. 
'May I interrupt? I read exactly what you are saying' . 
22 Significantly, the intention to perform a request remains distinct from the intention to be polite. 
Tannen's hosts could have interpreted her remarks as requests without for that matter taking them to be 
polite. In this respect, other than pointing to their eagerness to satisfy her wishes, it is impossible to asscn 
with cenainty whether they took such requests to be polite. However, to the extent that this interpretation 
cannot be excluded, tlJis is an instance of politeness 3,,, a perlocutionary effect which may be 'unintended 
and successful' (Fraser 1999:3). 
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The interviewer's fluctuation between the 2sg. and the 2pJ. can hardly have been caused 
by a change in his relationship with the addressee within the space of a few words. 
Rather, their relationship is perfectly compatible with using the 2sg.:23 using this 
expression constitutes the addressee's face. However, the speaker is interested in more 
than the addressee's recognition of his polite intention: by using the 2p\. , he displays his 
familiarity with the linguistic norms of the current setting, thus establi shing himselfas a 
competent member of society, and thereby constituting hi s own positive face. This 
second desire of the speaker is not directed to any pal1icular audience. The 
perlocutionary effect of constituting his own face is achieved if anyone and everyone 
watching thi s broadcast, including those present in the studio (including the hearer), 
thinks he is fami li ar with the operative linguistic norms, in virtue of hi s addressing the 
hearer in the 2pJ. However, it is clear from Grice ' s (1989b:92, see above) definiti on of 
speaker-meaning, which models the speaker's intention to produce a response r as 
directed to a particular audience, that the second desire of the speaker in ( 11 ) cannot be 
so modelled.24 Nevertheless, the perlocutionary effect of constituting hi s face is 
achieved. Consequently, politeness must be construed as a perlocutionary effect, which 
can be achieved irrespecti ve of the recognition of the speaker' s polite intention by any 
pal1icular audience. 
The second piece of supporting evidence comes from the obse lvation that, more 
often than not, face-constituting takes place over several conversational turns rather than 
in single utterances. Building on Goffman's concept of interactional imbalance, 
Bayraktaroglu ( 1992a: 13ff.) shows how certain kinds of acts may be required to ensure 
face-constituting, given the kinds of acts that have preceded them. In such cases, 
po liteness is the overall result of the CQ-QCCU1Tence of all of these acts, rather than being 
achieved by anyone of them in isolation. This possibility remains unaccounted for if 
achiev ing politeness depends on recognising the intention with which the speaker 
uttered a pal1icular utterance. Each time a speaker utters an utterance, s/he is held to do 
so with a pal1icular intention, and each time thi s intention is recognised, some further 
perlocutionary effects mayor may not be achieved. Consequently, a perlocutionary 
effect which is contingent upon recognising the speaker's intention in uttering a 
pal1icular utterance is either achieved or not following the understanding of this 
utterance alone~ its achievement carmot be distributed over several utterances occUlTing 
sequentially in di scourse, since a distinct intention corresponds to each of these . This is 
not to deny that a pal1icular perlocutionary effect can in principle fo llow the recognition 
of each of these speaker-intentions. However, this perlocutionary effect alone does not 
amount to po li teness: onl y when taken jointly do these p erlocutionary effects - what 
Bayraktaroglu ( 1992: 15) terms 'changes in face-values' - achieve politeness. Again , 
23 Terkourafi (2001) argues that the 2sg. in CG docs not carry connotations of familiarity/equality as it 
does in SMG. 
2~ The difficulty lies in that the audience cannot be delimited in any circumspect way, such that the 
speakcr may be said to havc designed his utterance with a part icular audience in mind rather than another. 
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politeness must be construed as a perlocutionary effect achieved independently of the 
recognition of the particular intention with which the speaker uttered anyone pm1icular 
utterance. 
Recognition of the speaker's intention is, nevel1heless, required in the case of 
strategic politeness (B&L:93).25 In such cases the speaker is manipulating the 
situational context within which hi s/her utterance is to be interpreted, rather than taking 
it to be as both pm1icipants have perceived it to be so far. Furthermore, the speaker is 
seeking to secure the hearer 's concurrence to hisfher man ipulat ion of the situat ional 
context. Jfthe hearer concurs with this, the situational contex t wi ll actua lly be perceived 
differently by both pal1icipants in future. But the hearer's concun'i ng to whatever the 
speaker is trying to achieve depends on the hearer's recognising what the speaker is 
hying to achieve. That is, it depends on the recognition of the intention with which the 
speaker utters a pmticular utterance. This recognition takes the form of a particulari sed 
implicature. S ign ificantly, the perlocutionary effect now sought is manipulation of the 
situational context, above and beyond face-constituting. In this way, instances of 
strategic politeness appear as marked in relation to the unmarked linguistic behaviour 
which aims at constituting face, and "can only have their raison d'etre as exploitat ions 
of[thisJ defau lt, 'unmarked' behaviour" (Escandell-Vidal 1998:46; cf. Jary 1998: II ). 
In sum, recognising the speaker's intention when s1he is behaving linguist ica ll y in 
an unmarked way is not required for the hearer to take hirnlher to be polite on the basis 
of his/her utte rance.26 Politeness as a perlocutionary effect consists of the hearer holding 
the belief that the speaker is polite. This, the hearer comes to hold upon the speaker's 
uttering expression x in situation y on the basis of the hearer's holding another beli ef, 
rough ly, 'utte ring expression x in situation y is polite.' If the hearer a lready held this 
latter belief prior to the speaker's utterance , politeness is achieved independently of the 
hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention, i.e . it is anti cipated. To the extent that 
po liteness passes unnoticed (Kasper 1990: 193; Jary 1998: 1-2; Escandell -Vidal 
1998:46), this is the primary way in which it is ach ieved. Nevertheless, achieving 
politeness as a perl ocutionary effect depends on the hearer's recognising the speaker's 
intention on two occas ions. First, if the hearer did not already hold the be lief that 
' uttering expression x in situation y is polite ' - a si tuation potentially common during 
language acquisition and L2 learning. Second, if the speaker utters an expression other 
than x in situation y, or expression x in a situation other than y, i. e. in instances of 
strategic politeness. On both occasions, the hearer cannot come to hold the be lief that 
the speaker is po li te until sfhe has recognised the speaker's intention, i.e. until s/he has 
derived a parti cularised implicature pertaining to the speaker's polite intention. 
2S Strategic politeness encompasses using strategies as a 'social accelerator' or a 'social break' (B&L:93, 
228IT.), and is distinct from politeness generical ly achieved by means ofslrategies (fn.9, 1.2.1 above). 
26 Working within the framework of RT, Escandell-Vidal (1998) similarly dissociates politeness as 
standard linguistic behaviour from the speaker's intentions, associating the latter with strategically 
exploiting expectations. 
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5.4 Politeness and linguistic form 
Viewing politeness as a perlocutionary effect helps account for the observation that it 
typically passes unnoticed: politeness as a perlocutionary effect is most often 
anticipated, and only exceptionally does it rely on recognising the speaker's polite 
intention. PerlocutionaIY effects are however open-ended and indefinite, even more so 
than conversational implicatures (Grice 1989a:39-40): a conversational implicature is 
li censed (by the speaker) and calculated (by the addressee) on the assumption that 
certain assumptions are mutually available to both, and known by them both to be so 
availab le - in RT terms, they are mutually manifest. The same is not true of 
perlocutionary effects: these depend upon the set of assumptions held by the addressee 
alone, i.e. no constraint of mutual availability of assumptions app lies to them. 
Consequently, the speaker is even less in a position fully to predict what the 
perlocutionary effects of hislher utterance will be. This raises the question: if achieving 
perlocutionary effects is very much what we may call a ' hit-and-miss' operation, how is 
it that, usually, when a speaker thinks slhe is polite, the addressee thinks so too? 
To answer this question, I first distinguish ' ambivalent ' from ' indirect' utterances. 
This distinction interacts with the degree to which an expression is conventionalised for 
some use in determining how politeness as a pe rlocutionary effect is achieved. 
Conventionalisation will be understood in a broad sense: it refers to an experientially 
establi shed statistical likelihood that a particular expression will be used in a particular 
context. Consequently, it is a matter or degree, and subject to variation both cross-
linguistically and intra-linguistically. Evidence from the CG data suggests that polite 
discourse largely involves using conventionalised ex pressions (chapter 7 below). 
Subsequently, I explore how an implicature to the effect that the speaker is being 
po li te27 might be derived, and show that such an implicature will be pal1icularised if the 
speaker's utterance in context is indirect or ambivalent, or conventionalised for some 
use but used in a context other than that relative to which it is conventionalised. 
However, such an implicature will be generali sed if the speaker uses an expression 
which is conventionalised for some use relative to the (minimal) context of utterance. 
Fina ll y, the Tole of a pal1icular form of words (Grice's 'what is said ') in achieving 
politeness is explored. These findings suggest a direction in which the three-tiered 
picture of utterance interpretation advocated within Neo-Gricean approaches may be 
extended. 
5.4.1 Ambivalent vs. indirect utterances 
Building on an idea by Thomas (2000; fil.17, 2.7.1.1 above), we may distinguish (12)-
(15) below in two general classes: 
27 The phrasing 'the speaker is polite' vs. ' the speaker is being polite' makes explicit the difference 
between the content of a belief held by the addressee (perlocutionary effect sought/achieved) vs. the 
propositional content of an implicature of the speaker's utterance. 
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(12) Open some windows. 
(13) I was wondering if it would be OK to open some windows. 
(14) I was asking myse1fifit would be OK to open some windows. 
(15) It 's hot in here. 
129 
(12), (13), and (14) are 'ambivalent': they make clear how the speaker's utterance may 
be complied with - namely, by opening some windows, or explaining why this is not 
possible - although their illucutiunary force may remain unclear: is (12) an order or a 
request? Is (13) a request for action, or for permission to act? Is (1 4) a request or an 
assertion of what's on the speaker's mind? (15), on the other hand, to the extent that it is 
not conventionali sed for some use, is 'indirect': it may be a request, a criticism, or a 
mere statement of fact; in each of these cases, it will be complied with differently. 
The distinction between ambivalent and indirect utterances para llels Brown and 
Levinson's (1987) distinction between on-record and off-record strategies. The reason 
for adopting a different telminology here is that their reference to strategies can onl y too 
easi ly obscure the fact that «many of the c1assic off-record strategies [ ... ] are very often 
actually on record when used, because the clues to their inte rpretation (the mutual 
knowledge of Sand H in the context; the intonational, prosodic and kinesic clues to 
speaker's attitude; the clues derived from conversational sequencing) add up to onl y one 
really viable interpretation in the context" (B&L:2 12). This point, I argue in 5.4.3 
below, is central to the question of when and how implicatures of poli teness are derived. 
Consequently , contrary to the authors' distinction between on- and off-record, the 
distinction between ambivalent and indirect app lies exclusive ly to utterances in context. 
To illustrate this point, consider first Brown's (1995) discussion of irony in Tzeltal. 
In Brown and Levinson 's classification, irony is an off-record strategy (B&L:221-2). 
Discussing its extensive use between Tzeltal women, Brown shows how, in this case, 
irony has been conventionali sed as a positive politeness strategy. However, she claims, 
conventionali sation cannot account for all observed instances of Tzeltal irony. Building 
on this claim, she argues that recognising the speaker's intention is always necessary for 
the attribution of politeness (Brown 1995: 154-5). This conclusion, I would argue, does 
not necessarily fo llow from her examples. In one of these, irony is used by both plaintiff 
and defendant in court ( ibid.: 162-4). Brown calls th is 'angry irony '; positive politeness 
is not what is aimed at (or for that matter achieved). Nevertheless, there is an important 
difference between this and the cases of conventionalised irony di scussed as instances 
of positive po li teness: the setting of the exchange in court, which sets this example apart 
from the other ( infotmal) exchanges. To account for ach ieving politeness, 
conventionali sation must not be understood in a narrow sense, whereby some 
expressions in a particular language are conventionali sed compared to some others. It is 
not a property of li nguistic expressions, "inhering in particular linguistic forms" (Brown 
1995: 154). Rather, an expression is conventionalised for some use only in relation to 
some context. Uttered in a different context, the same expression will no longer be 
conventionalised, and recognising the speaker's intention will now be necessary to in fer 
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its meaning. Indeed, it will be the di screpancy between the contex t in relation to which 
the express ion is conventionalised, and that in which it is actually uttered, that will 
serve as a trigger for the inferential process. In Brown 's cOUl1-case example, the setting 
of the exchange in court may well trigger the face-threatening interpretation of irony. 
Arguably, irony in Tze ltal is only conventionalised as a positive politeness strategy 
when used between women in infOlmal settings. 
The above example illustrates how utterances which, in terms of the ir propositional 
content, are indirect become ambivalent when used in the context in re lat ion to which 
they are conventionali sed. A fUl1her example, thi s time from CG, SUPP0l1S this claim: 
(16) irten 0 protos 
come-past-perf.-3sg. the-NOM. first-NOM. 
'The first one has arrived.' 
This was the standard utterance with which my patelllal grandmother sent her two 
young sons to bed every evening. According to my father, when uttered in this context 
(by my grandmother in the evening, prompted by one of her sons' yawning), (16) could 
onl y be comp lied with in one way: by go ing to bed. In this case, an indirect utterance 
had, in virtue of its regular CO-OCCUlTence with a pal1icular context, become ambivalent. 
However, thi s was so only for the small set of speakers involved, who were aware of the 
relevant constraints on the interpretation of thi s utterance. Whi le thi s ' micro-social ' 
pers pective lies one step before the 'macro-social ' one demonstrated by Brown 's 
example of conventionalised irony between Tzelta l women in informal settings, the 
mechanisms invo lved - conventionali sati on, as defined in the next section - are 
essentially the same. 
5.4.2 Conventionali sation of form and politeness 
Based on the preceding di scussion, conventionali sation will be defined as a relationship 
holding between utterances and contexts, which is a cOlTelate of the (stati stical) 
frequency with which an expression is used in one's experience in a particular context. 
It is thus a matter of degree, and may well vary for different speakers, as we ll as fo r the 
same speaker over time. This does not preclude the possibi li ty that a parti cular 
expression may be conventi onali sed in a pal1icular context for virtually all speakers of a 
pal1icular language, thereby appearing to be a 'convention' of the language. 28 However, 
it does highlight the rational bases of the relevant conventions (Lewis 1969). 
Conventionali sation is thus akin to the notion of standardisation, recently outlined as 
fo llows: 
"A form of words is standardised for a cel1ain use if thi s use, though regularised, 
goes beyond literal meaning and yet can be explained without special conventions. 
[n each case, there is a certain core of linguistic meaning attributable on 
28 This will depend on the extent to which speakers' experience is similar. Two factors are essent ial for 
this: their objective conditions of existence, and communicati on. These are captured under Bourdieu's 
( 1990; 1.3 above) notion of the 'habitus'. 
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compositional grounds but a common use that cannot be explained in terms of 
linguistic meaning alone. The familiarity of the form of words, together with a 
fam iliar inference route from their literal meaning to what the speaker could 
plausibly be taken to mean in using them, streamlines the process of identifying 
what the speaker is conveying. The inference is compressed by precellent. But were 
there no such precedent, in which case a more elaborate inference would be 
required, there would still be enough contextual information avai lable to the hearer 
for figuring out what is being conveyed. That is why special conventions are not 
needed to explain these cases." (Bach 1 998:713~ emphasis added) 29 
Conventionalisation, thus understood, is a broader notion than Strawson's ( 1964) 
convention-based communication. An expression is conventionalised for some use 
under constraints which are not stipulated, as are conventions such as those of a game of 
bridge, but experientially established. Consequently, such constraints are subject to 
reinforcement, modification, or cancellation through experience. Moreover, absence of 
knowledge of the relevant constraints does not preclude the possibility that the intended 
inference may still be deri ved, whereas absence of knowledge of the conventions of 
bridge would render one incapable of understanding the utterance " I bid you five no 
trumps.,,30 For these reasons, politeness cannot be conventionall y implicated by an 
utterance. Po liteness is not inherent in linguistic expressions in the same way as the 
contrastive meaning is pal1 of the conventional meaning of 'but' independently of 
context. Rather, politeness resides in the implicit evaluation of an expression relative to 
a context of utterance (5 .4.3 .3 below). 
Several experimental studies highlight the imp0l1ance of conventionalisation fo r 
achiev ing pol iteness. Hav ing asked native speakers of English and Hebrew to rank 
utterances according to their politeness impol1 in particular scenarios, Blum-Kulka 
(1987a) found that "the highest level of politeness in both English and Hebrew is 
achieved by the use of conventional indirectness" ( 1987a: 1 36~ original emphasis) as 
opposed to 'h ints' (utterances which are non-conventionally indirect). Simi larly, 
researching the impact of requestive strategy on degree of perceived poli teness in 
American English and Korean, Holtgraves and Yang ( 1 990:724 ~ cf. Holtgraves 
29 Early remarks stress the importance of standardisation as 'short-circuiting' intended inferences (Bach 
1975, Harnish 1998l1976J:267, Morgan 1978, Brown & Levinson 1987l 1978j:248, Atlas & Levinson 
1981 :5). Arguing from the essentially rat ional (capable of being worked out) vs. conventional (requiring 
special conventions) character of the inferences involved each time, standardisation has been 
subsequently distinguished from conventionalisation (Bach & Harnish 1979: 192-202, Zegarac 
1998:341 ff. ). I adopt the laller term here to emphasise the fact that, if an inference is "compressed by 
precedent", it may still be learnt as convent ional by any individual speaker. To the extent that slhe has 
never actually calculated the intended inference - as when children learn to associate panicular 
expressions with particular periocutionary effects sought through explicit instmction (Snow et al. 
1993:303; S{'''C below) - hislher knowledge of the condit ions for fel icitous use of the expression carrying 
this inference will be conventional, yet, unlike knowledge of conventi ons, subject to modification through 
experience. 
>0 The difference is one of degree. 'Convent ion', in this respect, should be understood as one end of a 
continuum, with 'intention' lying at the opposite extreme. Inasmuch as instances of linguistic 
communication involve the intentional deployment of signs which are essentially conventional, they are 
of the "intermediary" type which Strawson (1964:459) expl icitly acknowledges. 
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1997: 110) found that "hints were not rated as the most polite strategy." While, contrmy 
to Blum-Kulka, Holtgraves and Young are careful to note that subjects' advance 
knowledge that all utterances were requests effectively made the hints used in their 
study on-record (ibid. ), it is significant that in both studies, conventional indirectness 
was consistently preferred over hints. What is more, whereas non-English subjects' 
evaluation of hints was highly variable - with Hebrew speakers rating these relatively 
low on the politeness scale (Blum-Kulka 1987a: 137) and Korean speakers preferring 
them for small rather than large requests (Holtgraves & Yang 1990:723) - English 
speakers consistentl y ranked hints second only to conventional indire ctness. The fact 
that this was so for Amcrican (used in both studics) as wcll as British and Australian 
English (included in Blum-Kulka's data) provides prima/acie evidence that Brown and 
Levinson 's ranking of off-record indirectness at the high end of the politeness scale 
(B&L:60; fig. I, 1.2.2 above) may be traced back to a convention of the (English) 
language, rather than being a universal trait of polite discourse. Similar results are 
reported for a number of languages.] l 
Studies of a developmental guise also support the importance of 
conventionalisation for politeness, by showing that the use of conventionalised 
expressions and the acquisition of politeness by children are often explicitly linked, as 
below: 
Father: (to child) Say 'please could I have some ketchup' . 
Child: Please. 
Father: Please may I have some ketchup. 
Child: Please. 
Father: Just say the whole sentence for a change: Please may I have some ketchup. 
Child: Please. 
Father: No. We ' re gonna wa it till you say' Please may I have some ketchup.' 
Child: Please can I have the ketchup. 
(from Snow et al. 1990: 235) 
Drawing on a large corpus of conversational data from American fami lies, Snow et al. 
(1990:303) identify "direct teaching of the child about what forms to use in various 
situations" as one of two major sources of information about the politeness system 
availab le to chi ldren. The second source was manipulating relevant contextual 
dimensions such that the child can observe their correlation to language fonns, while a 
third potential source, direct teaching about the nature of the rules, was rarely resorted 
to in their data (ibid.) . 
Stud ies of L2 leamers' polite behaviour point in the same di rection. While 
discourse completion tasks found that L2 learners and native speakers perfonn sim ilarly 
with respect to the production of hints, with L2 learners producing these as frequently 
and in the same situations as native speakers (Weizman 1992), L2 learners' abi lity to 
recognise and produce polite requests using conventionalised means prefen'ed by native 
31 See Weizman 1992: 125, Turner 1996:5-6. Marquez Reiter 2000. 
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speakers was found wanting (Phillips 1993). Taken jointly, these results, though 
expected, appear perplex ing for an account of politeness in telms of rati onally assessing 
payoffs and weighing ri sks (B&L:83-4). To the extent that conventiona li sed 
indirectness falls under negative politeness (B&L: 132ff.), L2 leamers should be able to 
derive thi s strategy on independent grounds, and thereby use it approximately as 
efficiently as native speakers. However, this is not what these studies found. While the 
use of hints may be rationally motivated as claimed, that the use of conventionalised 
indirectness is similarly motivated remains to be proven. 
Furthelmore, the fact that conventionalisation may a lso be linked to positive face-
wants argues against its construal as effectuating a desirable compromise between the 
wish to be direct and the wish to avoid imposition, which motivates placing it under the 
negati ve politeness super-strategy (B&L:130ff.). As Manes and Wolfson (1981) have 
shown, conventionali sed expressions are central to American Engli sh complimenting 
behaviour, a type of behaviour viewed as intimately, if superficially, linked to the 
hearer 's positive face-wants. Analysing data collected in a variety of everyday speech 
situations between men and women of different ages and from a wide range of 
occupational and educational backgrounds, they found that a single syntactic pattern 
(NP is/looks really ADJ) accounted for well over 50% of observed compliments, whi le 
a total of 85% were fully describable with reference to only three syntacti ca l patterns. In 
addition, compliments showed regularities in their semantic composition: speakers 
showed an overwhelming tendency to use one of only fi ve adjectives (nice, good, 
beautifltl, pretty, great) and two verbs (love and like). Commenting on these findings, 
Manes and Wolfson ( 198 1: 123) point out that 
"[t]he combination of a restricted semanti c set and an even more restricted set of 
syntactic stlUctures makes it clear that what we are dealing with here is not simply 
a matter of frequency. Rather, we are forced to recognise that compl iments are 
formulas, as much as thanks and greetings. [ . . . J they are highly stlUctured formulas 
which can be adapted with minimal effott to a wide vari ety of situations in which a 
favourable comment is required or desired." 
Rhodes ( \989) draws a similar conclusion regarding the use of positive politeness in 
Ojibwa. Based on observational data from requests, he argues that in thi s Ame rican 
Indian language positive politeness is conventionalised, which, he claims, explains its 
predominance over negati ve politeness in this culture (Rhodes 1989:255ff. ). Finally, 
Brown 's ( 1995) discussion of conventionalised irony in Tzeltal as a positive politeness 
strategy may also be seen as evidence that the politeness super-strategy realised by any 
palticular linguisti c means on an occasion of utterance is intimately linked to the degree 
to which thi s linguisti c means is conventionalised for some use (5 .4.1 above). 
In conclusion, experimental and observational data, as well as data from language 
acqu isition and L2 learn ing, converge on the central role which conventionalised 
expressions play in achieving politeness. These indications accord with our current 
findings regarding politeness reali sations in CG (chapter 7 below). While the 
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imp0l1ance of conventionalised expressions has thus been repeatedly acknowledged, the 
possibility that thi s translates into essentially different inferential paths involved in 
achiev ing politeness when an expression is conventiona li sed for some use as opposed to 
when it is not, though intuitively evident, has not been -previously explored.32 In 5.4.3 
below, I argue that thi s distinction, alongside the distinction between ambivalent and 
indirect utterances, ho lds the key to how politeness as a perlocutionary effect is 
achieved. 
5.4.3 Calculating implicatures of politeness 
Following Grice ( 1989a:39-40; cf. Levinson 1983: 114-8), a proposition will count 
as a conversational implicature of an utterance, if it meets the conditions of 
cancellabili ty (i.e. it is defeasible in context), non-detachability (i.e. it is not dependent 
on the fOim of words used - excepting implicatures arising due to the maxim of 
Manner), and calculability.J3 Remarking on thi s last condition, Recanati 
(1998[ 1993]:523 ; orig inal emphasis) writes: 
"Many followers of Grice have (wrongly) interpreted this as requiring that the 
theorist be capable of working out whatever conversational implicature is posited 
to explain a given semantic phenomenon; but Grice clearly had in mind the 
palticipants in the talk-exchange themselves: it is the speaker and hearer who must 
be capable of working out the implicatures." 
Calculability may thus be understood as a condi tion of psychological plausibility, 
predicting a potential end-point for the inferential process: of all the inferences arising 
from an utterance of a sentence in context, the hearer may plausibly draw only those 
which can be calculated based on assumptions which slhe takes to be mutually ava ilable 
to both paIticipants. Below, I argue that a pal1icularised implicature to the effect that the 
speaker is be ing po lite is drawn at different points in the inferential process depending 
on whether the utterance is indirect or ambivalent but not conventionali sed for some 
use, However, such an implicature is generalised when an utterance is conventionalised 
for some use, i.e. presumed unless there occurs to the hearer a reason to the contrary. 
5.4.3.1 When the speaker's utterance is indirect 
When the speaker's utterance is indirect, it may give rise to two distinct implicatures in 
context: one regarding the speaker's intention in making the utterance, and another 
concerning the speaker's polite intention, which remain di stinct propositions. I outline 
four inferential paths demonstrating tha t, in the case of indirect utterances, the 
propos ition concerning the speaker's polite intention is cancellable, non-detachable, and 
calculable, and thus qualifies as a patticularised implicature of the speaker's utterance. 
32 In a work which came to my attention aft er completing this research, EscandeIl-Yidal (1995) advances 
a similar proposal, although she does not theoretically work it out. 
33 Despite criticisms or the adequacy or these criteria (Sadock 1998[1978]), they jointly yield accurate 
predictions in most cases. 
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In line with the premises of speakers' mutually assumi ng each other's rationality 
and face-wants (5 .2 above), the indirect utterance in (15), repeated below, 
(15) It 's hot in here. 
addressed by a guest to the host during a dinner-pat1y at the latter's house, can give ri se 
to the implicature in ( 17) 
(17) The speaker wants me to somehow make it 'not-hot ' for himlher. 
as fo llows (1 st path):34 in uttering (15), the speaker is express ing the attitude of belief 
toward the proposition ' it' s hot in here ' (step I: recovery of propos itional content). 
Interlocutors' propositional attitudes being private , the speaker would not go to the 
trouble of reveali ng hislher attitude toward any pal1icuiar proposi tion of hislher own 
will , if slhe did not have some other intention s1he intends me to recognise (step II : 
assumption about speaker's rationality) . People do not generally like being hot (step III : 
background knowledge). The speaker knows that I, as the host, can somehow make it 
' not-hot ' for himlher (step IV: background knowledge) . So, in address ing (15) to me, 
the host - as opposed to another guest - the speaker could be expressing hislher 
desire that I somehow make it ' not-hot' for him/her (step V: inference from steps I, IJ I 
and rV). Yet, the speaker has not done this but has asserted instead that ' it 's hot in here' 
(step VI: propositional content). If the speaker has not explicitly expressed hislher 
desire that I somehow make it 'not-hot' for himlher, it is probably because s1he is trying 
to give me options/avoiding to impose on my negative face, i.e. s1he is being polite (step 
VlI: inference from assumption about interlocutors' mutua l face-wants). Therefore, the 
speaker's intention in uttering ( 15) is probably to request that I somehow make it ' not-
hot' for himlher (step VII1 : in ference from steps V, VI and VII). In th is case, the 
inference about the speaker's polite inten tion (step VI I) precedes the recognition of the 
speaker's intention (step VIII) and directly plays a part in it. And since recognising the 
speaker's in tention arguably marks the end-point of the inferential process, the 
implicature to the effect that the speaker is being polite will have been drawn as pat1 of 
that process, i.e . at no extra cost. 
Howeve r, the assumption that 'giving options' is po li te is subject to cultural 
constraints. Studies of non-conventional indirectness in a number of languages (5.4.2 
above) reveal that thi s kind of behaviour can also be perceived as an imposition, since 
the responsibi li ty for bringing about the perlocutionaty effect sought is now placed 
exclusively with the addressee (as opposed to utterances where the speaker's 
34 This and following accounts parallel that of Searle (1996a[ I9751). The difference is that Searle 's 
account explicitly refers to Speech Act theory and the CP, whose psychological reality remains doubtful 
(on Speech ACl Theory, sec 2.7.1.1 above; on various revisions of the CP, see 5.2 above), whereas the 
accounts in this section dmw on the premises of speakers mutually assuming each other's rationality 
(from which their mutual face-wants emanate; 5.2 above), background knowledge, and inferring goals 
from plans, whose psychological plausibility has been tested in a series of experiments (fn.37, 5.4.3.2 
below). 
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commitment to bringing about some perlocutionary effect is made explicit, and 
therefore the speaker carries this responsibility jointly with the addressee). In such 
cases, deriving (17) from an utterance of (15) in the above situation could be modelled 
as fo llows (2nd path): steps I to VI: as above. If the speaker has not explicitly asked me 
to somehow make it 'not-hot' for him/her, it is probably because s/he is reluctant 
to assume the responsibility for bringing about a particular perlocutionary effect, and 
prefers to leave that respons ibility with me (step VII : inference from assumption about 
interlocutors ' mutual face-wants - nota bene, thi s step differs from an implicature of 
politeness because the speaker is now imposing on (threatening) the negative face of the 
addrcssee).35 Therefore, the speaker's intention is probably to request that I somehow 
make it ' not-hot' for himlher (step VHI: inference from steps V, VI and VB). This time, 
the implicature in (17) has been derived without the mediation of an implicature to the 
effect that the speaker is being polite. 
( 15) may also be uttered without giv ing rise to the implicature in ( 17). It may, for 
example , be taken as a criticism. The inferential process after step III would now run 
roughly as follows (3rd path): in uttering (15), the speaker is expressing discontent at 
being in this setting (step IV: inference from steps I, II and Ill). The speaker knows that 
I, as the host, am responsible for temperature conditions in this setting (step V: 
background knowledge). So, by addressing (15) to me, the host, the speaker is 
conveying a criti cism of my hosting abilities (step VI: inference from steps IV and V). 
(15) is no longer understood as a request, but neither is the implicature that the speaker 
is being polite drawn. Or, ( 15) may be taken as small talk . The inferential process afte r 
step III wou ld then IUn roughly as follows (4th path): the speaker has no reason to 
believe that I can somehow make it 'not-hot ' for himlher - the addressee may be 
another guest, or the assumption binding the owner of the house to provide for those 
present may be culturally or situationally suspended (step IV: background knowledge). 
So, the speaker's intention in (15) is probably to establi sh contact, i.e. s1he is being 
polite (step V: inference from assumption about speaker's rationality, step rv and 
interlocutors' mutual face-wants). In this last case, the only impl icature drawn is one 
regarding the speaker's polite intention, i.e. poli teness is identified as th e perlocutionary 
effect sought by the speaker. 
The four possibilities analysed above illustrate how an indirect utterance can give 
ri se to the propos ition that the speaker is being polite. This proposition is functionally 
independent from the impli cature in ( 17) - the requestive read ing of (1 5) - that is, it 
has its own truth conditions (Levinson 1983 :144-5; Carston 1988: 158): either may be 
tlUe while the other is simultaneously false (paths 2 and 4), or both may be tlUe (path I) 
3S Simultaneously, VII may cOllsfilrlfe the addressee's posilive face: 'the speaker leaves that responsibility 
with me out of respect (because! am older/wiser/ctc.)'. Provided, then, that positive face-wants took 
precedcncc in context (call Ira B&L:64, 74 ; see 1.3.1 above), VII could amount to an implicature of 
politeness. This would parallel the use of formulaic expressions by Japanese speakers who, when 
introduced to powerful addressees, ask them to "please treat me well" (Matsumoto 1988:409ff. ). 
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or false (path 3). It is thus - like ( 17). but independently of it - cancellable based on 
an utterance of (15). Moreover, it is non-detachable: (15) could read ' it' s [rather] hot in 
[this room]', or ' il fait chaud ci-dedans', and still give ri se to the implicature that the 
speaker is be ing polite along paths I and 4. Finally, it is calculable, since its derivation 
- subject to cultural and situational constraints - is part of, rather than an extension 
of, the inferential process leading to recognising the speaker's intention. The hearer 
may, then, plausibly draw the implicature that the s peaker is being polite if the 
speaker's utte rance in context is indirect. However, whether slhe wi ll actually draw such 
an implicature - in other words, which of the inferential paths open to himlher given 
the speaker's utterance sfhe will follow - is wholly dependent on the particulars of the 
situation. These include the speaker's intonation and non-verbal behaviour when 
uttering (15), the addressee 's prior impress ion of, and/or familiarity with, the speaker, 
as we ll as the addressee's mood of the moment. In such cases, the recognition of the 
speaker's polite intention needs to be secured before politeness as a perlocutionary 
effect can be aehieved.J6 And while this recognition is at least pal11y subject to the 
interlocutors' mutual contextual - including cultural - beliefs, such beliefs do not go 
all the way toward securing it: idiosyncratic factors playa part too. Consequently, when 
the speaker's utterance in context is indirect, the implicature that the speaker is being 
polite, if derived, will be pa11icularised. 
5.4.3.2 When the speaker's utterance is ambivalent and not conventionalised/or some 
use 
A different inferential path will be followed if the speaker's utterance in context is 
ambivalent but not conven tionalised for some use. The derivation of the proposition 
concern ing the speaker's polite intention now fo llows, temporally and causally, the 
recognition of hislher intention in making an utterance. Nevel1heless, thi s proposition is 
still cancellable, non-detachable, and (potenti ally) calculable based on the speaker's 
utterance, and thus qualifies as a pal1icularised irnplicature ofhi slher utterance. 
Consider ( 14), repeated below 
(14) 1 was asking myselfifit would be OK to open some windows. 
Addressed by a guest to the host during a dinner pal1y at the latter's house, (14) can 
give rise to the implicature in ( 18) 
(18) The speaker wants some windows opened. 
via the following inferentia l process: in uttering (14), the speaker is infonning me of 
hislher attitude toward the proposition ' it is OK to open some windows' (step I: 
recovery of propos itional content). Interlocutors' propositional attitudes being 
private, the speaker would not go to the trouble of informing rne of hisfher attitude 
>6 This is not the same as the hearer actually thinking that the speaker is polite (5.3 above): politeness as a 
perlocutionary eITect relics on the recognition of this intention, but is not guaranteed by it. 
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toward any particular proposition out ofhislher own wi ll ifs/he did not nave some other 
intention which slhe intends me to recognise (step II: assumption about speaker's 
rationali ty). So, what is the speaker's intention in thi s case? First, despite having reason 
to be lieve that ' it is OK to open some windows' is true (e.g. because this is a house, as 
opposed to an exhibition of paintings, where temperature and humidity need to be 
controlled) (step III : background knowledge), the speaker has not assel1ed 'it is OK to 
open some windows ', but merely that s/he is entertaining 'it is OK to open some 
windows' as a possib ility (step IV: propositional content). Second, this being my house, 
the speaker has reason to believe not only that I am in a privil eged position to know 
whether 'it is OK to open some windows' is true, but also that J am in a privileged 
position to make this proposition true (step V: background knowledge). So, by choosing 
to infonn me (rather than a guest) that s/he is entertaining ' it is OK to open some 
windows' as a possibi lity, the speaker is actually asking me to confinn whether thi s 
proposition is true (step VI: inference from steps I, IV and V). Nonnally people express 
an interest in finding out whether some proposition is true to help furth er their goals37 
(step VB: as in step II). Whether ' it is OK to open some windows ' is true ean help 
further the goal of opening some windows (step VlIJ: associating plan elements with 
desired goals). So the speaker's intention in uttering ( 14) must be to request that some 
windows be opened (step IX: inference about speaker's intention).38 Recognising the 
speaker 's intention in this way amounts to establi shing how his/her utterance may be 
complied with - in this case, by opening some windows, or explaining why this is not 
possible. 
However, to derive from (14) the implicature in (19) 
(19) [In uttering (14)] the speaker is being polite. 
the hearer needs to take some fm1her steps. Slhe must reason as foll ows: if the speaker's 
intention is to request to open some windows, slhe could have expressed hislher des ire 
to open some windows (step X: background knowledge/theory of speech acts). 39 
37 Goals are appealed to here based on experimental results establishing the psychological reality of 
people's ability to associate plan clements with desired goals (Lindsay et al. 1993, Lindsay & Gorayska 
1994). Both in selecting appropriate plan elements and in interpreting their significance, subjects 
consistently appealed (0, and relied on, goal-directed planning processes, rather than a set of general 
semantic interconnections. The goal-di rectedness of human behaviour recurs in the literature on utterance 
understanding (e .g., Attardo 1997:769; Cohen & Levesque 1990:268-9; Gds 1995:38; nGreen 1996:90; 
M.Green 1995: 103ff.; Harris 1996:49; Kasher 1998: 186; Lindsay et al. 1993:4-5 ; Lindsay & Gorayska 
1994:3; Litman & Allen 1990:365; Sperber & Wilson 1995:268; Thomason 1990:356-7), and may indeed 
be viewed as emanating from speakers' rationality (G.Green 1996:97). Given the lack of widely accepted 
definitions of 'goals' and 'plans' as technical tcnns (for a proposal, see Lindsay & Gorayska 1994:22), 
the following infonnal definitions are currently adopted: "Goal: the object of a person's ambition or 
effort ; a destination; an aim"; "Plan: a formulated and especially detailed method by which a thing is to 
be done" (COD, 9th cd.). 
38 Our experience of misunderstandings as speakers of natural languages renders the delCasibility of this 
inference intuitively appealing (Searle 19%a: 170, B&L:89). 
39 By implying the conscious availability of a ranking of possible realisations of requests according to 
their degree of (in)directness, this step cannot be taken unless ( 14) has been previously understood as a 
request. This will only be possible to the extent that the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance may 
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However, the speaker has instead chosen to inform me that s/he is enterta ining ' it is OK 
to open some windows ' as a poss ibi li ty (step XI: propositional content). The speaker 
has, then, expended more effot1 than minimally required for me to recognise thi s 
intention; so s/he must have some other intention that slhe also intends me to recognise 
(step XII : assumption about speaker's rationality). Requesting for something to be done 
by means of expressing one's corresponding desire is normall/o avoided, given that it 
encroaches on the other's negative face (step XII I: infe rence from step X and 
interlocutors' mutuall y assuming each other's face-wants). So, the speaker has avo ided 
to express hislher desire to open some windows to avoid impos ing on my negative face, 
i.e. to be polite (step xrv: infcrcncc from steps XI, Xll and XllI ). 
The de rivation of the 'polite' implicature in (19) from an utterance of (14) as 
outlined above suggests that (19) is cancellable: (14) may be unde rstood as convey ing 
the request in (18), but it wi ll only give rise to the impli cature in ( 19) if negat ive face-
wants take precedence over positive face-wants in context. ( 19) will then be de rived 
subject not only to cultural constraints, but also to situational ones.41 (19) is also non-
detachable: (13) above, repeated below, could still give ri se to it. 
(13) r was wondering if it would be OK to open some windows. 
However, the availab ility of (13) may well hamper the calculability of ( 19) based on an 
utterance of ( 14). This is because deriving (19) depends on the prior de rivat ion of (18): 
fo r the hearer to think that the speaker intends to be poli te in uttering (14), the hearer 
must first infe r that the speaker is thereby perfonning a req uest. Only if ( 14) counts as a 
request can its propositional content be compared to alternative ways of making 
requests, and the speaker's polite intention recognised. However, it seems doubtful that 
the hearer would actuall y expend the extra effort needed to derive (19) from an 
utterance of ( 14) (steps X to XIV above) , once s!he has established how ( 14) may be 
complied with by deri ving (18) (step lX). To do this, the hearer would need a reason. 
The phrasing of (14) may provide such a reason. It will have been noti ced that (14) 
sounds rather odd in Engli sh.42 (13) above is a much more natural way of express ing 
(roughly) the same propositional content. Given that (13) is conventionalised in English 
be jointly detennined by the propositional content of his/her utterance and the situational context. 
However, given that this may not always possible (fn.17, 2.7.1.l above), the possibility itself of 
calculating (19) on the basis of(1 4) must be left open. 
40 This qualification is important: this assumption can be safely drawn only when negative face-wants are 
prioritised in context. Where positive face-wants are prioritised, on the other hand. expressing one's 
desire for some thing/action may well constitute one's own positive face, by making one appear confident 
about one's own desires. 
41 For Brown and Levinson, positive face-wants may take precedence only if the speaker takes 
him/herself to belong to the group of others whose opinion mailers for the addressee (B&L:63-4). This 
will be a case of positive face-wants taking precedence in context, even when they may not do so in the 
culture as a whole. On the possibility of positive face-wants being prioritised depending on cultural 
constraints, see 1.3.1 above. 
42 The difficulty in safely assuming that (18), and, based on that. (19) will be calculable by native 
speakers of English may explain why they arc unlikely to use ( 14) to convey (18), and ( 19) based on that. 
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for convey ing the request in (18), the speaker's not using (13) on this occasion could 
serve as a trigger for the addressee to expend the extra eff0l1 needed to deri ve (19) 
based on an utterance of ( 14). However, the fact that (13) is so conventionalised could 
also hamper the deri vation of ( 18) based on an 
implicature (Levinson 1995:97; 2000: I 35ff.)43 
utterance of (14) 
That is, given 
via an M-type 
that (13) is 
conventionalised in English to convey the request in (1 8), the addressee could be 
deterred from understanding (14) as a request in the first place, and instead take it to be 
an assel1ion of what is on the speaker's mind. In thi s case, the calculability of (1 9) 
depends on whether the addressee thinks that (13) is equally available to the speaker as 
a convcntionalised exprcssion for conveying the request in ( 18). If the addressee takes it 
that thi s is so, sfhe is likely to take ( 14) as an assertion and not as a request. If, however, 
slhe has reason to think that the speaker does not hold (13) to be so eonventionali sed -
say, because sfhe takes the speaker to be an L2 learner based on the latter's accent -
s1he may stiLi understand (18) as a request. That is, whether (1 9) is calculable or not 
depends on the assumptions that the speaker and the hearer mutually take it that the 
other holds in context (Recanati 1998:523; 5.4.3 above). In conclusion, (19) is 
cancellable, non-detachable, and calculable on the basis of (14). It is, then, a potentia l 
implicature of ( 14), which wi ll necessitate referring to th e particulars of the situation as 
outlined above to be derived, i.e. it will be p3lticularised. 
43 Levinson ( 1995:97; 2000:73ff.) proposes three heurist ics. The first one, Q, is constrained to expression 
alternates, defined as such on the basis of their semantic content rather than fonn, and is therefore not 
applicable to inferences associated with convent ionalised expressions. Specific inferences based on the 
form of the words used arc motivated by the remaining two heuristics (the shorter 1995 definitions ofQ2 
and M are cited under the 198712000 headings I and M): 
I: 'What is simply described is stereotypically and specifically exemplified' 
(a) unmarked expressions warrant rich interpretations to the stereotype; 
(b) minimal forms warrant maximal interpretations. 
COIIS/I"aitll: only of unmarked, minimal expressions 
Characteristics: 
not fundamentally metalinguistic; 
invokes world-knowledge of stereotypical relations; 
positive inference to speci fi c subcasc. 
M: 'Marked descriptions warn "marked situation'" 
COIlSlrajlll: only of marked, unusual or periphrastic cxprcssions 
Characteristics: 
mctalinguistic (marked compared to unmarkcd) 
the inference is to the comp/emem of the inference that would have been induced by the 
unmarked expression. 
These heuristics have default applicat ion: they operate unless the context or the content of the utterance 
explicitly indicates that thcy should not bc. Thcy thus yicld inferences falling undcr a third layer of 
meaning, 
"intermediate between coded mcaning and noncc spcaker mcaning [ ... ] a level of systematic 
pragmatic inference based lIot on direct computations about speaker-intentions, but rather on 
general expeCfaTiOlls about how language is 1Io,.,l/ally used." (Levinson 1995:93; original emphasis) 
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5.4.3.3 When. the speaker's utterance is conventionalisedjor some lise and IIsed in the 
context relative to which it is conventionalised 
So far , I have argued that politeness may be communicated by means of particularised 
implicatures if the speaker ' s utterance in context is indirect or ambiva lent but not 
conventionali sed for some use. When the speaker's utterance in context is 
conventionalised for some use and used in the context relative to which it is so 
conventionalised - which renders it ambivalent ipso facto (5.4.1 above) - politeness 
will be implicated in a generali sed manner from a first implicature pertaining to the 
perlocutionary e ffect sought by the speaker's utterance. In requiring a minimum of 
contextual information, this "second-leve l" implicature will be more contex t-dependent 
than Gels as proposed by Levinson (1995, 2000), yet will be presumed once such 
minimal context is available. It is thus not patticularised, in that it does not require 
referring to the speaker's intention (though it may, of course, be cancelled in vittue of 
such intention) .44 
Uttered by a guest addressing the host during a pal1y at the latter 's house, ( 13), 
repeated below 
(13) I was wondering ifit would be OK to open some windows. 
will give ri se to (18) without recourse to a full-blown inferential process (steps I to IX, 
b 45 5.4.3.2 a ove) . 
(18) The speaker wanlS some windows opened. 
However, the further proposi ti on that the speaker is being polite, something like 
44 Such constnJal of Gels implies an extension of Levinson's scheme; fuller exposition of the argument 
will have to wait until 5.4.5 below. Briefl y - pace Levinson (2000:24), who differentiates standardised 
inferences, which rely on compression by precedent, from Gels, which are "driven by general heuristics, 
and not dependent on routinisation"- I view the kind of social unmarkedness associated with 
standardised inferences as lying one step before the linguistic unmarkedness of Levinson's GCls 
(especially, I-type GCls). By a gradual increase in 'froze!U1ess' (exemplified in 5.4.5.1 below), 
standardised inferences can acquire linguist ic reflexes of their characteristic use, such that the socially 
unmarked alternative also becomes the linguistically unmarked one. Levinson's 1- and M-heuristlcs 
(fn.43, 5.4.3.2 above) yield the correct predictions in both cases. Below, inferences presumed in normal 
circumstances arc indicated as GCIs, while inferences presumed with reference to a minimum of 
contextual information are indicated as "'GCI s. 
45 (18) is established as an implicature of ( 13) as follows: it is defeasible - ( 13) can be meant as a 
question rather than a request. Tense seems to make a difTerence: 'I am "vollderillg [present cont inuousJ / 
I wonder [simple presentJ ifit is [simple presentJ OK to open some windows' are more likely than (13) to 
be understood as questions. TillS suggests that (\8) is an implicature of (13) attributable to the form of 
words used (i.e., detachable), which may be overridden by the speaker's intentions in context. In this 
case, the relevant inferential process wil l be akin to applying Levinson's (2000: 112fT.) I-heuristic: ( 13 ) is 
the unmarked (qua shorter) way of conveying roughly the same propositional content as ( 14) above. 
Hence, (13 ), rather than (1 4), is by default a'isociated with the more specific request reading. 
Nevertheless, (13) may be meant as a quest ion in context, and a polite one at that. ( 13) may be so 
understood only in virtue of the speaker's intentions (i.e. via a particularised implicature), which will 
override its generalised reading as a request. Deriving a particularised implicature of politeness, based on 
first understanding ( 13) as a question, then comparing it with alternative ways of asking questions (e.g. a 
direct question), remains possible along the li nes discussed in 5.4.3.2 above. 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Chapter 5 111e ratiollality of politelless 142 
(20) [In uttering (13)] the speaker is being polite. 
would now be presumed in all contexts relative to which (13) is conventionalised. 
A survey of native speakers' understanding of (2 1) be low uttered by a friend 
confi rmed the presumptive nature of the 'polite' implicature in the case of 
conventionali sed expressions. 
(2 1) I was wondering if you could help me and I' m not trying to be polite. 
While finding (2 1) odd, respondents46 suggested two poss ible interpretations. First, by 
explicitly cancelling the 'polite' implicature, the second clause also cancels the request 
understanding of (2 1), expressing doubt as to the addressee's ability to hclp instead. 
However, the majority interpreted (2 1) as a pressing request. Signifi cantly, respondents 
did not feel that (2 1) was necessarily impolite, although they would seek further clues 
(body language, subsequent turns) to understand how it was meant. Thi s would suggest 
that politeness is impossib le to cancel exp li citly , which should be the case with all 
implicated content. It thus con films the view that politeness constitutes a perlocutionary 
effect (5.3 above); as Fraser and Nolen (1981:96) put it, politeness is "tota ll y in the 
hands (or ears) of the hearer." It also confirms the prediction that po li teness is assumed 
by default (1.3.2 above): to abandon this initial assumption, respondents would need 
substantial indications of the contrary - even explicitly denying it is not ipso facto 
interpreted as impolite . To account for the two interpretations suggested by respondents, 
one must consider the incrementality of interpretation. The first clause of (2 1) is 
interpreted as pol ite by presumption. However, politeness is not part of speaker-
meaning: onee achieved as a perlocutionary effect in vil1ue of thi s presumptive 
interpretation of the first clause of (21 ), it cannot be cance ll ed by its second clause, 
which accounts for several respondents' comments of the two clauses as unrelated, or of 
the utterance as unclear, or a non sequitur. Indeed, respondents who would be inclined 
to interpret the first clause of (2 1) literall y in the light of the second clause, suggested 
they would do so in retrospect. 
To return to (13) above, this suggests that the addressee's thinking that ( 13) is a 
conventionalised expression under the circumstances for conveying the request in ( 18) 
amounts to hislher holding the belief that, roughly, ' uttering (something like) (13) when 
one is a guest at another' s house and one w ishes to perform (something like) the request 
in (18) in English is polite ' . The evaluative judgement is part of thi s be lief, rathe r than 
an a posteriori evaluation of the belief: the expression, qua conventiona li sed, cannot be 
held to be so conventionali sed independently of thi s evaluation (or it would not be so 
conventionalised, whereupon the evaluation would be arri ved at each time anew). 
Generally put, when one leams (through expe ri ence or through explicit instruction) that 
this is the way to do some thing - for example, the way to eat is by holding a kn ife in 
one's right hand and a fork in one's left - one is effectively learning an evaluation by a 
46 Twenty-two Trinity Hall graduate students. 
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set of agents of a pmtieular way of doing a pat1ieular thing. Consequently, if (13) is 
conventionalised as a request in the context above, it does so by counting as a polite 
request in th is context. 
(20) enjoys thi s presumptive status in all contexts relative to which (13) is 
conventionalised to convey the request in (18). Nevertheless, (20) is defeasible In 
context (G rice 1989a:39; 5.4.3.4 below). (20) would also be detachable: were (14) 
above used instead of (13), (20) would not necessarily be derived (on the difficulti es of 
calculating an implicature of politeness from an utterance of ( 14), see 5.4.3.2 above).47 
Finall y, (20) would now be presumed (by way of an *I-implicature) in virtue of the 
addressee's holding the bcliefthat, roughly, 'uttering (something like) (13) in a situation 
when one is a guest at another's house and one wishes to perfonn (something like) the 
request in (18) in Engli sh is polite.'48 The addressee wi ll fonn the fUl1her belief that the 
speaker is po li te in vi t1ue of this *I-implicature. Sinee politeness as a perlocutionary 
effect consists of the addressee's holding this fUl1her belief, politeness will now have 
been achieved without the recognition of whatever intention to be polite the speaker 
may have had, i. e. it will have been anticipated. To the extent that previous studies, as 
we ll as the analysis of the CG data (chapter 7 below), have shown conventionalised 
expressions to be the prevailing means of achiev ing politeness, this is the primary (i.e. 
usual) way in which politeness is achieved. Used in the context relative to which they 
are conventionali sed, conventionalised expressions are presumed to be polite, and 
therefore pass unnoti ced. 
47 This is attributable to the maxim of Manner, which has led fraser (1999: 19) to propose that "'Be polite' 
is a sub-maxim of the Maxim of Manner. The unmarked case, then, is to speak politely. " However, this 
proposal produces a contradiction. On the one hand, the unmarked sequences would be those 
characterised by avoidance of prol ixity and brevity of expression: 'Miss x sang "Home Sweet Home'" is 
unmarked vs. 'Miss x produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the scorc of "Home 
Sweet Home'" (Grice 1989a:37). Whereas, on the other hand, the unmarked sequences would not 
necessarily be characterised by these properties: ' I was wondering if it would be OK to open some 
windows' would be unmarked (in English, qlla polite) vs. 'Open some windows'. Consequently, "Be 
polite" and the other sub-maxi ms of Manner appear to be mutually exclusive, while lacking an indication 
as to how each may constrain the others' application in context (as, e.g., with the first and second su b-
maxim of Quantity), this proposal cannot be implemented. 
48 Arguably, (20) would not be calculable as a noncc-implicatuTC of (13). Recall that for a proposition to 
be calculable, the speaker must take it that the addressee is able to calculate this on the basis of his/her 
utterance in context. For the speakcr to take it 1hat the addressee is able to calmlare a panicular 
proposition, the speaker must first take it that the addressee does not already hold 1his proposition to be 
true. But this is not the case for thc spcaker who uttcrs (13) taking it to be convcntionalised in English to 
convey the request in (18). This time, the speaker does so on the assumption that ' u1tering (something 
like) (13) when one is a guest at another's house and one wishes 10 perfonn (something like) lhe request 
in ( 18) in English is polite' is already mutually held by bolh him/herself and 1he addressee, i.e. that the 
addressee already holds as true the proposition which the spcaker would Ollie/wise take the addressee to 
be able to calculate on the basis of hislher utterance. The addressee, on the other hand, will have no 
reason this time to continue the inferential process (infer steps X to XIV, 5.4.3.2 above) beyond ( 18) 
based on which s/he may comply with the speaker's utterance. Based on hislher prior experience in 
similar communicative situations., s/he will already hold a belicf Ihat, roughly, 'uttcring (something like) 
(13) in a situation when one is a guest at another's house and one wishes to pcrfonn (something like) the 
request in (l8) in English is polite.' No furthe r inferencing is 1riggered (as in 5.4.3.2 above, leading to a 
particularised implicature of politeness), since lhis time the conlext of utterance is in harmony with the 
content of this belief. 
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5.4.3.4 When. the speaker's utterance is conventionalised jor some use and used in a 
context other than that relative to which it is conventionalised 
144 
Uttered by a husband addressing hi s wife at home, (13) would sound odd , Two things 
may plausib ly happen next. First, in viltue of (13) conveying ( 18) in normal 
circumstances, the wife may still presume (13) to be a request. Second, (13) not being 
conventionalised in this context, the husband 's choice will appear as socially 'marked ', 
its markedness residing in the (unexpected) relationship between the expression used 
and the context of utterance (cf. the definition of conventionali sation in 5,4,2 above). 
The social ' markedness' of her husband's choice will now generate an >l< M-implicature 
to the complement of the "' I-implicature that wou ld have arisen from the (sociall y) 
unmarked expression (Levinson 2000:155). Yet, thi s does not amount to impoliteness 
(which must be communicated; 1.3 .2-3 above).49 
Rather, the addressee is now provided with a reason to continue the inferential 
process beyond understanding ( 13) as a request. For thi s, she would appeal to furthe r 
features of the context: is there a reason why her husband might think windows should 
not be opened even though he would so desire, for example, is one of those present ill , 
or is a storm expected? Are fUlther parties present, in whose presence her husband may 
wish to sound more formal than usual? Has a rift between them occurred prior to thi s 
utterance, such that her husband may be communicating thi s by means of his choice? 
Based on what she takes to be the case, she may attribute to her husband the intent ion to 
be polite; or she may not. However, deriving a 'polite' implicature wi ll now require 
recognising the speaker's intention. In other words, politeness, if achieved, will be 
communicated.5O 
5.4.3.5 Implications o/the analysis and sllflllllmy 
Defining conventionali sation as "a cOlTe late of the (stati sti cal) frequency with which an 
expression is used in one's experience in a palticular context" (5 .4.2 above) allows one 
to include under thi s !Uhric expressions which are di rect in the sense that their use can 
49 The relevant · M-type implicature may be explicated as "[In uttering (13)] the speaker is not being 
polite (in the nonnal way)", which is different from an implicature of impoliteness ("11n uttering (13)J the 
speaker is being impolite"). This analysis is supported by respondents' claims that they would not think 
the speaker is being impolite until subsequently provided with proof of this (5.4.3.3 above). 
S() Jary (l998:7ff.) argues thai only cases such as this lasl one give rise 10 implicatures of (im)politeness, 
because only if it turns out that the addressee's assumptions about the degree of politeness required 
somehow diverge from the speaker's corresponding assump1ions, is (im)politeness relevant enough to be 
worth the addressee's while to process. While agrccing that , morc onen than not, politeness docs not 
constitute an additional message (Jary 1998:2), I find his account incomplete, in that it does not tackle 
how a convent ionalised expression such as ( 13) achieves politeness when the addressee's assumptions 
about the necessary degn.>e of pol iteness are i ll "an/lOIlY with the speaker'S corresponding assumptions, in 
which case no (panicuJarised) impJicatures about the (im)poJiteness of the speaker's utterance are 
licensed (5.4.3.3 above); or how the implicature that the speaker is being polite may arise in the absence 
of any discrepancy betw{.>en the interlocutors ' assumptions about 1he necessary degree of politeness when 
an utterance in context is indirect (5.4.3.1 above) or ambivalent but not conventionalised for some use 
(5.4.3.2 above). 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Chapter 5 111e ratiollality of politelless 145 
be expla ined in telms of the ir compositionally deri ved linguistic meaning. Utterances 
such as ( 12) above, repeated below: 
(12) Open some windows. 
are always ambivalent in context, in that they make clear how they may be complied 
with (5.4. 1 above). Moreover, they do so on composi tional grounds a lone, i.e. not in 
vil1ue of heuri stics or otherwise rational conversational activity. Nevel1heless, the 
frequency of (12) in a particular context may still quali fy it as a conventionali sed 
expression for conveying the speaker's intention that s/he wants some windows to be 
opened. This observation holds the key to accounting for the CO data presented in 5. 1 
above. 
Utterance In ferential process • 
Indirect Implicature of politeness Request reading: 
e.g. 'It 's hot in here ' potentially derived deri ved independently of 
as part of in ferring implicature of politeness; 
request understanding PCI of the utterance 
(how the utterance may be 
complied w ith)~ 
PCI of the utte rance; 
(if achieved) 
politeness communicated 
" ~ 
Ambivalent Request reading: Implicatu re of politeness 
not conventionalised derived before derived after 
fo r some use implicature of politeness; request understanding; 
e.g. 'I was asking pel PC] of request PCI ; 
myselfifit would be (if achieved) 
OK ... ' politeness communicated 
Conventionalised for Request reading: Implicature of politeness: 
some use, used in the I-type Gel I· -type Gel of I-type 
context relative to (unmarked relative to other (request) GCI 
which it is ways of expressing (roughly) (expression unmarked relative 
conventionali sed the same coded content) to what is expected in context, 
e.g. 'f was wondering i. e. due to 
if it would be OK ... ' conventionalisation ); 
hy guest to hnst during politeness anticipated 
P01-:ty at host's house 
Conventionalised fo r Request reading: M'-type Ge l ofl-type 
some use, used in a I-type Gel (request) Gel 
context other than the (as above) (expression marked relative to 
one relative to which it what is expected in context) 
is conventionalised motivates 
e.g. 'f was wondering implicature of politeness as 
If it would be OK. .. PCI of I-type (request) GCI; 
by husband to wife at (if achieved) 
home politeness communicated 
Table I : Communicated vs. anticipated politeness 
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Direct expressions (e.g. requests phrased in the imperative-2sg. with no add itional 
markers of poli teness) are the most frequent means by which offe rs and requests are 
performed in a number of contexts in CO (figs. 4.8, 4.9, 4. 11 , 4.12 above). 
Nevertheless. such expressions are not perceived as impolite. I would argue that this is 
so because, based on their experience as CG speakers, the informants recorded hold 
such direct express ions to be polite (qua socially adequate; 1.1 above) in a number of 
contexts. When such an expression is used in a context relative to which it is, in their 
experience, conventionalised, politeness as a perlocutionary effect is automatically 
achieved in virtue of this experience, condensed in their holding the above belief 
(5.4 .3.3 above). However, uttering such an expression in a different context will no 
longer automaticall y achieve politeness. Politeness must now be communicated. The 
discrepancy between their prior experience of similar contexts and the use of the direct 
expression therein will now trigger the operation of the M-heuri stic, and the particulars 
of the situation will be taken into account in search of a plausible reason for this 
discrepancy. Once more, if the addressee comes to hold the propos ition that the speaker 
is being poli te as true, thi s will be because slhe will have derived this as a particularised 
implicature of the speaker's utterance (5 .4.3.4 above). Table summarises 
schematically the four poss ibilities outlined in thi s section (parentheses indicate 
provisional inferential stages). 
5.4.4 The argument from 'what is said' 
In this section, I discuss evidence supporting the existence of a level of 'what is said ' 
akin to Grice's understanding of this level as "closely related to the conventional 
meaning of the words (the sentence) [the speaker) has uttered" (1989a:25). This is the 
level at which conventionalised expressions are consciously accessible as di stinct from 
each other, and as such it plays a direct role in the acquisition of, and memOlY for, polite 
forms. 
The fact that the determination of Gricean 'what is said ' does not always yield a 
tlUth-evaluab le proposition, even after reference assignment and disambiguat ion have 
taken place, is widely acknowledged? The level at which truth conditions are assigned 
has cOITespondingly shifted from that of Gricean 'what is said ' to the level of the 
proposition expressed, variously refelTed to as an 'impliciture' (Bach 1994:272ff. ), an 
'explicature' (Carston 1988; Sperber & Wilson 1995 [ 1986]: I 76ff.), or a pragmatically 
enriched level of 'what is said ' (Recanati 199 1 [1 989] : 105ff. ),52 calling into question the 
motivation for di stinguishing a separate (Gricean) level of 'what is said '. While Bach 
(1994:273) defends a stri ct notion of 'what is sa id' as the (not necessarily consciously 
availab le) level of the literal meaning of the utterance, which in turn provides the 
51 For an overview, $(."C Jaszczolt 1999:27ff. 
52 These terms are not co-extensive, but share the property of constituting the starting point for calculating 
(particularised) implicaturcs (for a schematic representation, see Levinson 2000: 195). 
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grounds on which the impliciture is worked out, within the framework of RT thi s level 
is abandoned in favour of pragmatically enriched explicatures derived as developments 
of the logical fOlTn of the sentence uttered. Carston (1999: 109) defends the latter view: 
"[Bach 's] conception of what is said seems to be redundant in a cognitive 
processing account of utterance understanding, since it plays no role in the 
interpretation which is not already played by the independently motivated leve l of 
logical form ." 
In a series of experiments testing subjects' intuitions concerning the difference 
between 'what is said ' and what is implicated by an utterance, Gibbs and Moise ( 1997) 
found that, not only did subjects differentiate between the two notions, they consistently 
interpreted 'what is said' as the product of pragmatic enrichment beyond reference 
assignment and di sambiguation. Based on these findings, they argue in favour of the 
relevance-theoreti c approach to utterance interpretation, according to which 'what is 
said ' by an ullerance or a sentence cannot be made consciously available until it has 
been pragmatically enriched, i.e. until it has been developed into a full-fl edged 
explicature in accordance with the Principle of Relevance (ibid.:65ff. ; Sperber & 
Wilson 1995: 158; Carston 1988: 168-9) . Noting that " it may be that Gibbs and Moise's 
experiments tell us more about how the word say is interpreted than about whethe r 
people have rel iable intuitions concerning what is sa id in contrast to what is implicated" 
(1999:349), Nicolle and Clark point out a number of difficulti es with accepting these 
results as conclusive (ibid.:342-4). After conducting further experiments, they conclude 
that "people can very easil y be made aware of 'what is said ' as distinct from what is 
communicated (that is, implicated), even though they do not normally interpret the tenn 
'what is said ' in thi s way" (ibid. :349). 
Ev idence from conventionali sation corroborates Nicolle and Clark 's last claim. 
Consider, fi rst, repli es which address (solely) the conventional meaning of the words 
uttered, rather than the pragmatically enriched inference ( lacking an indication that such 
inference should not be drawn). 
(22) (a) Can you open some windows? 
(b) Yes, I can . (without proceeding to do so) 
We have all been confronted with similar replies on some occas ion. And, while we may 
be upset, or amused by them, we cannot accuse the addressee of providing an ilTelevant 
reply, merely an unhelpful one. Nevertheless, thi s was clearly not the reply we had 
expected: our being amused or upset is indicative of thi s . Such examples suggest that a 
stri ct notion of 'what is said ', identifi ed wi th the conventional meaning the words 
uttered, may still be theoreti cally useful in accounting, not for how we normally 
understand utterances, but for how we are capable of understanding them: the fact that 
we can see the relevance of (22b) to (22a) - (22b) addressing the conventiona l 
meaning of the words in (22a) - argues in favour of recognising a level of ' what is 
said ' which is prior to pragmatic enrichment, since such a leve l is recovered (by back-
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tracking our steps, as it were) when the need arises (i.e . when our expectations were 
frustrated). 
A second type of evidence comes from the acqu isition of polite fonns. As noted in 
5.4.2 above, direct teaching of polite forms is an important source of information for the 
politeness system. The emphasis in this case is on the exact forms to be used, rather 
than on the pragmatically enriched inferences they normally give ri se to . Consider (23)-
(26) below: 
(23) I was wondering if it would be OK to open some windows. 
(24) Would it be OK to open some windows? 
(25) It 's OK to open some windows, isn ' t it? 
(26) I don't suppose it would be OK to open some windows. 
In the absence of any indication or reason why the addressee should take into account 
the pal1iculars of the situation,53 these may be rep0l1ed to a third party by saying either 
of (27) or (28) below: 
(27) Sfhe asked (me) ifit's OK to open some windows. 
(28) Sfhe asked me to open some windows. 
Furthermore, they may be rep lied to by saying something like "Sure" or "Certain ly", or 
"No, I'm afraid not/that 's not possible (because . . . )" . Either way, the add ressee would 
not be responding to the conventional meaning of the words uttered, but to their reading 
as requesting that some windows be opened.54 In addition to such reading, (23)-(26) 
may give ri se to particularised implicatures in context (cf. 5.4.3.4 above). The fact that 
only (27) or (28) above - that is, the request reading of (23)-(26) rather than the 
conventional meaning of the words uttered - can plausibly be rep0l1ed or rep lied to 
strongly suggests that (27) and/or (28) are a necessary step toward g uarantee ing the 
optimal relevance of these utterances in context. At the same time, the evidence 
suppOl1S the case for a separate leve l of 'what is said ' which is pri or to pragmatic 
enrichment ,55 yet - unlike the leve l of logical form , understood (at least on some 
53 Significantly, a characteristic intonational pattern is pan of the conventionalisation of fonn as defined 
above (on the language-specific intoning of social fonnulae, see Cmttenden 1997[1986]:164). (26) is a 
case in point: its request reading is associated with an ullerance-final rising intonation. While this is not 
the only intonation that licenses a request reading of (26) - intonational variation being a matter of 
degree rather than of categorical distinction - a token of the same ullerance using flat intonation would 
hamper its reading as a request, even if this were a possible inference on all other COllnts (e.g. setting, 
panicipants, and so on). Fretheim (1998 11 9921) discusses the role of intonation in deriving scalar 
implicatures, which are one type of GCls. Whi le he sees the claim that intonation can affect the derivation 
of scalar implicatures as weakening the argument for the existellce of GCls, I would argue that it merely 
supports the proposed COlltexlualisatiOIl of their scope (5.4.5 below). 
54 Not all conversational implicatures share these properties. Consider ( 15) above: 
(l5) It's hot in here. 
licensing ( 17) in context: 
(17) The speaker wants me to somehow make it 'not-hot ' for himlher. 
Understanding (15) as implicating (17), the addressee still could not report (15) by saying "S/he asked me 
to somehow make it not-hot ror him/hcr", or reply to it by saying "Sure" or "No, I'm afraid. 
55 Jaszczolt (1999:8) distinguishes logical forms from semantic representations, and points Ollt that only 
the latter can be enriched. The two terms are used intcrchangeably within RT, where pragmatic 
enrichment may concern either (Sperber & Wilson 1993; 1995:73, 175, 179). 
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accounts) as "an abstract, underspecified leve l of semantic content" (Levinson 
2000:240) - is consciously accessible.56 For (23)-(26) to be taught as different, they 
must remain d istinct at a leve l which is consciously accessib le. 57 The leve l of 'what is 
said ' suggests itself as such a leve l. Acknowledging a distinction at this level, "direct 
teaching of the child about what forms to use in various situations" (Snow et al. 
1990:303) becomes possible . 
Fina lly, naturalistic experiments testing subj ects' ability spontaneously to reca ll a 
prior speaker 's utterance, found that 'what is said' - the conventional meanings of the 
words uttered - was accurately recalled more frequently when the speaker had used a 
convcntionali scd expression, as opposed to a hint (Holtgravcs 1997). Moreover, 
memory was enhanced when an otherwise conventionalised expression had been used in 
a context relative to which it was not conventionalised (ib id .: 1 09). These findings 
suppOl1 the anal ysis in 5.4.3 above: off-record hints, being indirect in context, require 
inferencing to deri ve how they may be complied with: "the extra eff011 involved in 
recognis ing the speaker's meaning probably reduces the likelihood that the exact words 
wi ll be encoded" (ibid .: 111 ). The use of an otherwise conventionalised express ion in a 
context relative to which it is not conventionali sed, on the other hand, enhances the 
verbatim recall o f the utterance, since it is the di screpancy between the wording of the 
utterance and the context in which this is uttered that sets the inferential process in 
motion in the first place. That such discrepancies are noticed - and remembered -
supports the claim that the wording of conventionali sed expressions must be represented 
at a leve l prior to pragmatic enrichment. 
Taken j o intly , the evidence presented above strongly suggests that a leve l of 'what 
is said ' which is prior to pragmatic enrichmen t has a p lace in a theory of lingui stic 
communication: the information represented at thi s leve l can be made consciously 
availab le, although it normally (i.e. so long as our expectations of the s ituation are met) 
is not. Yet thi s leve l cannot be reduced to that of logical form, identifi ed with the output 
of grammar. The same logical form may be app li cable to sentences (29) and (30) 
below,58 and both may be uttered to request that some windows be opened. 
$6 The conscious accessibility of the level of logical form is mled out by Sperber & Wilson: "Semantic 
representations are incomplete logical forms. l ... j lTheyj l ... j never surface to consciousness" 
( 1995: 193; cf.285n.7). Levinson (2000:240-1) is more tentative: "Few theorists would [ . .. ] deny that such 
an abstract, underspecified level of semantic content should play an imponam role in a semamic theory 
l ... j what one is left with is an ext remely impoverished level of representation. Kempson (1986) 
recognises this: on her account, logical fonm will have l ... j subpropositional status. l ... j The recognition 
of the existence of this level is one of the imponant sea changes in the history of semantics - it is real 
enough, but it is relative ferra incognita." for an alternative view, sec Jaszczolt 1999, csp. pp. 5-8. 
S1 This cannot be the level of the proposition expressed (which is consciously accessible), since (23)-(26) 
do not yet express unique propositions unt il the referents of 'I' and 'some windows', and the time and 
place of the utterance have b{."Cn fixed. 
58 The possibility that lexical items such as 'OK ' and 'bad ' may not be represented as distinct concepts in 
the logical forms of these sentences is suggested by our ability as hearers to constmct logical fonns for 
sentences containing lexical items we have not yet acquired. Arguably, in such cases, a variable 
specifying general syntactico-semantic informal ion about Ihe (as yet unacquired) lexical item is initially 
insened in place of the fully-specified concept. This last one may emerge as distinct from neighbouring 
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Nevel1heless, while potentially coinciding in their logical fonns and in 'what is 
communicated ' (fig. I , 5.3 above), the two utterances remain distinct at the level of 
'what is said' . 
(29) Would it be OK to open some windows? 
(30) Would it be bad to open some windows? 
Consequently , contrary to Carston's (1999: 1 09) claim, a strict notion of 'what is said ', 
such as that advocated by Bach ( 1994:277ff. , 1999:77-9), appears to playa role in the 
interpretation of utterances not already played by the independently motivated level of 
logical form, and as such it must be retained. 
5.4.5 On the notion of min imal context 
In 5.4.3.3 above, I argued that, when an expression is conventionalised for some use 
relative to the context of utterance, the polite reading is an "' I-type GCr following from 
the expression being socially unmarked given the context. At first g lance, allowing 
contextual infonnation to determine the output of the proposed heuristics (Levinson 
1995,2000) may seem to defeat the point which ori ginall y moti vated the proposal of 
these heuristics: the observation that expressions can have default, preferred 
interpretations in virtue of their linguistic propel1ies alone, and that when uttered, they 
will li cense these interpretations, all else being equal. In th is section , I set out the 
reasons why the proposed approach does not amount to a reduction of GCls to PCls (as 
proposed within RT; cf. Levinson 2000:25-6), but is more appropriately viewed as 
d' L' , h " exten mg evmson s sc ern e. 
Some preliminary evidence against adopting an RT framework was discussed in 
5.4.4 above.6o More serious difficulties ari se when we attempt to characterise the status 
of the 'po li te' implicatures di scussed in 5.4.3 above with in RT. On the RT view, the 
proposition expressed by an utterance (i ts exp licature) is the product of inferential 
enrichment o r its logical rorm in keeping with the Principle or Relevance. Higher-order 
explicatures are deri ved by optionally embedding this proposition under a higher-level 
description, such as a speech-act, or propositional attitude, description , or in general , 
any assumption schema typically express ing an atti tude toward it (Sperber & Wilson 
1993:5ff.; 1995: 18 1-2). Implicatures, on the other hand, are not such developments of 
the logical fo rm of the utterance; they do not include this as one of their sub-parts. 
Rather than combining decoding and inference, implicatures are deri ved wholly by 
in fe rence. Thus, whi le (18) (5 .4.3.3 above) can perhaps be construed as a higher-order 
concepts following repeated encounters of the lexical item in discourse, or cxplicit definition of i t. 
Ultimately. the logical forms of(29) and (30) are a matter of the semantic framework adopted. 
59 Similar insights underlie Horn 's Q- and R- principles (Horn 198&, 19&9, 1998[19841. 2000). Contrary 
to Levinson (1987:72), Horn does not disti nguish between semantic minimisation and expression 
minimisation. While conflating thcse two notions is warranted by both Zipf's ( 1949) Principle of Least 
Effon (which motivates Horn's approach) and empirical considerations (Levinson 1987:73; Huang 
1994:263fn.5). the present adopt ion of Levinson's proposals is justified by an appeal to scientific 
perspicacity. 
60 For general criticism of RT, see Gazdar & Good 1982, Levinson 1989. 
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exp li cature of (13),61 the 'polite ' inference In (20) cannot be so modelled. The 
proposition expressed by means of (13) 
(13) 1 was wondering whether it would be OK to open some windows. 
is that the speaker is wondering whether it would be OK to open some windows, where 
the referents of ' I' and 'some windows' have been identifi ed, and the time and place of 
utterance fixed. Were it thi s proposition that is being assessed as polite in (20), the RT 
account would pred ict - contrary to intuition - that (14) 
(14) I was asking myselfifit would be OK to open some windows. 
is as easily (indeed, at least pal11y due to its coded content) assessed as polite. Rather, 
what is assessed as po lite in (20) is the speaker's utterance, the particular expression he 
used to convey this proposition.62 Consequentl y, (20) is not an explicature of (13). (20) 
is, therefore, necessarily an implicature of (13). However, once (20) is so construed, it 
becomes impossible to account for its presumptive nature, as exemplified by the 
diffi culty of cancelling the politeness of (13) without cancelling its understanding as a 
request (see the discussion of (2 1) in 5.4.3.3 above). To explain this, we would have to 
assume that 
"all inferences are constructed de novo without reference to a default rul e or a 
preferred interpretation, by hypothesising that the background premises remain 
suffi ciently constant to yield the observable bias in interpretations. It may not be 
easy to distinguish between thi s view [attributed by Levinson to some RT theorists; 
MT] and a theory of default interpretations [proposed by Levinson; MT], especially 
because such a contextual bias might itself be sufficient to engender a mental 
counterpart, a default rule of inference. The material difference would be that 
instead of having two different kinds of inference and one ki nd of context (as in 
GCI theory [ ... D, we will have one kind of inference and two kinds of context, the 
defau lt context and the full y particular nonce context (amounting to a reduction of 
GCls to PCls) ." (Levinson 2000:26)63 
In the account in 5.4.3 above, the social (un)markedness of an expression re lative to the 
context of use moti vates default inferences pel1ain ing to politeness, which would 
perhaps not be obtainab le as nonce inferences of the utterance (fn.48, 5.4.3.3 above). A 
rather d iffe rent type of inference was involved if an express ion was indirect o r 
ambivalent but not conventionali sed for some use . Thus acknowledging the need for 
two types of inference, one yielding prefelTed interpretations (Gel s) and anothe r 
61 This should be possible along the lines of Groefsema's ( 1992: 123fT.) proposed re-analysis of requests 
traditionally tenned 'indirect', although the details remain to be worked out. 
62 The 'polite' inference in (20) could perhaps be an explicature of (13), if 'echoic mention' of the form 
used (rathcr than the developed logical fonn/proposition expressed) were allowed to be embedded in an 
assumption schema typically expressing an att itude to it. A potential problem with this proposal is that the 
speaker's utterance would be implicitly echoic, where implicit echoic use typically triggers garden-
pathing (Carston 1996:320-1 ), a property the interpretation of(13) as polite would seem to lack 
63 The possibility ora strong contextual bias engendering a mental counterpart is taken up in 6.5 below. 
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drawing on the particulars of the context, the account proposed in thi s thesis departs 
from the RT framework, wherein all implicatures are patticularised. 
At the same time, the proposed account suggests a direction in which the picture 
painted by Levinson in the quotation above may be enlarged. To be entel1ained as a 
working hypothesis is a third possibility, namely that acknowledging two kinds of 
inference and two kinds of context may yie ld a powerful account of utterance 
interpretation , where the seeming lack of economy is offset by a potentia l to account for 
a wide( r) range of phenomena. This proposal elaborates on previous suggestions that 
meaning becomes gradua ll y conventionalised along the following ' cline of 
convcntionali sation' (Traugott 1999; Levinson 2000:262-3): 
PCls 0 GCls 0 coded meaning 
(utterance-token meaning) (utterance-type meaning) (sentence meaning) 
This cl ine implies a gradual detachment of meaning from context: inferences ari sing 
from speakers' intentions become defeasible inferences associated with propel1ies of 
linguistic expressions which in tum become pal1 of those expressions' coded meaning 
(hence indefeasible) . If the right-hand pat1 of thi s cline has been relative ly researched 
into (e.g., Horn 1998[l984]:407ff.; Levin son 1987:98ff.; 2000:26Iff.), such is not the 
case with its left-hand pal1 - perhaps because thi s wou ld involve "a theory of default 
or preferred or statisti cally normal contexts [which] should be a rather more empirical 
matter" (Levinson 2000:27). Empirical evidence from CG (5 .4.5.1 below) provides 
grounds on which to hypothesise that, as pal1 of becoming gradually detached from 
context on the way from PCls to GCls, inferences go through a stage at wh ich 
contextual input is still required, yet thi s is minimal and well-circumscribed; the 
cOITesponding inferences are now presumed in virtue of general heuristics, rather than 
derived in virtue of the speaker's intentions .64 That is, on closer sCllltiny, the left-hand 
pali of thi s cline may turn out to look as follows: 
PCIs " GCls 
( k . 0 ( . 0 utterance-to en meanmg utterance-type meanmg 
meaning 
deri ved in nonce context) 
contexts 
presumed in minimal context) 
GCls 
(utterance-type 
presumed in all 
ceteris paribus) 
The theoreti ca l viability of this proposal depends on finding a consistent way of 
delimiting those contextual variables which constitute the ' minimal context' in relat ion 
to which an expression is assessed as polite . One possibility is to distinguish between (i) 
that contextual information which is perceivable pri or to making any particular 
utterance, and can thus give ri se to expectations about an agent's goals, and Oi) that 
which is no1.65 The former would include infonnation (which may be simply presumed) 
64 Franken (1998:7) also associates derault reasoning with a narrower conception or context. 
65 Because the setting or an exchange constrains the goals that may plausibly be sought therein, ir one is 
interested in pursuing a particular goal, one will physically render oneselr in the part icular setting where 
this goal may plausibly be pursued (Lindsay & Gorayska 1994:37). Pursuing different goals also makes 
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about the interlocutors ' sex, age, and social class, the setting of the exchange, and the 
timing of a pal1icular utterance, while the latter would encompass explicit cultural 
assessments of specific behaviours, idiosyncrati c factors, and fUl1her intonational and 
kinesic c1 ues.66 Ifwe compare the derivation of ( I8) from (13) 
(13) I was wondering if it would be OK to open some windows. 
(18) [In uttering (13)] the speaker is being polite. 
to that of(19) from (14) 
(14) I was asking myselfifit would be OK to open some windows. 
(19) [In uttering (14)] the speaker is being polite. 
we find that different contextual information is indeed appealed to each time (5.4.3.2, 
5.4.3.3 above). For ( 13), th is included a reference to attributes of the speaker (a guest), 
and the addressee (the host), as well as th e setting (the host's house) and the timing (a 
pal1y at the host 's house) o f the exchange. However, for (14), an additional appeal to 
cultural assessments of pal1icular behaviours, and further contextual factors 
(intonational and kinesic clues, idiosyncrati c factors) was necessary. This comparison 
suggests that, when an utterance contains a fOlm of words which is conventionalised for 
some use relative to the context of utterance, the 'polite' implicature requires minimal 
contextual input, i. e. it is presumed given a minimal context. However, when such fonn 
of words is used in a context relative to which it is not conventionalised (5 .4.3 .4 above), 
or lacking such a form of words (5 .4.3. 1,5 .4.3.2 above), the fully actualised (nonce) 
context of utterance must be taken into account before the ' polite' implicature can be 
drawn. 
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to hypothesise, given the observation that 
po liteness most often passes unnoticed, that inferences mot ivated by social 
(un)markedness are presumed much like inferences motivated by linguistic 
unmarkedness. Experimental evidence confi rming that conventionalised expressions are 
better recalled if used in a context relative to which they are not conventionalised 
(Holtgraves 1997: 109) al so suggests that the perce ived markedness of such expressions 
resides in their relationship to the context of utterance. Thus, by extending the relevant 
available diffcrent rolcs to be assigncd to panicipants in an exchange. The association of diffcrent kinds 
of goals with different settings thus results in different roles being operative in different settings. Since 
assigning such roles amounts to delimiting interlocutors' rights and obligations (including their rights and 
obligations toward each other), such role-assignment enhances the contextual salience of certain items of 
background knowledge compared to othcrs. Consequently, features of the situational context such as who 
is talking to whom and where, act as poi nters to the kinds of goals that the speaker may be assumed to be 
pursuing at any onc timc. 
66 Bach (1999:72) proposes a parallcl distinct ion between narrow and broad context as a way of drawing 
the theoretical boundary between semantics and pragmatics: 
"There are two sorts of contextual information, one much more restricted in scope and limited in role 
than the other. Information that plays the limited role of combining with linguistic information to 
dctcrminc conlent (in the sense of fixing it) is restricted to a short list of variables, such as the identity 
of the speaker and the hearer and the time and place o f an utterance. Contextual infonnation in the 
broad sense is anything that the hearer is to take into account to determine (in the sense of ascertain) 
the speaker's communicative intention." 
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notion of markedness, generalised inferences, whether presumed In normal 
circumstances, or with reference to a minimum of contextual information, remain 
obtainable w ith reference to the same inferential mechanisms (Levinson's 1- and M-
heuri stics) . In Levinson's account, markedness is construed as "covering fonnal 
pro lixity , infrequent expressions or those of unusual formation" (1995:104; cf. 
2000: 137) . However, once conventionali sation relative to a context has taken place, 
markedness tums out to be a function not so much of the formal propel1ies of a certain 
fo rm of words alone, as of such propel1ies in conjunction with the (mi nimal) context in 
which the words are used. Expressions are conventionalised (i. e. they give rise to "']-
type inferences) only in relation to some context, best captured with reference to a 
minimal context (which, contrary to nonce contex t, is available a priori, and can thus 
give rise to expectations about the speaker's goals). 
Blurring the boundary between PCls and GCls as it may do, thi s revision does not 
abo lish it. The resulting inferences are still generalised because they are independent 
from nonce context. However, they are dependent on a minimal context, and are 
therefore universal (Levinson 1995 :110) only inasmuch as the mechanism for their 
derivation is also universal. This move is in acco rdance wi th evidence from sca lar 
implicatures, based on which Hirschberg (1985:43) concludes that "generalised 
implicatures, while more context-independent than pa l1icularised [ones], are still 
context-dependent", as well as evidence corroborating the context-dependent nature of 
stereotypicality (Barsalou 1987: 104ff.).67 And it is perhaps not wholly unwan'anted 
given Levinson's own observation that "[iJnferences to the stereotype are [ ... ] not 
' generalised ' in the sense that they are independent of shared beliefs [ . . J but [ . . ] in the 
sense that they fo llow a general principle - restrict the interpretation to what by 
consensus constitutes the stereotypical, central extensions" (1 995: 1 03; emphasis added), 
i.e. they are s ti ll somehow tied to context. 
5.4.5.1 Empirical evidence supporting the e.:'Ctension a/the operation a/the Levinsonian 
heuristics 
The determining factor for a PCI to become generali sed given a minimal contex t is 
frequency of use in this context.68 The expression most freq uently associated with a 
pal1icular communicative function relative to a context becomes the unmarked means of 
fulfi ll ing th is function in this context. The express ion is at thi s stage the unmarked 
67 Barsalou (1987: 104) includes under fac tors determining an exemplar's typicality of it s category, the 
propenies an exemplar should have best to serve the goals associated with this category, and the 
frequency with which a panicular exemplar is perceived to instantiate this category. Minimal context 
relates to both these factors. First, it gives rise to expectations about interlocutors' goals, which in tum 
motivate plans of which specific plan-elements may be typical or non-typical exemplars. Second, once an 
expression is conventionalised for some use, if minimal context docs not inhibit such interpretation, the 
corresponding implicature will be presumed, i.e. it will be derived more frequently compared 10 
implicatures requiring a reference to nonce context. 
6S Such frequency may be intimately rel ated to a notion of social power, as proposed by Leezenberg 
(2000; cf. Braun 1988:59; Bou rdi eu 1991). 
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altemative relative to other expressions potentially used in that context. Such social 
unmarkedness stm1s acquiring linguistic reflexes as the range of contexts in which a 
pal1icular expression is used most frequently to fulfil a certain function expands. Its 
unmarkedness now resides in its relation to other expressions in the language 
irrespective of context. This prediction is borne out by evidence from the use of 
conventionalised expressions for performing offers and requests in ca. 
Minimisation of form and content (i.e. linguistic unmarkedness; Levinson 1987) as 
a concomitant of frequency of use (i. e. of social unmarkedness) is manifested most 
clearly by the expressions ase, 'let', aku, 'l isten' , and e/~7 su po, ' let me te ll you' , all 
phrascd in AV-impcrative-2sg.69 In the data collected, their very high frequency goes 
hand in hand with their being morphologically truncated (from af7se, akuse, and da na su 
po respective ly) and occuning utterance-initially, both of which suggest that these 
forms are in fact frozen or fixed in CG (Jespersen 1924:20). Indeed, when these 
expressions are used, the act to be performed is typically expressed by a fUl1her ve rb, 
such as na rolisumen in (29) (Klamer 2000:76). 
(29) [60.29; At work; Speaker: male , 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: salesperson to old customer] 
endaksi. ase na rolisumcn ton andrea 
O.K. !et-illlp.-2sg. SP ask-dep. - Ip!. the-NOM. andreas-NOM. 
'O.K. Let me ask Andreas.' 
The way they combine with other elements in discourse provides further evidence of 
thei r being rrozen. Whereas c:1'a su po is literally a request, i.e. the first pari or an 
adjacency pair, the speaker seldom waits for the hearer's uptake before continuing (and 
one is hardly ever provided). Paralleling Klamer's (ibid.) hypothesis that the absence of 
an intonational break after a repol1 verb marks its function as a complementiser, we can 
interpret a lack of speaker change at the end of this intonational unit as signalling the 
non-requestive function of el'a su po. In the case of llim and ase, it is their argument 
structure which is affected: akuoccurs without a complement, whereas aseoccurs with a 
clausal complement, and is consequently not felt to have the full semantic content of 
' leaving (something)" which it has when followed by an NP. Both processes (loss of 
arguments and acquisition of new ones) have been associated with an expression's 
becoming frozenlfixed as "the result of frequent ly occuning in appropriate surface 
contexts" (Klamer 2000:96). ase, aku, and el'a su po may therefore be interpreted as 
' prefaces' (Nofs inger 1991: 134-5): they selve to attract or ensure the addressee 's 
continued attention, while contributing little, if anything, to the proposition expressed 
by the utterance. 
69 Phonological reduction is a vel)' early rcOex of such roulinisalion. That it is routinisation (social 
unmarkedness) that causes phonological reduction (linguistic unmarkedness) and not vice versa has been 
experimentally established by studies of dyadic conversations, e.g. within the HeRe Map Task project 
(Ellen Bard, p.c.). 
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This explanation essentially amounts to the claim that increased frequency of use is 
associated with both brevity and semantic ve rsatility as suggested by Zipf (1949) in his 
statisticall y-informed analysis of the Principle of Least Effort (Hom 1998[ 1984]:405 ). 
A similar suggestion can be traced back to Meillet's (1958[1 912]: 135ff) refl ections on 
the processes by which grammatical forms originate , for which he coined the term 
"grammaticalisation". Viewing "changes in form and meaning as a fun ction of 
frequency of use in discourse" (Hopper & Traugott 1993 :60) has led to conceptual ising 
grammaticalisation in telms of "use of lexical item in di scourse> grammat ical item" 
(ibid.:8 1) along the foll owing lines (ibid.:75-92): initially, an association develops if, 
whcn a cc rtain cxprcssion is uscd, somc condition happcns to bc fulfillcd, such that 
frequent co-occurrence of the two in discourse results in the condition corning to be 
understood as an integral pat1 of the meaning of that expression. The addition of a new 
meaning opens up new distributional possibilities for the expression, thereby accounting 
fo r its increased textual frequency. Thus, expressions gradually become semantically 
"bleached", or general, where semantic generality is associated with low (semantic) 
informativeness (Atlas & Levinson 198 1). 
However, if "[f]requency demonstrates a kind of generalisation in use patterns" 
(Hopper and Traugott 1993: 103), one might expect more than the semant ic (truth-
conditional) informativeness of the expression to be affected (Coulmas 198 1:4). Given 
the association of textual frequency with unmarked segments in typological studies 
(Greenberg 1960), and the fact that the notion of markedness operates on different 
levels of analysis, I would suggest that expressions which are used frequently also 
become interactionaliy unmarked. 7o The relevant process may be explicated as fo llows: 
if we accept that use of an expression on a particular occasion can convey assumptions 
regarding the management of face-relations in an exchange, then the wider the range of 
contexts in which an expression occurs, the larger the set of such assumptions 
compatible with its use. (f we call the set of these assumptions the expression's 
' interactiona l' in formativeness, it follows that the addi tion of new truth-conditional 
meanings, by creating new distributional possibilities for the expression, will also affect 
its interactional informativeness. More specifically, the se t of face-related ass umptions 
compatible with use of the expression will be expanded, resulting in use of the 
expression on any par1icular occasion being interactionally less ' informative' . or more 
'general '. In thi s way. 'interactional generality ' accompanies semantic generali ty, and 
both are li nked to increased frequency of use.?] 
70 On this view, interactional unmarkedness rollows rrom social unmarkedness. understood as rrequency 
or occurrence. 
71 An explanation for the relative rrequency or additional markers of politeness in dirferent sett ings in the 
rccordcd data (figs. 4.8-16 above) naturally falls out, if the notion of interactional infonnativeness is 
taken on board. lr thc pcrrormance of orrers and requests at home and at work is largely a matter or 
choosing one of two widespread formul ae ror each speech act, it rollows that these rormulae will be 
interactionally general. Additional markers or politeness would then be charged with narrowing down the 
sct of face-related assumptions compatible with the utterance, i.e. as a means or increasing its 
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The statistical aspect of this process is not to be overlooked. As Hopper and 
Traugott (1993:114) point out, "speciali sation [the process whereby the choice of 
grammatical forms becomes reduced as cet1ain ones become generali sed in meaning 
and use] does not necessarily entail the elimination of alternatives, but may be 
manifested simply as textual preferences, conditioned by semantic types, sociolinguistic 
contexts, discourse genres. and other factors." In other words, when the range of senses 
conveyed by an expression is expanded or generali sed compared to another expression, 
the difference between the two will show up as a stati stical, not a categorical one. 
Parallel to the idea that expressions may be grammaticalised to different degrees, 
advanced in a historical linguistic context, the idea of a scalc of formulaicity, on which 
expressions range "from completely fixed and lexicali sed to completely free, novel 
occurrences" (Lambrecht 1984:776) has been proposed to account for the syntactico-
semantic combinatorial possibilities and pragmatic acceptability of expressions 
synchronicall y. In his analysis of German Bare Binomials (pai rings of two nouns where 
no determiner precedes the nouns, e.g. 'Man und Frau', 'Katz und Maus'), Lambrecht 
(ibid.) suggests that "[t]he scale from fixed to free types is also a scale from greater to 
lesser contextual autonomy, in such a way that the most lex ica li sed phrases are also 
those which occur with greatest freedom from contextual constraints." Lambrecht 
(1984:777ff.) distinguishes three types of Bare Binomials - irrevers ible, pre-
schematised, and contextualised - which differ with respect to the amount of context 
necessary to guarantee thei r acceptability. To account for these differences, Lambrecht 
appeals to Fillmore's frame semantics (6.4. 1.3 below). He claims that the stronger the 
pre-existing cognitive re lation between the concepts denoted by the two conjoined 
nouns, in virtue of the ir participating in the same semantic frame, the higher the chances 
that a binomial will become lexicalised and irreversib le. As a result, in'eversible 
binomials evoke their own fram es, whi le for contextualised ones "linguistic context and 
semantic frame would need to be close to identical for [the] phrase to become 
acceptable" (ibid.:784). Consequently, "the acceptability of B[are] B[inomials] can 
vary, depending on the degree to which the conjunction of two things is pre-
schematised in the mind of the speakerihearer" (ibid.:788). 
Two aspects of Lambrecht 's discussion are currently relevant. First, as will be 
shown Sh0l11y, combinations of a type of verb-modality-number+person which are most 
frequent over a wide range of contexts in CG are also subject to paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic constraints. Second, their acceptabi lity appears to be influenced by 
cognitive frame structure in a way similar to how the acceptability of Bare Binomial 
phrases is influenced by semantic frame structure (Lambrecht 1984:785). Lambrecht 
explains the analogical relation shown to hold between the degree of lex icalisation of an 
expression and its contextual autonomy with reference to a pre-existing cognitive 
interactional informativeness. Inversely, speakers' realisations in formal settings being more evenly 
distributed would explain the low occu rrence of additional markers of politeness in these settings. 
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relation holding between the different components of a semantic frame. Arguing 
backwards, if it turns out that the higher the degree to which p3l1icular combinations of 
type of verb-modality-numbet+ person are fixed, the higher their degree of contextual 
autonomy (the range of situational contexts in which they occur), then this can be 
appealed to as evidence that the use of polite expressions in CO is indeed guided by 
cognitive frames, in which a cognitive relation is establi shed between linguistic 
expressions and extra-linguisti c features of the situation. As the strength of this relation 
will vary for different speakers (of different cultures, professional groups, or 
generations), different expressions will become fixed to different degrees in different 
(sub)culturcs (ib id .,788). 
To exemplify how increased contextual autonomy (an expression's occurring in a 
wide range of situational contexts, crucially including contexts of both high and low 
D+P; 4.2. 1 above) goes hand in hand with its being highly fixed on both the 
paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axes, the combination Bela-indicative with ri sing 
intonation-2sg. realising offers will be used. This is not to say that offers performed 
using alternative combinations of verb-modality-number+person are ungrammatical , 
strange to the ear, or diffi cult to eli cit fiom native speakers in isolation (Hopper & 
Traugott 1993: 162). Rather, what we are dealing with is a marked skewing in the data 
collected such that Bela-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is preferred to perform 
offers at home and at work over a wide range of contexts, in each of which it constitutes 
the preferred (most frequent) realisation. 
A number of cri teria have been proposed to determine the extent to which an 
expression is grammaticalisedlfixed (Lambrecht 1984, Lehmann 1985, Klamer 2000). 
weight 
(the degree to which a sign 
is distinct from members of 
its class) 
cohesion 
(the degree to which a sign 
systematically contracts 
ce l1ain relations with other 
signs) 
variability 
(the degree to which a sign 
enjoys momentary mobility 
Ishiftability with respect to 
other signs) 
aradiomatic 
integrity 
(degree of (degree of 
semantic phonological 
generality) reduction) 
paradigmaticity 
(degree of integration into a 
paradigm) 
paradigmatic variability 
(degree of 
interchangeability with 
other signs (including 0) 
from the same paradigm) 
s ntaomatic 
scope 
(extent of the construct ion 
it he lps to form) 
hondedness 
(degree of cohes ion with! 
attachment to other signs in 
a syntagm) 
syntagmatic variability 
(degree of freedom of 
movement within a 
syntagm) 
Table 2: Parameters of grammatic ali sat ion (after Lehman 1985: 306) 
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Below, I draw on Lehmann's (1985) classification, which, appealing to the notions of 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations of the language sign, is theoretically motivated 
and subsumes empirically-based proposals. Lehmann (1985:306) suggests that the 
freedom with which a linguistic sign is used can be measured on three dimensions: 
weight, cohesion, and variability, each of which has a syntagmatic and a paradigmatic 
aspect (table 2). A loss in weight and variability, and/or an increase in cohesion 
translate into a gradual loss of freedom for the sign. The loss in paradigmatic weight (or 
' integrity ') for Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. reali sing offers at home and at 
work concerns two levels. At the level of fOtm , its surface realisation, 8e/is, can be 
reduced to monosy llabic Bes, 'lis, or Be (Lambrecht 1984:781); 18 out of 106 offers 
(17%) using Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. are thus truncated, with Bes 
accounting for 15 (84%) of these. At the level of content, 15 out of 33 times (45.5%) 
when an uptake is provided, this consists in thanking or providing a request, showing 
that Bela-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is not so much interpreted as a literal 
question about the addressee's desires but as a token of the speaker's 
availabi litylwi llingness to satisfy these, i.e. as an offer. Characteristically, a statement of 
the addressee's desires using Belo-indicative with rising intonation-1 sg. is never 
provided in response to Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg., attesting to the type 
of shift in meaning as a result of pragmatic inferencing which can lead to semantic 
bleaching mentioned above . On the other hand, the fact that Belo-indicative with rising 
intonation-2sg. cannot be adverbially modified (e.g. by an adverb denoting degrees of 
desire) testifies to a loss in syntagmatic weight (or 'scope'; Lehmann 1985:308). An 
increase in paradigmatic cohesion (or 'paradigmaticity '; ibid.:307) also appears to be 
taking place: of 129 occurrences of Oelo-indicative with ri sing intonation-2sg. at home 
and at work, 106 (82 .17%) perfOlm offers, while only 23 (17.82%) perform requests. 
That is, Bela-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is typically associated with the 
pragmatic paradigm of the offer. Moreover, the lexeme Belo occurs in combination with 
the indicative with rising intonation-2sg. in 129 out of 20 I (64.2%) occurrences at home 
and at work, i.e. a high degree of syntagmatic cohesion (or 'bondedness') appears to 
exist between these particular values for type of verb-modali ty-number+person. In 
add ition, a loss in paradigmatic variability means that desire in offers at home and at 
work is overwhelmingly expressed by using Belo (1 18 occurrences, 96%; 106 of these 
(90%) are in the indicative with rising intonation-2sg.) rather than other semantically 
equivalent expressions (5 occurrences, 4%). Finally, a loss in syntagmatic vari ability 
(ibid.:309) means that 98 times out of 106 (92.5%) Belo-indicative with rising 
intonation-2sg. occurs utterance-initially, with the only items that can precede it being 
address telms, or the conjunction lipon, 'so'. 
The evidence presented above shows how an expression which is conventionalised 
relative to a (range of) context(s) (i.e . which is socially unmarked in these contexts qua 
the one most frequently used) can gradually develop linguistic reflexes of this 
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conventionalisation (i.e. become reduced in both form and content, as well as less 
fl ex ible in its combinatorial possibilities w ith other items in discourse). The tendency to 
grammaticalise, now observed as a generalised tendency accompanying the gradual 
detachment of the meaning of expressions from context, rather than restricted to the 
boundary between utterance-type meaning and sentence meaning, remains unaccounted 
for if a leve l of prefelTed interpretations is not theoreti ca lly acknowledged. At the same 
time, frequency of occunence - which precedes, and actually moti vates, the observed 
gradual increase in frozenness - does not concem all possible cultural contexts. Rather, 
it is restricted to a subset of these, which supports the proposal of an intelmediate stage 
between PCIs and Gels where preferred interpretations arise with respect to a minimal 
context (5.4.5 above). 
5.5 Summary 
Based on the observation that "'[c]ompetent adult rnembers' comrnent on absence of 
politeness where it is expected, and its presence where it is not expected" (Kasper 
1990:193), po liteness was defined as the unmarked way of speaking in a community 
(chapter I above). In thi s chapter, I sketched an account of how politeness, thus 
understood, may be achieved. This account rests on the premises of interlocutors ' 
mutually assuming each other's rationality and face-wants. Interlocutors' mutual face-
wants orientate them to the goals which each may plausibly be pursuing in contex t. This 
is why expectations as to interlocutors' goals arise once a minimal context is ava il able, 
i.e. prior to the rnaking of any pat1icular utterance. Once an utterance is made, two paths 
are poss ible. First, it rnay conform with these expectations, and therefore be presumed 
to be polite by way of an "'I -irnplicature. Politeness as a periocutionalY effect - the 
addressee's holding the be lief that the speaker is poli te - is then achieved if the 
addressee holds a be lief to the effect that uttering the fOl11l of words used by the speake r 
in the particular situation is polite; in this case, politeness wi ll have been anticipated. 
Second, the speaker's utterance may not conform to the addressee's expectations. An 
"'M-implicature pertaining to the cornplement of the ' polite' "' I-impli cature will now 
arise, and interlocutors reciprocal sensitivity to face will trigger part icularised 
implicatures as to the speaker's intention with reference to nonce context. This time, if 
po liteness as a perlocutionary effect is achieved, it will rely on the prior recognition of 
the speaker's intention. That is , politeness will have been communicated by means of a 
pal1icularised implicature. The two possibilities outlined above suggest that politeness 
may, after all , not be a unitary phenomenon. While this should not be surprising given 
divergences between the common-sense understanding of the terrn (anything exceeding 
an expected norrn , which would now fall under commun icated politeness) and its 
technical understanding (an expected norm, now falling under anti cipated politeness), 
this issue must remain open for further research. 
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Politeness and cognition 
6.1 lntroduction 
"For generations, scientists and philosophers 
have tried to explain ordinary reasoning in lerms 
of logical principles - with virtually no success. 
I suspect this enterprise faiLed because it was 
looking in the wrong direction: common sense 
works so well not becausc it is an approximation 
of logic; logic is only a small part of our great 
accumulation of different, useful ways to chain 
things together. Many thinkers have assumed 
that logical necessity lies at the heart of our 
reasoning. But for the purposes of psychology, 
we'd do better to set aside the dubious ideal of 
faultless deduction and II)', instead, 10 
understand how people actually deal with what is 
lISlIal or rypical" 
(Minsky 1986: 187) 
In the preceding chapter, [ argued that politeness as a perlocutionary effect is more 
often than not achieved independently of the recogni ti on of the s peaker's poli te 
intention. In this case, the addressee 's holding the be li e f that the speaker is polite is 
arrived at in vil1ue of the addressee's first holding anoth er bel ief, namely that ' uttering 
expression x in situation y is po lite '. In this chapter, I shall investigate how one may 
come to hold, and draw on, be li efs of this latter kind. My point of depm1ure wi ll be that 
holding such beliefs consists of sharing in the evaluative practices of a group of agents 
(1.3 above). This evaluative character of beliefs about politeness sets them apart from 
beliefs concerni ng the truth or falsity of propositions. The latter are reached via 
principles of logical necessity which hold in all possible worlds. I The former are socio-
historically constituted (Werkhofer 1992; chapter 7 below), and as such emerge within , 
and are bound by, an agent 's pm1aking in a 'societal' rat ionality which constrains the 
specific functions (out of the multitude of potential functions) that a linguistic means is 
employed to perform in the pm1icular place and time of utterance (1.3.3 above). Primary 
sociali sation within a community thus results in holding a set of beliefs about the 
expression of po li teness therein. Such beliefs are held implicitly, in that, in the notmal 
case, one will act based on them, and will not reason explicitly about them unless the 
expectations they help construct are frustrated. These beliefs are both 'stored' in 
memo!)' and brought to bear on a situation in the fOlm of frames, which can be viewed 
as structuring - and thus bringing to bear upon each other - prototypical information 
1 Recent accounts which incorporate contextual considerations (e.g., Heim 1988; Forbes 1990; Kamp 
1984; Kamp & Reyle 1993) do so with a view to assessing the tmth or falsity of utterances, and as such 
remain within the trutlHonditional tradition in linguistic semantics. 
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about a situation and the appropriate use of language therein. Contrary to Brown and 
Levinson 's (1987) intention-based approach, in which the face-redressing potential of a 
linguistic expression is a function of its deviation from speaking in accordance with 
Gricean maxims, and therefore stable across cultures, a frame-based approach to 
po liteness implies an evaluating of linguistic expressions which, being socio-
historicall y determined, supersedes individual rationality and may vary across cultures 
and over time. The universality of this latter approach lies in proposing frames as the 
cognitive mechanisms by means of which the aforementioned societal rationality is 
implemented, while the contents of this rationality - which forms are appropriate in 
which situations - can bc changcablc. 
6.2 Beliefs about politeness and implicit real-world knowledge 
This section aims at tackling three questions: 
(i) what are the possible causes of beliefs about the communication of poli teness? 
(ii) how do these be liefs contribute to the reasoning process which underli es the 
production and the interpretation of polite utterances? 
(iii) what is the epistemological status of such beliefs, as this can be inferred from (i) 
and (ii) above? 
Two causes of beliefs are generally accepted: other beliefs, and organism/ 
environment interactions (Fodor 1989:2). Beliefs about the politeness of a particular 
utterance in a certain situation emanate from the fOlmer, in that they always involve 
other be liefs, pertaining for example to the outcome of the exchange, viz. whether the 
speaker's goals were promoted as a result of hislher using the utterance in question. 
This is also tlUe when direct observation of the outcome of the exchange is not possible, 
as for example when, rather than being the result of personal observation of, or 
participation in , an exchange, a representation of the outcome of the exchange is 
provided by an educator. In this last case, the authority one is prepared to acknowledge 
to the educator will be directly relevant to ultimately holding the belief or not (Sperber 
1996:96). Thus, whether based on persona) experience or fOlmal instruction, the process 
by which a be lief about politeness comes to be held always involves communication, in 
the sense that, the (viI1ual) presence of an audience is instrumental to the promotion of 
the speaker's goals. 2 
Linguistic po li teness was earlier defined as the unmarked way of speaking in a 
community (1.3.2 above). The question to be answered next is: how do beliefs about 
po liteness contribute to the reasoning process underlying the production and 
interpretation of polite utterances to achieve this? Let us begin by considering some 
remarks about the nature of human understanding. Schank and Abelson ( 1977:30) 
2 The presence of an audience constitutes a necessary condition for the Gricean account of meaning 
(Avramidcs 1 989:65-6). 
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define understanding as that process during which we make sense of the world by 
estab li shing causal links between eventualities.3 However, these links are not always 
explicitly stated. It then becomes the task of the understander to provide such links in 
order to discover local coherence, which will in turn help himlher conceptualise the 
eventuality as of a ce l1ain type and understand its significance. To explain how this is 
achieved, researchers have commonly suggested that people draw on implicit real-world 
knowledge to fill in the missing links (Schank & Abelson 1977:9; Zacks & Tversky 
200\:13). The app lication of such knowledge takes the form of default assumptions, 
in fe rences that people draw unless there occurs to them an alternative or reason to the 
contrary (Bach 1984:38). Howcver, to bc of any usc, such knowledge must bc 
structured. In other words, to understand an eventuality, one must be able to ca ll up 
knowledge which is relevant to the eventuality at hand.4 By thus taking part in ordinary 
reason ing, implicit real-world knowledge sets up expectations about eventuali ties. It is 
exactly when such expectations are met that things go unnoticed. According to this line 
of thought, when, and to the extent that , speaking politely passes unnoti ced, this is 
because it meets interlocutors ' expectations about the exchange at hand, based on their 
implicit real-world knowledge about verbal interaction. 
Significantly, real-world knowledge is relevant only inasmuch as it applies to 
understanding a situation in the absence of an alternative or reason to the contrmy. That 
is, it is desirable to be able to override such knowledge (i.e. reason explicitly about the 
situation), should one at any point have reason to believe that the default no longer 
app lies. Having implicit real -world knowledge about a si tuation could then be described 
as weakly rationally holding a set of beliefs about the si tuation, such that these be li efs 
may be ovelr idden - albeit not abandoned - if they fail to yield an understanding of 
the eventuali ty at hand. According to Sperber (1985:57-8), different criteria of 
rationality apply to different kinds of beliefs. A subject's beliefs are factual only if they 
are representations directly stored in the subject's encyclopaedic memory, or derived 
from other factual beliefs by inference (Sperber 1985:54). Representational beliefs, on 
the other hand, are representations embedded in some other (factual or representational) 
belief that the subject holds about them (Sperber 1985:56). Being indirectly stored in 
this way, representational beliefs only confolm to weak criteria of rationality. Thei r 
rationa lity depends on their being (ultimately) embedded in a factual belief, and 
although they may well be found to be mutually cons istent wi th closely related (factual) 
beliefs, this is not a necessary condition prior to their being held as rational. 
Bel iefs about po li teness would seem to be representational on two counts. Fi rst, 
they are caused by other beliefs. Consequently, holding 'utteri ng expression x in 
situation y is po li te' is embedded in holding 'one 's uttering express ion x in situat ion y 
3'Eventuality' is used as a generic term covering both states (including 'static' situations. e.g. the 
perception of objects). and the dynamic unfolding of event s (Kamp & Reyle 1993:509). 
4 This observation is central to what has been tcnned ' the frame problem'. 
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wi ll ceteris paribus5 help promote one ' s goals' , and can be rationally he ld only in vil1ue 
of this embedding. Second, their distribution , i. e. their acquisition and acceptance, 
crucially - as opposed to incidentally - involves communication (Sperber 1985:59; 
1996:95). Being representational , bel iefs about politeness may be weakly rationally 
held , such that they can account for the unmarked sequences all else being equal, and 
be ovelTidden when the default does not apply. 
The fact that beli efs about politeness are representational affords us with an 
exp lanation o f how politeness comes to be socially and historically constituted and 
reconstituted, as in Werkhofer's ( 1992 : I 82ff) suggested analogy with monetary 
cxchangcs. [t is generally acceptcd that linguisti c forms possess a potentiality of 
meanings, rather than any fi xed meaning , and that they can in virtue of this fu lfi l 
different fun ctions. It is then plausible to assume that any linguistic form will , at a 
cel1ain time and place, be employed to fulfil a subset from this potential set of 
functions. There is nothing however to prevent thi s subset from being an essentially 
changeable one, resulting in roughly the same fun ctions being taken up by different 
linguistic fOlms across communities and over time. Claiming that beliefs about 
politeness are only weakly rationally held allows fo r the possibility that, in any given 
community, politeness functi ons may essentiall y be taken up by any linguistic form that 
can potentially ( in virtue of its meaning) perfOlm such fun ctions, while the motivation 
for the particular fDIms actually attested may be found in the socio-historical 
constitution of politeness in the community in question. At the same time, the situated 
functioning o f a pal1icular form as polite in a pal1icular s ituation will render marked the 
use of other forms in that pal1icuiar situation, or the use of thi s particular form in other 
situations. In thi s case, a particular expression's polite imp011 on an occasion of use wi II 
be not so much a matter of the set of functions which it may potentially fulfil (in virtue 
of its meaning) - and thus reached via individual rationalising about ends and means, 
as in Brown and Levinson's ( 1987) approach - as a matter of the set of functions it is 
actually used to fulfil at the time and place of utterance, thereby requi ring a fami li arity 
with the norms of the community in question.6 
The three questions posed at the outset can now be answered as follows: beliefs 
about poli teness are caused by other be liefs and owe their di stri bution to 
communication. They contribute to the reasoning process which guides the production 
and interpretation ofpoiite utterances in an implici t way. i. e. by setting up expectations 
about an exchange, in the absence of an altemati ve or reason to the contrary. Given that 
they are caused by other beliefs, and di stri buted via communication, beliefs about 
poli teness are representational, that is, they conform to weak criteria of rationality. This 
5 Significantly, the ceteris pariblls clause refers to considerations of urgcncy and cuhural affinity between 
interlocutors, as well as the usual considerations of perceptual proximity. intelligibility and the like. 
6 The failure of L2 learners to use conventionalised expressions as efficiently as native speakers (Phillips 
1993, discussed in 5.4.2 above) could be explained on these grounds. 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Chapler 6 Polilenes;.; and cognifion 165 
provides a natural explanation for a wealth of evidence (Escandell -Vidal 1995; 1.3.4 
above) suggesting that such beliefs vary across communities and over time. 
6.3 Frames as structures of implicit real-world knowledge 
Given the role of implicit real-world knowledge in understanding (6.2 above), it is easy 
to see why a signi fi cant gain in processing time and eff0l1 can be achieved if this 
knowledge is structured. As Bach (1984:45) remarks: 
"[T]here are always more inferences to be made. If we didn ' t generally jump to 
conclusions, we would make hardly any of the inferences that we needed to 
make. But if we are generally right in the conclusions we jump to, surely this is 
no monumental coincidence. Somehow our inferences must take relevant 
information into account without getting bogged down in in·elevancies." 
From thi s viewpoint, frames may be thought of as just such structures of implicit real-
world knowledge which is relevant to the eventuality at hand. This is at once a claim 
about the organisation of memory as about the way in which perceptual mechanisms 
function. In understanding a current eventuality, not only wi ll relevant implicit real-
world knowledge be called up from memOIY, but also attention wi ll be directed to what 
are considered determining features of the type of eventua li ty we think we are dea li ng 
with.7 Inasmuch as eventualities in our everyday life are pre-planned (Alterman et al. 
1998), this means that, in understanding an eventuality, we are attuned to paying 
attention to certain pieces of infOlmation over others. In this sense, frames can function 
as "structures of expectation" (Tannen 1993 :21 ). 
Schank and Abe lson ( l 977) base their claims about the organisation of me mOly on 
a s imilar argument According to this, "any pattern matching that needs to be done 
against information stored in memory requires a canonical form for the informat ion" 
(1977: 16; cf. Minsky 1975:236). It is the repeated co-occurrence of ce lia in features in 
an eventuality which prompts us to group these togethe r and remember the whole 
eventuality as an episode by virtue of these co-occurring features: 
"An episodic view of memory claims that memory is organised around personal 
experi ences or ep isodes rather than around abstract semantic categories. If 
memOlY LS organised around persona1 experiences then one of the principal 
components of memory must be a procedure for recognising repeated or similar 
sequences. When a standard repeated sequence is recognised, it is he lpfu l in 
' filling in the blanks' in understanding. Furthennore, much of the language 
generation behaviour of people can be explained in this stereotyped way." 
(Schank & Abelson 1977: 17-8) 
In suppOl1 of this view, recent experimental results have shown inferences based on 
statistical co-occurrence to play an important pati in language learning and event 
7 That Ihe two processes go hand in hand was already remarked by Banlen ( 1932:220): "To adequately 
serve Ihe demands or a constantly changing environment, we have not only to pick items out or their 
general selling, bUI we must know what pans or lhem may now and alter without disturbing their general 
significance and runctions". 
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learning, and to precede (and indeed motivate) the causal or intentional understanding 
of an eventuality (Zacks & Tversky 200 1: 12). 
Frames understood as such experienti all y establi shed 'structures of expectat ions' 
naturally complement (post-)Gricean accounts of meaning,8 and in particular 
Levinson's reformulation of the maxims in terms of heuristi cs (fn.43, 5.4.3.2 above). A 
key term relating to the operation of the I and M heuri sti cs is that of a 'stereotype'. 
While thi s term applies both to linguistic descriptions and to rea l-world situations, it 
does so independently ( i.e. the motivation for describing a linguistic description as 
stereotypical lies in its relationship with other linguistic items rather than in its 
relationship to the real-world situation it is a description of). For this reason, the 
relationship between stereotypical linguistic descriptions and the real-world situations 
they describe needs to be stipulated by means of the proposed heurist ics: the fact that a 
linguistic description is stereotypical prompts me to look for a stereotypica l real-world 
situation it is a description of~ but it does not tell me which one. The claim presently put 
forward , on the other hand, is that frames combine information about linguisti c 
descriptions with infOlmation about real-world situations (6.5 below). The presence of 
one acts as an indication to the presence of the other - albeit a weak one, given that 
reasoning which is exclusive ly frame-based (i.e. wholly implicit) applies only in the 
unmarked case. In bringing knowledge about stereotypica l situations to bear on 
knowledge of the appropriate use of language therein, the reconciliation of a frame-
based account of understanding with the Levinsonian heuristics thus appears not only 
feasible, but also theoretically desirable.9 
8 A proposal to analyse 'other items of background knowledge' - which Grice (1989a:3 [) lists among 
the data the hearer relies on in working out the presence of a conversational implicature - as frames is 
found in Schiffrin (1994:368). The view that the frames called up by features of the event during the 
process of understanding constrain the operation of the conversational maxims may indeed provide an 
answer to various difficulties which researchers have pointed out over the years. For example, it has been 
argued that the two injunctions of the maxim of Quantity (fn.4, [.1 above) must be complemented by 
considerations of relevance to help draw the intended implicature (Hamish [998]19761:276; Carston 
1998:182-3). Regarding the maxim of Relation, Grice himself (l989a:27) remarked that it "conceals a 
number of problems [ .. .]: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, 
how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation 
are legitimately changed, and so on". Even implicatures generated by the "Be brief (avoid unnecessary 
prolixity)" clause or thc maxim of Manncr may be impossiblc 10 draw with certainty until what 
constitutes 'necessary prolixity ' has been est ablished. The maxims in question should then be viewed 
only as guidelines for deriving the intended implicature. As such, they do not operate on masses or 
unstructured background knowledge but rat her within the boundaries of the selected frames, which set up 
expectations as to the applicable level of infonnativeness, relation and 'necessal)' prol ixity'. 
9 In an earlier article (1987:65), Levinson himself uses Charniak's notion of frames within the Al tradition 
to account for the stereotypical inference from "John pushed the can to the checkout" to "John pushed the 
cart rull of groceries 10 the supermarket checkout", drawn in virtue of the relevant knowledge about carts 
and checkouts. In fact, several examples from the same article can be explained using frames, given 
Schank and Abelson's (1977:41 ) observat ion regarding the use of the definite article, when this occurs as 
pan or an instantiated frame (ralher than frames , the authors refer to 'scripts' as encompassing detailed 
sequcntial information about events; 6.4.1.2 below): 
"Scripts allow for new references to objects within them just as if these objects had been previously 
mentioned; objects within a script may take ' the' without explicit introduction because the script has 
already implicitly introduced them." 
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6.4 Frames in previous research 
6.4. 1 Historical background 
The intellectual roots of the concept of a frame may be traced back to Kant's conception 
of a 'schema ', understood as providing a picture of a pure concept, and thus bridging 
perception and cognition (Nerl ich & Clarke 2000: 14 1). Earl y in the twentieth century, 
Kant's ideas were influential within the German school of Gestalt psychology, and in 
Bmtlett's (1932) seminal work on memory. Since then, scholars in a variety of 
disciplines have undel1aken research to confilm the existence of expe ri entially-based 
knowledge stlUctures and their role in understanding. 10 A set of related terms such as 
'frames', 'schemas' , and 'scripts' have been used to cover a range of 
conceptuali sations, from the perception of static scenes and objects (Minsky 1975) to 
the organisation of word-senses in the lexicon (Fillmore 1976, 1977, 1982), and from 
the sequentia l unfo lding of events (Schank & Abelson 1977) to the emergence of 
meaning there in (Goffman 1974, 1976). I I What remains constant throughout these 
approaches is a reference to an experientially acquired piece of stereotypical knowledge 
which is stored in memOlY in such a way as to be easily retrievable - indeed 
automaticall y - when features of the CUITent situation are reminiscent of it. This piece 
of knowledge functions as a bridge between perception and cognition. by providing a 
representation for the situation; however, the degree of abstraction of this representation 
remains a matter of considerable debate. 12 Direct ly observable features of an 
encountered situation are then matched with features of thi s representation , thereby 
recalling it from memory, so that it provides a platform from which the 'missing links' 
(not direct ly observable features of the situation) may be projected, or filled in. 
Interest in thi s kind of experientially-conditioned understanding has been fuelled 
by two observations which recur in the relevant literature: first . events in the world tend 
to follow recurring patters, and second, humans are able to, and commonly do, act based 
on incomplete information. Experientially-conditioned understanding - and action 
which is based on it - essentially exploi ts the implications of the fi rs t observation to 
overcome the limitations of the second. Indeed, recent trends in AI propose to view 
even creative reasoning as an extension of this kind of understanding (Wills & 
Thus (cr. Levinson 1987:65-66; emphasis added): 
"John unpacked Ihe picnic. The beer was wann." +> The beer was pan of Ihe picnic. 
"John was pUI in a cell. rhe window was barred." +> The cell has a window. 
"The baby cried. n,e mummy pickcd il up." +> 'Thc mummy' was thc molhcr oflhc crying baby. 
"John said 'Hello' to the secretary and then he smiled. " +> The secretary was female. 
The lasl infercnce rcquires conjoining two beliefs, onc promplcd by Ihc definite anicle (viz. secretaries in 
scripts are typically female) and anot her one, viz. lypically smiling is desirable when a male is addressing 
a female , at least more so than when addressing a male. This last belief is heavily socially conditioned, 
which accounts for the weakncss of the resulting inference compared to the previous ones. 
lO 'Experientially ' is used informally, to highlight the not neccssarily tmlh-prcserving characler of Ihe 
inferences involved. In panicular, no claim to innateness is advanced, as within cognitive approaches. 
I I Tannen ( 1993: 15-20) provides a brief overview of related disciplines and terms used. 
12 Cf. the controversy betwecn viewpoint-dependent and viewpoint-independent representations III 
research on visi on (Liu 1996; Tjan & Legge 1998). 
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Kolodner 1996). The ovelview which fo llows aims at highlighting the recent research 
tradition within which the notion was developed - approaches with in AI, psychology, 
linguistics, and sociology which have often been mutuall y influential - and is not 
intended as exhaustive. Some applications of the four theoretical frameworks outlined 
to discourse are subsequently presented, while the section closes with a re-assessment 
of the significance of the notion of frames in the light of recent empirical evidence. 
1J1.l.! Artificial Intelligence 
Often cited as representative of related research wi thin AI is Minsky's work on visual 
frames. Minsky (1975:212) defines a frame as "a data-structure for representing a 
stereotyped s ituation". He proposes to think of a frame as 
"a network of nodes and relations. The 'top' levels of a frame are fixed , and 
represent things that are always hue about the supposed situation. The lower 
levels have many tetminals - 'slots ' that must be fill ed by specific instances of 
data. Each telminal can specify conditions its assignments must meet" (ibid.; 
original emphasis). 
Loosely attached to a frame's terminals are default assignments embodying a subject's 
expectations about the situation. These can however "be easily displaced by new items 
that better fit the current situation" (1975:218). The evocation of a frame "on the basis 
of partial evidence or expectation" initiates a matching process which aims at assigning 
to each of its terminals a value consistent with the terminal 's assignment conditions 
(ibid.:2l8-9). This process is controlled pattly by information assoc iated wi th the frame 
(i.e. how to use it, what one can expect to happen next, what to do if these expectations 
are frustrated), and partly by knowledge about the subject's current goals (ibid.). 
However, the necessaty condi tions for the activation of a frame may requi re more than 
recognising the presence of cel1ain features: the related agencies must also recognise 
that those features are in suitable relationships (Minsky 1986:252). On this view, the 
matching process is more usefully viewed as dependent on "specific, learned knowledge 
about differences between pairs of frames rather than on broad, general principles" 
(Minsky 1975:250). Minsky also suggests that "[c]oll ections of related frames are 
linked together into Faille systems. [ ... J Different frames of a system share the same 
telminals. [ ... ] The frame systems are linked, in turn , by an information retrieval 
network" which provides a replacement frame when the matching process fails to 
successfully assign values to the terminals of a previous ly proposed frame (ibid.:2 13; 
original emphasis). Knowledge about interactions between frames can help explain 
potential discrepancies between the perceived si tuation and the proposed frame, so that 
the latter ought not necessarily to be abandoned ifit fails to be substantiated (ibid. :250). 
Frames result from a process of de-specialising (1986:228). The repeated 
observation of sim ilar situations results in their representations taking the fo rm of a 
frame with constraints built into it concerning the poss ible range of each of its termina l 
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values. Specific values are thus gradually replaced by 'variables' ranging over well-
constrained domains in a way reminiscent of the formation of open sentences in fonnal 
10gie. 13 Frames are stored in long-term memory, with their default assignments 
generating stereotypes (1975:228). During an ongoing interaction, every new piece of 
information is kept in short-telm memory and an effolt is made to match it with what 
has come before. New memory-units must be activated to accommodate infOtmation 
which remains unmatched. However, given our limited supplies of shOlt-term memory, 
this tends to slow down understanding and make subsequent matching more diffi cult 
(1986:234). A frame called up from long-tenn memory makes availab le addit ional 
information (not cxp licitly providcd during interaction) to which the new information 
can be matched. In this way, shOtt-term memOty is relieved of having to accommodate 
unmatched information, and hence can be fully applied to what comes afterwards. 
Minsky saw these proposals as specificall y app licable to language. He argues that, 
in the same way that frames refelTing to syntactic rules and generating transient 
semantic structures are used in understanding sentences, so the understanding of larger 
discourses (e.g., stories, explanations, conversations. discussions, and styles of 
argument) involves frames stemm ing from linguistic conventions. Such frames operate 
across wider spans, and generate larger structures, distinct from the transient semantic 
structures built during the understanding of sentences ( 1975:236, 246). Every human 
community develops such conventions, and the con'esponding frames must be learnt, 
just as grammar-forms must be learnt (1986:272). 
iii . 1.2 AI/Psychology 
Schank and Abelson's ( 1977) proposals about the structuring of implicit real-world 
knowledge cut across the fields of Al and cognitive psychology. Their concern is to 
model the understanding of stories by machines on the understanding of stori es by 
people. To answer what they term "the knowledge structure game of where-does-that-
come-from" (1977: 148), they propose four types of conceptual entities: scri pts, plans, 
goals and themes. Each of these contains more detailed information about an event 
compared to the next, and their application follows a hierarchical order stalting with the 
more specific one avai lable for the CU1Tent si tuation (1977:97). In this way, knowledge 
about the wo rld forms a continuum, ranging from speci fi c knowledge ("knowledge [we 
use] to interpret and palticipate in events we have been through many times" (1977:37» 
represented by scripts, to general knowledge ("knowledge [which] enables a person to 
13 This remark is general enough to allow thai, in principle, the representation of any previously 
encountered situation approximating the current one can help to understand it (cf. the example of a two-
year old deciding on an itinerary based on the memory oflhe previous day 's ilinerary in Leake \996:3). 
This interprctation accords with viewing beliefs about politeness as weakly rationally held: the morc a 
particular frame becomes de-specialised, the stronger it will be rat ionally held, although its rationality, 
when frames about politeness are concerned, will never salisfy the strong criteria of rationality applicable 
to factual beliefs. 
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understand and interpret another person's actions simply because the other person is a 
human being with celtain standard needs who lives in a world which has certain 
standard methods of getting those needs fulfilled" (ib id.». Moreover, a generative 
relation holds between these four types of entities (I977:97): themes generate goals, 
which generate plans, which give rise to scripts. The determining factor is repetition: 
the more frequently a celtain sequence of events is recognised, the more likely it is to be 
represented as a script ( 1977:55). Thus, scripts emerge as "made up of slots and 
requirements about what can fill those slots. The structure is an interconnected whole, 
and what is in one slot affects what can be in another. Scripts handle styli sed everyday 
situations. Thcy arc not subjcct to much changc, nor do they provide thc apparatus for 
handling totally novel situations" (I977:4 1). The advantage of using scripts when 
available is that they make more predictions about the event, thereby allowing us to do 
less processing and wondering about frequently experienced events (1977:99). 
For a script to be instantiated, celtain conditions must hold. These roughly amount 
to at least two of its features appearing in an appropriate relationship (1977:47-8). More 
than one script may be active at the same time, so long as it is clear which events fall 
under which script (e .g. a 'romance' script and a ' restaurant ' script may be 
simultaneous ly operati ve; 1977:57). However, when an incoming event could fall under 
either of the activated scripts, 'scriptal ambiguity ' can occur. This persists until future 
input helps decide in favour of one of them, unless other knowledge (e.g. about the 
personal character of a protagonist) is available (1977:58-9). In other words, previous 
inferences can be undone when future input contradicts them. This is possible if we 
mark such inferences with a lack of certainty as we draw them (1977:6 1). Indeed, 
'comments' like these on the application of a script are not the only possible so11. 
Similar markers aid us to 'keep in mind' events with strong future implications 
(1977:45; ef. Ry1e 1979:82; Lasearides & Oberlander 1993:27). 
Significantly, scripts "are written from a palticular role 's point of view" (1977:42). 
The "personal script" in one's mind may then be at variance with the "actual or 
situational script", which can cause errors in understanding (I977:59). The notion of an 
'actual or situational' script is however not unproblematic given the authors' definition 
of scripts as "a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a we ll-
known situation" (1977:4 1): one cannot assume a situation to be 'well-known ', unless 
there is someone around to do the knowing. In other words, scripts are by definition 
constructed by people and cannot exist outside their minds. One way out of this 
difficulty would be to define the 'actual or situational' script as that script which, given 
a spec ific situation, and given a set of socio-culturally affiliated individuals, most 
individuals in this set would agree is applicable to the situation at hand. 
Schank and Abelson add to this account of the structuring of implicit real-world 
knowledge an account of the acquisition of this knowledge. Drawing on observationa l 
data, they argue that information is not only stored by humans in episode form but is 
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also acqui red in thi s way ( 1977:222): "the pattern of learning would seem to be that 
first, definiti ons of objects are learned as episodes. Then, scripts are learned to connect 
events. Finally, scripts are organised by goal structures that are used to make sense of 
the need forthem" ( 1977:227). 
(jf.1.3 Linguistics 
An earl y proponent of frames within the field of linguistlcs is Fillmore. Contrary to the 
Al approaches outlined above, hi s proposal does not incl ude a detailed account of the 
way in which fram es operate. Rather, he provides an argument for complementing 
traditional linguisti c descriptions of languages based on analyses of their grammar and 
lex icon with "an inventory of the fram es that have linguistic reflexes , -paying attention 
to the number of frames, to the areas of special elaboration, to the degree to which 
complex frames have been pre-packaged in lex ical meanings, to the structure and 
complexity of the frames and so on" (1976:29). Fillmore's interest in fram es originated 
in his writi ngs about case grammar, where he described "the case frame associated with 
a particular predicating word as the imposition of stm cture on an event (or on the 
conceptualisation of an event) in a fixed way and with a given perspecti ve" (1977:58; 
cf. 1982: 112ff). 14 Extending the notion to lexical meanings, Fillmore proposes to think 
of a frame as "a kind of outline figure with not necessarily all the details filled in" 
(1976:29) . His aim is to avoid the misleading assumption that, by separating a word's 
semantic descripti on fro m lhe contexts in which it appears, we succeed in capturing in 
one fOlmu lation the common features of these different contex ts (1977:68). 
A distinction may be drawn between scenes and linguisti c frames. Scenes include 
"visual scenes, ( .. . ] familiar kinds of interpersonal transactions, standard scenarios, 
familiar layouts, institutional structures, en active experiences, body image; and, in 
general , any kind of coherent segment, large or smaJi, of human beliefs, actions, 
experiences, or imaginings" ( 1977:63; cf. ibid. :72-4). Scenes are formed through 
abstraction, as schematic representations are deve loped with some of the pos itions left 
blank. Frames, on the other hand, refer to "any system of linguisti c choices (the easiest 
cases being co llections of words, but also including choices of grammatica l rules or 
grammatical categories) that can get associated wi th prototypical instances of scenes" 
(1977:63). The two categories must be distinguished because a scene may well be 
fo rmed in the speaker's mind without there being any linguistic options ava ilable for its 
encoding within the frame most directly acti vated by that scene ( 1977:66). Howeve r, 
when such options are avai lable, as is generally the case, scenes and frames will , " in the 
minds of people who have leamed the associations between them, activate each other" 
(1977:63). This activation process is described as fo llows: 
l~ Cf. Schank & Abelson's view of scri pts as written from a particular role's viewpoint (6.4.1.2 above). 
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" Palticular words or speech fOimulas, or palticular grammatical choices, are 
associated in memory with particular frames, in such a way that exposure to the 
linguistic fonn in an appropriate context activates in the perceiver's mind the 
particular frame - activation of the frame, by turn , enhancing access to the other 
linguistic material that is associated with the same frame ." (1976:25) 
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Frames are associated in memory due to shared linguistic material, while for scenes the 
relevant associations emerge due to "sameness or similari ty of the entities or relations 
or substances in them or their contexts of occurrence" ( 1977:63). Consonant with the 
view that meaning acquisition begins with pragmatics and is on ly subsequently taken up 
by semantics (Schank & Abelson 1977:222; Dressler & Merlini Barbaresi 1994:408; 
Werkhofer 1992: 194), Fillmore claims that the labelling of whole scenes or experiences 
precedes the labelling of individual, isolable parts of these, to fina ll y produce "a 
repeliory of labe ls for schematic or abstract scenes and a repe li01Y of labels for entities 
perceived independently of the scenes in which they were first encountered" (1977:62). 
Psychological ev idence of the greater cognitive complexity of handling 
decontextualised behaviours and objects of perception (1976:24) supports this last 
claim. 
Acknowledging a debt to Hymes 's (1972) ethnography of speaking, Fillmore also 
draws a methodological distinction between interactional and cognitive fram es 
(1976:25; 1982:1 17). The former encapsulate infol111ation about the different contexts 
of interaction in which speakers of a language can expect to find themselves, together 
with infOlmation about the appropriate linguistic choices relevant in each case, wh ile 
the latter are comparable to the semantic domains which relate to particular events or 
activities (Paltridge 1997:51-2) . Knowledge of a language implies a fam il iarity with a 
large number of both types of frames. While Fillmore 's work is primari ly focused on 
the latter kind of frame, the frames proposed in the present thesis may indeed be viewed 
as fa lling under the fOlmer categOlY (6.5 below): they investigate speakers' ab ili ty to 
"schematise the situation in which [a] piece of language is being produced" (1982: 11 7), 
focussing on the interaction between speakers and hearers. 
If Fillmore's earlier proposals were heavily influenced by AI approaches, his later 
work stresses the "speech community" as providing the motivating contexts in which 
frames emerge ( 1982:1 12). In this concern, he approximates Goffman's interest in the 
relationship between the indiv idual and society.'5 Fillmore now defin es a frame as "any 
system of concepts re lated in such a way that to understand anyone of them you have to 
understand the whole stlUcture in which it fits" ( 1982: I I I). Contrary to fOlm al 
semantics, frame semantics emphasises "the continuities, rather than the discontinu ities, 
between language and experience" (ibid.): frames emerge in motivating contexts 
encompassing social practices and institutions, and are thus inextri cably linked to 
particu lar historically situated perspectives on the world ( 1982: 11 9ff.). A frame may be 
IS Unlike Fillmore, Goffman explicitly adopls the perspcclive of Ihe individual on Ihis relalionshjp 
(6.4.1.4 below). 
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'evoked' by linguistic material, but it can also be 'invoked' in the sea rch for coherence 
by an interpreter ( 1982: 124). Later research emphasises thi s dia lect ic relationship 
between ' top-down ' and 'bottom-up' processes during understanding (6.4.3 be low). 
Fillmore exemplifies the existence of frame structure in lexical meanings with reference 
to various phenomena, such as polysemy, metaphor, and semantic change (1982: 125ff.). 
iii. 1.4 Sociology 
Within socio logy, the notion of a frame is associated with the work of Goffman. 
Like researchers working within the frame tradition in AI , psychology and linguist ics, 
he is concemed with the need to appeal to some sort of interpretati ve framework in 
recognising a particular event (what we have so far call ed the unmarked or stereotypica l 
case). He refers to a framework of this kind as 'pri mary' (1974:21). Crucially, the 
organisationa l principles which define a situation as such are imputed therein by 
society, and are onl y derivatively a matter of individual cognition ( 1974: 1-2, 247; 
Schmitt 1998:1070). Society may, in this respect, be likened to the author of 
instructions fo r handl ing a device, instructions which a process of socialisation makes 
agents adept at recognising. This observation serves as a premise to Goffman 's 
subsequent analysis (1974:13) which aims at showing how "a given activity. one 
already made meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is tTansformed into 
something patterned on this activity but seen by participants to be something quite else" 
(1974:44; foot note om itted). Driven by this interesl , he investigates how such 
transformations are achieved, a process referred to as 'keying'. This is described with 
reference to a set of conventions which pal1icipants in an act ivity are assumed to 
mutuall y know and acknowledge as constituting such a key (1974:45). interpreting a 
'strip ' of ongoing acti vity involves applying (whether in the sense of recognising, or 
imposing) a set of organisational principles to it: such principles emanate from society, 
which ultimately emerges as the unifying factor behind both processes (1974: 10-1 ). 
Matters of psychological plausibility and the organisation of memolY thus remai n 
untouched: the emphasis is now not on the mechanisms by which perception and 
cognition are inter-re lated, but on the ways social events are organised such that this 
inter-relation can take place. 
Goffman 's views on the way frames funct ion in conversation acquire their full 
significance in the light of the above remarks. When analysing talk, frames provide a 
way of uncovering "how contexts might be classified according to the way they affect 
the illocutionary force of statements made in them" (1976:306). In this respect, they 
approx imate Fillmore 's interactional frames, although no claim regard ing thei r 
psychological reali ty is advanced, as in Fillmore's earl ier work. The ana lyst's task is to 
specify a limited set of basic frames potentially applicable to the 'same ' event, e.g. an 
utterance, such that the meaning of the utterance in each case can be derived in a 
principled way with reference to the frame which is currently applicable (1976:3 10). 
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From the speaker's perspective, this derivation of meaning from the surrounding 
context is by no means a straightforward operation: 
"our basic model for talk perhaps ought not to be dialogic couplets and their 
chaining, but rather a sequence of response moves wi th each carving out its own 
reference, [ ... ] In the right setting, a person next in line to speak can elect to 
deny the dialogic frame, accept it, or carve out such a format when none is 
apparent." (1976:293) 
One's choice of expression will then 'betray' one's way of defining the situation at 
hand. Significantly, the possibility to make such choices depends on knowing the range 
of frames app licable. However, although managing to impose one's frame on a situation 
constitutes a powerful tool for achieving one's goals, it is arguable whether th is can be 
expected to be the case in unmarked situations, where roles are fai rly fixed and little 
margin left for negotiating the applicable frame. 16 In sum, Goffman 's insights into 
conversation emphasise societal input into arriving at a framework for the situation at 
hand, a process by no means as simple, or uni-dimensional, as the AJ emphasis on 
perception ofa situation may have led one to believe (fn.18, 6.5 below). 
6.4.2. Some app lications to discourse 
The research tradition surveyed above has motivated linguistic analyses of both written 
and oral discourse. An early application of frames to the analysis of text is found in van 
Dijk and Kintsch (1983). Their notion of 'superstructure schemata' ( 1983:236, 308) 
may be traced back to the AI tradition, particularly Schank and Abelson 's scri pts 
(6 .4.1.2 above) , while the theme of a 'canonical schema' which constrains the 
transrormations that can be applied therei n ( 1983:240) echoes Gorrman 's interest in the 
process of ' keying' (6.4. 1.4 above) . Superstructure schemata are culture-specific (and 
therefore learnt ; 1983:236,238) and situation-specific within cultures (1983: 138-9, 
244). Van Dijk and Kintsch are explicit about the psychologica l underpinnings of thei r 
program: they are interested in "the cognitive properties of such postulated schemata 
.. ] in what ways superstructure schemata actually can and do play a role in 
comprehension, storage and retrieval of discourse" (1983:236; ori ginal emphasis). To 
this end , they repol1 previous, as well as their own, experiments, showing that narrative 
stories are more accurately and speedily recalled when conforming to an establi shed 
canonical fo rm, and the events in them are repo[1ed in a canonical orde r even when they 
had not been presented in such an order. In addition, stories are better summarised when 
subjects are familiar with the culture-specific narrative schema that the text follows 
(1983:25 1ff.). 
16 Of course. what little margin is left for negotiation is proof lhat the very notion of an 'unmarked' 
situation is an idealisation in itself - albeit a use ful one, if we are to avoid "wish[ing social life] further 
into unreality" (Goffman 1974:2) - and that fcw real-world situalions are actually unmarked in lhis way. 
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Tannen's ( 1993) investigation of repol1s on a short film by Greek and American 
subjects during an interview reveals a 'story-telling' frame embedded in an 'interview' 
frame. An analysis of the subjects' use of language when later recounting the plot 
(omissions, repetitions, additions, incolTect statements, generalisations etc.) reveals that 
they are conforming with different sets of expectations, that is, the contents of the two 
types of frames, as well as the interaction between the two levels, are different for the 
two sets of subjects (1993:41 ff.). Watanabe (1993) investigated the differential handling 
of group discussions (initiating, giving reasons, building an argument, and ending) by 
American and Japanese students ( 1993: I 82ff). The frustration of the Japanese students' 
expectations about this type of event is now taken as evidence that different cultures 
organise knowledge about the same type of event in different frames. Shifting to an 
intra-cultural perspective, Tannen and Wall at (1993) explicitly focus on the interact ion 
between knowledge schemas (a participant's knowledge at the macro-level about what 
happens in a particular type of event) and interactive frames (how a definition of the 
situation is actively negotiated between participants at the micro-level) , as indexed by 
changes in a speaker's sty le (intonational patterns, length and elaboration of utterances; 
1993:63ff). Similarly, Schiffrin (1993) investigated speakers' prompting and alignment 
strategies, by means of which they make manifest not onl y their understanding of a 
previous utterance (at the micro-level) , but also the contextual presuppositions with 
which they approach the cutTent event (at the macro-level). These four studies follow in 
the Goffmanian tradition, whereby a subject's use of language 'indexes' hislher 
understanding of the situation (6.4.1.4 above). 
Gumperz's (1996) discussion of contextualisation cues as indexing interpretive 
[sic] frames invoked in conversation remains with in the Goffmanian tradition. 
Remarking that , due to CU1Tent processes of globalisation, language and culture can no 
longer be assumed to be co-extensive (1996:377), Gumperz analyses naturally 
occurring exchanges where miscommunication occurs because, although pal1icipants in 
the event speak the same language, they come from different cultural backgrounds. 
Gumperz attributes these breakdowns in communication to the different discursive 
practices which participants in the event have acquired through experi ence in their own 
culture, and which they carryover to exchanges with people who do not necessari ly 
share these (1996:383). Such practices include 'contextualisation cues' defined as "a 
cluster of indexical signs produced in the act of speaking that jointly index, that is 
invoke, a frame of interpretation for the rest of the linguistic content of the utterance" 
(1996:379; cf. ibid.:383). The fact that such cues can be located and studied is appealed 
to as evidence of "cognitively significant systematic differences in contextualisat ion 
conventions, acquired over time in the course of informal interaction" (1996:390). 
General metapragmatic assessments, as to "what is to be expected in the exchange, what 
should be lexicall y expressed, what can be conveyed only indirectly, how moves are to 
be positioned within an exchange, what interpersonal relations are involved, and what 
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rights to speaking app ly" (1996:396) also depend on such conventions. The relat ion 
between such general metapragmatic assessments and contextualisation conventions 
can onl y be justified if we appeal to frames, which bring to bear on the interaction more 
than is explic itly there. 
Reminiscent of Minsky 's focus on the perception of the situation within the AJ 
tradition (6.4 .1.1 above), but also sensitive to Fillmore's cultural anchoring of language 
use (6.4. 1.3 above) is Aijmer's ( 1996) account of conversational routines in Engli sh 
(1996:26-8). Based on the analysis of a large corpus of naturall y occurring data, she 
suggests frames fo r the use of each formula, combining formal features (e.g. fun ction, 
intonation, possible continuation patterns, discourse-specific features, i.e. whethcr thc 
exchange is face-to-face or on the phone, etc.) and si tuational features (e.g. setting, 
participants, timing, i.e. when the formula is used relevant to the speech act perfonned). 
Although the proposed frames are an analyst's tool - the result of the statisti cal 
analysis of naturally occUlTing data - Aijmer subscribes to AJ claims regarding their 
storing in , and recall from, memOlY ( 1996:26), citing psycholinguisti c evidence 
regarding the importance of pre-planned, routinised sequences in language acquisition 
and fluent production ( 1996:7-9). 
6.4.3 Recent directions 
Various types of ev idence have been adduced to suppOl1 the existence of cognitively 
significant frame-structure in discourse . Comprehension experiments17 showed 
enhanced recall for material which conforms to expectations, whether about events 
described (Bower et al. 1979; Brewer & Dupree 1983) or about the canonical narrative 
fo rm of a text (van Dijk & Kintsch 1983), as well as recall of stereotypical material 
which was not explicitly present in the discourse (Pari s & Lindauer 1976; Tannen 
1993:5 1), and inaccurate recal l of presented material so as to conform to expectations 
(Tannen 1993:50). Moreover, recall of stereotypical events followed a canonical order 
(Bower et al. 1979), even when this had not been the actual order of presentation 
(Lichtenstein & Brewer 1980), though in the latter case comprehension was slower 
(Kintsch, Mandel & Kozminsky 1977). Cultural familiarity with the type of situation 
(whether nan-ative or action sequence) was also found to enhance recall accuracy in 
comparison with situations which were not familiar (e .g. narratives/events ITom another 
culture), for which recall was poor (Kintsch & Greene 1978; Steffensen et aL 1980, 
repol1ed in van Dijk & Kintsch 1983:253). Finally, free-recall of stereotypical events 
was found to be more accurate in healthy as opposed to schizophrenic subjects with 
regard to content and judgements about degree of stereotypicality; sequential ordering 
of highly stereotypical events however remained unaffected, which has been interpreted 
17 These have used both texts and videotaped material as stimuli. 
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as a ' bottom-up ' gradual breakdown of schematic structures for events in schi zophrenic 
subjects (Chan et al. 1999) . 
Nevel1heless, as Whitney et al. (1995:138) point out, evidence obtained by means 
of recall tasks is inconclusive: it is unclear whether frame-structure is imposed during 
comprehension (an online process), or during (and as required by) subsequent testing 
(an offline process). The same is true of the linguisti c analyses presented in 6.4.2 above . 
Even when the material analysed was naturally occurring talk (e.g. Watanabe 1993; 
Tannen & Wallat 1993; Schiffrin 1993; Gumperz 1996; Aijmer 1996), frame-structure 
was uncovered following post/acto analysis. Its role in informants' online processes of 
discourse production and comprehension remains to be proven. On the other hand, the 
claim that frame-structure guides retrieval but not encoding of information found 
support in experiments showing that subjects asked to reca ll materi al from a previously 
read passage from a pmticular pmticipant 's perspective were later able to recall 
previously unrecalled mate rial , when the perspective from which they were asked to 
recall the passage was shifted (Anderson & Pichert 1978). 
To assess the validity of postulati ng frames as a bridge between perception and 
cognition, researchers have subsequently turned to studying subjects' online processes 
of object recognition and text comprehens ion. The issue now is to what extent, when 
recognising an object or understanding a text, subjects do so based on abstract 
knowledge, i.e. build ing a representation in a bottom-up fashion based on the 
information provided, or operate within the boundaries of stored representations, i.e. 
calling on top-down processes. Evidence of top-down process ing has been found in 
consistently (i.e . across subjects and over time) leaming-dependent variable 
performance at object recognition, which is best accounted for by postulating 
viewpoint-dependent representations of objects (Liu 1996). Similarly, studies of lex ical 
access during text comprehension found that access was faster when unambiguous 
words appeared as pm1 of a well-known script to which they were relevant, while for 
ambiguous words meaning access was se lective in strongly biasing contexts (Whitney 
et al. 1995: 144-7). Top-down effects were al so noted in elaborati ve inferences: typical 
category members were infelTed from general terms in strongly biasing contex ts, while 
atypical category members were less like ly to be infelTed even when the contex t was 
strongly biasing toward their inference (Whitney et al. 1995 : 152). 
However, researchers in both object/scene recognition and text comprehension are 
increasingly coming to appreciate that bottom-up and top-down processes acti ve ly 
interact during perception. While earli er research may have overestimated the role of 
top-down processes, recent evidence suggests that the ex tent to which top-down 
processes influence perception depends on both the nature of the task at hand, and the 
individual. Top-down processes would seem to contribute more to perception, 
increasing the number of e laborative infe rences being generated, when contexts are 
highl y-constraining, and when subjects do not possess expert knowledge or have 
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limited working memOlY resources. More specifically, investigating the categorisation 
of objects/scenes based on visual perception, Schyns (1998) presents experimental 
evidence suggesting that perceptions are fl exible: there is a continuous interaction 
between visual cues which are available in the input stream of information and those 
which are diagnosti c of a category. Object/scene categorisation does not begin where 
perception ends. because the available cues may be low in diagnosti city , the latter being 
a function of both task-related and individual-based constraints (1998: 148ff.). Similarly, 
Whitney et al. (l995: 148ff. ) suggest that control of information active in working 
memOlY during text comprehension is di stributed between online processes (concepts 
acti vated in working memory can enhance or inhibit the acti vation of fUl1hcr concepts 
in the general knowledge base) and omine processes (planning processes pertaining to 
the type of text and the reader's goals can equally have activating or inhibiting effects). 
The latter constitute context-based factors which interact with reader-based factors in 
guiding comprehension (1 995: 155). Transcripts of informants' protocols (verbal 
reporting of their thoughts while reading ambiguous passages) support the context- and 
reader-dependence of the degree of top-down processing in tex t comprehension 
(1995:15 7). Computational implementation of event recognition adds to these factors 
the degree of specificity and expected duration of the acti vated schema/frame: highly 
specific schemata ( i. e. rich in attributes), and schemata expected to continue for a long 
time can influence sensitivity to new input data (Hanson & Hanson 1996: 128). 
In sum, the evidence from vision and text comprehension research supports the 
claim that perception and cognition mutually constrain each other. Although the internal 
workings of this interaction remain to be explicated, little reason is left to doubt its 
existence. Given the observation that li nguisti c politeness most often passes unnoti ced, 
this interaction may be frui tfull y investigated to explain how politeness is achieved. The 
following section outlines some preliminary theoreti cal and empirica l grounds for this 
proposal , which is more full y elucidated in the following chapter. 
6.5 On the proposed notion of frames 
The approach to linguisti c politeness proposed in thi s thesis may be tenned ' frame-
based' in that it argues for two main points. First, a large part - albe it by no means a ll 
- of polite discourse consists in using conventionalised expressions for achieving 
politeness, as defined in 5.4.2 above (al so 7.2-3 below). Second, linguistic expressions 
and the extra-linguisti c contexts in relation to which they are conventionali sed (i.e. in 
relation to which they fun ction as fOlmulaic; 7.2 below) may be described with 
reference to frames. This claim also has a strong version, suggesting that the relevant 
linguisti c and extra-linguisti c infOlmation is 'stored' in memory holisti cally (this 
section, 7.4 below). The extra-linguisti c features which jointly constitute such frames 
are limited in number, and specific in kind: they pel1ain to immediately perceivable 
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information about a situation, and include a reference to the identities of the speaker and 
addressee (which may be broken down to information about their respective ages, 
sexes, and social classes), and the place and the time of utterance (i.e. the sett ing in 
which a speech act was realised, and its order of occurrence in the fl ow of discourse). 18 
loint reference to these extra-linguistic variables provides the 'minimal context' against 
which an utterance is both understood as realising an act of a particular kind and 
evaluated as a polite way of performing that paliicular act (5.4.5 above) . When an 
expression is conventionalised for some use relative to such minimal context, and used 
in that p3l1icular context, the information contained in the corresponding frame is a ll 
that is required for this evaluation. The socio-cultural evaluation, a manifestation of 
societal rationality which supersedes individual rationali ty both temporally and 
ontologica ll y,19 provides the link between expressions and minimal contexts, or 
between the linguistic and extra-l inguistic information jointly constituting a frame . fn 
other words, this evaluation is the reason why frames come into being in the first place. 
The approach is frame-based in that it argues that such frames are part of speakers' 
knowledge of their language (Fillmore 1982:117; 6.4.1.3 above), and acquired in the 
process of socialisation with in a communi ty. This claim is based on two considerat ions. 
First, speakers' choices in the recorded CG data repeatedly coincide on the same 
expressions, down to P31iicular phonetic realisations of these (7.3, esp. 7.3.3, below), 
above and beyond a preference for a general ' level' of indirectness, e.g. for one of 
Brown and Levinson's four verbalisable strategies (fig. I, 1.2.2 above). Second, this 
consistency in speakers' linguistic choices cannot be obtai ned on the basis of Brown 
and Levinson 's proposed f01mula for computing W x by compounding the values ofD, P 
and Rr. as these variables are cUITently defined. This is because speakers are not 
afforded with a bird's-eye view over the languages they use and contribute to changing. 
Unlike the linguist who carries out a post facto analysis of the data, speakers do not 
have access to the socio-historical circumstances which shape their languages. Before 
elaborating fmiher on the interactional motivation for this approach, and the empirical 
evidence which supports it in the following chapter, thi s section presents some 
theoretical and empirical arguments why such an approach is both justified and needed. 
Frames, as originally proposed within the fields of AI and psychology, were 
intended to deal with the perception of objects (e.g. Minsky 1975). Subsequently, 
frames have been appealed to as an explanatory device for various phenomena which 
involve a dynamic unfo lding of events, such as speech events (6.4.2 above). Recent 
research has un ve iled both philosophical and psychological reasons why the perception 
18 These fealures pertain to categories which are socially constmcted to a greater or lesser extent. 
Nevenheless, Ihey are currenlly characterised as immedialely perceivable since, in lhe absence of 
indications to the contrary, participants operate on default assumptions about them, panly based on 
sensory data. 
19 In the sense that it is socio-culturally defined means and ends that the individual as a rational agent 
manipulates. 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Chaptcr 6 Polilenes;.; and cognifion 180 
of objects (which form pal1 of a natural environment) and the perception of events 
(including those which form pat1 of a social environment, such as linguistic exchanges) 
may be amenable to similar treatment. One possible definition of events is to treat them 
as objects: 2o both events and objects may be regarded as bounded regions of space-time. 
From the point of view of an observer, the perceptual experi ence of an object is similar 
to that of an event, in that both involve the perception, during a segment of time and at a 
given location , of an entity conceived to have a beginning and an end. On this view, 
"[e]vent perception can be regarded as the temporally extended analogue of object 
perception" (Zacks & Tvel'ky 200 I :5). Defended on philosophical grounds, thi s 
dcfiniti on has thc additional advantage of approximating psychologists' proposals that 
events are dynamic objects, while what people call objects are concrete objects (M ille r 
& Johnson-Laird 1976:87). Recent findings suppot1 these proposals. Both objects and 
events may be characteri sed in tetms of pattonomies (h ierarchical organisat ion of the ir 
constituent parts and subpal1s) and taxonomies (hierarchical classi fi cation based on 
kind-of relationships) and these characterisations appear to be psychologically 
significant for the ir perception ?t Moreover, both object and event perception seem to 
be guided by local maxima in the number of features which are changing (Zacks & 
Tversky 2001 :7), and agreement about such boundaries among experimental subjects is 
generally high (Hanson & Hanson 1996: 11 9). These insights provide a theoretica l 
grounding for extend ing frame-based explanations from the perception of objects to the 
perception of events, which has remained unspeJt in previous research. 
The frames proposed in the following chapter are based on regularities of usage 
detected in the corpus of data collected. As such, they are first and foremost proposed as 
an analyst's too l. The fact though that such speci fi c tendencies regarding the co-
occurrence of linguistic and extra-linguistic features of the context can be detected in a 
large corpus of spontaneous conversational data opens up the possibility that speakers 
may directl y attend to such features and the relations between them when formulating 
their utterances. Similarly, building on their own experience with the use ofl anguage in 
a particular situation - and thereby trading the possibili ty of en'or for speed in 
understanding - li steners may appeal to these features in interpreting the speaker's 
utterance, unless an alternative or reason to the contrary occurs to them. This possibility 
must be taken seriously in light of a growing body of evidence suggesting that humans 
are sensitive to stati sti cal properties of language, and that such propert ies play an 
imp0l1ant pal1 in language learning (Zacks & Tversky 200 1: 12). By paying attention to 
objecti vely observable frequencies of co-occurrence of these features in spontaneous 
discourse we are afforded with an insight into the circumstances under which native 
speakers acquire their languages, and thus into the notion of conventionalisation, 
20 TillS view is advanced in the writings of David"on and Quine (Zacks & Tversky 2001 :4-5). 
21 For an overview ofrclevant cxperimental findings , see Zacks & Tvcrsky 2001 :5-6. 
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defined in 5.4.2 above as the statistical likelihood that a pal1icular expression will be 
used in a particular context to one's (subjectivelindividual) experience. 
Frames thus understood may be viewed as an aspect of the ' habitus' (1.3 above), 
proposed as a system of regulating di spositions whose locus is the individual, but which 
emanate from social conditions of existence, and are thus objectively regulated 
(Bourdieu 1990:53). The habitus is responsible for producing anticipations which bear 
"no resemblance to conscious calculation" (Bourdieu 199 1: 77), but are more like 
"practical hypotheses based on past experience" (Bourdieu 1990:54), anticipations 
which "give di sproportionate weight to early experi ences" (ibid.). The imp0l1ance of 
early experiences for the formation of the habitus allows for the emergence, under 
similar conditions, of habitus which are homologous, in the sense that they will 
inadvel1ently (i.e. naturall y and automaticall y) both constlUe an event as such and 
respond to it in similar ways. 
"The genesis of a system of works or practi ces generated by the same habitus (or 
homologous habitus, such as those that underlie the unity of the life-style of a 
group or a class) cannot be described either as the autonomous development of a 
unique and always se lf-identical essence, or as a continuous creation of novelty, 
because it arises from the necessaly yet unpredictable confrontation between the 
habitus and an event that can exercise a pel1i nent incitement on the habitus only 
if the latter snatches it from the contingency of the acc idental and constitutes it as 
a problem by applying to it the very principles of its soluti on~ and also because 
the habitus [ ... ] is what makes it poss ible to produce an infinite number of 
practices that are relative ly unpredictable (l ike the corresponding situations) but 
also limited in their diversity. In shOlt , being the product of a parti cular class of 
objective regulariti es , the habitus tends to generate all the ' reasonable', 
'common-sense' behaviours (and only these) which are poss ible within the limits 
of these regularities, and which are likely to be posi ti ve ly sanctioned because 
they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteri sti c of a particular fi eld [ ... ]" 
(Bourdieu 1990:5 5-6; footnote omitted) 
In analogy with these insights, the data collected for the present thesis may be viewed 
as a body of practices, and the frames abstracted from them as an aspect of the 
individual, yet homologous, habitus of the speakers who generated these practices. 
Moreover, the positive sanctioning of the behav iours produced by the habitus -
referred to earlier as ' the evaluative link between the linguisti c and extra-linguisti c 
features of any particular frame' - fo llows from the same objective regularities which 
fo rm the habitus in the first place. The repeated co-occun'ence of linguistic and extra-
linguistic fea tures in the data collected a ffords us with a glimpse at some of these 
regularities. 
The account of politeness in CG given in the fo llowing chapter also builds on 
Fillmore's notion of interactional frames, which he introduces as follows: 
"The interactional frames amount to a categori sation of the di stinguishable 
contexts of interaction in which speakers of a language can expect to find 
themselves, together with in fo tmation about the appropriate linguisti c choices 
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relevant to these interactions. . .] A patt of knowing a language is knowing or 
recognising a large number of such frames, and knowing what linguistic choices 
are relevant for each of them." (1976:25) 
182 
In the account proposed in this thesis, speakers' knowledge of language includes a 
knowledge of repeltories of frames which are constrained by thei r socio-cultural 
affiliation, while at the same time being constantly subject to change in light of the 
interaction between previous experience and potentia ll y changing social conditions of 
existence. 
This view allows for a unified account of what would seem to constitute, on Brown 
and Levinson's approach, two types of competence, depending on whether one is 
actively producing or interpreting language. Accord ing to Brown and Levinson, "the 
world of the upper and middle groups is constructed in a stern and cold architecture of 
social distance, asymmetry, and resentment of impositions, while the world of the lower 
groups is built on social closeness, symmetrical solidarity, and reciprocity" (B&L:245). 
This statement leaves the nature of the interaction between the two 'worlds' largely 
unspecified. On the one hand, examples such as the use of endealment terms (e.g., 
" love") by working-class till-operators to middle-class customers in British 
supermarkets,22 and examples of increased indirectness by professional Japanese 
women address ing subordinates (Matsumura & Chinami 1999), and by senior 
academ ics addressing college pOlters (with whom they are in daily contact; Peter 
Matthews p.c.) suggest that speakers always assess variable values from the viewpoint 
of thei r social stratum. On the other hand. to explain the fact that speakers' choices in 
the above instances do not normally result in miscommunication across social strata, 
one would have to assume that, when they are the recipients of such forms, speakers are 
able to adopt the viewpoint of social strata different from thei rs. In this case, 
interlocutors' production and interpretation of others' utterances would appear to 
conform to different principles. Their active production of language would seem to 
reflect their social affi li ation, whi le their interpretation of others' discourse would seem 
to reveal an abi li ty to adopt another's viewpoint. If inte rlocutors are indeed capable of 
such shift in perspective, the question arises naturally why they should not also 
effectuate this when actively producing language. 
A plausible reason for this lies with the notion of an act of identity on behalf of the 
speaker (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985: 182, quoted in 3.4 above; for some examples 
from CG, see 7.3.3-4 below). In acquiring language both by hearing it and by act ively 
producing it, speakers develop repertories of frames wh ich include frames of which 
they onl y have a 'passive' knowledge. For example, in sexually segregated societ ies, 
men will be aware of women's 'ways of speaking', although they themselves will not 
use them. In Bourdieu's terms, the anticipations of the habi tus tend "to function as a 
22 This use is culture-specific (and hence only accept able given a fami liarity with the norms of British 
culture), witness the indignation ora Swedish customer so addressed (Birgit Finstad p.c.). 
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practical sense of the acceptability and the probable value of one's own linguistic 
productions and those of others on different markets" (199 1 :77; emphasis added). The 
notion of a linguistic market adds to linguistic exchanges an economic dimension, 
"establi shed within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, 
endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is 
capable of procuring a certain material or symbolic profit" (Bourdieu 199 1:66). 
Bourdieu (1991:37ff.) argues at length for the necessity to differentiate "the capacity to 
speak, which is vit1ually universal" from "the socially conditioned way of realising this 
natural capacity. which presents as many variants as there are social conditions of 
acquisition" (199 1:54-5; original emphasis), and for the need for linguists to extend 
thei r attention from the former into the realm of the latter. Viewing polite discourse as 
the result of speakers appealing to their respective repertories of frames which form part 
of thei r linguistic capital , and in anticipation of the profits which are a function of the 
market to which this capital is presented, affords us wi th an explanation for 
interlocutors' differential 'competence' as active producers and as recipients of 
language. 
On a more empirical note , the account put forward in this thesis proposes that joint 
reference to such extra-linguistic features of the situation as the sex, age, and social 
class of the speaker and the addressee , the relationship between them, the setting of the 
exchange, and the order of oCCutTence of the speech act in the flow of the conversation, 
affords us with more accurate predictions regarding the expression of politeness in the 
CG data, compared to Brown and Levinson's three sociological variables. The 
pre lim inal), analysis of the data in 4.2 above yielded some indicat ions support ing this 
proposal. A frame-based approach is more economical than Brown and Levinson's 
account, in that it allows for immediately perceivable extra-l inguisti c features of the 
situation to be directly linked with the appropriate linguistic expressions. The claim that 
participants appeal to a level of assumptions of D, P and R~ which is intermediate -
hierarchically as we ll as temporally, if Brown and Levinson 's account is to be given 
psychological plausibility - between the perception of the si tuation and the choice of 
linguistic expression should thus be abandoned on grounds of both empirical adequacy, 
and theoretical parsimony. [n the light of the observation that politeness most often 
passes unnoticed (1.3.2 above), such theoretical parsimony can be invoked to support 
the psychological plausibi lity of the proposed account. Clearl y, the claim that the extra-
linguistic features li sted above, and only these , are necessary and joi ntly sufficient to 
account for politeness phenomena across cultures, currently put forward on the basis of 
the data analysed, remains to be confinned by future research. In the meantime, the 
emphasis on agents' expectations which underlies research on the not ion of frames to 
date - expectations the confirmation of which allows for eventualities to pass 
unnoticed - provides a strong motivation for considering a frame-based approach to 
po li teness, and unrave ll ing its implications and limitations. 
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6.6 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the research tradition 
within which the notion of frames, introduced in 1.3.3 above, has emerged, and to 
outline the usefulness of this notion for politeness studies. The chapter began by 
considering the nature of speakers' beliefs about politeness. It emerged that such beliefs 
are part of speakers' implicit real-world knowledge, that is, speakers will act based on 
them unless there occurs to them an altemative or reason to the contralY. Frames may 
be viewed as structures of implicit real-world knowledge, which make available 
knowledge which is relevant to the eventuality at hand. By linking extra-linguisti c 
information about a situation with information about the appropriate use of language 
therein , they naturally complement an account of linguisti c politeness in terms of 
Levinson ' s ( 1995, 2000) proposed heuristics. Frames were originally proposed as a 
bridge between perception and conception. Although different approaches have 
attributed variable weights to each of these two factors, recent findings confinTI their 
interaction, to varying degrees, during the process of understanding. Post facto analysis 
of empirical data reveals frames in the fOlm of objective regulariti es of CO-OCCUITence of 
extra-linguistic and linguisti c features of a situation. In light of evidence establi shing 
the importance of stati sti cal propel1ies of language for language learning, a case can be 
made fo r viewing frames as the cogni ti ve trace, so to speak, of such regularities on 
speakers' knowledge of their languages. [n the proposed approach, emphasis is placed 
on the social cond iti ons of language acquisition. These result in speakers developing 
repeltories of frames whose degree of proximity reflects similarities in the speakers ' 
social conditions of existence . The following chapter presents a deta iled analysis of CG 
data, in an attempt to substantiate the claim that the si tuated reali sation of polite 
discourse cannot be adequately explained as the result of the application of a principle 
which is universally valid - at least not without further elaboration of this principle -
but requires a reference to speakers ' repel10ries of frames which are part of thei r socio-
culturally constrained competences. 
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"Theoretical linguists, in the last two decades, 
have been trained to investigate the generati ve 
capacity of language. [ ... ] So prevailing was the 
study of the undoubtcdly cssential property of 
language to allow the production of ever new 
sentences that the assumption that almost every 
sentence has an occurrence probability of close 
to zero was never questioned, much less put to a 
rigorous test. [ ... ] much of what is actually sajd 
in everyday interaction is by no means unique. 
Rather, a great deal of communicative activity 
consists of enacting routines making use of 
prefabricated linguistic units in a well-known 
and generally accepted manner." 
(Coulmas 1981: I) 
Toward a psychologically plausible account 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 outlined the theoretical motivation for a frame-based approach to 
politeness, and the research tradition within which it is placed. It was argued that 
politeness is a perlocutionary effect which is mostly (i.e., to the extent that it passes 
unnoticed) automatica lly achieved when the speaker utters an expression which slhe 
takes to be mutually held by participants to be conventionalised relative to the 
(minimal ) context of utterance. The relationship between expressions and (minimal) 
contexts can be captured in terms of fram es, which thus emerge as experientially-based 
structures of expectations. Empirically, frames take the form of observable regulari ties 
of usage. This chapter aims to provide empirical suppol1 for these claims. It begins by 
defining a notion of fotmu laicity which brings to the fore its interactional importance 
for politeness, and proceeds by proposing some frames for the express ion of politeness 
in CO based on the data co llected. An interim summary assesses Brown and Levinson's 
(1987) approach and the proposed frame-based one in the light of these findings, while 
the final section delves into the psycholinguistic implications of the proposed approach, 
and reviews recent evidence which argues in its favour. 
7.2 Politeness and formulaicity 
In chapter 4, I investigated the impact of different combinations of observable features 
of the situation on the linguistic realisations of requests and offers in eG. One outcome 
of that investigation was that speakers did not always choose to be more indirect as the 
sum of D and P increased (4.2.1 above). Rather, speakers' choices of specific linguistic 
real isations (such as Action Verb-imperative-2sg., or Action Verb-subjunctive-2sg. fo r 
requests, and Action Verb-subjunctive-lsg., or Telo,' l-want'-indicative with rising 
intonation-2sg. fo r offers; figs.4.8-9 , 4.11-12 above) proved to be so robust across 
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different combinations of extra-linguistic features that one may speak of these linguist ic 
reali sations as 'folTnulae ' for the realisation of requests and otTers respectively in CG. 
The term ' folmula ' in this context refers to a fully specified morpho-phonological 
surface reali sation of a VP, where the head of the VP is subject to lexical and/or 
semantic constraints ( in the examples above, it is either an Action Verb, or the ve rb 
Telo,' I-want') . Poli teness formulae thus defined fall under what Pawley and Syder 
(1983:208ff.) term ' lex icalised sentence stems'. In these, "the sentence structure is fully 
specified along with a nucleus of lexical and grammatical morphemes wh ich normally 
include the verb and certain of its arguments~ however, one or more structural elements 
is a class, represented by a category symbol such as TENSE, NP, or PRO" (Pawley & 
Syder 1983:2 10). One distinctive property of lexica li sed sequences is that they are 
'social institutions' (ibid.:209): they are, to some extent, arbitrari ly chosen among 
synonymous expressions, as the standard way of expressing a particular culturall y 
authorised meaning (ibid :211 ). In Coulmas 's scheme, this property of politeness 
formulae is captured by placing them under "routine formulae", that is, " fix ed 
expressions for highly recurrent communicative tasks" ( 1994: 1292; cf. 198 1 :2-3). 
That a large propol1ion - albeit by no means all - of polite discourse should 
consist in using fOlmulaic speech is hardly surprising. From the point of view of online 
processing, psycholinguistic evidence shows that possessing a sufficiently large stock of 
formu lae allows more time for planning thus promoting fluency in speech (Pawley & 
Syder 1983; Wray & Perkins 2000:15-7). The normal order of acquisition by which 
receptive competence precedes production is also often reversed in the case of routines 
and politeness fOimulae (Saville-Troike 1989[ 1982]:241; Wray & Perkins 2000: 19-20). 
Saville-Troike (ibid.) associates this reversal with the fundamental importance of using 
politeness formulae for effectively assuming the role of social actor. That is, fonnu lae 
"embody accepted ways of responding verbal ly to a variety of situations [ ... ]. Using the 
expected fo rmulas is a strong indication of belonging, social identity or acculturat ion" 
(Coulmas 1994: 1293; cf. Wray & Perkins 2000: 13-5). This prope.1y of fo rmulaic 
speech renders it pal1icularly apt for maintaining face, an integral part of which, I 
argued in 1.3.3 above, is demonstrating familiarity with the norms of the community 
with in which one is operating. The psycholinguistic and interactional significance of 
formu laic speech may in fact be seen as two sides of the same coin: 
"[T]he driving force behind the processing shOl1-cuts is ensuring that the 
speaker's production is fluent and that information is available when required: 
formu laic language by-passes, partially or entirely, depending on the fo rm, the 
generative system. The driving force behind the socio-interactional formulas is 
ensuring that the speaker gets what he/she wants and is perceived as an 
individual within the group. Significantly, formulaic language is better suited to 
this than novel language is, because a hearer is more likely to understand a 
message if it is in a form he/she has heard before, and which he/she can process 
without recourse to full analytic decoding. [ ... ] .just as the processing short cuts 
are a means of ensuring that the speaker achieves successful production, so the 
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socio-interactional fOlmulae are a means of ensuring that the hearer achieves 
successful comprehension." (Wray and Perkins 2000: 17-8, original emphasis and 
spelling; of. Condon 200 I :51 0-1 ) 
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Viewed from this perspecti ve, our results come as no surprise: the uniformity of 
speakers' cho ices in the data co llected is explained by "the speakers' self-interest in 
matching their output to what the hearers will understand" (Wray & Perkins 
2000:18fn .6). The importance of formulaic speech to politeness is of course by no 
means a new finding. Numerous studies di scuss the use of formulaic express ions to 
achieve speci fic goals in interaction (e .g., Overstreet and Yule (2001 ) on the disclaimer 
' not X or anything, but Y' in English; Matsumoto ( 1985) on the hedge 'chotto', Ide 
(1998) and Takekuro ( 1999) on the express ions 'sumimasen' and 'onegaishimasu ' 
respective ly in Japanese; Nwoye (1989) on proverbs in 19bo; Ferguson (1981) on 
greetings and responses to them in Arabic). What I am arguing for, however, is a much 
broader definiti on of form ula ic ity, and consequently its wider di stri bution across 
situational contexts. FOlID ulaici ty may be viewed as the synchronic analogue of 
grammaticalisation, and can be assessed using diachronically-inspired criteria (5.4.5 .1 
above). One significant pro perty of fo rmulaic express ions is arbitrariness: formulaicity 
cannot be predicted based on morpho-phonological, syntacti c, semantic, or pragmatic 
criteria alone, although, jointly considered, these can provide indications of the ex tent to 
which an ex:press ion synchronically functions as formulaic (7.3-4 below). The CG 
results thus re-cast the standard picture both qual itati ve ly and quantitatively: in the data 
collected, fOIIDulaic speech carri es the burden of polite discourse. This finding, 
explained above as a concomitant of the psycholinguisti c and interactional significance 
of formulaic speech, raises the possibi lity that the use of fOlmulae may be a prominent 
feature of polite discourse in any culture. While the confilmation of this prediction must 
necessarily await further quantitative studies of polite di scourse ac ross cultures, it does 
suggest the need for an account in which emphasis is placed, not on a universall y valid 
principle motivating nonce inferences, but on experientiall y acquired stlUctures of 
anticipated 'default ' behaviour. 
7.3 Proposed frames for the use of some politeness formulae in CG 
In the analysis which follows, speakers' preferences for parti cular combinations of verb, 
modality. and numbel+ person are first located in the data co llected, and the diffi culties 
of accounting for them as rationall y-deri ved realisations of a universal principle within 
Brown and Levinson's scheme are discussed. To overcome such difficulties. 
sociolinguisti call y and diachronically in fo tmed insights are appealed to. Each 
subsection closes by proposing a suitable frame, which captures the intimate 
relationship between such combinations of linguisti c features and their contexts of use. 
The analysis reveals a small number of 'formulae' as defin ed in 7.2 above. 
characteri sed by two propel1ies: (i) they have greater or lesser cun'ency in the culture, in 
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the sense that they are applicable to a wide or limited range of situations respecti vely; 
(ii ) they are not free ly interchangeable, in that pat1icular combinations of extra-
linguistic features systematically co-occur with specific expressions, even if alternative 
expressions falli ng under the same super-strategy from Brown and Levinson' s fi ve-part 
hierarchy (fig. I , 1.2.2 above) are avai lab le. That is, given a particular combination of 
extra-linguistic features, speakers appear to opt for concrete, fully specified, linguistic 
realisations rather than a general level of indirectness , or politeness super-strategy. 
Thus, the linguisti c expressions analysed below constitute formulae on both counts of 
Coulmas' s ( 1994:1 292, quoted in 7.2 above) definiti on: they are ' fixed ' both in form, 
comparcd to other expressions in the language which arc created anew cvery timc, and 
in function, in that they fulfi l specific highly recurrent communicati ve tasks. It is this 
intimate connection between fo rm and function - a connection which makes it possible 
to anticipate the one given the other - that an account in telms of frames aims to 
elucidate. 
7.3. 1 A V -subjuncti ve-2nd singular 
In the data co llected, two combinations of verb, modality and number+person - AV-
imperative-2sg. and AV-subjunctive-2sg. - account for the majority of requests 
performed at home and at infonnal social gatherings, and at work (figs.4. 8, 4.11 above). 
Evidence discussed in 4.2. 1 above suggested that the use of these combinations remains 
unaffected by an increase in the values of D+P. Moreover, AV-imperati ve-2sg. is 
preferred over the more ind irect AV-subj unctive-2sg. in almost all situational contexts 
in these two setti ngs . However, in requests perfonned for the firs t time at home or at 
informal social gatherings between middle-class women of the same age who are 
friends; this order of preference is reversed (( 1) be low; fig.7 .1). 
( I) [75.3 ; Informal social gathering; Speaker: female, over 51, middle-class; Addressee: 
female, over 51, middle-class; Re lationship: friends] 
6e lma mu na fillS tin , kolokotin su tSe na pamen ap' ed 
thelma-VOC. my SP eat-dep.-2sg. the-ACe. pastry-ACe. your-2sg. and sr go-dep.-
I pI. from there 
'Thelma dear, do ealltp your pastry so we can go to the other room.' 
In the above example, D and P are presumably low: interlocutors are of the same 
sex, age, and social class, so the distance between them is small . Similarly, the power of 
the addressee over the speaker is low, as they are fri ends who have known each other 
for years. One may want to claim that the increased indirectness of the speaker's request 
should be put down to middle-class val ues (B& L:245). However, in requests addressed 
by middle-class men to middle-class men of the same age at homelinformal socia l 
gatherings, a similar preference fo r increased indirectness is not found (fig.7.2). 
1 There are not enough instances or requests exchanged between rriends or different ages, or or working-
class background, or rrom different social classes, to ascertain the errect or age and class on this 
prererence. 
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Pavlidou (1991:38) notes women's pronounced tendency to phrase requests in the 
subjunctive in SMG: where women used the subjunctive, men tended to use modalised 
performatives. Due to thi s association with SMG speech, use of the subjuncti ve would 
constitute a prestigious variant in CG, when compared to use of the imperati ve (the 
other variant commonly used to perform requests in CG). This suggests an explanation 
of the speaker's choice in ( 1) along the lines of social network th eOlY (Milroy 1980). 
According to this , the more prestigious variant would occur more in the speech of those 
speakers who have less ties within their local network. This explanat ion makes two 
assumptions. First , men's social network ties in Cypriot society are more dense! 
multiplcx than thosc of women. Whilc this may be a valid assumption, it is not easy to 
ascertain within the boundaries of the present study; I therefore confine myself to 
pointing it out. The second assumption concerns the prestige attached to use of the 
subjunctive. If explained within the framework of social network theory, one would 
expect the preference for AV~subjunctive~2sg. to characterise women's speech in all 
situations. However, an examination of requests addressed by women to men, or 
exchanged between women of the same age who are friends at work, or which are 
performed for the second time, shows that AV!SAV~imperative~2sg. is the preferred 
real isation in these cases (figs.7.3, 7.4, 7.5). Arguably, in these latter cases, women are 
accommodating to the speech patterns of their addressees (when they are men), or 
considerations of urgency predominate in the exchange. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from this discussion. First, Brown and 
Levinson's definitions of Distance and Power (B&L:76~ 7) constitute general guidelines, 
rather than categorical predicaments. More accurate predictions regarding assessments 
of these variables in any particular culture require appealing to further insights, such as 
those of Social Network Theory (M ilroy 1980)2 or Accommodation Theory (Gi les & 
Powesland 1997[1975]; Gi les and Coupland 199 1). Significantly, these insights can 
onl y be appealed to post facto by a theorist: they do not form part of speakers' pre-
theoretical intuitions. The fact that, contralY to observab le features of the situat ion, 
these further theoretical insights are not available to guide speakers during the 
production of polite discourse, argues against the psychological reality of Brown and 
Levinson's notions of D and P. Second, taking these latter insights into account raises 
the question of how they affect assessments of D and P. It seems plausible that they 
would affect D and P values simultaneously; in this case, the claim that these two 
variables are assessed independently of each other (B&L:80) is no longer tenab le. 
Finall y, the indirectness of a linguistic expression is not the only factor determining its 
appropriateness on a particular occasion. Women's preference fo r phrasing requests to 
their women friends in informal settings in AV-subjunctive~2sg. can be explained as a 
result of less strong network ties only on the assumption that thi s vari ant is somehow 
2 Brown (1998 :98) takes a step in this direction, when a'isociating positive politeness with relatively 
multi-stranded relationships in her study of Tcnejapan speech. 
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more prestigious in CO compared to its more direct counterpat1. In conjunction with the 
observation that inappropriateness can be interpreted as face-threatening ( 1.3.2 above), 
this finding leads to the conclusion that politeness cannot be seen as a concomitant of 
indirectness a lone. An account of this preference in telms of frames summarises the 
empirical findings , while not imposing an association of greater indirectness with 
increased W values which is unsolicited by the facts in this case. Thus, theoretical 
interpretation can follow empirical observation, rather than precede it, allowing for a 
more multi-layered and fine-grained account than wou ld otherwise be possible. The 
(online) interpretation of AV-subjunctive-2sg. as a polite request follows from jointly 
taking into account the speaker's and the addressee's sex, the relationship between 
them, the setting of the exchange, and the order of appearance of the speech act in the 
fl ow of the conversation (table 1).3 
Sex of speaker: female I Sex of addressee: female 
Relative age of speaker and addressee: fame) 
Social class of speaker: Mdd/e) Social class of addressee: (niddle) 
Relationship: friends Speech act: request 
Setting: at homelinformal social zatherinzs Occurs for the: J st time 
A-lSub ·unctive-2sf!. 
Table 1: Proposed frame for A V -subjunctive-2sg. as the preferred formula for 
performing requests 
7.3.2 AV-subjunctive- Ist plural 
As with requests, two combinations of verb, moda lity, and numbel+ person - AV-
subjunctive-I sg. and Tela-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. - account fo r the 
majori ty of offers performed at home/infolmal social gatherings or at work in the data 
collected (4.2. 1 above , figs. 4.9, 4.12). However, middle-class4 male salespersons 
addressing middle-class male old customers of the same age prefer a third possibi lity, 
namely A V -subjunctive-l st pI. ((2) below; fig.7.6). 
(2) [62.3; At work; Speakerl: male , 31-50, middle-class; Speaker2: male, 3 1-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: salesperson (S2) to old customer (S I)] 
S 1: .... lSe pas na ais sa lines mana mu? 
>S2: oi en:a tis aumen pu pano pu fcenun, na metrisumen 
S 1: . and how SP see-dep.-2sg tubes mother-VOC. my? 
>S2: no FP them-ACe. see-dep.-Ipl. fi'om above that come-out-ind.-3pl., SP 
measllre-dep.-Ipl. 
S 1: . 'And how will you see the tubes my friend? 
>S2: 'No, we' ll see them from above where they ' re sticking out, to measure them. ' 
Assessing the indirectness of this last variant relative to the other two is not 
straightforward: Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. can be an instance of 
3 In (his and subscqllcm tables, cxtm-linguiSlic features whose impact on the preferences discussed could 
not be ascertained based on the collected data arc placed within parentheses. 
4 The importance of the speaker's class for this preference cannot be ascertained based on the data 
collected. 
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negative politeness, by way of questioning the addressee 's desire for some thing/act ion 
(B&L: 13 1), while A V -subjunctive-I sg. can be positively poli te, since it presupposes the 
speaker's knowledge of, and concern for , the addressee 's wants (B&L: 102). On this 
view, AV-subjunctive-lpl. would be positively polite, wh ile also tinted with negative 
politeness, since it uses pluralisation, an impersonalisation device (B&L: 198-203).5 
Alternatively, the lpl. may be interpreted as inclusive (8&L:127), strengthening the 
positive po li teness of AV-subjunctive-Ipl. 
This account fai ls to explain why AV-subjunctive-Isg.!pl. do not occur when 
addressing working-class male old customers (whose power over midd le-class 
salespersons should be less than that of middle-class old customers) at least as often as 
(the negatively polite) Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. (fig.7.7); or why AV-
subjunctive-Isg. - the ' least' polite variant if A V-subj unctive- I pI. is interpreted as 
negatively tinted - is prefelTed when addressing Jemale middle-class customers 
(fig.7.8) , since any potential decrease in P due to the addressee's sex would presumably 
be offset by an increase in D, the sum of D+P remaining essentially unchanged. 
One complication is introduced here by the category of num ber+person. Arguably, 
the existing T/V opposition in Modem Greek (however limited in CG usage; 2.7.2.4 
above) taints the 2sg. with connotations of directness. Hence, the negative politeness of 
Tela-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is not untainted by bald-on-record echoes, 
which male salespersons may be trying to avoid when addressing middle-class 
customers, but which are acceptable if the addressee is work ing-class. The 1 pI. effects a 
desirab le compromise in this respect. It is more indirect than the Isg. while 
simultaneously avo iding the 2sg. contained in the negatively polite variant. 
Iloweve r, this explanation does not account for examples such as (3 1) in 5.4.5. 1 
above, where the 2sg. co-occurs with the I pl. lf use of th e 2sg. in <1se, ' let-imp.-2sg.' , is 
possible with middle-class addressees, why should this same choice of number+person 
present a problem when it occurs in Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg.? Recall 
here the discussion of <1SC, ' let', <1ku, ' listen ', and cIa su po, ' let me te ll you' (5.4.5. 1 
above). There, their high frequency of occurrence in morphologically reduced form and 
in utterance-in itial position in the collected data, jointly with their limited combinatori al 
possibilities with other items in discourse, were interpreted as indicating their being 
frozen in eG. Use of the 2sg. where such frozen forms are involved does not argue 
against its association with bald-on-record strategies when the combination oj verb, 
modality, and nllmberperson is not jroen 
Frozenness is, however, a matter of degree rather than categorical distinction. Thus, 
while less frozen than asc, 'let', aw, 'listen', and cIa su po, ' let me tell you', Bela-
indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is still less than fully autonomous (5.4.5. 1 above). 
To the extent that it is fixed - witness its loss in weight and vari abil ity, and gain in 
5 Appealing to iconicity similarly predicts that AV-subjunctive-lpl. is more indirect than AV-subjunctive-
Isg. 
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cohesion - Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. will "occur with greatest 
freedom from contextual constraints" (Lambrecht 1984:776). Indeed, it is used time 
after time to perform offers at home and at work across a wide range of combinat ions of 
extra-lingui stic features. As its distributional possibi lities expand, Belo-indicative with 
rising intonation-2sg. becomes 'interactionally general', that is , compat ible with a wide 
set of face-related assumptions. Its association with negative politeness reached on the 
grounds of its propositional content (B&L's strategy 'question, hedge') is thereby 
loosened. Put differently, its interactional generality 'subtracts' from its negati ve 
politeness. This could explain why Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is used 
comparati vcly more with working- rather than middle-class male old customers 
(fig.7.7). 
Yet, this does not mean that Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is 
inappropri ate for use with middle-class male old customers, merely that it is not 
sufficient ly interactionally informative. interactional infOlmativeness is thus one of two 
reasons motivating male salespersons' preference to phrase offers to middle-class male 
old customers using A V -subjunctive-l pI. (fig. 7 .6). As Braun (1988:59) points out, 
when polite fOlms expand, both in the sense of being used by more speakers and in a 
higher number of communicative situations, their politeness 'wears out ' (which is 
another way of saying they become interactionally general). Consequently, while Bela-
indicative with rising intonation-2sg. is more indirect than A V -subjunctive-l pl. , the 
latter is more interactionally informative, by virtue of its much more restricted 
distribution across situational contexts. Note that the set of face-related assumptions 
compatible w ith A V -subjunctive-I pI. may encompass both negative- and positive-face 
oriented ones (asserting knowledge of, and concem for, II 's wants, and 
impersonal ising) or positive-face oriented ones alone (assel1ing knowledge of, and 
concern for, H's wants, and including both Sand H in the activity). Consistent with the 
impossibi lity of assigning priority to one aspect of face over another independently of 
cultural and situational factors (1.3.1 above), what matters is that the set of these 
assumptions is narrower than the corresponding set of assumptions compatible with use 
of Belo-indicative with ris ing intonation-2sg. Thus, speaker effort to communicate 
pal1icular face-related assumptions consti tutes another fac tor alongside speaker effort to 
be indirect (whether indirectness is defined as length of the infe rential path, or a matter 
of iconicity; 4.1.3-4 above) determining an expression's appropriateness in context. 
To account for the observed restriction of AV-subjunctive-Ipl. to offe rs to male 
addressees, an additional appeal to social network theory is needed. I f network ties are 
stronger for middle-class men, they will use more vemacular forms. The 1 pI. tums out 
to be just such a non-standard form, when contrasted to the other 'plurali sed ' variant, 
the 2pl. (on the standard flavour of the 2pl. in eG, see 2.7.2.4 above, 7.3.3 below). If 
the lpl. constitutes the vernacular norm and men's network ties are stronger, its use 
would stress male group-solidarity, making it inappropri ate for use to female 
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addressees. Significantly, male speakers' preference for phrasing offe rs using AV-
subjunctive-I pI. is restri cted to the relationship of salesperson to old customer. 
Changing the relationship to one between old colleagues marks a retum to the more 
widespread variants (Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. , and AV-subjunctive 
(with rising intonation)- I sg.~ fig.7 .9). Male salespersons' stressing their solidarity with 
middle-class customers thus emerges as a means for them to foreground the shared 
aspects of thei r relationship, a move which seems desirab le given the com mercial nature 
of the transaction, but would be redundant between old colleagues. 
In sum, male salespersons' preference for A V -subjunctive- I pI. when addressing 
offers to male middle-class old customers is explained less as a result of the 2sg. 
tainting Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg. with connotations of directness, than 
of the fact that this combination, being interactionally general, fai ls to delimit the 
pal1icular face-related assumptions which speakers want to convey on these occasions. 
The extra-linguistic features jointly promoting the interpretation of A V -subjunctive- I pI. 
as a polite offer are the speaker's sex, the addressee's sex and social class, and the 
relationship between them (table 2). 
Sex of speaker: male I Sex of addressee: male 
Relative age of speaker and addressee: tame) 
Social class of speaker: (niddle) Social class of addressee: middle 
Relationship: salesperson to old customer Speech act: offer 
Setting: at work Occurs for the: 1st time or subsequently 
A ~lIbiullctive- lpl. 
Table 2: Proposed frame for AV-subjunctive-Ipl. as the preferred formula for 
performing offers 
7.3.3 ,"xo- indicative with rising intonation-2nd plural/3rd singula r 
The possibil ity that an expression may be 'negatively polite with bald-an-record 
echoes' (as in Belo-indicative with rising intonation-2sg.), or ' positively polite with 
negative politeness connotations' (as in A V -subjunctive-I pI. ) exemplifies the 
difficulties faced by an approach which assumes that utterances can be placed along a 
uni-dimensional scale of indirectness. Contrary to what one might expect if a 
summative quantitative assessment of their indirectness were all that mattered, these 
expressions are not situationally interchangeable (7.3.2 above). Evidence from the use 
of two fUl1her combinations of verb-modality-number+person supports the need for a 
notion of 'qualitative' indirectness based on which expressions may be distinguished 
from each other (4. 1.4 . above). 
In Brown and Levinson's hierarchy of strategies, exo,'I-have' -indicative with rising 
intonation-2pl. and exo-indicative with rising intonation-3sg. both fall under negative 
politeness: they realise strategy I, 'be conventionally indirect' , by seeking to confirm 
whether the preparatory condition regarding the existence of goods requested holds 
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(B&L:137), and strategy 7, 'impmonalise Sand H' (B& L:1 90ff.). However, the two 
expressions are differentially used in the data collected. While both are used by new 
customers making first requests of salespersons, exo-indicative with ri sing intonation-
2pl. is prefelTed by middle -class speakers and is almost absent from the speech of 
working-class speakers, where it is replaced by exo-indicati ve wi th rising intonation-3sg. 
« 4), (5) below; figs. 7.10, 7.11). Similarly, working-class salespersons receive more 
e xo-indicative with rising intonation-3sg. compared to middle-class sa lespersons 
(figs.7.1 2, 7.13). The div ision of labour between the two expressions is also sensitive to 
the sex of the speaker, with working-class women preferring exo- indicati ve with rising 
intonation-3sg. more than working-class men (figs.7. I4, 7. 15), and age, with sameness 
of age increasing OCCUlTences of exo-indicative wi th rising intonation-3sg. (figs.7. 16, 
7. 17). 
(4) [17.02; At work; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-class; Addressee: female, 18-30, 
working-class; Re lationship: new customer to salesperson] 
CfCle: phinats? 
have-ind.-2pl., peanuts? 
'Do you-2pf. have some peanuts?' 
(5) [89.0 I; At work; Speaker: female, 31-50, working-class; Addressee: male, 3 1-50, 
working-class; Re lationship: new customer to salesperson] 
cfi mikres pu na mi n ex un s~e3ia pan~? aspro 
have-ind.-3sg. small {socks} that SP not have-ind.-3p!' patterns on? white 
'Are there any small plain ones? In whi te.' 
These findings appear perplexing if the two expressions are equiva lently indirect, 
as Brown and Levinson predict. Middle- and working-class speakers' consistently 
different so lutions to the task of impersonal ising the addressee suggest that, when 
requesting something for the first time from a salesperson they are not familiar with , 
speakers are also performing an act of identity (LePage & Tabouret-Ke ller 1985: 182, 
quoted in 3.4 above). To the extent that non-literal use of the 2pl. in CG marks instances 
of standard ising speech (2.7.2.4 above), it is constrained by both having access to the 
standard code, and the extent to which the speaker finds identifying himlherself with 
' the group of standard speakers ' desirable in the situat ion at hand. Middle-class 
speakers have greater access to SMG than working-class speakers, in that they have 
more opportuniti es to interact with Mainland Greeks, either in Greece , where they travel 
regularly to study, on holiday, or on business trips, or in Cyprus, where Mainland 
Greeks often hold short-term contracts in white-collar jobs. Being socially stratified as a 
result, non-literal use of the 2pl. constitutes an outward manifestation of middle-class 
identity, to be call ed upon when asserting this identity is judged desirab le. The financial 
implications of a commercial exchange make requesting something for the first time 
from a salesperson with whom one is not familiar just such an occasion. However, this 
motivation is constrained by the desire to accommodate one's speech to that of one's 
addressee. Consequently, middle-class speakers tend to use exo- indicative with rising 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Chapter 7 Toward a psychologica/~y pla1lSibie aCC01lnt 195 
intonation-2pl. more with middle-class addressees than with working-class ones. A 
desire to avoid connotations of conceitedness or femininity associated with middle-class 
speech (Edwards 1979) could then account for the limited appearance of the 2p l. in 
men's speech, this tendency being more pronounced in the speech of working-class 
men. 
exo-indicative with rising intonation-2pl. and exo-indicative with rising intonation-
3sg. thus emerge as represe nting different norms. to which speakers tend or which they 
avo id depending (a) on the degree to which they have access to them, and (b) on thei r 
desire to present themselves in a cel1ain way, which subsumes the wish to accommodate 
thei r spccch to that of thcir addrcssccs. This ana lysis finds support in the phonctic 
realisations of the two variants, which largely conform to the rules of SMG and CG 
respective ly: e xo-indicative with rising intonation-2pl. is realised as crete, i.e. with 
suspension of a Cypriot-specific IUle of softening of Ix! to [f] (1 in table 1,3.2 above). 
fi ve out of s ix times (83 .34%), while exo -indicative with rising intonation-3sg. is 
realised as eji, i.e. applying softening of Ix! to If) , six out of eight times (75%). The 
discovery of consistency in speakers' choices down to the level of phonetic detail 
argues strong ly in favour of the formulaic character of these expressions. Rather than 
creating them anew based on nonce calculations of D, P and RT. speakers appear to 
retrieve them in a holi stic manner when encountering pal1icular combinations of extra-
linguistic features. The extra-linguistic factors jointly determining use of these 
expressions in the data co llected are the relationship between interlocutors, the order of 
appearance of the speech act, the speaker's social class, and to a lesser extent hislher 
sex and age relative to the addressee, as well as the addressee's social class (tables 3, 
4) , 
Sex of speaker: female, male I Sex of addressee: any 
Relative age of speaker and addressee: oum,er to older, older to younze/~ same 
Social class of speaker: middle Social class of addressee: middle, lvorking 
Relationship: new customer to salesperson Speech act: request 
Setting: at work Occurs for the: 1st time 
exv-indicative with rising intonation-2pl. 
Table 3: Proposed frame for exo-indicative with rising intonation-2lll. as the 
preferred formula for performing requests 
Sex of soeaker: male, female I Sex of addressee: male, female 
Relative age of speaker and addressee: same, any 
Social class of speaker: workinf! Social class of addressee: WOrkil1f!, middle 
Relationship: new customer to salesperson Speech act: request 
Setting: at work Occurs for the: 1st time 
exo- indicative with. rising intonation-3sg. 
Table 4: Proposed frame for exo-indicative with rising intonation-3sg. 
as the preferred formula for performing requests 
6 In these and subsequent tables, extra-linguistic variants are listed in order of frequency. with most 
frequent ones placed first. 
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7.3 .4 Belo-conditional-l st singular 
The polite formulae discussed so far concern the realisation of offe rs and requests at 
home and at work. An examination of offers and requests performed during formal 
discuss ions or interviews on the radio and television reveals a ve ry different picture. 
Speakers' choices of combinations of type of ve rb-modali ty-number+person are now 
more evenly di stri buted among the various fo rmal possibilities (figsA.14, 4.1 5 above). 
Nevel1heless, closer inspection reveals certain preferences for particular combinations 
of verb categori es. To an extent , these concern the expected shift ITom Action Verbs to 
Speech Act Verbs, since the focus of the acti vity is now verbal, and the virtua l 
substitution o f the 2sg. by the 2p l. , in keep ing with the standardising fl avour of the latter 
(2 .7.2.4 above) which makes it appropriate for use by the media. Most prefen'ed though 
are two further combinations, Belo,' [-want ' -indicative-l sg. and Belo-conditional-l sg. 
((6), (7) below). 
(6) [2. 12; On the rad io; Speaker: male, 31-50, middle-ci ass ; Addressee: female, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewer to interviewee] 
Belo na apandisumen is ton akroatin pu ton afisamen (.) eh 
want-ind.- /sg. SP answer-dep.-l pI. to the-ACC. li stener-ACC. that him-ACC. leave-
past.-perf.-Ipl. (.) er 
' I 'd li ke {us} to answer the listener that we left (.) er' 
(7) [85.2; On TV; Speaker: female, 31-50, middle-ciass; Addressee: male, 31-50, 
middle-class; Relationship: interviewee to interviewer] 
8a i8ela na pros8eso kati eoo omos. 
P want-past-impelf-Isg. SP add-dep.-l sg. someth ing here though. 
' / would like to add someth ing here though. ' 
The first th ing to note about these combinations is their attachment to the formal 
discuss ion/radio/TV setting. While Belo- indicative-l sg. and Belo-conditional- l sg. 
constitute indirect requests by affirming the sincerity condition' in the same way that 
exo-indicative with rising intonation-2pl. and exo-indicative with ri sing intonation-3sg. 
constitute indirect requests by questioning the preparatory condition concerning the 
existence of goods sought (B&L: 137; 7.3.3 above), the two types of requests have 
clearly defined - and diffe rent - domains of application. And whereas questioning 
the preparatory condition refelTing to the existence of goods sought may be absurd 
when action, rather than goods, is being requested, the same is not true of affirming the 
sincerity condition: affilm ing one's desi re for some thing functions equally we ll as a 
request as questioning its availability (compare English ' 0 0 you have MP' with ' I' d like 
NP'). Neveltheless, the preferences fo r exo-indicative with rising intonation-2pl.l3sg. 
as opposed to 8elo- indicati ve/conditional-l sg. are clear. Belo-conditional-l sg. In 
pal1icular is used onl y once in sixty one requests by a new customer add ress ing a 
salesperson ( 1.64%) . In other words, although they all fa ll under negati ve politeness, 
7 Being unprompted, these express acts desirable from the speaker's point of view, hence qualifying as 
requests under the definition proposed in 2.7.1 . 1 above. 
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these combinations of verb-modality-number+person are not interchangeable. Rather, 
they are atta.ched to obsetvable features of the situation - in the case of the ex o-
variants the type of relationship, in the case of the Belo-variants the setting of the 
exchange - in a way that an account based on the sum of D, P and R~ fails to predict. 
Focussing on the two variants prevailing in requests performed for the first time in 
formal discussions and on radiorrV, we find that even more detailed predictions are 
possible. 8elo-indicative-l sg. is favoured by interviewers addressing interviewees and 
by men (figs.7. 18, 7.19), while Belo-conditional-Isg. is clearly favoured by interviewees 
addressing interviewers, and by women (figs.7.20, 7.21). Based on these findings, one 
may suspect that the choice between these two variants relates to thc powcr of the 
hearer over the speaker: with interviewers or men, P is low, and this is reflected in these 
speakers' cho ice of 8elo-indicative-1 sg. However, interviewers and men favour Belo-
indicative-Isg. only weakly. In this case, it is the much more pronounced tendency of 
women and interviewees to use Belo-eonditional-l sg. that calls for an explanation. 
To provide this, one needs to consider the relative salience of the two variants. 
According to the criteria Auer et al. (1998: 163-7) propose for this purpose, 8elo-
conditional-I sg. is more salient than 8elo-indicative- 1 sg. both objectively and 
subjective ly. The sUtface realisation of 8elo-indicati ve- lsg. is 8elo, whereas 8elo-
conditional-Isg. is realised as 8a i8ela. While 8elo remains the same whether in CG or 
SMG, 811 i8e};1 noticeably belongs to the SMG code, as it contains the SMG particle of 
futurity 8a. This contrasts to the CG particle of futurity en:a, which is phonetically 
distant from its standard counterpal1, the difference between the two being phonemic 
rather than phonetic, and lexicalised (cf Auer et al. 's criteria of articulatory and 
perceptual distance , phonemicity, and lexicalisation). Moreover, en:a is written 
differently (when written), is areally restricted to Cyprus, and cannot co-occur with the 
2nd person po lite plural «20), 2.7.2.4 above), which has a distinctly standardising 
fl avour in CO (cf. Auer et al.'s criteria of representation in lay dia lect writing, area l 
distribution, and usage in code-alternation). According to Auer et al. (1998: 163), 
"[d] ialect features which are perceived by the speakers as 'salient' are taken up and 
given up more easil y and faster than those which are perceived as 'less salient"'. 
Considering that 8elo-conditional-1 sg. is virtually exclusive to formal discussions and 
radio and TV settings, 1 would argue that this variant is not only associated with these 
settings, but is also a salient feature of 'media-speak' in eG. This explains its more 
frequent adoption compared to the less sa lient Bclo-indicati ve-I sg. by speakers wishing 
to demonstrate their familiarity with 'media-speak' and the con'esponding settings. 
Clearly, interviewees are particularly keen to demonstrate such familiarity: they do not 
appear on radio and TV as regularly as their hosts, but wish to present themselves as 
competent discussants nevertheless. Women too seek to confirm themselves as 
competent users of 'media-speak ' , as they appear on radio and TV less frequently than 
men. Women make up just over a quat1er of interviewers recorded (5 out of 18, or 
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27.8%), and onl y a fifth of interviewees (8 out of 40, or 20%). By opting for Te l o-
conditional-l sg. women and interviewees perfolm an act of identity (cf. 7 .3.3 above): 
they seek to identify themselves with a pal1icular group of speakers (the group of 
'media-speakers' as represented by interviewers and by men) by selecting a salient 
variant characteristic of this group's speech. 
The discussion of 8elo-indicative/conditional-1 sg. perfOlming first requests in 
fo rmal settings highlights two advantages of an account of po li te di scourse in terms of 
observable features of the situation summarised as frames over Brown and Levinson's 
principle-based account. First, as in the case of exo-indicative with rising intonation-
2pI./3sg., thc choice between 'cqually' indirect forms is not random but constrained by 
their diffe ring domains of application. Within a frame-based approach, appealing to 
combinations of extra-linguistic features of the situation enables us to make thi s 
prediction. Second, by not abstracting away from the pm1icular linguistic fOlms used, a 
frame-based approach allows us to assess the salience of an expression in addition to its 
indirectness, which, in conjunction with information about the relati onship between 
interlocutors and about the sex of the speaker, enables us to predict not only which 
pal1icular expressions speakers will choose, but also to what extent. The proposed frame 
for use of 8elo-conditional-l sg. as a polite request is given in tab le 5. 
Sex of speaker: female, male Sex of addressee: any 
Relati ve age of speaker and addressee: sallie, vounJzer to older 
Social class of speaker: (niddle) Social class of addressee: (nidd/e) 
Relationship: interviewee to interviewer, Speech act: request 
interviewer to intervievllee 
Setting: at formal disclIssions, on radiolTV Occurs for the: 1 sf time 
fk/o-conditiona/-l sf{. 
Table 5: Proposed frame for Te~~conditional-Isg. as the preferred formula for 
performing requests 
7.3.5 Interim summary 
The preceding discussion of the use of polite formu lae in CG has shown an account of 
speakers' choices for performing offers and requests in the collected data based on 
Brown and Levinson's hierarchy of strategies and the proposed formula for computing 
W to fail on the fo llowing counts. First, their hierarchy of strategies classifies linguisti c 
expressions as more or less indirect based on the propositional content which they 
express, i.e. using semanticall y oriented criteria. However, uttered in a parti cular socio-
historical and linguistic context, linguistic expressions are at once standard or 
vel11acular, more or less interactionally informati ve, and more or less salient ; nothing is 
new about that. What is new, however, is that notions of standardness, interactional 
informativeness, and salience, interact with indirectness (whether defined as a question 
of in fe rential length , or as a matter of iconicity) in determining speakers' choices in 
context. 
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The second reason why Brown and Levinson' s approach fail s to account for the 
CO data concerns their definiti ons of the three sociological vari ables, D, P and R~. The ir 
approach places the emphasis on the relationshi p between interl ocutors, i.e. on the dyad. 
This is clear in their association of politeness strategies with particular pay-offs (which 
may also take the fo rm of assumptions) that the speaker seeks to secure 011 the part of 
the addressee (8 & L:7 1-4). In choosing a pal1icular strategy, the speaker assesses these 
pay-offs aga inst the sum of the proposed soc iological variables (B&L: 83-4). tn 
pal1icular, slhe assesses D, P and Rx as slhe perce ives them to be, or as s1he wants to 
appear to perceive them to be (cf. their discussion of po liteness as a social acce lerator 
0 1' brakc, B&L:228-31). Finall y, variablc valucs arc gcncrall y highcr in thc world of thc 
higher social strata and dominating groups, and thi s may extend to whole cultures, 
which can thus be di stinguished into positive- and negati ve-politeness oriented ones 
(B&L: 245). While allowing enough flex ibility fo r the way the val ues of D, P and R~ are 
assessed in context, these predictions fall Sh0l1 of accounting for the fact that in 
speaking politely, speakers posi tion themselves not on ly in relation to their addressees, 
but also in relation to the whole of the culture, with which they seek to identi fy 
themselves to a greater or lesser extent. Consequently, the 'pay-offs' sought may 
transcend the dyad, and as such they may not always be poss ible to secure via the 
medium of the addressee. This is an insight which cannot be incorporated in Brown and 
Levinson's account, where the pay-offs sought apply exclusively at the micro-level (the 
level of the dyad), and such pay-offs provide the moti vati on for particular strategies. 
Take yo ung women's non-l iteral use of the 2p l. during service encounters (2.7.2 .4 
above). Their choice cannot be justi fied on the grounds of se tting (at work) or of the 
identity of the addressee (all recipients of such forms being Cypriot Greeks). Rather, the 
young women who choose the 2pl. on such occasions are performing an act of identity. 
They seek to identify themselves with the group of SMG speakers, by means of 
adapting their verbal behav iour to that of the latter. At the same time, though, they are 
extending the non-literal use of the 2pl. to new environments, to relationships (that of 
salesperson to customer) and settings (that of work) where it was not prev iously used in 
any systematic (i .e . amenab le to generalisation) way. As the distributional possibilities 
of the 2nd person polite plural expand , its interactional informati veness is affected. 
From primarily indicating a switch to the standard code under appropriate contextual 
circumstances, thi s is now becom ing a proper (i. e. conventionali sed) marker of 
politeness. In this way, CO may be moving in the direction ofa T /V pronominal system 
comparable to that of SMG. Only time will show if thi s prediction is co rrect. What is of 
immediate impol1ance is that pronominal systems (a widely used type of politeness sub-
strategy) can and do change, and they do so as a result of usage (for further examples, 
see Braun 1988:57-6 1). 
Brown and Levinson suggest a functionalist explanation of language change based 
on considerations of face (B&L:255ff.). However, thi s proves impossible to implement 
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empirically, as the authors nowhere relate thi s to speakers' assessments of D, P and Rx. 
Presumably, what changes is not speakers' ways of assessing these variables, but the 
concrete fOlms reali sing different strategies over time. This leaves open the question of 
why exact ly these fo rms are re-ranked in the first place, i.e. what prompts speakers to 
use them with W values with which they previously would not have, if speakers' ways 
of assessing D, P and Rr have not changed, and considerations of W (i. e. the sum of 
D+P+R~) are the onl y ones determining use of these forms. To their credit, Brown and 
Levinson recognise that "linguistic patterns will vary to the extent to which face redress 
may reasonably be supposed to be a major functional source [ . . . ] there are many 
possible systemic and cogn itivc functions for [any linguisti c pattcrn], and facc rcdrcss 
[may be] (at most) a complementary source" (B&L:262). If this statement saves the 
credibili ty of their account as a (partial) explanation of language change, it detracts 
from its psychological plausib ility. Inasmuch as systemic and cognitive functions other 
than assessment of potential face-threat underlie the use of polite fOlm s, confi lmation of 
their theory should not be sought in empirical data, but at a theoretical level where other 
functions can be abstracted away from . This is exactly the point that thi s thesis is tly ing 
to make (cf. 1.3.4 above). 
An account in terms of frames whi ch summarise speakers' cho ices in contex t, 
rather than tly ing to pre-empt them, suggests itself as a powerful too l with which to 
analyse polite discourse synchronically (and potentially diachronically, as the above 
analysis of young working women's non-literal use of the 2pl. suggests). In accounting 
for the CG data, we invoked sociolinguisti call y informed analyses regarding the 
strength of speakers ' social networks and their desire to present themselves in a certain 
way, which subsumes their desire to accommodate to their addressees ' speech. Jt 
emerged that , when speaking politely, speakers both are constrained by their position in 
social space - which also determines the varieties of speech to which they have access 
- and lise polite discourse to position themselves in it. In other words, in speaking 
politely, speakers also act out a social persona which transcends the narrow 
considerations of the dyad and transforms them into social actors who have the ability 
not onl y to passively use language, but also to actively change it. It is in thi s sense that 
we must understand Klein's observation that "where semantic systems are postulated, 
one must also consider the possibility of shifts in the predominant pragmatic strategies 
or ' norms ' of actual use [ . . . ] the possibility of interaction between these two kinds of 
bias [ .. ] [can] lead to the re interpretation of pragmatic preferences as social norms" 
(1980:6 1; original emphasis). What paves the way for changes in semantic systems is 
speakers' active use of language: who is talking to whom, what is the relationsh ip 
between them, and in what setting. 
An account in terms of frames also lays a claim on psychological plausibi lity as an 
account of interlocutors' onl ine processing of polite discourse. To the ex tent that 
variation is found in every society, and to the extent that linguisti c fOlm s are 
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characteri sed as standard or vernacular, interactionally more or less infonnative, or 
more or less salient, based on extra-linguistic (socio-histori cal) and linguisti c 
(structural) considerations, speakers cannot be operating using Brown and Levinson's 
formula for computing Wand their proposed hierarchy of strategies i n vaCl/O. The 
notions of D and P and of indirectness are adequate to account for what goes on 
synchronically only after they have been ' contextualised' taking into account the 
pal1iculariti es of the society and of the language at hand.8 However, untangling the 
underlying principles at work necessitates close scrutiny using theoreti cal tools a lay-
person cannot be assumed to master, much less have the time to resort to during online 
processing. Brown and Levinson arc not unaware of thi s: 
"[our] analys is focusing on the non-arbitrary order evident in ling uisti c styles 
allows for the relationsh ip between language styles and social structure to be 
spelled out in detail. It is along these lines that we hope to be able to use our 
model of the universal s of linguisti c politeness to characteri se the cross-cultural 
differences in ethos ( . . . ] in differen t societi es ." (B&L: 252-3; endnote omitted) 
Perhaps, contrary to prior perception (Eel en 1999:64) - undoubtedl y fuelled by claims 
that the fo rmula yielding W constitutes "at least a parti ally accurate representation of 
cognitive process" (B&L: 8 1) - Brown and Levinson did not intend their theory as a 
psychologicall y plausible account of the producti on and interpretation of polite 
discourse. However that may be, the fa ct remains that, while their theory may be 
applicable at an abstract level, it does not by itself take us all the way to the concrete 
predictions which the data allow. As such, it cannot model speakers ' choices at the 
micro-leve l. To effectuate the leap from the abstract to the psychologically plausible, a 
different approach is required. 
In chapter 5, I sketched a theoretically moti vated account, according to which 
politeness is achieved as a periocutionalY effect consisting in the addressee holding the 
belief that the speaker is polite upon the speaker's uttering an expression x (in our case, 
a combination of type of verb-modality-number+person) in a situation y (a certain 
combination of extra-lingui sti c features). In chapter 6, I argued that the evaluati ve link 
between expressions and (mi ni mal) contex ts of utterance moti vates the direct 
association of these components of the situation in the fOlm of frames. Significantly, the 
rationality of this li nk emerges only as a result of post facto analysis, such as the 
analysis of CG politeness formulae undertaken above. Such rationality is not available 
to speakers at a micro-level, and thus cannot be assumed to provide the link in the ir 
calculations o f means and ends (B&L:64-5). Rather than the application of a unive rsally 
valid principle which associates the sum of D, P and Rx with semantically defined 
degrees of indirectness, the analysis of speakers' choices in contex t reveals a knowledge 
of which expressions to use in which situations. The conventional character of this 
knowledge is sUPP0l1ed in three ways. First, it is constrained by such attributes of 
interlocutors as sex, age, and social class . Second, expressions which are equally 
8 For a proposal al ong these lines, sec Turner ( 1999). 
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indirect on semantic criteria are not used interchangeably, but are tied to obselvable 
features of the situation. The sex, age and social class of the speaker and of the 
addressee, the relationship between them, the setting of the exchange and the order of 
appearance of the speech act are extra-linguistic features of the situation available to 
interlocutors through perception, from which further items of background knowledge 
(e .g. participants ' rights and obligations) are derivable. Crucially, it is the CO-OCCUITence 
of particular values of these features that accounts for speakers' use of po li teness 
formu lae in the data. Joint reference to all these features is therefore necessary to 
delimit the range of situations to which specific formulae are applicable , though all may 
not be equally determining for the usc of any palticular formula ? Third, given a 
combination of extra-linguistic features, speakers' choices cluster around concrete, fully 
specified linguistic realisations. In this respect, the resources of grammar and 
phonology are not creatively drawn upon by speakers. Rather, the consistency in 
speakers' choices extends to the level of phonetic detail, providing a strong indication 
of the formulaic character of the corresponding expressions. 
These findings allow two versions of the argument advanced by the present thesis 
to be formulated. On the weak version, a frame-based approach to poli teness enab les us 
to capture the detailed predictions which the data allow, and is therefore preferable as 
an obselvationally adequate account of the data collected. According to a strong 
version, the proposed frames constitute palt of speakers' knowledge of their language, 
and the processing of polite discourse is to be explained along the lines of the 
interaction between perception and cognition lying at th e centre of research on frames 
to date (6.4 above). The theoretical reasons for formulating this strong vers ion were 
expounded in 6.5 above. The following section takes up some of its -psycho li nguistic 
implications, investigating the type of memory organisation this strong version of the 
argument imp lies, and the evidence for its existence. 
7.4 Creativity vs. formuJaicity: some open issues 
The empirical manifestation of the existence of politeness formulae in the previous 
section, coupled with the observation that polite discourse most often passes unnoticed 
which points both to its pervasiveness and speed of processing, make pertinent the 
question of a psychologically plausible account of the processing of polite discourse. Is 
this best accounted for as a generative process which fo llows syntact ic IUles, or are 
po liteness formulae stored in memory in a fashion sim ilar - though by no means 
identica l - to items in the lexicon and retrieved as such according to observable 
features of the situation? Brown and Levinson's account is compatible with the former 
view. It views linguistic expressions as the output of the operation of the universal 
9 Thus, Telo-indicativelconditional-lsg. are primarily attached to setting, and only subsequently 
distinguishable based on the identities of the speaker and the addressee (7.3 .4 above). 
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principle Wx=D(S,H)+P(H,S)+R.r, which takes as input the values of D, P and Rx, 
calculated on the spot and anew for every FT A~. The frame-based approach cUiTently 
proposed, on the other hand, implies a holi stic processing of patterns integrating both 
linguistic and extra-linguisti c subpatterns, which is compatible with the latter view. The 
questions rai sed by these two views (and the possibility of interaction between them) 
have exercised (psycho) linguists at least since the early ]960s and it is not the purpose 
of this thesis to contribute to the ongoing debate. However, this debate has yielded 
several observations sUPP0l1ing a frame-based approach to politeness which so far I 
have defended on theoreti cal and empirica l grounds. f irst, the human memory capacity 
may well be more extensive than previously assumed. Second, holistic processing may 
precede analytic processing during language acquisition, and may indeed remain central 
(or primary) at later stages as well. Finally, real-world knowledge is inherently drawn 
upon by the human brain during language processing. This section reviews these claims 
and outlines their signi ficance for our present thesis. 
According to the prevai ling view within the generative linguisti c tradition, lexical 
knowledge pertains to idiosyncrati c properties of lexical items, i.e. properti es which do 
not follow from general principles (e ither of UG or of the language in question). This 
view is central to X-bar theOty, and hence remains cUlTent within Govemment and 
Binding and Minimali sm (Chomsky 1995 :235; Webelhuth 1995:32). The emphasis on 
economy of storage and subsequent reliance on rule-based production means that any 
sequence of words, and indeed of morphemes, which can be produced by rule, must be 
produced by rule. Such a view has been judged problematic in the face of cel1ain 
sequences' ' privileged' status over others, manifested in two ways .lO first, native 
speakers' preferences tend to cluster around parti cular express ions of an idea over other, 
equall y grammatical ones (cf. our current fi ndings; Coulmas 1979: 239). Second, 
dystluency in production (e.g. pauses, repetitions, false starts, etc.) and/or diffi culty in 
understanding are more likely to occur the more novel the idea being formu lated, or the 
expression used to fotmulate it (Pawley & Syder 1983:222-3n.12). In fact, di scourse 
which is novel on both these di mensions sounds highl y poeti c as a result (Wray & 
Perkins 2000:12). At the same time, knowledge of this S011 seems to be what 
differentiates native speakers' choice of expression and fluency from that ofL2l earners 
(Phillips 1993; Syder & Pawley 1983:21 5), and as such must be accounted for within a 
theOlY which aspires to provide a model of nati ve speakers' knowledge of their 
language. 
This is where form ulaici ty comes in. [n the Chomski an scheme of things, fOtmulaic 
expressions are stored in the lex icon and retri eved as wholes. This accounts for their 
non-compositional semantics and syntacti c irregularity (Kiparsky 1976:78-9). However, 
10 One should note that the generative view does not purpon to otTer an account of linguistic processing in 
real time. As Chomsky (1995:32) remarks, "[t]he means by which knowledge is arrived at is not 
invariably reflected in the form that the knowledge ultimately takes." 
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neither semantic, nor syntacti c irregularity are necessary conditions for formulaicity 
(Kiparksy 1976:74-5 ; Pawley & Syder 1983:211 ; Wray & Perkins 2000:4-5), and the 
same holds for (overall) frequency of OCCUITence (Wray & Perkins 2000: 7). Rather, the 
essence of formulaicity res ides in its arbitrariness: expressions whose meaning can be 
predicted from their intemal structure, and which are not al ways the shortest and 
simplest of the grammatical alternati ves (Pawley & Syder 1983: 197). may be 
conventionali sed for paIt icular uses, and as such show arbitraril y limited di stribution 
across contexts. Consequently, several di scussions of formulaicity have found it to be a 
gradable concept (Fraser 1970; Bolinger 1976:5ff ; Kiparsky 1976:92; Pawley & Syder 
1983: 192; Lambrecht 1984: 776ff; Fillmore et al. 1997[1 988): 5; Wray & Perkins 
2000:1). 
The existence of degrees of fOimulaicity challenges the possibility of accounting 
fo r it within an essentially compositional view of language production and 
comprehension. For, if onl y the most rigid formulae are stored whole in the lexicon, 
while the rest have their pal1s li sted separately and provided with contextual restri ctions 
specify ing their possible phrase-mates and contex ts of occurrence, such restrictions 
would sometimes have to be open-ended to allow for novel exploitations of existing 
pattel11s which may we ll be syntacti cally deviant (Lambrecht 1984:794-5). 
A fUtther diffi culty with allowing only the most rig id formulae to be stored in the 
lexicon is the extent to which everyday language appears to be formulaic (Fillmore 
1979:92). As Wray and Perk ins note, "[iJfwe take formulaicity to encompass [ ... J also 
the enOimous set of 'simple' lexical collocations, whose pattel11s are both remarkable 
and puzzling from a formal grammatical point of view [ . . . J, then poss ibly as much as 
70% of our adult nati ve language may be formulaic" (2000: 1-2; references omitted). 
Formulaicity has been shown to be central to native-like selection and fluency (Pawley 
& Syder 1983), Ll acquisition (Rowland & Pine 2000; Wray & Perkins 2000: 19-22), 
and L2 leal11ing (Philli ps 1993). Furtherm ore, it has been assoc iated with the verbatim 
recall of utterances in oral style discourse and oral literature, and is more prominent on 
the interactional, rather than the referential, dimension of use (Long 1994, Kiparsky 
1976:9 1-9).11 In other words, fo rmulaici ty is by no means marginal to our everyday use 
of language. This means that, if formulaic expressions are to be produced by rule, as 
hypothesised above, the items supplemented in the lexicon by a large number of 
complex (and potentially open-ended) rules of CO-occUlTence, i. e. the most burdensome 
ones to produce, would indeed be the ones most frequently ca lled upon. This scenario is 
untenable in view of experimental fi ndings that fo rmulaic usage promotes both fluency 
in production (Pawley & Syder 1983: 199ff. ) and the verbatim recall of utterances (Long 
1994:232). 
II This second finding constitutes primaj([Cie evidence supporting the hypothesis that formulaic usage is 
central to polite discourse (7.2 above). 
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The emphasis on rule-mediated production within the generative tradition emanates 
from the assumption that humans are endowed with limited memory but unlimited 
generative capacity. However, evidence from phonology and spoken word recognition 
suggests otherwise. Investigating the reality of units such as distinctive features for 
speech production, Ladefoged (1972:282) notes: 
"The indications from neurophysiology and psychology are that, instead of 
storing a smal1 number of primitives and organising them in terms of a large 
number of rules, we store a large number of complex items which we manipulate 
with comparatively simple operations. The central nervous system is like a 
special kind of computer which has rapid access to the items in a very large 
memory, but comparatively little ability to process these items when they have 
been taken out of memory. There is a great deal of ev idence that muscular 
movements are organised in terms of complex, unalterable chunks of at least a 
qual1er of a second in duration (and often much longer) and nothing to indicate 
organisation in terms of short simultaneous segments which require processing 
with context-restricted rules." 
Similarl y, contrasting previous views on the organisation of the mental lexicon with 
recent trends in human memory research, Lively et al. ( 1994:292; original emphasis; 
references omitted) conclude: 
"the traditional linguistic perspective on the mental lexicon [ . . ] is based on 
economy of storage and heavy reliance on the computational machinery of 
syntactic rules. However, a radically different view of the mental lex icon is 
suggested by several recent models in the human memory literature. These so-
ca l1 ed EPISODIC or INSTANCE- BASED models suggest that a highly deta iled 
representation of every stimulus pattem is encoded and retained in long-term 
memory [ .. .]. Representations include the stimulus and information about its 
sUiTounding context. Retrieval is accomplished by comparing new inputs to all 
traces stored in long-term memory in parallel [ . . . ) . Stored traces that are similar 
to the input are counted as strong evidence toward the recognition of the input." 
If the human memory capacity is indeed more powerful than previously assumed, 
as these authors suggest, there is nothing preventing partial1y productive formulae from 
being stored and recalled from memory as wholes, without being built from scratch with 
the mediation of rules, even when such rules are avai lable. Bolinger (1976:8ff. ) and 
Pawley and Syder ( 1983 :2 15ff.) propose that linguistic units which speakers perce ive to 
be productive are in fact stored in memory twice, both as individual units availab le to 
manipulation by rule, and in ready-made sequences ranging from morphemes to words 
and to whole co llocations of words (Bolinger 1976:9). Based on an investigation of 
formulaic usage by child and adult native speakers, child and adult L2 learners, and 
aphasics, Wray and Perkins (2000: 19; reference om itted) propose that 
"the defau lt setting is formulaicity, both for production and for comprehension. 
This enables the individual to focus hislher analytic abilities away from the 
linguistic 'packaging' and onto the production and evaluation of propositions, the 
updating of contextual information and the making of predictions about what is 
go ing to happen next [ef. Pawley & Syder 1983:204, 208; MT]. Focus can switch 
to an utterance itself if there is any irregularity or breakdown in comprehension 
or production. This is often marked by dysfluency in the speaker and/or by a 
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hearer failing at first to decode it, until suitable attention is brought to bear upon 
it." 
Within thi s model, both holisti c and analytic processing of utterances are predicted. 
What differs from previous accounts is where the emphasis is placed. Holi stic 
processing is seen as central, while analyti city remains "on hand to pick up any 
diffi culti es, [ ... ] caused by a speaker's thick accent or non-nati ve grammar, background 
noise, dysfluency, poetry , word games, and so on" (Wray & Perkins 2000: 13; footnote 
omitted). 
The possibility of ' double storage' of pal1ially producti ve formulae allows for one 
type of processing of a pa l1icular unit to be constrained by the applicability of the 
other. 12 The more prominent the holi sti c trace of a particular sequence in memory - as 
a result of the speaker's perception of its (restricted) producti vity, or of the frequent ( if 
not exclusive) CO-OCCU1Tence of its palts in discourse, or of both - the fewer and more 
restri cted the chances that the sequence will be processed analytically, and vice versa. 
This insight may hold the key to many of the obselved prope lties of formulaic usage. Jt 
accords with the top-down nature of language acquisition, whereby individual items are 
first encountered in fully specified constlUctions (Bolinger 1976:8ff.; Rowland & Pine 
2000). Different speakers achieve different levels of abstraction from these 
constructions and for di fferent items, which accounts for the variability in native 
speakers' intuitions regarding the naturalness, acceptability, and even the 
grammaticality of specific sequences (Pawley & Syder 1983: 196; Bolinger 1976:8ff. ; 
Lambrecht 1984: 788), as we ll as for the fact that such judgements may change over 
time. At the same time, holisti c process ing of frequently co-occurring items enhances 
fluency and memory performance, and thus remains central, the more so as a large part 
of everyday d iscourse turns out to be fo rm ulaic in nature (Le. arbitrary, in the sense that 
its fDlm and/or meaning, both referential and interactional, may not be full y predictable 
by rule) . Increased frequency of CO-OCCUlTence of pal1icular items can feed back into 
their being processed as a whole, setti ng in moti on processes of grammaticali sation, 
(5 .4.5. 1 above). 
FUl1her to opening up the possibility of double storage of productive linguisti c 
items, evidence that the human potential for storage in memory may we ll be greater than 
previously assumed suggests that the holistic processing of extra-linguistic and linguisti c 
subpatterns which are seen to co-occur in the real world may in fac t be less effDl1fui fo r 
the human brain than analyti cally breaking them down into their component parts and re-
assembling them via a principle of the type W x=D(S,H)+P(H,S)+Rx - notwithstanding 
the fact that this would have to be a more com plicated vers ion (or rather many derivative 
instantiations) of the proposed fo rmula, in order to take account of all the societall y- and 
linguistically-specific contextual restrictions (Turner 1999). 
12 This suggestion accords with the analyses of various conSlmctiOIL" within Constmction Grammar (Kay 
1997), and rccent computational approaches to the lexicon (Copcstake 200 1). 
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The imp0l1ance of holisti c processing is brought to the fore by recent research 
suggesting that this may al so precede analyti c processing during L I acquisition. 
Rowland and Pine (2000) examined data from one child 's early production of wh-
questions to test the assumption of rule-based theori es of syntax acquisition that, in 
producing multi-word speech, children are manipulating abstract syntacti c categori es 
such as subject, verb and auxiliary to produce rule-governed grammatical sequences. 
Such theories claim that, in correctly producing object wh-questions, children are 
app lying a subject-auxiliary inversion tule, and so cannot produce object wh-questions 
correctly until thi s rule has been acquired. However, the data show that correctly 
invcrtcd wh-qucstions co-occur with uninvcrsion CITOI'S in thc same dcvclopmcntal 
stages. Moreover, COlTect production appears to be guided by lexical, rather than 
abstract category, considerations (lex icall y spec ific wh+aux combinations), and 
corresponds to wh+aux combinations which are frequent in the mother's input 
(Rowland & Pine 2000: I 73ff.). Rowland and Pine (2000: 177; references omitted) see 
these results as: 
"add[ing] to a growing body of evidence that suggests that children's earl y 
multi-word speech may refl ect low scope lexically specific knowledge, not 
abstract category-general tules [ . . . J. This evidence seems to support the 
suggestion that a di stri butional learning mechanism capable of learning and 
reproducing lexically specific patterns that are modelled in the input may be able 
to explain much of the early multi-word speech data." 
According to this interpretation, holistic (lex icall y-based) temporally precedes analyti c 
(ru le-based) processing, which comes into play onl y later, and bui lds upon the former 
by identifying the constituent structure of items acquired holi sti call y (Rowland & Pine 
2000; Wray & Perki ns 2000: 19-22) . Crucially, what appears to be ru le-based 
production can be an epiphenomenon of what is in fact a lexically-based process. 1n 
add ition, lexically-based production depends on frequency of occurrence of particular 
lexical items in the input (Bolinger 1976:4). 
The suggestion that linguisti c knowledge may not onl y be (la rge ly) stored 
holistically, but al so acquired in th is way accords with the claim of the cunent frame-
based approach that experientially established frequencies of co-occun'ence of linguisti c 
and extra-linguisti c features of a si tuation can prompt their association in memory in the 
first place (6.5 above). ln the case of polite discourse, there are two reasons why holistic 
processing of the resulting frames may in fact never yield to analyti city. Fi rst, formulaic 
di scourse presents inherent interactional advantages which creative di scourse lacks (7.2 
above). The need to secure these advantages, and to do so consistently and speedily 
poses a difficult formal task which may be effi ciently solved by appealing to ready-
made solutions, i. e. the proposed frames. Second, as is often remarked, the distinction 
between knowing what an expression means and how to use it can be hard to defend 
(Fillmore 1979:92). By the same token as knowledge of language is presumed to 
include knowledge of the lexicon which in fac t re presents knowledge about the world 
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(ibid.:97), it arguably al so includes knowledge of a repertory of frames, in the sense of 
unanalysed, experientially acquired structures of default behaviour. 
The literature reviewed above focuses on the holi sti c process ing of linguisti c 
expressions, i.e. the knowledge involved re mains (large ly) linguisti c. However, the 
claim that real-world knowledge is drawn upon at the same time as linguisti c 
knowledge during the online processing of polite di scourse is of a rather diffe rent order, 
and finding hard evidence supporting it is clearly a matter for future research.13 For the 
time being, l have argued that this possibility is theoreti call y des irable. Postu lating an 
intelmediate level of assumptions about D, P and Rr adds to the effort of process ing 
polite di scourse, while both its pervasiveness and speed of processing suggest that this 
is the unmarked way of speak ing in a community (1 .3 .2 above). In addition, notions of 
standardness, interactional in fo tmativeness and sali ence interact with that of 
indirectness in determining speakers ' output (7.3. 1-5 above), so that room would have 
to be made for them also, further burdening the online processing of poli te di scourse. 
The frame-based approach proposed in this thesis resolves these di fficulties by 
defending a view of polite discourse as large ly conventionalised. As the quantitative 
analysis undertaken in 7.3 above has demonstrated, what emerges as rationally 
motivated linguisti c production at the macro-level is in fact only an epiphenomenon of 
what constitutes for native speakers conventional ised knowledge of which forms to use 
in which situations. 
All in all , the psycholinguisti c analyses reviewed in this section suggest a certain 
degree of continuity between knowledge of language and real-world knowledge. Rather 
than relying on real-world knowledge exclusive ly as input from which to abstract any 
app licable generali sations, speakers appear to be operating on the basis of low scope, 
specific knowledge to a greater or lesser ex tent, depending on both individual features, 
and the nature of the task at hand. These analyses th us provide encourag ing ev idence of 
the psychological plausibility ofa frame-based approach to politeness. 
13 Encouraging indications for the psychological plausibility of the interaction of real-world knowledge 
and linguistic knowledge in real time are furnished by recent research into the event-related brain 
potentials of native speakers during language comprehension tasks using electrophysiological teclmiques 
(Federmeier & Kutas 1999). 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
o Marina TerkOl,rafi 
" 
" . 3rd plural u 0 
e 
" 
• 2nd s ingular = 
" ~ 0 
" • is1 singular " ~
E 
i 0 . is1 plural 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7.1: Requests performed for the first time by middle-class warnell 
addressing middle-class women of the same age who are their friends 
at home and at informal social gatherings 
10,-----------------------------, 
8 
6 
D 3rd s ingular 
" ~ 4 
• 2nd s ingular 0 
E 
~ 
. 2nd plural 
" ~ 2 0 
.il • is1 singular 
E 
i 0 . IS1 plural 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7.2: Requests performed for the first time hy middle-class lDen 
addressing middle-class men of the same age who are their friends 
at home and at informal social gatherings 
number+person 
. 2ndsingular 
• 1st plural 
• 1st singular 
~~-O-~-~-O-~~-O-~~-OOO-~--~-OOO~i~~-~i ~-O~ O~-
i;i ~ i n Ui I U Hi) Ii i UI ~ ~ U Ui ~,i U i~ U U U ~ U ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ . «~tt~~~~tt~ ~ .tt t ~~~[i~~OO~~!. ~ tt ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~i ~ tii~iO 
t t.:: " t" "'t~,, 
Combinations of type of verb and modalt lY 
Figure 7.3: Requests performed for the first time by middle-class women 
addressing middle-class men of the same age who are their friends 
at home and at informal social gatherings 
.. ~ 
" il 
e: f ffi 0: 
t ", 
Combinations of type of verb and mOdali lY 
ntttnbcr+pcrsott 
. 2nd singula r 
. ls( . ingular 
Figure 7.4: Requests performed for the first time by women addressing 
women of the same age who are their friends at work 
o Marina TerkOl,rafi Combinations of !ype of verb and modality 
ttttttlbcr+pcrsott 
. 3rdsingular 
. 2nd . ingular 
Figure 7.5: Requests performed for the second time by middle-class women 
addressing middle-class women of the same age who are their friends 
at hume ur at infurmal social ~athedn s 
o Marina TerkOl,rafi 
. indired 
. 2nd s inglllar 
• l SI singular 
• lsI plurnl 
Combi nations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7.6: Offers by male salespersons to middle-class male old customers 
of the same age at work 
D 3rd plum1 
. 2nd s inglllar 
• l SI singular 
Combinations oftypc of verb and modality 
Figure 7.7: Offers by male salespersons to working-class male old customers 
of the same age at work 
o Marina TerkOl,rafi 
4,--------------------------, 
3 
2 
numbcr+pcrson 
_ 2nd singuhlf 
_ 2ndplurnl 
_ 1st singular 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7.8: Offers by male salespersons to female old customers at work 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
z , 
~ 
Z 
7 
o 
_ indirect 
_ 2nd singular 
_ 2ndplurnl 
_ 1st singular 
_ 1st plura l 
Figure 7.9: Offers by men to middle-class men of the same age 
who are old COlleagues at work 
o Marina TerkOl,rafi 
" 
" u 0 
e 
" = 
" ~ 0 
" 
" ~
E 
i 
~ 
u 
0 
~ 
8 
5 
~ 
0 
" 
" ~
E 
i 
12 
10 
8 
6 D 3rd singular 
_ 2ndsinglllar 
4 
_ 2ndpluml 
2 
_ 1s1 singular 
0 _ 1s1 plural 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7.10: Requests performed for the first time by middle-class 
new customers addressing salespersons at work 
7,--------------------------, 
_ indirect 
D 3rt! s ingular 
_ 2ndsinglllar 
_ 2nd pluml 
_ Isst singular 
0 _ 1s1 plural 
Combinations oftypc of verb and modality 
Figure 7.1 1: Requests performed for the first time by working-class 
new customers addressing salespersons at work 
o Marina TerkOl,rafi 
D 3rd singular 
_ 2ndsingubr 
_ 2ndpluml 
_ 1s1 singular 
~"'=TT===~" _ lSl pluml 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7. 12: Requests performed for the first time by new customers 
addressing middle-class salespersons at work 
10,---------------------------, 
8 
6 _ indirect 
D 3rd singubr 
~ 4 
_ 2ndsingubr u 0 
~ 
8 
_ 2ndpluml 5 
~ 2 0 
" _ 1s1 singular 
" ~
E 
i 0 _ 1s1pluml 
Combinations of type of verb and modality 
Figure 7.13: Requests performed for the first time by new customers 
addressing working-class salespersons at work 
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Figure 7.14: Requests performed for the first time by working-class 
female new customers addressing salespersons at work 
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Figure 7.15: Requests performed for the first time by working-class 
male new customers addressing salespersons at work 
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Figure 7. 16: Requests performed for the first time by new customers 
addressing salespersons of the same age at work 
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Figure 7.17 : Requests performed for the first time by new customers 
addressing salespersons of different age at work 
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Figure 7.18: Req uests per formed for the first t ime in formal discuss ions 
and on rad iorrV by interv iewers addressing interviewees 
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Figure 7.19: Req nests performed for the fi rst t ime in fo rmal discuss ions 
and on radiorrV by male speakers 
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Figure 7.20: Req uests performed for the first time in formal discussions 
and on radiorrV by interviewees addressing interviewers 
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Figure 7.21: Req uests performed for the first time in formal discussions 
and on radiorrV by female speakers 
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Conclusions 
The observation that linguistic politeness most often passes unnoti ced (Kasper 
1990: 193) has more and more led researchers to think of poli teness as a norm 
underl ying behaviour which is adequate in context (Braun 1988:49; Escandell-Vidal 
1998:46). This thesis set out to explore the theoretical implications of thi s view on the 
basis of a corpus of spontaneous realisations of offers and requests in Co. 
The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the collected data revealed several 
d ifficulties w ith explaining CG polite discourse with reference to a universal principle 
such as Brown and Levinson's formula for computing Wx (B&L:76). These difficulties 
are attributab le to the micro-level perspective adopted by these authors. The proposed 
fOlmula imp lies that the polite impol1 of an utterance is a function of its degree of 
indi rectness, assessed on semantic criteria. Interlocutors then assess the values of the 
three sociological variables, D, P and RT , applicable to the current FTA~ and choose to 
be more indi rect as the sum of these values increases. However, language is fi rst and 
foremost a public, or shared medium, and only derivative ly the sum of individual 
competences. It is thus not amenable to individual rational ising about means and ends 
prior to, or independently of, this public character. The assumed direct motivation of 
politeness strategies by pay-offs which they secure for the speaker, and by interlocutors ' 
either positive or negative face-wants (where the latter always take precedence over the 
former) fa ll s short of accounting for this. 
To overcome these difficulties, a shift in perspective is necessaly. Only when 
viewed against the backdrop of the alternatives available in the culture as a whole do 
speakers' choices in the collected data emerge as rational. Speakers are , however, 
' anchored' w ithin the culture, and consequently they do not have a bi rd's-eye view over 
it. What appears to be rational 'all-knowledgeable' action at the macro- leve l is therefore 
more adequate ly explained as action based on low-scope, specific knowledge of what 
expressions to use in what situations, which is of a rather more conventional type . 
o Marin" TerkOlmifi 
Conclusions 210 
This knowledge was formalised above as a repertory of frames associating 
linguistic expressions with extra-linguistic features of the situation such as the 
interlocutors' sex, age, and social class , the relationship between them, the setting of the 
exchange, and the order of occurrence of the speech act perfOlmed. These extra-
linguistic features jointly constitute a minimal context which, when encountered, 
licences presumptive inferences regarding the polite import of pal1icular linguisti c 
expressions therein. It is by virtue of such presumptive inferences that politeness as a 
perlocutionary effect consisting of the addressee's holding the belief th at the speaker is 
polite is achieved, at least to the extent that it passes unnoticed. Such frames are 
acquired through primary social isation in a community, and as such are intimately tied 
to, and reflect the pecul iarities of, the language and the community at hand. They thus 
belong to a middle level linking Brown and Levinson's proposed scheme (which 
abstracts away from such peculiarities) with the level of evelyday conve rsational 
practice taking place in fully specified (nonce) contexts (from which frames abstract). 
This research puts on the agenda four proposals to be appraised by future research. 
First, face-wants may be universally constmed as wants of the self, where definitions of 
the se lf can vary cross-culturally. At the same time, the essentially paradoxical nature of 
positive and negative face-wants must be retained, although priority cannot be assigned 
to one aspect independently of the applicable situational and cultural context. 
Sociologicall y oriented studies of verbal and nonverbal behaviour in several cultures 
inspired by Goffman 's work in an Anglo-American context (e.g. Goffman 1956, 1967, 
197 1) are required to empirically validate this proposal. 
Second, face-wants along with rationality underlie co-operati ve discourse. In other 
words, politeness as facc-constituting is onc of the 'design features ' of co-operative 
discourse. This proposal, stemming from the re-analysis of instances of apparent ' non-
cooperativeness', opens up the possibility of theoretically accounting for politeness as 
the unmarked way of speaking in a community, hence for the observation that it most 
often passes unnoticed. A corollalY hypothesis is that si tuational and cross-cultural 
variability in degrees of co-operation are explainable with reference to the vari able 
nature of face-wants suggested above. Empirical confirmation of this second hypothes is 
would provide indirect empirical sUppOl1 for the moti vating role of face-wants in co-
operative discourse. 
Third , linguisti c expressions become gradually detached from the context of 
utterance. An essential stage in this gradual conventionalisation of meaning is the 
progressive lessening of contextual clues required to recover the (primary) contribution 
that an utterance makes to the ongoing discourse (how it may be complied with). 
Implicatures, in this respect, have been previously distinguished into two genera: 
particularised, necessitating a reference to the nonce context of utterance, and 
generalised, which are presumed a!! else being equal. My current proposal is to enrich 
thi s picture, by admitting implicatures which are likewise presumed using the 
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mechanisms proposed for generalised implicatures (Levi nson 's (1995, 2000) 1- and M-
heuristics), yet which are so presumed in virtue of being unmarked not relat ive to other 
expressions in the language, but relative to a minimal context. Information constituting 
such a minimal context is restricted to a short list of va riables avai lable prior to making 
any patticular utterance, such as who is talking to whom, when and where. 
Confi rmation of this proposal lies with statistically-infOlmed analyses of language use, 
which can help establish frequencies of use of particular expressions relative to 
particular contexts, as we ll as the effect of potentially frequent use on the formal 
properties of an expression. In palticular, two components of this proposal may be 
profitably refined: the exact list of variables constituting a minimal context, and 
whether! to what extent a cross-culturally and cross-si tuationally consistent li st of such 
variab les can be established~ and the precise effects of gradual 'decontextualisation' on 
the fOlmal propelties of an expression. Future research along these lines may eventually 
lead to a unifi ed view on the role of context in inference (Levinson 2000:23ff). 
Finall y, the present research suggests a degree of continuity between knowledge of 
language and real-world knowledge, implied by the holistic processing of the proposed 
frames. One is no longer viewed as input to determining the other. Rather, the two are 
processed in parallel , and each can provide clues to eluc idating the nature of the other. 
The possibi li ty of this interaction is generally acknowledged, and well documented, 
though not yet well understood. One prominent field of enqui ry charged with this 
explicating task is that of connectionism (e.g., Rumelhatt et al. 1986; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen 199 1; Chater \995). While comments on the limitations ofFodor's (1983) 
view of a modular mind are not new (e.g. , T anenhaus et al. 1987; Tanenhaus & Lucas 
1987; Shillcock & Bard 1993), neither the connectionist nor the modular view of the 
mind are uncontroversial. A significant amount of research wi ll no doubt continue to 
aim to untangle the limitations of, and potential for reconciliation between, the two 
approaches. 1n the meantime, to the extent that the proposed frame-based approach 
finds empirical suppOtt in studies of polite discourse in other cultures, including studies 
of speakers' potentially failing to be polite (along the lines proposed by Gumperz & 
Tannen 1979), it wi ll provide another example of the interaction between knowledge of 
language and real-world knowledge. 
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